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Abstract and Keywords 
My project explores war weariness in the First World War, especially as it 
pertains to the Canadian Corps. My first two chapters on the legal, disciplinary, and 
medical systems encountered by the Canadians in the war look at the army policies, 
structures and personnel in place to deal with morale, discipline, endurance, motivation, 
and medical problems. These structures served to 'measure' the problems facing 
individual soldiers and their units, and attempted to address these issues before they 
became more widespread and intractable. Policies were also put in place to mitigate 
emerging problems and to ensure that sufficient troops were in the line and able to 
perform their duties adequately. Unfortunately, these systems were often insufficient to 
deal with these emerging problems, and thus my next two chapters explore how these 
problems played out for the Canadian Corps in two periods: April-August 1917, and July-
November 1918. These periods provide much insight into the contributing factors to the 
onset, development, and negative consequences of individual and collective war 
weariness, as well as mitigating factors that helped offset it. These two periods were also 
chosen to highlight the comparative nature of this project, whereby the experience of the 
Canadian Corps was juxtaposed with other major armies on the Western Front, as well as 
with Canadian forces over the course of the second half of the war. Just as other armies 
were suffering 'wear and tear' and indicating manifestations of incipient breakdown, the 
Canadians were able to carry on without substantial reductions in fighting effectiveness or 
large-scale indiscipline. The reasons why the Corps was able to prevail despite the 
emerging and collective war weariness will be explored in this project.  
 
 
 
Keywords: war weariness, morale, discipline, combat motivation, endurance, combat 
effectiveness, shell shock, psychiatric casualties, PTSD, war neurosis, military medicine, 
military law, inability, reluctance, unwillingness, Western Front, Canadian Corps, 
Canadian Expeditionary Force, campaigns, Vimy Ridge, Hundred Days Campaign, 
mitigation, Western Front 
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Epigraph 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“…war isn’t worth the sacrifice…no war! It’s hell and I often say to myself why does 
God allow all this?...I hope and trust that He will work wonders before many more weeks 
have gone, and that the war will end before our brave men who are in the trenches are 
doomed…We all want to see Germany crushed. That is so, but I hope and trust that 
something will happen that the struggle will be finished without much more bloodshed.” 
-Private Bert Cooke, First World War Diary, 159-160 
 
 
 
“I can’t truthfully say that I felt any great sorrow at leaving the old bunch as there were 
very few of the old mob left due to casualties, also the food is much better and the 
quarters more comfortable…besides, in my opinion, I had already put in enough time ‘up 
the line.’”  
-Gunner Frank Byron Ferguson, Diary, 153 
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Introduction 
The Canadian Corps and the larger Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) of which 
it was a part played an important role in the First World War. Some have argued that the 
Canadian Corps, the fighting branch of the CEF which by mid-1916 was composed of 
four infantry divisions plus affiliated units, arms, and services, played an outsized role for 
its relatively small size and strength. The Canadians were of course merely a constituent 
part of the larger British Expeditionary Force (BEF), and the British Army itself was but 
one of the major Entente powers in the war. The British Army also expanded rapidly 
during the course of the war, but there were growing pains related to this massive 
expansion. This was also a world war that had global implications and amounted to 
perhaps the first truly modern, industrial war. Numerous surveys and general histories of 
the war1 attest to the developments both prior to and during the war itself, and the impact 
this had on the combatants and armies between 1914 and 1919. This was an exceedingly 
complex and multifaceted war, and entire volumes have been written, and continue to be 
published, on relatively narrow aspects of the conflict.  
 The industrialised nature of the war, the intersection of old and new military ideas 
coupled with the enormous wealth and technological prowess of the combatants, ensured 
a particularly bloody war. Furthermore, the recent military experience of the colonial 
powers and the atrophying of tactical thinking on the part of the Entente also played a role 
in the duration of the conflict. The advantages of the defensive over the offensive, aided 
by the use of quick-firing rifles and artillery with smokeless powder, barbed wire, 
                                                             
 
1 General histories of the war include: Ian F.W. Beckett, The Great War: 1914-1918 – Second Edition (Harlow: Pearson 
Education Limited, 2007); Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War: Explaining World War I (New York: Basic Books, 1999); 
Peter Hart, The Great War: A Combat History of the First World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Holger 
H. Herwig, The First World War: Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918 – Second Edition (London: Bloomsbury, 
2014); John Keegan, The First World War (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2000); John H. Morrow Jr., The Great War: An 
Imperial History – Centenary Edition (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014); Michael A. Neiberg, Fighting the Great War: A 
Global History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006); G.W.L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 
1914-1919: Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War (Ottawa: Dunhamel, 1962); William 
Philpott, War of Attrition: Fighting the First World War (New York: The Overlook Press, 2014); Robin Prior and 
Trevor Wilson, The First World War (Washington: Smithsonian Books, 2004); G.D. Sheffield, Forgotten Victory – The 
First World War: Myths and Realities (London: Review, 2002); David Stevenson, 1914-1918: The History of the First 
World War (London: Penguin Books, 2012); Hew Strachan, ed., World War I: A History (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998) and John Terraine, The Western Front: 1914-1918 (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1964). 
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machine guns (MGs), trenches, and other defensive features, ensured this was a long, 
drawn-out attritional war. Millions would lose their lives before a decision was forced. 
Advances in communications and logistics allowed enormous concentrations of troops to 
be well-supplied with all the accoutrements of modern war. Vast improvements in the 
ability to wage, finance, and sustain war, however, were not matched by improvements in 
the ability of human beings to withstand war.  
Combat on the Western Front put enormous pressures on the individuals and units 
expected to carry out orders and maintain cohesion in the face of trauma and mortal 
danger. This reality was a far cry from colonial skirmishes against mismatched and 
technologically inferior enemies. Because of the new reality of modern war and 
especially combat, soldiers were driven to, and beyond, the breaking point in 
unprecedented numbers. Psychiatric casualties and the detrimental impact of traumatic 
events had been noted in the past, such as railway and industrial accidents in the 19th 
century, and war neuroses in the American Civil War. But this was on an entirely 
different scale. For the soldiers who did not succumb to shell shock and become 
debilitated in the long-term, many became war weary. War weariness can be said to have 
affected many of those very soldiers who were pushed to, but not yet beyond, the 
breaking point. It is these soldiers, primarily, that this project will assess.  
The infantry at the front, especially, were exposed to several forces that constantly 
undermined their powers of resistance, and compromised their health and well-being. 
Trauma and terror, lice and vermin, the claustrophobia and privation of the trenches, 
explosions, snipers, gas, MGs and artillery, aerial bombardment, deprivation and 
hardship, the lack of proper sleep and food, and witnessing and participating in traumatic 
events all served to attack the morale and discipline of the soldiers. Individual soldiers as 
well as entire military units – and indeed, even whole armies and nations – could be 
described as war weary. War weariness is a concept that several historians discuss and 
secondary sources make use of,2 but they seem to take for granted what this phenomenon 
                                                             
 
2 One historian, for instance, made reference to the “war weariness and despondency” of the French nation which 
spread to its troops during the mutinies. Another referred to the “war-weary veterans” of the PPCLI, and another to 
British troops as “war-weary” in the Hundred Days. References to “general war-weariness” in the German Army and 
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was and how it impacted the individuals and military units. Other historians sidestep the 
issue entirely, or only discuss it in passing. But what exactly is war weariness, and how 
did it impact the soldiers on the battlefield? Moreover, did war weariness look the same 
for every unit and every army that participated in the war? How did the war weariness of 
combatant soldiers at the front differ from the phenomenon as it developed behind the 
lines and on the lines of communication, if at all?3   
 
 
War Weariness in the First World War – Definitions and 
Parameters  
War weariness at its most general and most basic can be understood as a negative 
reaction to the war, combat, and its effects. It might also be interpreted as a growing 
reluctance and unwillingness to continue, despite all the practical, legal, and social forces 
keeping soldiers with their units and at duty. Many soldiers at the time made use of 
particular expressions which reflected the erosion of strength and commitment to the war, 
even if they had been volunteers and formerly dedicated and keen. Some soldiers, for 
instance, stated that they were sick or tired of the war, that they were burnt-out,4 or that 
their nerves were at the breaking point. Others suggested that they were fed up5 and 
unwilling to continue. One infantry subaltern recalled General Haig’s address in March 
                                                             
 
the increase in desertion rates in the Russian Army “under the twin impacts of war weariness and excessive casualties 
suffered to little or no avail” were also made. See Anthony Babington, For the Sake of Example: Capital Courts-
Martial 1914-1920 (London: Leo Cooper, 1983), 117; David J. Bercuson, The Patricias: The Proud History of a 
Fighting Regiment (Don Mills: Stoddart Publishing Co. Ltd., 2001), 68; Jonathan Boff, Winning and Losing on the 
Western Front: The British Third Army and the Defeat of Germany in 1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012), 15, 93, 113; Dennis Showalter, “World War I,” in The Reader’s Companion to Military History edited by Robert 
Cowley and Geoffrey Parker (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company and The Society for Military History, 1996), 521-
526 and Hart, The Great War, 247. 
3 This dissertation will focus primarily upon the combat infantry and other soldiers at the front, but examples and 
comparisons with other forces, arms, and services can also be instructive. 
4 Many soldiers also made reference to weariness as exhaustion and physical fatigue, especially as it negatively affected 
attitude, behaviour, and decision-making. See, for example, Cate, ed., A Soldier’s Memoir of World War I, 48, 64. 
5 A soldier of the 13th Battalion said that during the final months of the war “everybody was fed up of course” by that 
point in the war. Another recalled that “I was getting pretty fed up and thinking that I’d sooner be going to the rear than 
[back] to the front.” And one wrote in the final months that “the war is lasting too long…we’re fed up! Everybody! All 
fed up!” LAC, RG 41 B III 1, Volume 9, Interview with W.P. Dodds of the 13th Battalion, Interview 1 of 2, page 15; 
Ibid, Volume 7, Interview with Guy Mills of the 4th Battalion, Interview 2 of 2, page 2, and LAC, MG 30 E 113, ‘Back 
to Blighty,’ George V. Bell Diary, 112. 
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1918 to his “battle-worn troops in the darkest hour of the war.”6 And a civilian observer 
in Berlin made reference to the German Army as “tired and worn-out,”7 reflecting the fact 
that collective war weariness caused problems by the final months of the war. Still 
another soldier admitted that the troops of the 20th Canadian Battalion were “weary and 
depressed by the losses sustained” at Cambrai, and that the troops were experiencing 
“combat-weary disillusionment” in the latter stages of the war.8 And even before 1918, 
soldiers were expressing discontent and a desire to an end to the war,9 or at least their 
own participation in it. Duncan MacDonald, for example, wrote on 8 September 1917 to 
his daughter Margaret that “I feel particularly ‘fed up’ with this job today and wish the 
war was over, or that I was going to Canada for furlough.” A little over a fortnight later 
he wrote that “I would like to see peace and get home safe again, as well as anybody, but 
I would hate to quit without beating the Germans decisively,”10 highlighting this tension 
facing most soldiers. Despite the war weariness of the troops, many were still committed 
to the cause, even if they no longer personally wanted to participate in the war.11 And 
archival sources and firsthand accounts also made reference to “war worn officers,” a 
“war-sick army,” “battle wearied troops” in the Hundred Days, and the “weariness of 
                                                             
 
6 Charles Douie, The Weary Road: Recollections of a Subaltern of Infantry (Stevenage: The Strong Oak Press Ltd., 
1988), 3. Another soldier wrote of “battle-weary French and British” units which limited the success at Amiens in 
August 1918. Walsh, The First World War Diary of Private Bert Cooke, 154.  
7 Princess Evelyn Blücher, An English Wife in Berlin: A Private Memoir of Events, Politics, and Daily Life in Germany 
throughout the War and the Social Revolution of 1918 (New York: E.P. Dutton & Company, 1920), 277. This phrase 
was also found in archival sources pertaining to Canadian troops. See, for example, LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4675, 
Extracts from Chaplains’ Reports, ‘Work of Chaplains in France, R.C.’ 
8 Major D.J. Corrigall, The History of the Twentieth Canadian Battalion (Central Ontario Regiment): Canadian 
Expeditionary Force in the Great War, 1914-1918 (Toronto: Stone & Cox Limited, 1935), 265 and Audrey and Paul 
Grescoe, eds., The Book of War Letters: 100 Years of Private Canadian Correspondence (Toronto: McClelland & 
Stewart Ltd., 2003), 6. See also Scott, The Great War as I Saw It for expressions of “weary” men. 
9 See, for example, McGrath, World War I Diary of William Hannaford Ball, 108, 148. And when he finally left 
Liverpool for home, he wrote “we are realizing what we have looked forward to for many a long day.” 
10 On 31 July MacDonald also wrote that “I wish that I was home to pay a visit.” Dalhousie University Archives and 
Special Collections [hereafter DUASC], Duncan Chisholm MacDonald Fonds, Collection No. MS-2-520, Box 1, Folder 
1-3, Letters of 31 July 1917, 8 September 1917, and 24 September 1917. 
11 This was a view also reflected by the Canadian Corps Commander Sir Arthur Currie after the war. He stated that 
“you cannot understand how sick we all were of the war, nor our anxiety of finishing it as soon as possible, if there was 
any chance of success. Your sons and brothers wanted to see it out. They wanted to be done with this cursed thing. They 
never want to see any more war.” John Robert Colombo, ed., Colombo’s Canadian Quotations (Edmonton: Hurtig 
Publishers, n.d.), 135. Private James Brown of the 89th Battalion also wrote that “the more we see of war and its results 
the less a man wants to see of it and the more he feels that we have got to win and put an end to the idiotic delusion that 
war is a method of settling disputes.” Grescoe, The Book of War Letters, 187. 
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war.”12 Many euphemisms suggested war weariness, without actually making use of the 
term itself.13 War weariness might also include physical elements, such as exhaustion and 
fatigue, but was more a state of mind, reflecting emotional, mental, or psychological 
exhaustion. And of course all soldiers grumbled, groused, and complained, which partly 
acted as an outlet for stress, but it was sustained criticism of the war and its prosecution, 
continued ill-feeling toward the army or its officers, a lack of enthusiasm, and cumulative 
stress that wore down even the most committed volunteers which reflected war weariness. 
It must also be understood that not all those individuals who were war weary 
necessarily desired an end to the war. Revolutionary agitation and pacifism affected some 
soldiers, to be sure, but certainly not the majority. Many of these war-weary soldiers 
remained committed to the cause and loyal to their governments, but were realistic about 
their own abilities to continue at the front. In a sense, then, the personal acknowledgment 
of war weariness and its negative implications was actually an act of patriotism and 
loyalty, as these soldiers understood that increasingly war-weary troops were a liability to 
others in the unit – and to themselves. This individual expression of war weariness, 
moreover, was often more about their own participation in the war, not opposition to the 
war itself, though it did sometimes transmute into an anti-war or pacifist attitude.14 
                                                             
 
12 Another document instructed chaplains of the need to “cheer and hearten the soldiers in their privations and perils,” 
as “this will be the most critical period of the war. For weariness cannot but fill our men after so long a period of 
hardship and endurance.” Moreover, “weariness can best be combated by garrisoning the soul of the Army. The war has 
now become a combat of endurance…[and the men need] strength of will to endure to the end.” See LAC, RG 9 III B1, 
Series 3, Volume 941, E-72-3, Establishment Canadian Corps Reinforcement Camp, ‘Canadian Corps M.G. 9-2/304, 15 
June 1918;’ LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4666, Chaplain Service, Last 100 Days, ‘The Final Advance (7 th October to 
11th November);’ Ibid, Volume 4648, England 1917-1919, ‘Administration’ and Ibid, Volume 4663, Publicity, various 
newspaper clippings; Cate, ed., A Soldier’s Memoir of World War I, 61, and Steward, An Infantryman on the Western 
Front, 166. 
13 For primary source references see Rogers, ed., Gunner Ferguson’s Diary, 126. Secondary source references to war 
weariness, without actually using the term, are found in John Baynes, Morale: A Study of Men and Courage – The 
Second Scottish Rifles a the Battle of Neuve Chapelle 1915 (London: Cassell and Company Ltd., 1967), 101; Rachel 
Duffett, The Stomach for Fighting: Food and the Soldiers of the Great War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2012), 220, 233; Martin Gilbert, The Battle of the Somme: The Heroism and Horror of War (Toronto: McClelland & 
Stewart Ltd., 2006), 246; Richard Holmes, Firing Line (London: Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1985), 215, 325 and Maj.-Gen. 
F.M. Richardson, Fighting Spirit: A Study of Psychological Factors in War (London: Leo Cooper, 1978), 34, 75-77, 
121-122. 
14 One soldier, for instance, wrote of “the ghastly senselessness of ‘civilized’ warfare.” Another admitted that “I for one 
think war is an awful thing in these enlightened days,” and wondered why disputes cannot be settled without bloodshed. 
Another admitted in late 1917 that he became “a confirmed pacifist from this time on.” And another wrote “damn this 
dirty, lousy, stinking bloody war” in his diary. See Charles C. Cate, ed., Notes: A Soldier’s Memoir of World War I 
(Victoria: Trafford Publishing, 2005), 40; Milly Walsh and John Callan, We’re Not Dead Yet: The First World War 
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Private Bert Cooke, for instance, wrote during the final months of the war that “war isn’t 
worth the sacrifice,” and hoped the war would “end before our brave men who are in the 
trenches are doomed.” He reaffirmed his belief in the cause, however, writing that “we all 
want to see Germany crushed…but I hope and trust that something will happen that the 
struggle will be finished without much more bloodshed.”15 Protests and collective 
indiscipline could have a political or revolutionary element, but more often than not were 
based on mundane issues such as the inadequacy of leave, poor rations, ineffective 
leadership, unsuccessful tactics, and the like.  
 War weariness was also related the impact of the war on individuals, whether that 
manifested itself in medical, political, disciplinary/legal, or social problems. Most soldiers 
and civilians existed on a spectrum, whether in the war zone, along the lines of 
communication, or on the home front far from combat. Historians often examine the 
soldiers on the extreme ends of the spectrum, but this project seeks to interrogate the 
experiences of those in the middle but perhaps approaching breakdown. This not only 
constituted the majority of soldiers during the war, it also seems to be a group that has 
heretofore been largely ignored. On the one extreme end of the spectrum were the 
soldiers best described as ideal warriors or happy soldiers: those who were able to endure 
war and combat for extended periods of time without undue health problems, and perhaps 
even came to enjoy killing and combat.16 The other extreme end of the spectrum included 
the soldiers who were debilitated by combat, made useless by acute exposure to intense 
stimuli or the cumulative impact of the stresses and strains of war.17 In many cases, war-
                                                             
 
Diary of Private Bert Cooke (St. Catharines: Vanwell Publishing Limited, 2004), 157; Rogers, ed., Gunner Ferguson’s 
Diary, 128 and LAC, MG 30, Volume E 113, ‘Back to Blighty,’ George V. Bell Diary, 135. 
15 Walsh, The First World War Diary of Private Bert Cooke, 159-160. 
16 One researcher argued that only around 2% of soldiers were able to stand sustained combat, and these were those 
who were predisposed toward “aggressive psychopathic personalities.” Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman, On Killing: 
The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society – Revised Edition (New York: Back Bay Books, 2009), 
44. Another historian defines the ‘Happy Warrior’ as those soldiers who were confident and cheery “despite the grim 
ordeals of battle.” Philpott, War of Attrition, 114. 
17 Some works on shell shock include: Richard A. Gabriel, No More Heroes: Madness and Psychiatry in War (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1987); Peter Leese, Shell Shock: Traumatic Neurosis and the British Soldiers of the First World 
War (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Paul Lerner, Hysterical Men: War, Psychiatry, and the Politics of 
Trauma in Germany, 1890-1930 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); Fiona Reid, Broken Men: Shell Shock, 
Treatment and Recovery in Britain 1914-1930 (London: Continuum Books, 2010); Ben Shephard, A War of Nerves: 
Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001) and Alexander 
7 
 
 
 
weary soldiers were at a point prior to shell shock debilitation, were being worn down and 
becoming less effective soldiers, but had not yet reached the point of complete futility. In 
this sense, war weariness was the penultimate step before complete breakdown. 
Another way to look at this spectrum is to identify the healthy, committed, ‘fresh’ 
troops on the one extreme end, and total shell shock debilitation and uselessness as a 
soldier on the other. Those suffering from war weariness, however, fell somewhere in 
between, but likely closer to breakdown.18 War-weary troops could carry on and continue 
to be effective soldiers, but might be less committed, were reluctant, or unwilling to 
follow orders as closely as in the past. Perhaps the main distinction was that war-weary 
soldiers were mostly able to carry on with duty, though they might be increasingly 
reluctant and unwilling, whereas debilitated shell-shocked soldiers were largely unable to 
continue at the front. In my estimation, this is the best way to approach the concept of war 
weariness and the impact of combat, and the war more generally, on the individual; it is 
also the main definition or understanding of war weariness that I will use throughout. One 
of the main issues addressed in this project thus examines when willingness to continue 
became the unwillingness to endure. This was of course different for every individual, but 
general trends and patterns can be discerned.  
 It is also important to understand that there were both contributing factors and 
preconditions for war weariness, as well as manifestations and its effects. The context and 
situation was crucial. To provide but one example, heavy casualties could both contribute 
to, and mitigate the worst effects of war weariness. In terms of contributing to the onset of 
war weariness, heavy casualties could have an enormous psychological impact on the 
surviving troops who perhaps witnessed the death of close friends and comrades, but also 
put more pressure on the remaining soldiers of the unit. But heavy casualties also had the 
effect of removing the most war-weary and worn-down soldiers, leaving more space for 
younger or less-experienced, and thus less worn, troops.  
                                                             
 
Watson, Enduring the Great War: Combat, Morale and Collapse in the German and British Armies, 1914-1918 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). See the bibliography for journal articles and other sources as well.  
18 Historian Joanna Bourke suggested that there was a fine line between war weariness (apathy, indifference, and 
fatalism) and shell shock. Joanna Bourke, Fear: A Cultural History (Emeryville: Shoemaker & Hoard, 2006), 216. 
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 War weariness could affect individuals, combat soldiers and non-combatants, and 
entire military units. Moreover, although it is largely outside the scope of this project, war 
weariness impacted both soldiers in uniform, and civilians on the home front.19 The 
phenomenon played out somewhat differently on the home front, but soldiers and 
civilians faced hardships and pressures due to the war which undermined commitment 
and morale. The prospect of ultimate victory and tangible successes on the battlefield, 
however, helped the Entente sustain support longer than their Central Power opponents. 
War weariness also afflicted the other national armies in the war. In the Russian army, for 
example, there was an enormous gap between officers and other ranks and the harsh 
conditions facing the regular Russian infantryman eroded confidence in the officer corps. 
These issues were also compounded by other deep-rooted problems in the Russian army 
and wider society. The Belgian army experienced the negative long-term effects of war 
and occupation, and the Italian and Austro-Hungarian20 armies also exhibited growing 
signs of war weariness by the final years of the war. Indeed, as historian William Philpott 
argued in War of Attrition: Fighting the First World War, despite perceptions of relative 
strength “the reality was that all armies were on their last legs come 1918, with the 
exception of the slowly growing and green American army and the small Belgian 
army.”21 
 Individual war weariness could lead to or contribute to numerous problems 
amongst soldiers at the front. Long-term service in the army, and especially at the front, 
contributed to issues such as apathy; loss of will, commitment, or endurance; 
psychological breakdown; undue caution or recklessness; fatalism;22 health problems 
such as psychiatric injuries, and other aspects that undermined the effectiveness of the 
                                                             
 
19 See Haste, Keep the Home Fires Burning, 2-4, 141. Rationing, censorship, endless casualty lists, food and fuel 
shortages began to take their toll on civilians, and entire societies and nations became war weary. Ultimately, the 
commitment toward the war effort and the ruling regime began to become more tenuous and provisional. Unions and 
other groups exploited this situation to extract concessions from the government, though most civilians continued to 
remain largely loyal and only refused further support after the failure and futility of the war became evident.  
20 Fiona Reid and Christine Van Everbroeck, “Shell Shock and the Kloppe: War Neuroses amongst British and Belgian 
Troops during and after the First World War,” Medicine, Conflict and Survival, 30, 4 (2014): 252-275.  
See also Herwig, The First World War, especially chapter 9 for the Habsburg forces. 
21 Philpott, War of Attrition, 311. 
22 See, for example, Lord Moran, The Anatomy of Courage: The Classic WWI Account of the Psychological Effects of 
War (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2007), 31, 44, 51, 119 and Caughill, ed., Letters to Janet, 125. 
9 
 
 
 
soldier. A contemporary poem on apathy provides a good glimpse into some of the 
negative implications of this attitude and emotion at the front: 
 In lies in the valley of what’s-the-use, 
 In the province of Let-er-slide,  
 That tired feeling is native there, 
 It’s the home of the listless I-don’t-care 
 Where the Put-it-offs abide.23 
 
This lack of concern and commitment on the part of apathetic and disinterested soldiers, 
worn down by years of service, could be detrimental to his unit, even compromising the 
ability to follow orders and do one’s duty. Apathy and exhaustion could also undermine 
commitment, with a soldier of the 13th Battalion commenting that “I lost all interest in the 
war…I just wanted to sit down and be allowed to rest awhile.”24  
Collective war weariness had similar attributes, but could be even more dangerous 
as large numbers of troops decided that their commitment to the war was increasingly 
uncertain. This collective war weariness could thus lead to large-scale collapse, 
manifesting in voluntary surrenders or disciplinary problems, or poor performance on the 
battlefield. More dangerously, however, collective war weariness could contribute to the 
adoption of apathetic, anti-war, anti-government, or even revolutionary attitudes. Some 
soldiers came to question the war itself, as well as its purpose, prosecution, cost, and 
implications. The case of Germany and the German Army in the final months of the war 
is an example, as is the Russian disintegration and slide into revolution which were both 
directly and indirectly related to the war effort.  
 War weariness was also directly and indirectly related to the morale, discipline, 
combat motivation, battlefield effectiveness and efficiency, and endurance of the soldiers. 
War weariness can be understood broadly as the erosion of strength, endurance, and 
commitment of the soldiers afflicted, and the increasingly tenuous support for the war and 
                                                             
 
23 LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4555, Folder 4, File 3, Poems, ‘In Flanders Fields, No. 10 Canadian Field Ambulance, 
CAMC.’ John Becker also expressed apathy in the late stages of the war. He also wrote that he was “fed up.” See Norm 
Christie, ed., Silhouettes of the Great War: The Memoir of John Harold Becker 1915-1919 (Ottawa: CEF Books, 2001), 
196-197. 
24 LAC, RG 41 B III 1, Volume 9, Interview with K.G. Blackader of the 13th Battalion, Interview 1 of 2, page 14. 
10 
 
 
 
one’s own continued participation in it. The factors contributing to this phenomenon were 
various, and included heavy casualties; exhaustion and the lack of proper rest and 
insufficient leave and rotation policies; the mental and psychological state of the soldiers; 
the nature, pace, and intensity of combat on the Western Front; and the rhetoric 
employed, expectations, and orders issued by superiors and the High Command. War 
weariness also manifested itself in numerous ways, including disciplinary and legal 
problems, such as insubordination and indiscipline, cowardice, desertion, self-inflicted 
wounds (SIWs); collective decline; heavy casualties; poor performance on the battlefield; 
medical problems; apathy, the lack of enthusiasm or vigour of the troops;25 the words, 
actions, and attitudes of the soldiers; increasing caution and reluctance to perform regular 
duties; unwillingness and the reduction of participation; the desire to evade duty or escape 
the trenches;26 morale issues; and eventual breakdown. If war-weary soldiers were forced 
to remain at the front and pushed beyond the breaking point, it seems that shell shock 
debilitation and serious health and medical problems were all but inevitable. This was just 
one reason why the medical and military authorities needed to be cognizant of these 
problems, and to monitor and if necessary intervene to prevent war weariness from 
transmuting into serious shell shock and other problems. 
 War weariness also affected entire armies, nations, and societies after a certain 
period of time. There was of course no definite amount of time that needed to pass before 
large groups of people became war weary; each case was different, and each army and 
nation faced unique and general challenges pertaining to the war. In Russia, for instance, 
by 1917 and certainly early 1918, the people were suffering from exhaustion, bankruptcy, 
                                                             
 
25 Prior to going into the line for the first time, James Adams of the 26th Battalion was nervous but excited. By mid-
September 1918, however, he wrote that since arriving in France “I have not always been in the best of spirits,” but still 
did not regret being sent to the front. And in late September he wrote that any “spark I brought to this adventure [was] 
all but gone…[and] some rest will surely send it roaring again. But for now it is a struggle to merely keeping it lit.”  
Caughill, ed., Letters to Janet, 127, 134. 
26 The evasion of duty and the desire to escape the trenches and continued service at the front could take various forms. 
One soldier wrote that during a period of action some soldiers “ran about bewildered, and some ‘just naturally’ 
disappeared, to be rounded up later covered in mud and dirt.” Cate, ed., A Soldier’s Memoir of World War I, 39. 
Soldiers could desert, go AWL, or refuse to participate in action, for example, or could remove themselves from combat 
through SIWs or self-inflicted illnesses. Other soldiers sought to willingly surrender to the enemy, or feign sickness or 
illness. Some war weary and shell shocked troops, moreover, decided on a permanent solution and took their own lives.  
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and starvation,27 all contributing factors toward war weariness and the defeat of its Army 
on the Eastern Front. Other indicators and manifestations of war weariness amongst the 
Russian civilian and soldier population were evident as well. The development of war 
weariness in the Russian Army was based on internal difficulties, but also as a response to 
external realities and the wider war situation. The Russians were seriously outclassed by 
the German Army, and when the latter launched Operation Albion in October 1917 it 
“promote[d] war weariness and despair amidst the Russian ranks.”28 And another 
historian argued that the mutiny in the 223rd Odoevskii Regiment in the autumn of 1916 
was “caused primarily by battle fatigue and war weariness rather than revolutionary 
agitation” amongst the troops.29 This ‘revolutionary agitation’ would come later, and also 
affected rear-echelon units and army administrative personnel. The Russians were the 
first to collapse because of the cumulative stresses and strains on the people, its army, 
economy, and social institutions, but they were not the last. General Erich Ludendorff, the 
de facto ruler of Germany’s army by 1918, also wrote of problems on the home front30 
and amongst his troops. Further fighting relied heavily on the maintenance of morale and 
discipline, and the soldiers needed strength and determination to counter increasing Allied 
(material) strength. The problem, however, was that “the armistice offer had had an 
unfavourable effect on the men’s spirits, and war weariness had increased” 
                                                             
 
27 Charles F. Horne and Walter F. Austin, eds., Source Records of the Great War: Volume VI 1918 (Unknown Place of 
Publication: National Alumni, 1923), xiv. 
28 Hart, The Great War, 302. 
29 Beckett, The Great War, 522. 
30 This is an issue discussed by historians in secondary sources as well. Herwig, for instance, wrote that hunger, “war 
weariness,” and uneven food distribution hurt the ‘public mood’ in Germany over time. He wrote, moreover, that 
industrial strikes in 1918 were caused by hunger, cold, and war weariness. Herwig, The First World War, 287, 366. 
Another historian noted that the German nation will was undermined after the acceptance of the justice of the war 
“transmuted” into war weariness. Furthermore, because of hardships on the home front, support for the war became 
increasingly conditional, with casualty lists, food shortages, “war-weary” civilians in bread queues, and people asking if 
it was all worth it. There was “war weariness and the longing for peace that went with it…[it] reached epidemic 
proportions during 1917 now that peace was mooted.” Philpott, War of Attrition, 8, 287.  
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significantly.31 Other historians have also made references to war weariness in the nations 
and armies of Italy, France,32 Bulgaria, Austria-Hungary,33 and Great Britain. 
 The experience of war weariness in the British Army is particularly instructive, as 
the Canadians were part of the British Army and there were substantial cultural, 
historical, and social connections between the two countries. Canada at the time was also 
legally and culturally a part of the wider British Empire. The Canadian forces were 
modelled on the British Army, and shared much of the same equipment and weapons. 
Much of Canada’s First Contingent, moreover, was British-born and British-led. The 
English-speaking soldiers in the Corps included many Anglophiles; many still had family 
or friends in the UK. Some of the lessons for the British Army could also be applied to 
the Canadian forces. Historian David Englander, for instance, argued that leave was more 
“than just a respite for war-weary troops,” as it also reaffirmed their humanity and 
individuality.34 Another historian noted the connections between the home front and 
battle front. Soldier morale and the will to continue fighting, for example, could be 
eroded by war weariness and “flagging support at home.” And despite the hardships and 
growing war weariness on the British home front, the pro-war consensus was maintained 
                                                             
 
31 General Ludendorff, My War Memories 1914-1918 – Volume II (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1919), 745. Historian 
Nick Lloyd also wrote that after the failure of the German Spring Offensives to end the war, confidence and high 
morale gave way to “extremely widespread war-weariness, glumness and despondency.” And by October 1918 German 
POWs were ‘war-weary and war-sick.’ Nick Lloyd, Hundred Days: The Campaign That Ended World War I (New 
York: Basic Books, 2014), 91, 203. 
32 For war weariness in France and the French Army, see Hart, The Great War, 339 and Philpott, War of Attrition, 291, 
who argued that the French mutinies were “one manifestation of the general war weariness that gripped Europe during 
1917.” Regarding Italian war weariness, one researcher noted that propaganda targeted “war-weary” Italian conscripts 
to great effect. Charles Roetter, The Art of Psychological Warfare 1914-1945 (New York: Stein and Day, 1974), 76. 
33 War weariness in Austria-Hungary and its armies has also been noted by historians. Mark Cornwall, for example, 
referred to “general war-weariness” and the “rigours of army life” as combining with problems on the home front to 
hurt the morale and discipline of the Habsburg forces. War weariness and food crises hurt morale, and troop morale was 
also compromised by war weariness, nationalist agitation, food and clothing shortages, and nurtured by enemy 
propaganda. Mark Cornwall, “Morale and Patriotism in the Austro-Hungarian Army, 1914-1918,” in State, Society and 
Mobilization in Europe during the First World War edited by John Horne (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), 177, 181, 188. Another historian noted that people on the home front, especially amongst the Central Powers, 
were “war weary,” and that there was growing war weariness “within the European belligerents’ populations” by the 
end of 1917. A decline in the support for the war and a general strike was “inspired by” war weariness. There was also a 
naval mutiny in February 1918 and industrial strikes in the heartland. Philpott, War of Attrition, 253, 281, 317. The 
Bulgarian collapse in late 1918 has also been attributed to “war-weariness, poor morale and a shortage of food and 
clothing,” but there were other factors as well. G.D. Sheppard, “Aleksander Stamboliski and the Bulgarian Contract,” 
History Today, 65, 9 (September 2015): 28-30.  
34 David Englander, “Discipline and Morale in the British Army, 1917-1918,” in State, Society and Mobilization ed. by 
Horne, 137. 
13 
 
 
 
by censorship, propaganda, and war prosperity. Furthermore, despite a “considerable 
degree of war-weariness” late in the war, fighting spirit was preserved at sufficient levels 
at least until the cessation of hostilities.35  
The onset of war weariness in the British Army was also acknowledged by 
medical and military authorities. A December 1917 report on the British armies in France 
concluded that “war-weariness there is, and an almost universal longing for peace but 
there is a strong current of feeling that only one kind of peace is possible and that the time 
is not yet come” to end the war.36 Therefore despite war weariness, some troops found the 
inner strength, coping mechanisms, and moral props to carry on with duty, even if their 
performance was compromised. And as more soldiers became war weary and the war 
continued into 1918, there was increasing evidence of poor performance on the 
battlefield. Historian Alexander Watson argued that the poor performance of the BEF in 
the spring of 1918 was based on “the legacy of despondency and war weariness”37 from 
Third Ypres and other pyrrhic victories.  
The experience of war weariness illustrates another important point regarding the 
phenomenon, namely that it affected both victorious and defeated armies. Success 
certainly helped mitigate the worst effects of war weariness on both an individual and 
collective level, but it was no panacea. The prospect of ultimate victory in the war and 
evidence of success on the battlefield helped sustain some soldiers, but the stresses and 
strains of combat wore them down nonetheless. In many ways, the Canadian soldiers and 
the Corps itself was successful and ultimately victorious despite the onset and negative 
consequences of war weariness. Indeed, by 1918 all armies were worn out, perhaps save 
the American forces.38 The comparison between the worn-out Entente forces and their 
new American allies was made by other historians as well. Anthony Kellett argued that 
                                                             
 
35 Anthony Kellett, Combat Motivation: The Behaviour of Soldiers in Battle (Boston: Kluwer Nijhoff Publishing, 
1982), 177, 180, 265. Another historian also wrote of “times of profound war-weariness in the British Army” 
throughout the war. Gerard Christopher Oram, Military Executions During World War I (Houndmills: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003), 169. 
36 Oram, Military Executions, 95. 
37 Watson, Enduring the Great War.  
38 It should also be noted that the US forces were no more effective than the others on the Western Front, and perhaps 
less so than the Canadians. Philpott, War of Attrition, 311. 
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US troops in mid-1918 were “markedly enthusiastic compared with their war-weary 
allies,” and Canadian soldier Coningsby Dawson stated that the troops at the front looked 
to the US for firmness and resolve “for the reason that she is not [yet] war-weary,” unlike 
the Entente forces and their soldiers.39  
 The study of war weariness is aided by recognition that this phenomenon also 
affected the Canadian home front and had an impact into the post-Armistice period. After 
years of war and with no end in sight, the Canadian home front became increasingly 
affected by war weariness. As historian Jack Granatstein argued, “Canadians at home 
were weary of war” by 1917.40 The seemingly endless casualty lists, shortages, 
prohibition, corruption, and profiteering were all contributing factors. Following the 
cessation of hostilities with the signing of the Armistice in November 1918, moreover, 
evidence of war weariness continued, despite the fact that the war was all but over. The 
soldiers, however, were experiencing the inevitable reaction from years of combat and 
were still in khaki, far from home, and still subject to military discipline. As a member of 
the 31st Battalion explained, by March of 1919 he was “fed up” with army life and just 
wanted to be demobilised and return home.41 Moreover, disciplinary problems and 
‘disturbances’ in the post-Armistice period involving Canadian troops, such as that at 
Witley and Rhyl Camp in the UK, suggest lingering discontent coupled with the absence 
of a cause to fight for. One officer explained the problems: 
In dealing with troops at the present stage, the psychological factor enters very 
materially into the proper control of the men, i.e. it is essential to understand the 
man’s peculiar attitude of mind produced by the relaxation of war strain and his 
desire for his home and work.42 
 
                                                             
 
39 Kellett, Combat Motivation, 297 and Coningsby Dawson, Living Bayonets: A Record of the Last Push (New York: 
John Lane Company, 1919), 215-216. 
40 Jack Granatstein, The Greatest Victory: Canada’s One Hundred Days (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2014), 
76.  
41 Marjorie Barron Norris, ed., Medicine and Duty: The World War I Memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, Medical 
Officer, 31st Battalion CEF (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2007), 341. Another soldier remembered that by the 
end of the war “I had had about enough by that time” and just wanted to return home. LAC, RG 41 B III 1, Volume 12, 
Interview with F.W. Kirkland of the 29th Battalion, page 8.  
42 LAC, RG 9 III B1, Volume 1778, D-18-14, Discipline Generally, A.D.M.S., England, Report dated 27 February 
1919.  
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This war-weary attitude seemed to be based on the fact that the war was won, but not yet 
over. The soldiers were expected to remain at duty well into the new year, and they were 
still far from their homes and loved ones. In this period, prior to demobilisation and 
transport back to Canada, the soldiers “simply wanted to go home” as soon as possible.43  
The problems that affected Canadian troops following the Armistice also affected 
the other victorious powers as well. The British, for instance, were unwilling to commit 
too heavily to the Western intervention in Russia on behalf of the White Army. 
According to one historian, by 1919 Britain “was weary of war,” as the “carnage and 
privation of the First World War had drained all enthusiasm for large-scale military 
ventures” and operations.44 Because war weariness affected both victorious and defeated 
armies, and was present on multiple home fronts, it is safe to conclude that it also affected 
the Canadian Corps, despite claims to Canadian exceptionalism and the fact that they 
were ultimately victorious. These concepts are not mutually exclusive, and it seems the 
Canadians were successful despite war weariness. This dissertation will explore war 
weariness in the Corps and how this impacted both individuals and military units.  
 
The Important Connections between the Home and Battle Fronts 
In addition to the impact of war weariness on combat soldiers, the phenomenon 
was also experienced by non-soldiers and civilians on various home fronts affiliated with 
the war effort. All troops were exposed to the stresses and strains of war, and thus faced 
the impact of war weariness, but this also affected the collective. An examination of war 
weariness in other armies allows for a comparison with the experiences of the Canadians. 
Indeed, as the other main combatants on the Western Front, the British, French, and 
German armies – having been in the field in substantial strength since 1914 – could be 
said to have experienced substantial and widespread war weariness amongst its troops 
prior to the extensive development of the same phenomenon amongst Canadians. And as 
the Canadian Corps and the wider CEF was but a constituent component of the British 
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Army, one can also interrogate the experiences facing the British armies to get a better 
understanding of specific members of those armies, such as the Canadian troops. And 
though a majority of Canada’s First Contingent were British-born,45 over time the 
proportion of Canadian-born troops increased, and throughout the war there was certainly 
a perceptible increase in awareness of a unique (or at least distinct) Canadian identity and 
nationality.  
An examination of the various home fronts also provides the historian with the 
opportunity to chart the growth and increasing impact of war weariness on these fronts, as 
well as identify the important connections between the home front and battle front. 
Censorship documents and reports on civilian morale allow the researcher to gauge the 
level of motivation and commitment to the war effort amongst civilians and others at 
home. The opinions and well-being of serving soldiers, and essential war workers and 
others, was crucial for the maintenance of the pro-war consensus. This evidence, 
suggestive and anecdotal but likely never comprehensive, provides a window into the 
negative effect of war weariness on the home front, and the erosion of endurance and the 
real, tangible impact of the war on the civilians at home. And though there have been 
arguments and debates as to whether the war was a genuine total war, it is undeniable that 
this conflict placed unprecedented demands on regular members of society back home. 
The frequent casualty lists, the loss of loved ones, the disruption of regular life, the 
shortages and hardships, the suspicions and anxiety, the rationing, and sense of 
uncertainty wore on even the strongest members of society.  
The various links between the home fronts and battle fronts is also an important 
aspect in assessing the impact, extent, and implications of war weariness. An increase of 
war weariness on the home front, manifested for instance in an outbreak of food riots or 
worker grievances (sometimes political in nature), could also have a negative impact on 
                                                             
 
45 The majority of the First Canadian Contingent of 30,617 were British-born (18,495), or around 60% of the total. 
There were 9,159 Canadian-born men (or just under 30%), with the balance being born in other British colonies, the 
United States, or did not provide a country of birth. By the war’s end, “the total number of Canadian enlistees had risen 
to just over fifty percent.” Tim Cook, At the Sharp End: Canadians Fighting the Great War 1914-1916 – Volume I 
(Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2007), 28-29, citing LAC, RG 24, Volume 1810, GAQ 2-1, v. 1, Enlistment 1st Canadian 
Contingent.  
17 
 
 
 
the troops of that nation stationed at the front, or in even in the armed forces more 
generally. After the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918, for example, German and other 
Central Power troops in transit from the Eastern to the Western Front were exposed to the 
increasingly tough conditions facing civilians and even military personnel in the Reich. 
Moreover, despite the best efforts of censorship officials and political indoctrination46 or 
propaganda, the curtailing of leave, and the increasing armed forces control over the 
civilian population, discontent on the battle fronts came to be known on the home fronts 
as well. The fall of commitment and worsening of conditions on one front could not have 
failed to impact the other front, in myriad and increasingly disruptive ways. In this sense, 
war weariness on the home front could induce, encourage, or reinforce that same 
development on the battle front, and vice-versa. And as the First World War was a global, 
total war, these links had an increased importance compared with earlier, limited, 
localised, or rapidly-concluding conflicts. The importance of the links between the home 
and the battle fronts was articulated elegantly in the words of historian Brock Millman,  
…modern warfare is not a conflict of armies so much as a contest of societies. 
Defeat can come as much from the collapse of the home front as from military 
failure. The maintenance of a nation’s will to fight is as important as its physical 
ability to continue the struggle. Total war….broadens the scope of the conflict and 
links aspects of the contest in an organic manner, to the point where weakness 
anywhere can become weakness everywhere. Lack of military success can easily 
give rise to dissent on the home front, which, taking the form of industrial unrest, 
may deprive the army of those things it requires to prevent new and greater 
defeats. Failure on the home front is therefore as likely to produce total disaster as 
is defeat at the battle front.47 
 
And historians M.L. Sanders and Philip M. Taylor argued that the reality of total war 
ensured that large segments of the population now had a direct interest in, and direct 
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impact on, the fighting and combat on the Western Front. The fighting in Europe now 
came to affect these civilians on the home front in unprecedented ways as well. They 
asserted that “during the war, sections of the community which had previously remained 
uninvolved in the exigencies of national survival had found themselves directly affected 
by events at the front line,” and that in a total war the gap between soldier and civilian 
“narrowed substantially.”48 
And as the war was also a modern, industrial war, requiring the mobilization of 
the entire resources of the state, the importance of the home front for the fighting forces 
only increased. As British historian Bernard Waites argued in A Class Society at War: 
England 1914-1918, the attritional strategy of the war guaranteed much loss of life and 
increased stress on the population and resources of the home front. This was crucial to the 
overall development of the war, as “the elusiveness of a resolution to the war on the 
battlefield meant that the home fronts acquired ever greater significance as the stalemate 
was prolonged.”49 The nature and extent of the conflict ensured an increased importance 
of the home front on the soldiers in the line and on the lines of communication. The links 
between the home fronts and battle fronts can only be taken so far, however. Civilians 
back home in Germany, for example, faced some different problems than their soldier 
counterparts fighting at the front. Moreover, the nature of military service and the 
practical realities of soldiering meant that war weariness was partly manifested in 
different ways on the battle front as opposed to the home front. The political tools used to 
mitigate or attempt to neutralise the worst effects of war weariness on the home front 
might also have differed from the institutional methods of the nation’s military leaders to 
deal with the similar problems at the front. Additionally, the powers and extent of military 
authority were partly different from those of political or national authority in Germany, 
though it could be argued the militaristic nature of German society and the increasing 
sway of military leaders over the political realm nullified this distinction over time.50  
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The war weariness on the home fronts and in each national context provide some 
insights into the phenomenon of war weariness itself, especially its contributing factors, 
examples and instances, consequences of its onset and development, and some lessons for 
the Canadian Corps and the historian. War weariness was noted by both contemporaries 
and historians in the context of Russia,51 France,52 Italy, Austria-Hungary, Great Britain, 
and Germany. It should also be noted that at times it can be difficult to distinguish 
between the causes of war weariness, and its symptoms. To take but one example, it 
seems that food shortages, rationing, and labour strikes on the home front could be a 
cause or contributing factor to the onset of war weariness, as it could lead to discontent 
among regular civilians and act as a disruptive force. Conversely, however, labour 
militancy or industrial strikes could also be a manifestation or example of widespread war 
weariness, as workers and others expressed their dissatisfaction with the war or how it 
was being prosecuted.53 Contemporary records and subsequent historical analysis suggest 
that this civilian and home-front war weariness affected all the major European combatant 
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nations and their societies by mid-1917, and certainly by 1918. This was true for Russia, 
France, Great Britain,54 and perhaps most importantly, Germany.55  
The experience of civilian and home-front war weariness allows the historian to 
draw some general lessons from these various national contexts. First of all, these 
different home-front experiences illustrate that there were general and specific, short-term 
and long-term, and internal and external contributing factors to the onset and 
development of war weariness. These causes could be either material, such as a lack of 
food or medical supplies, or non-material, such as a rise in pacifist or defeatist attitudes. 
France and Belgium had to endure German occupation as well as the general strains of 
the war effort, whereas all combatant nations suffered through rationing, shortages, food, 
and supply issues. How the nation’s military and political leaders reacted to these 
problems and addressed the grievances of the population was an important consideration 
in assessing the endurance of each nation at war. This was especially true as national 
service, whether that be in uniform or as a productive member of society, was based on 
the idea of a ‘contract’ or reciprocity. There were limits to duty and loyalty, and 
governments would be wise to appease members of society to ensure loyalty and 
economic production. Civilians and soldiers were expected to do their duty, but in 
exchange the powers of the state, particularly the government, were to provide for the 
needs of the people, including but not limited to, protection from enemy attack, adequate 
food and housing, and sufficient supplies and consumer goods. Hunger, uncertainty, and 
malnutrition in Germany made both soldiers and civilians susceptible to disease and 
demoralisation, and compromised the ability and willingness to endure.56 As was the case 
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with Russia, the inability of the government to provide for the people’s needs shattered 
the pro-war consensus and unleashed discontent that had been boiling below the surface 
for decades, but was then exacerbated by the stresses and strains of the war. 
The second main lesson to be drawn from these case studies is the important and 
complex connections between the home and battle fronts during the war. Each nation’s 
armed forces were drawn from their parent society, ensuring that these connections 
remained paramount throughout the conflict. The home front was vital to the war effort, 
ensuring social, political, and economic support for the soldiers on the battle front. 
Moreover, the armed forces relied upon the industrial and economic output of the home 
front, and the lack of supplies at home could directly hamper the prosecution of military 
goals and the wider war effort. The problems at the home front could also reinforce, 
reflect, or initiate problems on the battle front, and this also went both ways; it was a 
dynamic process, and despite the muzzling of opposition groups, counter-espionage 
efforts, censorship, and propaganda, these problems on the home front could not be 
contained or kept quiet indefinitely. The links between the home and battle fronts are also 
evident in the complex and at times adversarial relationship between the nation’s political 
and military leaders. In some cases, such as in Britain, the military leaders were legally 
subordinate to political oversight, which caused problems, especially related to questions 
over the best way to prosecute the war effort. In Germany, on the other hand, the military 
leadership of the country was in ascendency, which caused problems of its own. 
The third and final lesson to be drawn from these home-front experiences is that 
any combatant nation’s political and military leaders needed to be cognizant of these 
developing problems and address them as soon as possible. The government, in 
conjunction with military and other leaders, thus had to be prepared to intervene to 
protect its own interests, often at the expense of individual or civil rights. It was 
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important, for instance, to deal with growing dissent and the emergence of anti-war or 
anti-government groups and ideas. In Britain, the government established and then made 
use of the National War Aims Committee (NWAC) to address war weariness,57 silence 
dissent and portray anti-war voices, or even those seeking a negotiated settlement, as 
dangerous and even treasonous. Both civilians and soldiers needed outlets and ‘safety 
valves,’ and without proper ways of dealing with both acute and cumulative stresses and 
strains of war, these problems could develop into more serious expressions of dissent.  
 
 
Difficulties of the Project and Problems Facing the Historian 
Assessments of military actions and individual conduct on the battlefield are 
difficult at the best of times, but for events that took place a century ago, these problems 
were substantial. All armies and military forces are composed of both material and non-
material forces. The latter included myriad factors like doctrine, strategy, morale,58 public 
opinion, attitude, commitment, and other intangible forces. Material, or physical forces 
and factors included transport arrangements, weapon systems, and the men (and women) 
who wielded these weapons. Historians can examine systems, as well as structures and 
contingencies, but we cannot ignore the individuals who compose these systems and drive 
historical change. As a wealth of primary59 and secondary literature60 has made clear, the 
human, individual factor in war and combat will always be crucial, if not decisive. In 
addition to this, these human factors have enormous explanatory power and potential. 
Even with the increasing sophistication and automation of the battlefield in today’s world, 
the human factor still plays an important role throughout the process of military 
preparation and activity.  
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Comparisons between different armies and military forces and an appraisal of 
combat performance is also useful when considering the experience of the Canadians. 
Long-serving soldiers, military units, and armies in the field help illuminate the 
increasing problems facing the Canadian Corps over time, especially as the reality of 
manpower problems set in for Entente high commands and the Corps was used in an 
increasingly important role.61 Nevertheless, the other military forces provide some lessons 
for the historian, and provide contemporary lessons for the Corps itself in the final years 
of the war, in a process that came to be known as the ‘learning curve’ coupled with 
doctrinal and tactical development.62 And though the Canadians were largely successful 
militarily in their various engagements, the experience of success and defeat in other 
military forces allows for insight into the nature and impact of morale, discipline, combat 
motivation, endurance, and ultimately war weariness. Official government and army 
reports, eyewitness and firsthand accounts, and other contemporary material provides 
extensive examples and evidence of the negative effects of war weariness, the erosion of 
endurance, breakdown in combat, and the impact of cumulative and/or acute exposure to 
war and battle. It should also be noted that there are various levels of assessment we can 
attempt to access, to determine how combat impacted individuals, military units, and the 
war situation more broadly.  
Historical inquiry always includes some measure of difficulty; there are always 
certain gaps and distances between those writing about historical events and processes, 
and those who lived through them. Furthermore, personal views on experiences never 
remain static. Veterans and participants viewed the past through the lens of their own 
experiences but also through the realities of the time in which they are recalling. This is 
especially true of a subject that occurred a century ago. Moreover, there are some 
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differences between those who actually witnessed or participated in an event, and those 
who were merely alive at the time. Historians and researchers of the 21st century will 
never be able to truly experience what happened and what it was like to experience it. The 
past, moreover, is also manipulated for our own various ends.63 There are both general 
and specific difficulties with a project such as this, and especially related to source 
material,64 memory, the candour and representativeness of the soldiers, perspective,65 the 
intangibles of war and the human experience, and the nature of historical study itself.  As 
historian Robert Engen argued, it is difficult for historians to evaluate “what takes place 
on the battlefield at the personal level,”66 regarding those who were actually and 
physically there.  
And yet not all historical analysis rests upon official accounts and institutional – 
such as government or army – sources. There is certainly use for non-traditional sources, 
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as well as ephemera and sources which go beyond the written word. My research, for 
instance, has made use of some personal and very narrow perspectives and accounts, 
which examine how individuals experienced and reacted to vast historical processes and 
important events. Soldier memoirs, diaries, letters, and journals,67 for example, provide 
unique insight into how a single person and their immediate primary group viewed and 
dealt with the stresses and strains of war. Home-front studies,68 more private and personal 
accounts,69 and plays and novels70 also help our understanding of the war and its impact 
on individuals. As one historian has noted, many war stories are not fully ‘evidence-
based,’ but are still useful, as they tell us about ourselves and how we understand war.71 
One of the main difficulties of this project surrounds the candour of source 
material. Some authors of official accounts were unable or unwilling to fully recognise 
the realities of combat on the Western Front, and its impact on those who had to endure 
such experiences. Historian Rachel Duffett in The Stomach for Fighting: Food and the 
Soldiers of the Great War, for example, argued that it is “difficult to locate references to 
food shortages in the army’s contemporaneous records,” especially as “this would have 
been a subject unhelpful both at home and abroad.” Anecdotal and suggestive evidence, 
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combined with firsthand accounts and other archival sources, however, suggest that there 
were shortages and food problems. There were gaps between army policy and practice, 
and “failures in feeding were glossed over in the official army statistics,” lest an 
“acknowledgment of the military’s inability to provide for the most basic of human 
needs” prove embarrassing for authorities.72 Another historian argued that “whether from 
patriotic or professional motives, military writers have been reticent about discussing 
panic” on the battlefield.73 There was a reluctance to draw attention to medical or 
disciplinary problems, or to those soldiers who were unable to endure at the front. Clear 
and candid appraisals of the developments in combat and the reactions of individuals 
helps with the post-battle assessment of historians, but the confusion and ‘fog of 
uncertainty’ present in armed conflict militated against such complete and tidy 
understandings. 
To this end, it is important to read between the lines of source material and 
identify gaps in the literature,74 as well as to assess the euphemisms and indirect 
references to problems encountered on the battlefield. It is difficult to uncover clear and 
candid appraisals of individual war experience, in part because the soldiers at the front 
practiced a form of self-censorship75 and likely did not want to worry loved ones at home. 
Dwelling on the stresses and strains of wartime service would concern those at home, and 
remind the soldiers themselves of the problems they encountered on a daily basis. 
Frederic Manning in Her Privates We even argued that there was a soldier “conspiracy of 
silence” which lasted into the 1920s. Because of this, historians have to “dig deep 
between the lines of everyday banalities of letters from the front to find a hint of the 
fearsomeness of the fighting,” the trauma and terror. The use of euphemisms to downplay 
the realities at the front also complicates the job of the historian. Manning, for instance, 
remarked that “my mates have gone West” to denote their deaths, or that “we had a 
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roughish time” to indicate heavy casualties.76 And historians Chris Bell and Bruce 
Elleman argued in Naval Mutinies of the Twentieth Century that contemporary military 
authorities made use of euphemisms “in order to downplay the significance of these 
episodes.”77 And thus in this process mutinies became strikes, incidents, protests, unrest, 
or disaffection.  
Another difficulty pertains to the problems of memory and firsthand accounts. Not 
all soldiers captured their thoughts and feelings on any given subject. Moreover, for those 
who did want to capture their own personal viewpoint, would they always be able and 
willing to do so? Memory and firsthand accounts are necessarily limited and subjective, 
and some soldiers were inhibited and unwilling to express their own perceptions.78 There 
were also limitations based on literacy, opportunity, materials available, preservation,79 
lack of education or ability to articulate one’s views,80 and similar issues. Some soldiers 
captured their feelings on a subject at the time, whereas others only sat down to capture 
them in the months or even years following the event in question. As one British soldier 
argued, there were limitations to his memory, “which has become blurred and unreliable 
owing to the lapse of time and the crowded events of the last few years”81 which obscure 
and confuse. Over time, memory and the ability to properly recall past events gets 
                                                             
 
76 Manning, Her Privates We, n.p. 
77 Christopher M. Bell and Bruce A. Elleman, eds., Naval Mutinies of the Twentieth Century: An International 
Perspective (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), 2-3. 
78 One diary editor noted her subject felt that “silence was the appropriate balm.” Mann, ed., The War Diary of Clare 
Gass, xxxv. One historian noted that motivation must also be taken into account. Were personal recollections being 
used for profit or propaganda, for example? See John Laffin, World War I in Postcards (Gloucester: Alan Sutton 
Publishing, 1985), 4. 
79 Some letters and other accounts do not survive the decades between storage and subsequent interest. In one case, only 
five original letters survived, and the rest only survived in typescript, which created its own difficulties. Moreover, there 
were “the difficulties inherent in writing within the sound and even range of an artillery bombardment.” Joseph Pope, 
ed., Letters from the Front: 1914-1919 by Lt.-Gen. Maurice A. Pope, C.B., M.C. (Toronto: Pope & Company, 1993), ii. 
80 For soldiers undergoing artillery bombardments or trying to recall events tainted by trauma and terror, it was difficult 
to get a solid account of the event or experience. There were also very few “direct accounts of personal mental 
breakdown,” especially as it was difficult for individuals to express “complex emotional reactions” to war. 
Furthermore, some subjects were deemed taboo and thus would not be discussed. Fiona Reid, Broken Men: Shell Shock, 
Treatment and Recovery in Britain 1914-1930 (London: Continuum Books, 2010), 5. Other historians have also argued 
that many soldiers likely had a hard time putting terrifying, disorienting, confusing experiences into words, even if they 
had wanted to. There was, moreover, little psychological or emotional analysis in first person accounts. See Joanna 
Bourke, Fear: A Cultural History (Emeryville: Shoemaker & Hoard, 2006) and Rachel Duffett, The Stomach for 
Fighting: Food and the Soldiers of the Great War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012), 4.  
81 Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, From Private to Field-Marshal (London: Constable and Company Ltd., 1921), 
vii. 
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distorted and weakened, and for veterans in Legion halls across the country, perhaps a 
rehearsed or theatrical element to stories developed over time as well.82 Certain aspects of 
stories got polished, exaggerated, left out entirely. One historian has noted that two 
people could interpret the same event or experience in quite different ways. Moreover, the 
time between the event in question and its recollection could distort memories, even at the 
subconscious level.83  
Another problem with memory and firsthand accounts is the question of 
representativeness. Not all recollections and views of the soldiers survived, and some 
were against recording their opinions for posterity or publication, happy with personal 
letters and diaries. Other soldiers, however, actively sought to publish their views on the 
war, and this necessarily involved some measure of selection and editing. In a time of 
substantial letter and printed correspondence, it would be impractical to publish all the 
letters of any given soldier. It is certainly problematic that a smaller group of former 
soldiers now speaks for those who “have neither the ability nor the desire to impart to 
others” their own personal experiences.84 And as historians we must also be wary of those 
seeking personal profit in exchange for their war experiences.  
It was and remains important to capture and preserve as many personal and 
authentic views as possible, but the question of representativeness of these accounts poses 
particular problems for the historian. Were the war poets,85 famous in the interwar years 
for their stark presentation of the war and their anti-war or pacifist poetry and prose, 
really representative of all the lower-class (and lower-ranking) soldiers? The evidence 
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does not support the war poets as being representative, and there were literally millions of 
different viewpoints86 to emerge from the war. We as historians should try not to 
privilege certain accounts because they are more articulate or resonate better with our 
current social and cultural understandings. Unfortunately, historians sometimes have to 
extrapolate to the many the views of the few,87 and this is another problem pertaining to 
source material and firsthand accounts. 
As Winston Churchill also wondered, was it possible to trust the opinions of the 
‘chateau generals?’88 Everyone has certain motivations in writing, and it is thus important 
to understand the background and context to any first-person account of the period. 
Nevertheless, was it still possible to trust military history written by former officers which 
tended to be “highly biased”89 accounts? These sources and interpretations are still 
important, as they provide a unique and inside view of the inner functioning of a military 
unit, from one who was actually there. Furthermore, these accounts provide insight into 
how someone in a leadership position understood things and responded to developments 
in the unit, and at the front. And finally, these highly subjective accounts can be balanced 
with other viewpoints, and with secondary source material. It is for these reasons that 
historians need to be wary of official histories and highly hagiographical accounts.90 
Another problem inherent in this type of historical inquiry surrounds the 
intangibles of war and the difficulty of understanding certain concepts and ideas. How 
could the soldiers themselves find “the right words to portray the indescribable?”91 And 
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as historian George Bruntz argued in Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German 
Empire in 1918, how can historians quantify and measure contributions to victory? How 
can we “weigh imponderables” and certain contributions with other, yet equally 
important, contributions? Can we say, for example, that air power was responsible for 
40% of the victory over Germany in 1918?92 Furthermore, how can historians understand 
the intangible aspects of war such as morale and other ideas? Morale is an elusive notion, 
and is “all too frequently defined through generalities,”93 or meant different things to 
different people at different times. It is thus important for historians to be clear with their 
working definitions and to place their work into the wider context of the pre-existing 
historiography. It is also important to acknowledge that there are some aspects of the 
battlefield and the impact of combat on the individual that will always be unknowable to 
the historian. The confusion and complexity and the ‘fog of uncertainty,’ coupled with the 
fact that soldiers on the lower end of the military hierarchy rarely understood the ‘big 
picture,’94 ensured some ignorance of those trying to make sense of a battle or 
engagement long after the smoke had cleared.  
The nature of historical study itself also presents difficulties to historians tackling 
topics such as war weariness. As historians, the desire is to understand and present the 
past in a comprehensible way. The problem is that it can be “dangerous and [is] usually 
simplistic to seek general causes” to complex historical events and concepts.95 The causes 
of war weariness, for example, are complex and multifaceted, just as war weariness itself 
is complex, dynamic, difficult to pin down, and contextually contingent. Though certain 
trends, common elements, and patterns emerge, each historical case was different, and 
should be treated as such. This also points to the importance of comparative studies,96 and 
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to look at events or concepts over time. In many cases, historical analyses are too 
simplistic, eschew complexity, or fail to take into account all the factors at play.97 One 
historian noted that history and hindsight can obscure the difficult realities that decision-
makers at the time faced. The officers and commanders, and the units themselves, were 
affected by “the strategic imperatives of the moment”98 and other considerations we 
cannot now understand, let alone fully appreciate. 
 
Research Questions, Outline, and Theses 
This project will focus on the development and impact of war weariness on both 
an individual and collective level. To this end, some questions guided my research. What 
was war weariness, and how did both contemporaries and later historians ‘measure’ it? 
How did it affect individuals and how did they come to terms with this phenomenon? 
How did the collective, in this case the military unit, deal with the problems associated 
with war weariness? What was the Canadian experience of war weariness? Did war 
weariness play out differently based on nationality, culture, or other considerations? Did 
medical and military authorities recognise war weariness as a distinct issue that 
undermined the dedication and morale of soldiers? Or did these same authorities simply 
subsume this concept into already-existing understandings of health and discipline? How 
did culture and social reality impact how soldiers understood and dealt with war 
weariness? Did war weariness impact infantry and combat soldiers at the front differently 
than non-combatants or those on the lines of communication? How has our understanding 
of war weariness changed over the years and decades since the end of the war? How did 
the experience of the Second World War shape our understanding of war weariness, but 
also affiliated concepts such as battle exhaustion, combat fatigue, and shell shock? The 
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pages that follow will attempt to address these questions and others that emerged 
throughout the research, reflection, and writing for this project.   
At this point it would be prudent to comment on why I have organised this project 
the way it is, and why I have chosen to analyse two non-contiguous time periods, April-
August 1917 and July-November 1918. The first two chapters explore the administrative, 
legal, disciplinary, and medical structures in place to identify, measure, and address 
problems such as war weariness and ultimately shell shock. These were the institutional 
and army structures designed to deal with problems in a preventative manner, but also as 
they emerged over time; they were of varying success, and were not always able to 
properly address the problems facing both individuals and military units on the Western 
Front. These systems also suggest that the medical and military authorities were aware of 
these problems, even if they were not always able or willing to address them 
appropriately. There were, however, some policies in place to help mitigate the negative 
effects of war weariness and attendant problems. It became evident to these authorities 
that it was best to preserve the fighting strength of the soldiers, despite the negative 
effects of long-term service.  
The next two chapters explore how these systems and structures actually played 
out in two periods important to the Canadian experience in the war. The original plan was 
to examine the final twenty months of the war, between April 1917 and November 1918, 
which included the Third Battle of Ypres and the German Spring Offensives, as well as 
the operations actually covered below. But the two selected time periods took precedence 
due to space limitations, the important comparative power of the chosen periods, and for 
what these periods represent to the armies involved – namely, a certain amount of time in 
the field from which we can assess decline. An examination of these time periods also 
allows for an assessment of war weariness, its contributors and manifestations, as an 
historical problem, and not just an administrative, legal, or medical one. By 1917, the 
large continental armies and the British Army had been fighting for 30 plus months which 
provided ample time for the decline and destruction of each nation’s professional forces, 
and coupled with inconclusive fighting and terrible casualties wore down these armies on 
the Western Front. The Canadian Corps, on the other hand, by 1917 had been in the field 
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for a rather shorter period of time compared to their Entente and Central Power 
counterparts; the large victory at Vimy – a rather short campaign compared with 
operations of 1918 – also helped offset embryonic war weariness in the Corps in 1917, 
just as other armies were suffering from collective war weariness, wear and tear, and 
beginning to break down. But by 1918, when the Corps had been in the field for over 30 
months (dating back to April 1915), it was largely able to avoid the most pernicious 
effects of general and collective war weariness. This can be explained in part by the 
effective operations of the latter half of 1918 and the surprise victories therein. The Corps 
was able to take advantage of German decline and implement important organisational, 
tactical, and technological changes that helped overcome defensive positions and enemy 
action. Luckily for the soldiers of the Corps, things went well on the battlefield and the 
authorities were able to check war weariness right when it was needed most. The sense of 
progress, the prospect of ultimate victory in the war, the fact that battlefield operations 
were successful (liberation of civilians and inhabited areas), the capture of enemy POWs 
and equipment, and the fortunate timing of the Armistice also help explain how war 
weariness was kept at bay in the Canadian forces. I also felt it useful to compare the Vimy 
period with the Hundred Days, which is less well known. Moreover, Vimy was an intense 
battle, and the Hundred Days was a period of sustained combat, making them fertile 
ground for the study of war weariness. And furthermore, this project is not, nor does it 
claim to be, a comprehensive account of war weariness in the Canadian Corps. Rather, it 
is a foray into the field, using two time periods as case studies.  
The first part of the dissertation, Chapters 1 and 2, will outline the most important 
structures in place in the British Army and Canadian forces designed to deal with the 
health and disciplinary problems of the troops. In chapter 1, the legal and disciplinary 
regimes of the Canadians will be assessed, and in Chapter 2 the military medical system 
of the period will be explored. War weariness and shell shock were serious problems for 
the medical and military authorities, and how these structures dealt with these problems is 
an integral part of the story. Chapter 3 begins the second part of the dissertation, and will 
provide the reader with the first of two chronological sections. In this first one, the period 
of April to August 1917 will be assessed, including the battles and engagements 
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pertaining to Vimy Ridge. This chapter will identify some of the contributing factors 
toward, as well as manifestations of, war weariness amongst the Canadian soldiers. 
Chapter 4 will provide the reader with a similar discussion for the July to November 1918 
period, when the factors and forces contributing to war weariness were arguably even 
greater than in earlier periods. This is interesting because by August of 1918 there were 
tangible indicators of battlefield success and the prospect for ultimate victory had never 
been higher in the war. And yet, discontent and war weariness continued, despite these 
positive developments.  
 War weariness on the home fronts also illustrate how this affected soldiers, 
civilians, and war workers. Even in the civilian realm, military matters played an 
important role, especially in this industrialised, total war. The importance of the 
connections between the home and battle fronts must therefore be taken into account. 
Those at home had loved ones in uniform, and despite censorship and propaganda, 
information was passed between the two fronts regularly. And each army was drawn from 
and tied to its parent society. The problems on the home front, for instance, served to both 
reflect and reinforce the problems at the battle front for the soldiers. I argue that for 
armies to be successful in the long-term, they needed a robust civilian home front and 
society able and willing to endure the long years of suffering and uncertainty. 
Furthermore, the army and armed forces themselves needed strength and a measure of 
flexibility to identify and adapt to these problems inherent to 20th century warfare.  
 And though beyond the scope of this project, evidence of discontent and collective 
and individual indiscipline in the months following the Armistice also suggest the 
continued importance of assessments of behaviour, attitude, leadership, and officer-
soldier relations. Even after the cessation of hostilities, soldier grievances continued, but 
without the mollifying impact of ‘the cause’ and appeals to duty and service. Moreover, 
the slight but insufficient relaxation of army discipline allowed problems that had been 
simmering below the surface for months or years to boil over into mutiny, strikes, and 
indiscipline following the Armistice. 
 In the chapters on the legal, disciplinary, and medical aspects of First World War 
service I argue that these systems were unable to properly deal with the enormous number 
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of discipline and health problems as a result of wartime service, though many attempts 
were made. Moreover, the structure and priorities of the legal/disciplinary and medical 
system of the British and Canadian forces both contributed to, and helped deal with, war 
weariness. Ultimately, the courts martial system and medical arrangements were unable 
to prevent war weariness, and its limited means to react to these increasing problems 
actually alienated many and exacerbated the condition of those worn down by frontline 
existence – in some ways, army policies could actually backfire and make matters worse. 
Those pushed to, and subsequently beyond, the breaking point were not always treated 
with sympathy and understanding; they were sometimes depicted as criminals, slackers, 
or malingerers. It was crucial that chaplains, commanding officers, and medical personnel 
be well-acquainted with their subordinates so they could intervene successfully on their 
behalf before general war weariness transmuted into shell shock debilitation. 
Unfortunately for the soldiers caught up in the war’s maelstrom and unable to carry on 
despite their best efforts, the collective was prioritised over the need for recovery of the 
individual soldiers. The medical chapter illustrates the stresses and strains imposed on the 
soldier’s mind and body, and that the often-rigid army medical system had difficulty 
distinguishing between war-weary and shell-shocked troops, let alone dealing with them 
appropriately. A one-size-fits-all model of military medicine and notions of duty were 
insufficient to deal with these ‘problem’ cases. Some war-weary soldiers fell through the 
cracks of army medicine and became more of a problem down the road as a result. 
 In the two chronological chapters presented here, it will be argued that the 
operations of the Canadian Corps, and what happened between them, contributed to war 
weariness and in many cases shell shock debilitation. There were, however, also various 
forces designed to address and mitigate the worst effects of war weariness. Psychiatric 
casualties and shell-shock cases did not always begin as war weariness, but there was 
overlap in the causes and contributing factors in both phenomena. Moreover, the nature 
and intensity of the war ensured that there was little genuine respite from the stresses and 
strains of war. Leave and rotation out of the line proved insufficient, and other ranks at 
the front were expected to carry on until seriously wounded or killed. In the First World 
War there were no ‘tours of duty;’ a soldier signed up for the duration of the conflict, plus 
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another six months, and was expected to do his duty unto death or victory. The heavy 
casualties suffered, and the added pressure this placed on survivors, wore down the 
soldiers to the point of medical and disciplinary problems. The reality of combat on the 
Western Front, and the experience of witnessing or participating in horrific and traumatic 
events, wore down even the hardiest volunteers. The strategic and tactical considerations 
of the time, moreover, put added pressure on the soldiers, especially in the final months of 
the war when it was decided to give the enemy no respite from Entente attacks. This 
meant, of course, very little respite for the attacking soldiers as well.  
 Ultimately, war weariness is a useful and effective way of understanding the 
experiences of those in the First World War. This concept can be applied also to non-
combatant but vital soldiers on the lines of communication, as well as to all manner of 
combatant troops. War weariness affected every soldier who spent any significant amount 
of time in combat or the army generally, to varying degrees. War weariness was also not 
confined to infantry. Artillery troops, machine gunners, tank crews, pilots, miners, 
engineers, and those of the gas service all faced different risks and sources of danger, but 
they had things in common as well. The physical, but also emotional and psychological 
exhaustion affected those experiencing hardship and privation. The inability to legally 
escape the sources of danger on a regular basis drove some soldiers to go AWL, desert, 
voluntarily surrender, or administer a SIW. Most soldiers, however, remained committed 
to the war effort and did not want to let their comrades, their family, their unit, their 
superiors, or their nation down. Many of these soldiers found the inner strength to carry 
on, and relied upon fortifying forces to keep going; these soldiers were willing, but 
increasingly unable to continue with duty because of the development of health problems. 
Other troops, however, were physically (though perhaps not otherwise) able to carry on in 
combat, but were increasingly reluctant to do so, even if they did not always act on this 
reluctance, for various reasons. It is this dynamic between inability and reluctance that 
will be explored in the following pages.  
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Chapter 1 - The Legal and Disciplinary Systems and 
Aspects of Service for the Canadian Corps in the First 
World War 
 
One of the ways in which military authorities controlled and shaped the behaviour 
of the troops under their command was through the legal and disciplinary organisation in 
the forces. These systems were an important aspect of army control, and played a role in 
maintaining the health and fighting prowess of the soldiers during the war. It seems that 
legal and medical aspects are only interpreted as an issue when they are problematized. 
Much has been written about the miscarriage of justice and the problems of the legal and 
disciplinary system facing British (and Dominion) forces in the years since the First 
World War,99 but it is important to remember that counterfactuals and anachronistic 
judgments are less than helpful in current historical inquiry. Things could have been done 
differently, and the British could have modelled their legal apparatus and disciplinary 
regime in other ways, but this did not happen. The German Army, for instance, officially 
executed far fewer of its soldiers than did the British Army, though historians generally 
agree the Germans were more likely to make use of summary executions without trial. 
And the Australian government refused to apply the death penalty to its soldiers at all. 
These cases are instructive in terms of comparison, but each system must also be judged 
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in its own right. The British system of control, discipline, and legal structures developed 
in its own way, and was historically contingent upon the experience of colonial wars and 
naval discipline. Moreover, applying our modern sensibilities to a conflict that began over 
a century ago is inappropriate, to say the least. The legal and disciplinary, as well as the 
military medical systems, usually functioned adequately behind the scenes or in the 
background. After all, hundreds of thousands of soldiers were ‘processed’ through the 
legal and medical systems during the war, though there were some problems.  
 The legal, disciplinary, and medical systems and structures pertaining to the 
Canadian forces in the war were complex and incorporated many different elements. 
These were multifaceted systems, which had some flexibility and dynamism, with some 
changes taking place during the war itself. Adaptations were based on the reality of 
warfare generally, and combat specifically. Lessons learned from other armies were also 
incorporated into the systems, though less thoroughly. Pre-war ideas and preconceived 
notions played a large role in how these systems were organised and justified after the 
start of the war in August 1914. These were not static, unchanging systems, but prejudice 
and personalities, politics and propaganda, prevented the rapid alteration of these systems 
during the war itself.100  
 There are different ways to understand and assess the legal/disciplinary and 
medical aspects pertaining to the Canadian forces during the war. For example, how did 
the medical and military authorities and structures react to problems amongst their 
subordinates after the mobilization and enlistment phase? One such way to understand 
these responses is to present a series of binaries. Were these reactions largely proactive, 
or reactive? Were these responses primarily individual/personal in nature, or more 
structural? How often were these reactions informal – such as when a commanding 
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nature of the war and the level of government culpability and responsibility to veterans. The debates over the awarding 
of pensions in Britain are but one example of the importance of these issues well after the guns fell silent on the 
Western Front. See Ted Bogacz, “War Neurosis and Cultural Change in England, 1914-1922: The Work of the War 
Office Committee of Enquiry into ‘Shell-Shock,’” The Journal of Contemporary History, 24 (1989): 227-256; Fiona 
Reid and Christine Van Everbroeck, “Shell Shock and the Kloppe: War Neuroses amongst British and Belgian Troops 
during and after the First World War,” Medicine, Conflict and Survival, 30, 4 (2014): 445-463 and Desmond Morton, 
Fight or Pay: Soldiers’ Families in the Great War (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004).  
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officer (CO) or medical officer (MO) used sympathy and discretion – or institutional, 
making use of the formal army disciplinary system and courts martial? Were these 
responses dealt with internally, at the local level, by the CO or MO, for example, or more 
externally, beyond this level, by the larger army system as a whole? It is clear, moreover, 
that the military hierarchy in general tended to view specific behaviours as leaning 
towards a more medial issue; on the other hand, some authorities interpreted these same 
behaviours as more legal or disciplinary issues.101 How much overlap was there? 
It is my contention that there was indeed much overlap between these 
legal/disciplinary and medical aspects and responses to the problems facing Canadian 
soldiers in the war. These systems and structures, in large measure, were designed with 
the same goals in mind, namely the close control of the soldiers under command to ensure 
the maximum number remained at duty for the maximum amount of time.102 Though on 
the surface it seems that these two military systems – the legal/disciplinary and the 
medical – had seemingly opposite goals (the former to punish, shape behaviour, and 
remove troublesome soldiers, and the latter to heal and ensure soldiers stayed healthy and 
fighting fit), these two systems had much overlap too. The legal/disciplinary system was 
also designed to ‘heal’ soldiers from their misdeeds and their issues which undermined 
their abilities as a soldier, and the medical system often took the form of punishment, and 
was also designed to shape behaviour and thinking. The medical and legal/disciplinary 
distinction made by historians is perhaps a false dichotomy.  
This chapter will examine the control of soldiers in relation to the military legal 
and disciplinary systems and structures. The legal and disciplinary regimes worked in 
tandem with the medical system, with both seeking ultimate military victory and hoping 
to ensure the soldiers remained fighting fit, and obedient. Both these structures were also 
systems of man-management, to reinforce army (and government) authority. And 
                                                             
 
101 In this understanding, it seems that factors a, b, and c were deemed legal and disciplinary, but factors x,y, and z as 
medical. I argue, however, that there was substantial overlap between these two structures. 
102 Other overlapping goals included the desire for victory, the need to preserve unit cohesion and fighting strength, the 
hope to bring as many soldiers home as possible consistent with military requirements, the maintenance of army 
authority, and to keep the troops fighting fit. Moreover, both battalion, company, and smaller unit COs and MOs were 
in (relatively) close proximity to the soldiers under their command and care.  
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regardless of officer training, upbringing, or attendance at medical school, these MOs, 
officers, and leaders of the military units were largely the same people. These COs and 
MOs, and the officers who sat on courts martial, had similar class backgrounds. These 
similarities ensured that the reactions to a war-weary or shell-shocked soldier were also 
similar.  
When the legal/disciplinary system was working properly and efficiently, officers 
were able to apply discipline and punishment to the units under their command. These 
punishments could be informal, summary, and short-term, or more substantial like a 
month of field punishment. Moreover, the courts martial system was used to deal with 
more serious cases, such as desertion and absence without leave, though there were some 
irregularities at times. If a unit had performed especially poorly, if there had been an 
increase in disciplinary problems, or if a new or particularly exacting CO sought to send a 
message or make an example of a soldier or unit, some soldiers might be sent for a court 
martial for crimes committed. The CO had some discretion on how to deal with these 
breaches of discipline, but only had so much leeway when it came to enforcing discipline 
on subordinates. However, when things were not functioning as smoothly, such as when 
there was a backlog of cases, too many crimes at key times (such as a major offensive), 
too many issues in a single unit, or a loss of trust in the officers or the system generally, 
this system could break down. A lack of faith in a unit’s officers or in the 
legal/disciplinary structure could contribute to the onset of war weariness, undermine 
morale and combat motivation, negatively affect discipline, and compromise the 
performance of both individuals and military units. The same was true for the military 
medical system.103 
                                                             
 
103 There were problems, for instance, with the reality of shell shock, war neurosis, and psychiatric casualties. One 
major problem from these casualties was the difficulty in adapting and coping with them. There was also substantial 
difficulty in reconciling competing views of major stakeholders. The term ‘shell shock’ eventually became proscribed 
in the BEF, and was only to be used under very particular circumstances, if at all. These casualties became a burden on 
the existing medical system, and at first these cases were simply imposed on old categories (such as Hysteria and 
Neurasthenia). The need for a new way of thinking was essential. The problem was that there were different views on 
the origins/causes, development, and required treatment for shell shock casualties. Compare, for example, the views of 
Lord Moran with that of Sir Andrew Macphail, both MOs. The former felt that every soldier had their breaking point, 
and men could overdraw their account of ‘courage,’ whereas Macphail took a much more traditional and unsympathetic 
view, arguing that shell shock “is a manifestation of childishness and femininity…against which there is no remedy.” 
This view suggests that only certain people succumbed to shell shock, and that nothing could be done for them. Moran, 
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This chapter will provide a foundational structure for the chronological chapters 
below. This and the following chapter will outline some of the key army and military 
structures and systems operative during the war, and which had a direct impact on the 
experiences of regular soldiers in the military hierarchy. They will sketch how these army 
systems reacted to, and dealt with, legal, disciplinary, and medical problems during the 
war. The use of field punishment, as well as courts martial, medical classification boards, 
and the medical system more generally, were also aspects of these structures and their 
responses to a complex war that lasted years. And finally, this chapter will allow for an 
understanding of how these structures and systems play out in the chronological time 
periods below.  
 
Legal and Disciplinary Aspects of the BEF and CEF in the First 
World War 
 The legal and disciplinary system facing Canadian soldiers in the war sought to 
ensure that those under army command followed orders and were obedient to authority. 
These structures dealt with discipline – and indiscipline – in certain ways, and addressed 
military crimes and breaches of conduct within the context of the war effort. The general 
definition of discipline I use constitutes three main aspects: punishment, the threat of 
punishment (often used as a deterrent), and a system of man management. The Oxford 
English Dictionary presents discipline as both a noun and verb, with the noun being “the 
practice of training people to obey rules or a code of behaviour, using punishment to 
correct disobedience,” and “a system of rules and conduct.” When used as a verb, 
discipline involved “train[ing] (someone) to obey rules or a code of behaviour, using 
punishment to correct disobedience” and also to “punish or rebuke formally for an 
offence.”104 These definitions are appropriate to our purposes here. 
                                                             
 
The Anatomy of Courage and Sir Andrew Macphail, Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914-
1919: The Medical Services (Ottawa: F.A. Acland – Printer to the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, 1925), 278. 
104 These definitions were found online at https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/discipline. See also Victor 
Hanson, “Discipline,” in Reader’s Companion to Military History ed. by Cowley and Parker, 134-136. 
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 Discipline was part of a system to control behaviour and thinking. Lord Moran 
interpreted discipline as an important aspect of military service, but was also a means to 
an end – the end presumably being the solid performance of the soldier, and ultimate 
victory. Moreover, discipline was depicted as “control from without,” which could only 
be relaxed if it was replaced by control or discipline from within.105 Discipline could also 
take the form of either punishment or persuasion,106 and drill and training could 
contribute to the development of discipline, but this only prepared the troops to a certain 
point.107 Army discipline was part of the system of both control and punishment, and the 
even application of discipline was more effective, and more humane, than its uneven 
application.108 This discipline could also be tailored and applied to local circumstances,109 
and take into account the needs of the unit and other factors that fell outside official 
discipline. 
 And just as discipline needed to be tailored to local circumstances and military 
units, there were different types of discipline employed to further the army’s goals. 
Discipline could be more informal, for example, allowing the CO, officers, and NCOs to 
adjust policies to make them compatible to the needs of the individuals and the unit as a 
whole. This informal discipline allowed authority figures to use discretion and even act in 
a sympathetic way toward the troops, understanding what they had been through and what 
they still had to endure. The MO of the 31st Battalion stated that despite his shortcomings 
                                                             
 
105 Moran, The Anatomy of Courage, 172-182. 
106 This is often referred to as carrots and sticks, or the use of inducements or the promise of rewards and using the 
threat of punishment and punishment itself to shape behaviour and thinking. LAC, RG 9 III B1, Series 2, volume 662, 
D-106-2, ‘Discipline, Generally.’  
107 Moran, The Anatomy of Courage, 172-182. 
108 LAC, RG 9 III B1, Series 26, Volume 2180, Folder D-2-26 Volume 5, ‘Discipline: Generally,’ and Folder D-2-26, 
Volume 6, ‘Dress – Officers (Discipline), File 54/General No./3829 (Q.M.G.7).’ Training documents for 1917 also 
stated that officers must be taught that “enforcing strict discipline at all times” will help gain the confidence of the men, 
and “this must be a willing discipline, not a sulky one. Be just, but do not be soft – men despise softness.” LAC, RG 9 
III C1, Volume 3868, Folder 109, File 10, ‘Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive Action, 1917.’ 
109 Army rules and procedures were often about man-management, a system to control the soldiers under their 
command. In one such case, the local canteens frequented by the troops would only be closed if the medical authorities 
deemed it necessary to control the spread of meningitis. Leaving the canteen open, however, allowed for closer control 
of the troops and to keep them content (and hopefully law abiding). Had this canteen been closed, the troops would 
have travelled to other pubs and estaminets, further increasing the chances of spreading the contagious strain. Keeping 
it open was deemed “necessary if the men… are to be kept away from the neighbouring public houses or from buying 
whisky from illicit peddlers.” In this case, the local authorities deemed keeping the canteen open the lesser of two evils, 
allowing the troops to drink in army-sanctioned establishments. LAC, RG 9 III B1, Volume 392, C-22-1, document 
dated 20 January 1915.  
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as a military leader, General Richard Turner was well liked by the men of the 2nd 
Division, as he did not insist on the formal discipline so common in the British forces at 
the time.110 This informal discipline and demeanor allowed for a closer working 
relationship between officers, NCOs, and ORs, and the formal discipline111 expected of 
the men was often interpreted as demeaning, difficult, and impractical (especially in the 
trenches). This emphasis upon formal discipline often took the form of demanding 
“smartness, punctuality, thoroughness, avoidance of waste, general conduct and 
appearance of officers” and NCOs.112 The problem with this emphasis, of course, was that 
in many cases the authorities came to believe that ‘smartness’ would directly translate 
into, and ensure, success on the battlefield and fighting prowess. Using unit discipline as 
a direct proxy for military performance, however, was problematic. 
 Informal discipline was also an important part of the officers’ toolkit, as formal 
discipline could be a rather blunt instrument. In addition to this, the imposition and 
insistence on formal discipline could remove members of the unit from duty when they 
were most needed – and this was especially true when units were in the line or engaged in 
operations. Colonel Cy Peck of the 16th Canadian (Scottish) Battalion, for instance, used 
                                                             
 
110 Norris, ed., The World War I Memoir of Captain Harold McGill, 75. Moreover, this tendency to rely on informal 
discipline in some of the Canadian (and other Dominion, such as Australian) units, and the casual relationship between 
ORs and superiors, was looked down on by the British in the field. Canadians seemed to have a reputation for 
“indiscipline” during the war. DUASC, Clearing: The Tale of the First Canadian Casualty Clearing Station, BEF, 
1914-1919, by Thomas Brenton Smith, MS-2-432 – SF 44-1, page 103. 
111 This formal discipline imposed by the army often took the form of ‘smartness’ and cleanliness. According to training 
documents, “it is of the greatest importance that a high standard of discipline is maintained. Strictness on the part of 
officers and N.C.Os is necessary on such points as cleanliness, falling out on the march, straggling.” Moreover, the 
document indicated that “the secret of success in the present war is discipline” and that units that were the “smartest” on 
parade, and on and off duty, had “the best discipline in all other respects.” Another officer noted his men were 
becoming “smarter under the training…and the condition of the billets reflected this improvement.” PPCLI Archives, 
34(1) – 8, Infantry Battalion Training Notes, November-December 1914, and ‘Hints from France’ and Norris, The 
World War I Memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, 250. 
112 LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3868, Folder 109, File 1, ‘1st Canadian Divisional Training School.’ See also Ibid, 
Folder 109, File 3, ‘Training in Reserve Area,’ 10 March 1918 and ‘Training while in Reserve,’ 26 May 1917. This 
emphasis on the appearance and conduct of the officers could be detrimental in other ways as well. One document of 
1917 stated that officers should not drink in the same establishment as their subordinate NCOs (to say nothing of 
drinking with the ORs). This seemed to be a carry-over from the rigid (British) class system, and there were also 
cultural and social elements to this strict military hierarchy. Instead of fostering cohesion and mutual trust, it seems that 
these rules and distinctions could cause resentment. One artillery officer acknowledged this gulf between regular 
soldiers and officers, accepting that it was necessary for military discipline, but “was arbitrary and in a sense a sham.” 
Other training documents suggested that “discipline can only be maintained when the ‘chain of command’ is properly 
organized and kept up.” LAC, RG 9 III B1, Series 26, Volume 2180, Folder D-2-26 Volume 6, File ‘Confidential 
Memorandum,’ February 1917, Black, I Want One Volunteer, 77 and LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3868, Folder 109, File 
‘Training while in Reserve Area – 2nd Canadian Division G. 33/54.’ 
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discretion while his unit was fighting at the Canal du Nord and Hindenburg Line, in the 
autumn of 1918. Instead of sending all the unit stragglers up for courts martial, and thus 
removing them from combat, he rounded them up and established an emergency reserve 
force.113 This ensured that there were some soldiers on hand to deal with military 
emergencies and to help reconstitute the unit after heavy casualties, and giving these 
soldiers the opportunity to redeem themselves. In another instance of avoiding formal 
discipline, a Canadian artillery officer used physical violence on a subordinate soldier, 
explaining that that “was better than getting him a court martial for refusing to obey an 
order.”114 The use of the formal disciplinary and legal system was time-consuming, 
removed the offending soldier from the unit, and could be a drain on army resources.  
 The disciplinary system and the legal structures in place were designed, in part, to 
prevent war weariness – including dissent and reluctance – from spreading and reaching 
collective proportions. This system, however, was better placed to react to war weariness, 
its occurrences, and manifestations. The phenomenon was not fully understood at the 
time, hence the original focus on discipline and punishments, rather than positive 
inducements to behaviour and especially behaviour in combat. These structures, 
moreover, did not adequately address those who were fed up and war weary, but found 
the strength to carry on; rather, they focussed on those who evaded duty and exhibited 
disciplinary problems.  
  
A System of Discipline and Control 
Both informal and formal discipline were used to punish,115 deter, and as part of 
the man-management system to control the troops. These were deemed crucial to the 
proper functioning of any unit, both on the parade ground and in combat itself. Moreover, 
                                                             
 
113 René Chartrand, The Canadian Corps in World War I (Oxford: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 2007), 14 and H.M. 
Urquhart, The History of the 16th Battalion (The Canadian Scottish) Canadian Expeditionary Force in the Great War, 
1914-1919 (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1932), 309-310. 
114 Black, I Want One Volunteer, 26. 
115 One report from a Canadian Convalescent Hospital, for example, illustrated that sometimes the CO of units not in 
the field would send or transfer soldiers under their command to another unit when they felt that the current punishment 
was insufficient. This was the case because hospital COs were limited in authority and in what they could award as 
punishments. COs of infantry units in the field, however, had much more leeway when it came to issuing punishments. 
LAC, RG 9 III B1, Series 2, Volume 661, D-97-2, Discipline, Granville Canadian Convalescent Hospital. 
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many of these views on discipline emerged from the pre-war Canadian forces, namely the 
(non-permanent active) militia in Canada. These policies were then adapted to the current 
war conditions. A 1915 training manual, for instance, instructed that officers and ORs:  
will adopt towards each other and their subordinates such methods of command 
and treatment as will ensure prompt obedience, respect for authority, a deep sense 
of self-respect, a high sense of duty. [Furthermore] bullying, swearing or 
intemperate language must be avoided. It is the duty of a soldier to obey all lawful 
orders given by superior authority.116 
 
The problem with this automatic obedience to authority, however, was that it served to 
undermine independence of thought,117 which could prove devastating in the event of 
casualties during an attack or defensive operation. When officers and NCOs were killed 
or wounded during operations, subordinates had to take their place during the heat of 
battle. Without guidance from above and with the inability to make spontaneous decisions 
for the good of the group, the operation could fail. This could have mortal consequences, 
or even imperil the wider military situation.  
 The justifications for army authority and discipline were multifaceted, and were 
an integral part of army life. The British society from which many of the Canadian 
soldiers emerged was much more class-conscious and deferential than ours today. And 
though Canadian society in the early 20th century was less class-based than its British 
counterpart, respect for elders and social superiors was well ingrained; this made the 
transition to army life easier for some. Army discipline was predicated on the need for 
obedience and maintaining the chain of command. This deference to authority entailed 
the “immediate and implicit obedience of orders, both on and off parade,” and respect for 
and adherence to the orders and rank of superiors and the military hierarchy.118 
                                                             
 
116 The Military Museums, W.A. Howard Library and J.E. Child Archives, TMM FOO38, Gordon Gilmour Fonds, 
Folder 1, booklet: ‘Infantry Training for use of Canadian Militia, 1915.’ Moreover, what if the CO gave an unlawful 
order? Certainly soldiers were under no (legal) obligation to obey, but to disobey orders, even unlawful or unpopular 
ones, could undermine the entire system of military authority and compromise unit cohesion, trust in leaders and 
comrades, lead to even worse consequences, etc. 
117 Moran, The Anatomy of Courage, 208. 
118 Officers and superiors were also to insist on “the thorough performance of all duties.” Part of this insistence on the 
unquestioning obedience to orders was based on the idea that soldiers needed to be ‘programmed’ to obey orders 
automatically, even for seemingly trivial things like saluting. If a soldier was good on the parade ground and while not 
in combat, it would increase the chances that they would be obedient in combat as well, when it truly counted. This also 
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 Some soldiers took to this top-down authority and discipline rather easily, whereas 
others chafed at the idea of this control but still accepted the need for discipline, however 
problematic it could be. Still other soldiers were not thoroughly convinced of the need for 
the type and severity of discipline as practiced by the British and Canadian armies during 
the war. Coningsby Dawson who served on the Western Front, for instance, wrote in 
April of 1918 that “army discipline is in many ways silly and old-maidish.” He then 
recounted a story of a soldier punished for asking a colonel to hold his horse while he 
mounted it; he wondered what the sense was in punishing this “chap who’s faithful, well-
conducted and honest.”119 And yet, it was a widespread belief that army orders needed to 
be obeyed, and it was not the prerogative of the soldier to question these orders. 
Important mediators and intermediaries like NCOs, MOs, and chaplains, who helped 
connect the upper echelons of the military hierarchy with the rank and file, also played an 
important role in ensuring obedience to proper military authority. Chaplains, for example, 
assisted with army discipline and the man-management system in part by helping ease 
tensions and reinforcing that orders needed to be followed, especially unpopular ones. As 
one chaplain explained in a report: 
I would discuss the matter [of discipline] with them in my talks at the Sunday 
services and do all in my power to change their hostile attitude to one of ready 
acceptance and obedience to the order…I don’t believe in discussing or explaining 
orders to the men, but in obeying them. Orders are orders and must be 
obeyed…my love and sympathy with my lads are boundless, but my influence is 
always exerted in maintaining obedience to those in authority.120 
 
This paternalistic chaplain helped reinforce and legitimise army discipline, and made use 
of the ideas of self-sacrifice and self-control to help in this task. Some officers and unit 
leaders, though, were hesitant to discipline their men to the extent that the army desired. 
This discipline, however, was depicted as an integral step “in the process of converting 
                                                             
 
helps explain the emphasis on obedience, deference to authority, the army hierarchy, and army rules and discipline. 
LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3868, Folder 109, File 3, ‘Canadian Corps G. 439 – Adv. First Army’ and file ‘Training – 
Division.’ LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 5663, Folder 2, File 2, Miscellaneous, ‘G.R. Orders No. 3 and 81,’ former dated 
18 August 1914.  
119 Dawson, Living Bayonets, 112, letter from France, dated 26 April 1918. 
120 LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4669, Chaplains Reports, Historical 1.  
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other ranks into soldiers,”121 and was important for the proper functioning of the unit. 
And it was with these soldiers that the war would be fought, and either won or lost. 
 The legal and disciplinary system of the Canadian forces in the war relied upon 
certain soldiers to uphold these policies and regulations. The Corps of Military Police 
(MP), for instance, had myriad duties, including enforcing march discipline and directing 
traffic, tracking down offenders, and working with COs, assistant provost marshals 
(APMs), and courts martial in the application of military justice itself and to ensure that 
punishments were laid down and enforced.122 All of these duties helped ensure that army 
discipline was carried out on the troops. Medical officers, COs, sergeants and NCOs, 
chaplains,123 and other authority figures and intermediaries all played a role in ensuring 
the troops were familiar with all the army orders, military laws, and regulations, and that 
these were enforced.  
 All levels of the military hierarchy had a role to play in the application and 
enforcement of discipline and military law. Indeed, the system could not function without 
it. All soldiers in uniform were subject to military discipline, but accepted it more readily 
than others. One British soldier, for instance, was horrified with the firing squad he was 
involved in, and found that his sleep was disturbed as a result.124 He accepted the need for 
discipline, even if it was distasteful at times. This acceptance was made easier when the 
officers of each unit prepared the soldiers for it. As an officer of the 31st Battalion 
explained, while in barracks his troops took to discipline rather easily “for the men were 
quite prepared for it, understood its necessity, and conformed to the requirements of [the] 
                                                             
 
121 DUASC, Clearing: The Tale of the First Canadian Casualty Clearing Station, BEF, 1914-1919, by Thomas Brenton 
Smith, MS-2-432 – SF 44-1, page 39. 
122 At Vimy, MPs established advanced battle straggler stops and battle straggler collecting posts, and worked in 
conjunction with the APM there. Battle stragglers were to be “collected at the straggler collecting station, fed, re-armed 
from casualties, if unarmed, and marched back to their units in parties.” Wounded stragglers, on the other hand, would 
be sent to the dressing station. The APM (and military police) were to have 200 rations and “will take names of all 
stragglers.” See Andrew Davidson, A Doctor in the Great War (New York: Marble Arch Press, 2013), 88; LAC, RG 9 
III B1, Volume 1778, D-17-4, No. 3 Canadian Sanitary Section, ‘Discipline;’ Volume 3471, 10-4-4, ‘ORs, Absentees, 
etc.;’ LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3865, Folder 101, File 1, Organisation and Establishment Canadian Mounted Troops 
and Ibid, Volume 3845, Folder 49, File 4, Vimy Operations, “X” Division (1st Canadian), ‘Instructions.’ 
123 All chaplains were expected to be familiar with army orders, rules, and discipline. They were encouraged to become 
familiar and friendly with their troops, and become known by them, and also to be “acquainted” with the KRO. They 
would also be expected to be familiar with the British Army Act, guidelines for soldiers, etc. LAC, RG 9 III C15, 
Volume 4651, Education 1, ‘Notes on Service in the Army Chaplains Department.’ 
124 Arthur, ed., Forgotten Voices of the Great War, 277-278. 
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situation more readily and with less friction than could have been reasonably 
expected.”125 Adherence to discipline while in barracks, however, would have to survive 
the shock of battle and the stresses and strains associated with combat and its aftermath.  
 Officers and NCOs played an important role in ensuring the legal and disciplinary 
regimes were upheld both in barracks, and while on active service. The discipline of the 
unit was overseen by its CO, who set the tone for the unit’s training and morale;126 the 
other officers and unit NCOs proceeded accordingly. The unit’s officers played a key role 
in the system of man-management, set examples for their troops, especially in terms of 
dress and deportment, enforced the rules of service, held inspections and parades, 
oversaw discipline, and upheld censorship regulations,127 amongst other duties. 
Competent leadership and drill were but two ways in which officers could instil their 
views on discipline to their subordinates. Drill, for instance, was important as “a means to 
an end,” training the troops to follow commands and trust authority.128 Discipline was 
closely related to leadership and command, which highlighted the “necessity of [a] 
system of command so as to ensure continuity”129 in the unit. This also meant that heavy 
casualties could disrupt this continuity, and thus undermine the unit’s cohesion and 
connection between leadership and the led.  
 Aside from training, drill, and good leadership practices, there were other ways in 
which to convince the troops of the need to obey authority and follow orders implicitly. 
Lectures, training courses, and the use of route marches (to stress march discipline), for 
                                                             
 
125 Norris, The World War I Memoir of Captain Harold McGill, 33-35. 
126 Lt.-General E.L.M. Burns, General Mud: Memoirs of Two World Wars (Toronto/Vancouver: Clarke, Irwin & 
Company Limited, 1970), 65. 
127 Davidson, A Doctor in the Great War, 48; LAC, RG 9 III B1, Series 26, Volume 2180, Folder D-2-26 Volume 5, 
‘Discipline: Generally;’ LAC, RG 9 III C9, Volume 4533, File 1, ‘Correspondence,’ 16-1-15 to 29-1-19, ‘Dishonoured 
Cheques,’ and ‘Instructions for Railhead Supply Officers – Second Army’ and LAC, RG 9 III B1, Series 2, Volume 
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postcards, could not be sent within or outside the British Empire. Contravening orders could mean that important 
information fell into enemy hands, which could also endanger one’s comrades. One report on censorship stated that 
anyone who “discloses information which he knows is in contravention of the regulations is absolutely devoid of any 
code of honour, and may also be impairing the good name of the regiment.” LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4574, Folder 
2, File 5, Routine Orders, 1916-1917 and LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4214, Folder 1, File 12, ‘Censorship.’ 
128 LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3868, Folder 109, File 10, ‘Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive 
Action, 1917.’ 
129 Ibid. 
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example, served to reinforce these lessons, and “every effort [was] made to ensure that 
they [the other ranks] realise the seriousness of the situation.”130 If simple explanations 
and discussions failed to properly motivate the troops, there were always more practical 
means of shaping behaviour and thought. Promises of leave, or conversely threats to 
cancel upcoming leave, could certainly act as a powerful way to shape behaviour. Threats 
of punishment could be made to the entire unit,131 a collective approach to the 
enforcement of army discipline and standards of behaviour, or could be done in a more 
personal, individual way. At times these personal approaches to discipline entailed 
actually threatening the soldier with physical harm if orders were not obeyed. Deward 
Barnes of Toronto, for example, wrote in his journal that during an attack in August of 
1918 “one or two of the draftees [conscripted soldiers or MSA men]…refused and I 
threatened to shoot them if they didn’t dig” during the operation.132 These types of threats 
seemed to work most of the time. Some soldiers, however, were unwilling to conform to 
these rules and regulations, whatever the cost. 
 
Military Laws and Expectations 
The system of army discipline was based on military laws, expectations, and 
procedures. There were, of course, problems and limitations to this system, which were 
identified by both contemporaries and by subsequent historians, legal experts, and other 
researchers. After a soldier signed his declaration and took his oath upon attestation, he 
was subject to army law and military discipline. Special rules applied to soldiers actually 
in the war zone and at the front, but all soldiers, whether in Canada, the UK, or on the 
lines of communication in France and Flanders were subject to army discipline and law. 
                                                             
 
130 March discipline was deemed important while on active service, and thus was stressed by officers and training 
instructors. There was insistence upon “the strictest march discipline” while on the move, and certain policies were to 
be followed, such as no halts to be made in villages.   LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3868, Folder 109, ‘Training of 1st and 
2nd C.M.R. Brigades,’ ‘Confidential – Canadian Corps – G. 478 – 2nd Army,’ by C.H. Harrington, 16-12-15 and LAC, 
RG 9 III C1, Volume 3862, Folder 94, File 5, ‘2nd Canadian Division Operational Order No. 175.’ 
131 For ‘green’ formations, for instance, threating to not allow these units into the line might be effective. In 1915 the 
state of training for one Canadian unit ensured that “these troops will not be entrusted with a portion of the line until 
they are thoroughly efficient” as soldiers. LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3868, Folder 109, ‘Training of 1st and 2nd C.M.R. 
Brigades,’ ‘Confidential – Canadian Corps – G. 478 – 2nd Army,’ by C.H. Harrington, 16-12-15. 
132 Bruce Cane, ed., It Made You Think of Home: The Haunting Journal of Deward Barnes, Canadian Expeditionary 
Force 1916-1919 (Toronto: The Dundurn Group, 2004), 245. 
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During wartime and while on active service, the troops were under the authority of the 
British Army Act, the British Manual of Military Law,133 the King’s Regulations and 
Orders (KRO),134 and other statutes, orders, and even civilian legal structures. Canadian 
soldiers were also subject to Canadian laws, aspects of the Militia Act, and regulations 
specific to their own branch of service,135 provided they did not conflict with other legal 
norms.  
The Army Act outlined the military crimes and breaches of conduct under which 
soldiers were charged, punished, and brought before a court martial.136 For example, the 
crime of cowardice fell under Section 4 (7) of the Army Act, which stated that a soldier 
was guilty of cowardice when he showed “an unsoldierlike [sic] regard for his personal 
safety in the presence of the enemy,”137 such as by deserting his post, casting aside or 
laying down his arms. And there were different definitions and understandings of what 
constituted desertion, especially while on active service. The Army Act covered all 
conceivable military crimes, including those pertaining to refusing orders (section 11), 
theft and looting (section 6),138 desertion, including participating in, assisting, or failure to 
inform the CO of (section 14), and AWL (section 15).139 And to give COs, officers, and 
                                                             
 
133 In this chapter I make use of the 1907 British Manual of Military Law, the last version published prior to the 
outbreak of war in 1914. British War Office, Manual of Military Law (London: Printed for His Majesty’s Stationary 
Office, by Harrison and Sons, 1907). This version was found online at 
https://archive.org/details/manualofmilitary00greauoft.  
134 Under the KRO, for example, Section 4 covered cowardice, Section 7 related to mutiny, and Section 12 covered 
desertion. PPCLI Archives, Courts Martial and Discipline, Part II, File #: 30 (22) – 5, Memorandum – Desertion.  
135 Railway troops, for instance, were subject to both the British Army Act and the Railway Regulations Act. LAC, RG 
9 III B1, Volume 2179, Folder D-2-26 Volume 3, ‘Discipline – Generally.’ 
136 It seemed that COs could send any soldier on active service up for a courts martial and “they should do so, if in their 
opinion a case merits more than a punishment of 28 days Field Punishment No. 1.” LAC, RG 9 III B1, Volume 1778, 
D-17-4, No. 3 Canadian Sanitary Section, report of 16 February 1918. It seems that COs often had the choice of 
whether to impose field punishment, or send the soldier for a courts martial. Bell, Canada in War-Paint, 33. 
137 Moran, The Anatomy of Courage, 20 and PPCLI Archives, Courts Martial and Discipline, Part II, File #: 30 (22) – 5.  
138 Section 6 (1a) covered ‘leaving his CO in search of plunder,’ 6 (1g) was ‘breaking into a house in search of plunder,’ 
and 6 (1j) covered ‘irregularly appropriating to his own unit provisions and supplies.’ The MO of the 31st Battalion, 
moreover, wrote of soldiers seen scrounging for turnips in No Man’s Land. Moreover, McGill wrote that food was 
crucial for morale, and referred to “a tremendously strong appetite the looting instinct is, and how well disciplined 
troops must be to refrain from falling to plundering at critical junctures in military operations.” He noted, also, that 
some soldiers looted Lee Enfield rifles from the dead after giving up on their Ross rifles. Norris, The World War I 
Memoir of Captain Harold McGill, 111, 271, and 150. See also Cate, ed., A Soldier’s Memoir of World War I, 45, 75 
and William Hesler, ed., War Interlude: 1916-1919 (Bloomington: iUniverse Inc., 2011), 31. 
139 For each charge/crime there were different aspects to it. Section 8 (1), for instance, covered ‘offering violence to his 
superior officer,’ whereas section 8 (2b) covered ‘using insubordinate or threatening language to his superior officer.’ 
There were also different understandings of desertion. “Constructive desertion,” for example, was applied “where the 
absence of the accused soldier resulted in his avoiding any special or dangerous duty.” Other important Army Act 
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other authority figures some leeway when it came to charging soldiers, there were also 
more ‘catch-all’ charges under which soldiers could be tried and punished. Section 40 of 
the Army Act, for example, covered ‘conduct to the prejudice of good order and military 
discipline,’ giving COs some flexibility in punishing soldiers for breaches of conduct that 
were not necessarily covered by pre-existing laws.140 This charge, aside from the 
flexibility it afforded COs, also gave authorities some assurance that undisciplined 
soldiers could be punished, even if their ‘crime’ or breach of conduct fell outside more 
specific military laws found in the Army Act and other documents.  
The legal and disciplinary regime facing Canadian soldiers during the war was 
composed of both official and unofficial policies and procedures, as well as certain 
documents that formalised these policies and monitored soldier behaviour.141 Generally 
speaking, these were all designed to deal with those who experienced war weariness, but 
also those whose war weariness reached into outright refusal and evasion of duty. In 
many ways war weariness is a difficult concept to pin down; it describes those soldiers 
who were fed up, worn down, and increasingly questioning their role, but did not 
necessarily cross over into refusals and serious disciplinary problems. There was a fine 
line between war weariness and rejections of legitimate army authority, and there were 
                                                             
 
sections included: section 7 (crimes related to mutiny), section 19 (drunkenness), section 18 (malingering, pretending to 
be ill, or deliberately injuring yourself), and section 18 (disgraceful conduct of the soldier). The Military Museums, 
W.A. Howard Library and J.E. Child Archives, TMM F00 81, John Cummer Fonds, Volume 2, Series 4-6, 9-3-4, 
Folder 1, Notebook: ‘Notes taken during a Course at Harrowby Camp’ and PPCLI Archives, Courts Martial and 
Discipline, Part II, File #: 30 (22) – 5, ‘Memorandum – Desertion.’  
140 In one case of September 1916, for instance, a soldier was reprimanded for breaching censorship regulations, though 
he was actually charged under Section 40, “an act to the prejudice of good order and military discipline.” LAC, RG 9 
III C10, Volume 4574, Folder 1, File 4, Routine Orders of 1916 and LAC, RG 150, Volume 243, 2nd Canadian 
Divisional Supply Column (1), 1914-1915. This also allowed for stragglers, shirkers, and anyone exhibiting the 
slightest symptom of ‘cold feet’ to be punished by authorities, even if there was no formal charge or crime. PPCLI 
Archives, 34 (1) – 8, Infantry Battalion Training Notes, November – December 1914, and ‘Hints from France.’ 
141 Important paperwork pertaining to military discipline and army law included APM charge reports and sheets, which 
identified the crime (ex. “Drunk”), place and date, name of witnesses, punishment, and ‘by whom awarded.’ When a 
soldier was charged with a crime, there emerged correspondence and instructions regarding his care, confinement, 
outlined the punishment, and included requests for routes and warrants for the offender and his escort. Army Form B. 
252, moreover, was the standard charge sheet under the King’s Regulations, and was sent to the APM when a soldier 
committed a crime. And a soldier’s conduct sheet, service history, and disciplinary record were also used at times to 
call for either greater leniency, or as justification for a harsher sentence based on past experience/performance. All 
documents, including the charge sheets, accompanied the soldier in transfer/transit. For courts martial members, 
moreover, the ‘Notes for Guidance of Presidents’ (of courts martial) was also crucial. See LAC, RG 9 III B1, Volume 
392, C-26-1, Volume 1, Charge Sheets and Volume 2; LAC, RG 9 III B1, Series 2, Volume 661, D-79-2, Discipline, 
‘14th Reserve Battalion;’ Volume 662, D-102-2. Discipline, Canadian Postal Corps; Volume 1778, D-17-4, No. 3 
Canadian Sanitary Section, Discipline and PPCLI Archives, Courts Martial and Discipline, Part II, File #: 30 (22) – 5. 
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many forces that could push any individual soldiers from war weariness into more serious 
problems. These policies and procedures were intended to prevent war weariness from 
transmuting into more serious and collective disciplinary issues. 
Army Form B. 2069, for instance, was the ‘Offence Report,’ for use in field 
service only. This document outlined the regimental number, name, and rank of the 
offending soldier, the particulars of the crime, including place and date, the crime itself, 
by whom it was reported, and witnesses; the CO needed to initial it, a punishment levied, 
and signed by an officer.142 In terms of procedures, the courts martial, particularly the 
field general courts martial (FGCM), was the main body used to settle military legal 
issues. These issues could be settled locally and summarily, within the military unit itself, 
or for more serious crimes a court martial would be convened. Recidivist soldiers and 
repeat offenders, moreover, might also be sentenced under a court martial, even if their 
crimes were relatively minor. These military courts included officers, called witnesses to 
testify, gathered evidence, investigated crimes, examined documents and the soldier’s 
service record, and ultimately decided upon the guilt or innocence of the accused, as well 
as the recommended punishment.143 These courts martial, and courts of inquiry, had clear 
rules and procedures to be followed.144 Policies were in place to ensure these courts 
proceeded efficiently, and in conformity to military law and justice, but also to ensure 
there was some protection for the accused soldier; the latter included, for instance, the 
provision for a legal assistant or ‘soldier’s friend’ to help in his defence.145 And it was 
                                                             
 
142 The soldier’s charge sheet would also have to be updated to include this information, and any remarks also provided. 
LAC, RG 9 III B1, Volume 1778, D-17-4, No. 3 Canadian Sanitary Section, ‘Discipline.’  
143 LAC, RG 150, Volume 242, No. 1 Canadian Field Bakery, Canadian Army Service Corps, 13/6/17. 
144 For example, the army sought to dispose of courts martial cases as quickly as possible, but only if it did not 
negatively affect or interfere with “active operations.” There were attempts to stamp out “irregularities regarding 
discipline,” and ensure that proper punishments were awarded, as “illegalities in this respect” were “subversive to 
discipline.” Another procedure to be followed was that witnesses needed at the trial were not to be “allowed to proceed 
on leave before [the] trial.” And there were also rules regarding the distinction between AWL and Desertion. See 
PPCLI Archives, Sub-Series 30, Nominal rolls, Courts Martial and Discipline, Parts I and II, File #: 30 (21) – 5; LAC, 
RG 9 III C10, Volume 4554, Folder 2, File 12, Routine Order No. 302 and Volume 4563, Folder 1, File 3, ‘Circular 
Memorandum 26,’ dated 30 October. 
145 Those going to trial for capital crimes were not always given a fair chance at defending themselves. A ‘friend of the 
accused’ would be provided, but only “whenever practicable.” This suggests that this was not always the case, or that 
the military situation or military expediency could further disadvantage the accused. Rules also outlined certain 
procedures that had to be followed in order to bring a charge against a soldier through a court martial. Reports and 
letters of the PPCLI, for example, lamented that sometimes convictions were quashed because “charges were laid under 
the wrong section, or the prosecution failed to produce sufficient evidence.” It seemed, moreover, that the author of 
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British Army policy to publish the results of courts martial in brigade, battalion, and other 
units’ daily or routine orders.146 This was done, in part, to act as a deterrent to others, to 
stigmatise and embarrass the offending soldier, and to reinforce military discipline and 
army authority.  
The legal and disciplinary system did not always run smoothly, however, and at 
times it may have actually caused more harm than it prevented. There were problems 
related to the courts martial system,147 for instance, and also regarding the unequal 
application of discipline and punishment. An inequitable or overly harsh disciplinary 
regime may have actually undermined the soldier’s confidence in the military hierarchy 
and system, rather than work as a contributor to unit cohesion and fortitude.148 And some 
of the policies reflected in the disciplinary system, though not officially enshrined in it, 
also served to compromise unit cohesion and solidarity. An infantry training manual for 
the Canadian Militia, and also used during the war, stipulated that  
                                                             
 
these reports worried that men were failing through the cracks and going unpunished. These documents suggest that if a 
soldier could not be charged with desertion for lack of evidence, then they should be at least charged with cowardice or 
AWL. See LAC, RG 9 III B1, Volume 1778, D-17-4, No. 3 Canadian Sanitary Section, ‘Circular Memorandum;’ 
Volume 390, B-11-1 and LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4669, Chaplains Reports, Hospitals 1 and PPCLI Archives, 
Courts Martial and Discipline, Part II, File #: 30 (22) – 5, ‘Circular Memorandum A.8.,’ 36th (Ulster) Division, Scale of 
Punishments, dated 23 November 1915 and 30 (21) – 5. 
146 See, for instance, LAC, RG 9 III C9, Volume 4530, File 14F, ‘Orders: Daily Part I (2nd Canadian Divisional Train),’ 
1-1-18 to 30-4-18. Moreover, it seems the army authorities made a concerted effort to ensure that all pertinent orders, 
instructions, rules, policies, and procedures were published regularly, and clear for all troops to see and be made aware 
of. This meant, for example, that orders that had been published in the past were often re-published, as the issue was 
deemed pertinent again or to remedy recent problems. Documents from Shorncliffe Hospital, for instance, make it clear 
that important orders, rules, and instructions were often repeated to the troops, both verbally and in writing, multiple 
times. In one example, the orders were repeated three times in one month. LAC, RG 9 III B1, Series 2, Volume 662, D-
107-2, Discipline, Hospitals Generally and D-100-2, Discipline, Princess Patricia’s Red Cross Hospital and LAC, RG 9 
III C9, Volume 4537, File 3, Routine Orders, 25 September 1916. 
147 The accused was allowed to make statements and call witnesses, but it seems it would be hard to defend yourself 
because of the army hierarchy, presence of superior officers, and the shame/stigma associated with indiscipline. And 
when the accused was provided with a soldier’s friend, the latter often had little time to prepare or familiarise 
themselves with the case. One officer admitted that “this principle is absolutely wrong.” Another document is quite 
telling in this regard: “the attendance of a friend of the accused in no way relieves the court of its responsibility for 
safeguarding the interests of the accused, and eliciting all facts which may tell in his favour,” suggesting that there were 
abuses. PPCLI Archives, Sub-Series 30, Nominal Rolls, Courts Martial and Discipline, Parts I and II, File #: 30 (21) – 5 
and LAC, RG 9 III B1, Volume 1778, D-17-4, No. 3 Canadian Sanitary Section, ‘Circular Memorandum.’ 
148 One soldier wrote about misguided discipline and priorities, complaining that his punishment for having an extra 
webbing belt should have been overlooked, especially “with all the shells and bullets flying around” and other more 
pressing concerns. Caughill, ed., Letters to Janet, 112. 
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a soldier having a complaint to make will make it to his company commander 
through his company sergeant major. He must not go direct to an officer to 
complain or request indulgences.149 
 
Though part of the justification for this policy was practicality, it also served to reinforce 
the army hierarchy as sacrosanct. Some of these measures, however, seemed to run 
counter to harmonious relations between all ranks. An officer from No. 6 Canadian 
General Hospital, for instance, stated that “any man who addresses an officer without 
being accompanied by an N.C.O. will be severely dealt with,”150 further reinforcing this 
chain of command. 
 Military discipline and the army legal system were problematic in other ways as 
well. Though it is clear that military law and civilian law differed in fundamental 
respects,151 it seems that those in charge of overseeing military law did not have the time, 
resources, or even inclination to give all cases – especially those concerning ORs – a fair 
assessment.152 The military situation, the state of discipline in the soldier’s unit, the 
soldier’s own history,153 and the need to uphold morale could all take priority over the 
particulars of a case. In one situation, for example, a soldier of the 5th Reserve Battalion 
was punished for going AWL, but subsequent reports made it clear that the officer 
commanding (OC) did not have the authority to punish the soldier in this way.154 And 
even if the CO lacked the authority to apply sentences to certain crimes, these sentences 
                                                             
 
149 The Military Museums, W.A. Howard Library and J.E. Child Archives, TMM F0038, Gordon Gilmour Fonds, 
Folder 1, Booklet: ‘Infantry Training for use of Canadian Militia, 1915.’ 
150 LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4574, Folder 1, No. 6 Canadian General Hospital, Daily Orders, May 1916 – 
September 1917, File 4.  
151 Soldiers were governed by different laws and priorities. Moreover, military law was more about upholding the 
edifice and authority of the military hierarchy and chain of command, and about manpower and morale, than about 
justice and due process as in civilian courts.  
152 Officers were treated more leniently than ORs, as evidenced by the conviction rates for both general and field 
general courts martial. 74.02% of officers were convicted in general courts martial, whereas ORs faced a conviction rate 
of 82.25%. The disparity in field general courts martial were even greater. Officers were convicted in 75.92% of cases, 
but ORs faced a conviction rate of 86.90%. See Godefroy, For Freedom and Honour, 77, citing Putkowski and Sykes, 
Shot at Dawn and Oram, Military Executions during World War I. 
153 This could work both for and against the accused soldier. If the soldier had a clean record, had been loyal and 
dedicated, and if the courts martial officers were aware of the stresses and strains facing this individual and his unit, 
they might take this into account and offer some leniency in judgment and deciding punishment. On some occasions, 
the soldier might even be given the benefit of the doubt. If, on the other hand, the soldier had a questionable conduct 
history, was in a unit renowned for indiscipline, or if examples needed to be made, this might all act against the soldier.  
154 LAC, RG 9 III B1, Series 1, Volume 661, D-85-2, Discipline, 5th Reserve Battalion.  
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could remain. As one officer of the 12th Reserve Battalion explained, “unless it would 
appear that an injustice had been done to the accused, it is not considered that the 
sentence should be interfered with,” and thus should remain. The author then requested to 
superior authorities that in this particular case “please grant the necessary authority to the 
officer commanding 12th Reserve Battalion to make this award a legal one.”155 And 
though reserve units were not subject to field general courts martial – as they were not 
actively serving in the field – they could still be punished with other types of court 
martial. 
The mistreatment of accused soldiers and legal irregularities occurred in other 
ways as well. One chaplain, for instance, visited the APM compound to check on some 
prisoners, and “found the most serious abuses and ill-treatment taking place to[ward] 
Canadians and others” in detention there. The chaplain spoke up on their behalf, 
disgusted that the men were “suffering from a sense of injustice” and harsh treatment.156 
Some officers and courts martial members, moreover, went into these trials with 
preconceived notions of military law and discipline. It must also be emphasised that 
military law was not really about justice; it was always about maintaining discipline and 
upholding the needs of the armed forces above that of the individual. To a certain extent 
this could not be helped, but when dealing with capital cases where a soldier’s life was on 
the line, this was problematic. One such traditional view, especially prevalent early in the 
war and amongst disciplinarians, was that good soldiers simply did not commit crimes or 
breakdown. These soldiers, the view went, did their duty to the utmost, and suffered the 
stresses of war stoically and silently.157 One such contemporary view stated that 
malingering was a crime, and was not committed by “those governed by higher ethical 
conceptions,”158 suggesting that only certain types of soldiers committed such actions. 
These views on predisposition were problematic, as was relying too heavily on the past 
                                                             
 
155 Ibid, Series 2, Volume 661, D-88-2, Discipline, 12th Reserve Battalion.  
156 LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4674, DCS London, Correspondence with No. 1 Canadian Infantry Base Depot.  
157 Joanna Bourke wrote of racial, national, or cultural explanations for enduring. For the British, there was the notion 
of the stiff upper lip’ mentality, “bulldog endurance,” or ‘British phlegm.’ Bourke, Fear: A Cultural History, 217. 
158 Thomas W. Salmon, The Care and Treatment of Mental Diseases and War Neuroses (“Shell Shock”) in the British 
Army (New York: War Work Committee of the National Committee for Mental Hygiene, 1917), 30. 
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service record of an accused soldier to judge current culpability in crime. After all, 
warfare is an evolving and dynamic process; there was certainly room for individual 
improvement, especially as new soldiers became acclimated to army life and discipline, 
and there were extenuating circumstances as well that needed to be taken into account.  
 
 
Breaches of Conduct, Punishments, and Courts Martial 
Crimes and breaches of discipline came in all varieties.159 Breaches of discipline, 
for instance, included both those pertaining to omission and commission,160 so soldiers 
could be charged for committing unlawful behaviour, or for failing to do something that 
was expected of them. Moreover, the refusal to obey an order was distinguished from 
neglect to obey an order, though it is not clear just where the distinction lay.161 There 
were also more general and flexible charges that could to be used to discipline soldiers, 
especially when their conduct fell outside clearly-defined crimes and parameters. One 
Canadian soldier was disciplined, for example, who while on active service was in 
“contravention of routine orders; appearing at exercise outside company lines improperly 
dress[ed].”162 A similar charge covered “disobeying a lawful command given by his 
superior officer,”163 which gave COs some measure of flexibility in punishing 
subordinates.  
Of the more serious and clearly-defined crimes, absence without leave and 
drunkenness were common. However, reports, daily orders, and other documents suggest 
that the punishment could vary widely, based in part on whether the soldier was on active 
duty while the crime was committed, and whether the unit was in the battle zone.164 AWL 
                                                             
 
159 Canadian artillery officer Ernest Black noted in his memoir all the different crimes and breaches of conduct he 
observed. He noted, for example, the disregard of orders, theft, scavenging, looting, including of corpses, the playing of 
Crown and Anchor, though it was forbidden, disobedience, and insubordinate language. Black, I Want One Volunteer, 
19, 52, 99, 100, 148, and 166-171. 
160 Norris, The World War I Memoir of Captain Harold McGill, 36.  
161 See, for example, LAC, RG 9 III B1, Volume 2179, D-2-26 Volume 1, ‘Headquarters, Canadians, Bramshott.’ 
162 LAC, RG 9 III C9, Volume 4530, Folder 14E, ‘Daily Orders No. 178.” 
163 LAC, RG 150, Volume 242, No. 1 Canadian Field Bakery, C.A.S.C., 13/6/17. 
164 Ibid, Volume 241, 1st Canadian Field Butchery, 18 February 1915 and 10 May 1917. One soldier charged with AWL 
was given four days CC [confined to camp] and forfeited two day’s pay. Another soldier was absent for approximately 
12 hours, and was given Field Punishment No. 1 for two weeks, and forfeited one day’s pay. 
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and desertion were considered especially serious crimes, as they represented a breakdown 
of authority, could compromise the cohesion and fighting prowess of the unit, and could 
even imperil the military situation more generally if units became unreliable in the line. 
These crimes were also particularly despised because they seemed to privilege the 
individual over the collective, a serious problem when trying to manage masses of 
soldiers. This meant that courts martial officers were often keen on punishing soldiers for 
AWL and desertion to the utmost. And even if there was no evidence that the soldier 
absented himself to avoid a specific duty, one officer stated that the court was “bound to 
assume that an accused intended the natural and probable consequence of his actions,” 
namely to avoid a certain duty. If there was, however, proof that the soldier’s absence led 
to the avoidance of (a particular) duty, the court would presume he “absented himself 
with that object in view.”165 This is troublesome, if only because the court was adding 
intention to a soldier who might not have had such forethought. But again, military law 
was distinct from civilian legal systems in that there was no belief in innocence prior to 
conviction, and it was the duty of each accused individual soldier to prove that he was not 
guilty. AWL and desertion were taken especially seriously prior to large offensives, and 
soldier claims that they were unaware of any upcoming operation were often 
dismissed.166 It was important prior to attacks that all units were up to strength and 
available for service; absent or deserting soldiers not only undermined the strength of 
these units, but also offered the enemy a valuable source of intelligence if they were 
apprehended by the Germans. 
Military punishments related to army discipline could take various forms, and 
often had different goals as well. Some punishments were simply about removing the 
troublesome soldier from his unit or the front lines, lest he negatively affect the morale, 
discipline, and combat motivation of others. Other punishments, however, were designed 
                                                             
 
165 PPCLI Archives, Sub-Series 30, Nominal rolls, Courts Martial and Discipline, Part II, File #: 30 (22) – 5. 
166 Courts martial charges of AWL in March of 1917, for instance, were not inclined to believe an accused’s testimony 
that they were unaware of any future operations. The court argued that any soldier near the front would have been well 
aware that there was a big ‘show’ coming up. The months of preparations, the constant movement, and increase in 
activity were dead giveaways. Being aware of upcoming operations and then leaving one’s comrades anyhow was 
deemed particularly reprehensible, and was therefore often punished more severely. PPCLI Archives, 34 (1) - 6, 
Battalion Orders, Daily Orders Part II, 1 January – 31 December 1917.  
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to humiliate or even inflict pain on the accused.167 Field Punishment (FP) No. 1, for 
example, certainly fell into this category. According to the British Manual of Military 
Law, Field Punishment No. 1 and 2 could be awarded by courts martial and COs. The 
latter punishment included “extra fatigue duties,” and the soldier “may be subjected to the 
like labour, employment, and restraint, and dealt with in like manner as if he were under a 
sentence of imprisonment with hard labour.”168 Field Punishment No. 1, moreover, 
included these extra duties, as well as the added humiliation and discomfort of being kept 
in irons, “in fetters or handcuffs,” and “may be attached for a period or periods not 
exceeding two hours in any one day to a fixed object,”169 like fence, post, wagon or gun 
wheel. The Manual stipulated that “every portion of a field punishment shall be inflicted 
in such a manner as is calculated not to cause injury or to leave any permanent mark on 
the soldier,”170 and yet this was not always avoided.  
Other punishments had a more deterrent effect, and were designed to make an 
impression on the accused’s comrades and unit. There were concerns, for instance, that 
the application of insufficient punishment on soldiers would have a deleterious effect on 
unit discipline. One report noted that “the army commander considers that if field 
punishment were more rigorously carried out, it would act as a greater deterrent to crime 
than is the case at present.”171 Without this ‘rigorous’ application of punishment, soldiers 
might take liberties if they felt that their actions had no negative consequences. The 
author of another report on discipline stated that COs must “do their utmost to prevent 
looting,” and that any soldier caught in this act must be severely dealt with as a deterrent 
                                                             
 
167 The use of Pill No. 9, for example, might fall under this category. British MO Andrew Davidson referred to this as a 
colocynth extract that purged the system. It was basically a laxative that was given as punishment to ‘clear’ hangovers 
and the like. Martin Pegler, moreover, stated that the ‘No. 9’ was “the universal purgative pill for soldiers on sick duty. 
A universal laxative pill, given when no other remedy seemed suitable.” See Davidson, A Doctor in the Great War, 56, 
Bell, Canada in War-Paint, 57 and Martin Pegler, Soldiers’ Songs and Slang of the Great War (Oxford: Osprey 
Publishing, 2014), 135. 
168 British War Office, Manual of Military Law (London: Printed for His Majesty’s Stationary Office, by Harrison and 
Sons, 1907), 598-599. This version was found online at https://archive.org/details/manualofmilitary00greauoft.  
169 Ibid. The cover of Craig Leslie Mantle, ed., The Apathetic and the Defiant: Case Studies of Canadian Mutiny and 
Disobedience contains an illustration of a soldier undergoing Field Punishment No. 1. One British MO remembered FP 
No. 1 as ‘in fetters,’ and FP No. 2 as ‘in fetters and tied to a gun wheel.’ Davidson, A Doctor in the Great War, 33. 
170 British War Office, Manual of Military Law, 599. 
171 PPCLI Archives, Courts Martial and Discipline, Part II, File #: 30 (22) – 5. 
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to others,”172 which suggested that punishment and deterrence were the emphasis, not 
justice or reform. The deterrence factor was one reason why charges and punishments 
were published in daily orders for all soldiers of the unit to see.173 Whether this directly 
affected future discipline and incidence of crime, however, is another matter entirely.  
The emphasis on deterrence and the effect of discipline on the unit also helps 
explain critiques about sentences being too lenient,174 suggested punishments, and army 
policies on minimum sentences. An army memorandum issued in February 1917 reflected 
this concern for supposed leniency, and instructed COs not to dismiss charges laid by 
other authorities, such as MPs. This “mistaken leniency” was problematic, especially as it 
meant duplication of orders and undermined the efforts of MPs to enforce discipline.175 
Indeed, one subaltern recalled that as a member of a court martial, he was reprimanded by 
superior officers for recommending two years imprisonment for the accused, rather than 
execution.176 The military authorities also provided officers and courts martial members 
with suggested punishments for specific crimes. These were guidelines and were meant to 
apply to first offences only. For example, for the crime of ‘absence when warned for duty 
in camp or billet,’ the soldier should receive two years imprisonment with hard labour; 
for cowardice, and desertion, when warned for duty in the trenches, the punishment 
                                                             
 
172 LAC, RG 9 III B1, Volume 1778, D-17-4, No. 3 Canadian Sanitary Section, Discipline. This might also explain why 
seemingly innocuous crimes, like very short-term AWL, were punished so severely. One soldier, for example, was 
sentenced to 10 days Field Punishment No. 1, and forfeited one day’s pay, for being absent from duty for about three 
hours. In another case a Private was given 14 days F.P. No. 1 and forfeited 28 days’ pay, for being AWL while on 
active service for roughly 25 minutes. LAC, RG 150, Volume 243, 4th Canadian Division Supply Column (2), ‘Part II 
Daily Orders’ and 3rd Canadian Division Supply Column (1917-18), ‘Daily Orders Part II,’ 24 April 1917.  
173 LAC, RG 150, Volume 243, 1st Canadian Divisional Train (3), ‘Daily Orders.’ 
174 It must be acknowledged here that there were also many examples of critiques of army discipline and punishments 
being too harsh and disproportionate.  
175 LAC, RG 9 III B1, Series 26, Volume 2180, Folder D-2-26 Volume 6, ‘Confidential: Circular Memorandum,’ 
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restrict the movement of soldiers, for various reasons. Granting or withholding leave also acted as a powerful way to 
shape behaviour; all soldiers looked forward to leave, and therefore might be inclined to behave so as not to lose their 
privileges. The use of leave privileges could be used as inducement to good behaviour (carrot). LAC, RG 9 III C9, 
Volume 4530, Folder 4, ‘Canadian Corps A.19-0-17;’ DUASC, Clearing: The Tale of the First Canadian Casualty 
Clearing Station, BEF, 1914-1919, by Thomas Brenton Smith, MS-2-432 – SF 44-1, page 49; LAC, RG 9 III C9, 
Volume 4533, File 1 ‘Correspondence,’ 16-1-15 to 29-1-19, ‘Dishonoured Cheques,’ and LAC, RG 9 III B1, Series 2, 
Volume 661, D-93-2, Discipline, Canadian Ordnance Corps, 5 September 1917.  
176 Reid, ed., Personal Memoirs of the First World War, 204. 
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recommended was death; and for disobedience, or ‘showing a wilful defiance of 
authority,’ three years penal servitude was suggested.177 For recidivists, or “in subsequent 
or aggravated cases the sentences might be proportionally increased”178 in an effort to 
maintain discipline. Brigadier-General G.F. Farmar of the Canadian Corps headquarters 
explained it: 
As a general rule, in fairness to a man and in order to maintain discipline as a unit, 
it will be found more beneficial in every way, to inflict a substantial punishment 
in cases where a man has been given every chance to reform, but persists in 
rebelling against discipline.179 
 
The previous conduct of the soldier, his service and disciplinary record, were but one 
factor in deciding the punishment applied to troops. Past behaviour at times meant the 
difference between a capital sentence and lesser punishments. In theory, at least, the CO 
and courts martial officers should have taken into account: the accused’s character, “from 
a fighting point of view as well as from that of behaviour;” his previous conduct in action; 
the opinion of his superiors; and the state of discipline in his unit.180 This last point was 
especially important, as even soldiers with good service records could be sentenced to 
death if it was deemed important to make an example of the accused and send a message 
to his unit. In this case, as in so many others related to army life, the collective trumped 
the individual.  
                                                             
 
177 PPCLI Archives, Courts Martial and Discipline, ‘Circular Memorandum A.8.,’ 36th (Ulster) Division, Scale of 
Punishments, 23 November 1915. Another list of offences and recommended punishments suggested that for soldiers 
contravening orders regarding alcohol prohibition, they should receive five days F.P. No. 1 for the first offence, and 10 
days for the second offence. And for soldiers in hospital for VD, it was recommended that the soldier forfeits his field 
allowance, and placed under stoppage of pay at the rate of $.50 per diem while in hospital undergoing treatment. LAC, 
RG 9 III B1, Volume 1778, D-17-4, No. 3 Canadian Sanitary Section, Discipline and LAC, RG 150, Volume 199, 
C.M.P. Shorncliffe, ‘C.M.P. In the Field.’ See also Morton, Fight or Pay, 40. 
178 PPCLI Archives, Courts Martial and Discipline, ‘Circular Memorandum A.8.,’ 36th (Ulster) Division, Scale of 
Punishments, 23 November 1915. 
179 PPCLI Archives, Sub-Series 30, Courts Martial and Discipline, Parts I and II, File #: 30 (21) – 5, report of G.F. 
Farmar and LAC, RG 9 III B1, Volume 1778, D-17-4, No. 3 Canadian Sanitary Section, Discipline, 16 February 1918.  
180 PPCLI Archives, Courts Martial and Discipline, Part II, File #: 30 (22) -5, ‘Memorandum – Desertion.’ The soldier’s 
past and conduct sheet could determine the level of punishment. The CO could increase the days of pay forfeiture, for 
example, based on previous convictions and the man’s “character.” It was suggested that each case should be judged on 
its own merits, taking into account: length of service, previous record, the “excuse the offender may have to offer,” and 
“the present circumstances which prevail.” Attempts were made to acknowledge and factor in mitigating aspects, but 
this was not always possible. In one case, an officer claimed that the accused should receive only an ‘Admonishment,’ 
“in view of the fact that Piper McLean bears a very good reputation…[and] there did not seem to be any wilful deviance 
of authority.” Intention thus was taken into account. LAC, RG 9 III B1, Volume 1778, D-17-4, No. 3 Canadian Sanitary 
Section, Discipline, A.W.L. Charges and Series 2, Volume 661, D-79-2, Discipline, 14th Reserve Battalion. 
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 Some COs and courts martial officers were more lenient and sympathetic, and 
sought to acknowledge mitigating factors and the reality of the situation on the ground. 
One officer of the 8th Reserve Battalion, for instance, explained in February of 1918 why 
he let a soldier off with only a warning. He explained that the accused “has done splendid 
work both in France [in the army zone] and here,” his CO spoke highly of him, he had a 
clean conduct sheet, and was usually very good at saluting.181 Other COs and officers, 
however, seemed more concerned with their own reputation, or that of the regiment 
(battalion or other unit). Having high rates of crime and indiscipline might reflect poorly 
on the leadership and effectiveness of these officers. Captain Ralph Bell, for instance, 
recalled that one officer threatened a subordinate with a FGCM, adding “then you would 
be shot!” The officer, however, ended up dealing with the soldier at the local level, 
explaining that “I shall not permit the name of this battalion to be besmirched by you” by 
sending him up for a court martial.182 Ultimately, the army itself and the officers who 
upheld it were concerned about the ‘big picture,’ and ensuring that sufficient troops were 
in the line to achieve military goals. Discipline policies and courts martial were concerned 
about this wider view of the situation, about optics, about the collective over the 
individual and what was in the best “interests of discipline,”183 rather than what was best 
for the soldier himself. 
 Other punishments were designed to permanently remove soldiers from their units 
and from the forces, and from society more generally. In the most serious cases, the 
punishment was death - execution by firing squad. Of course, not all those who were 
charged under a capital offence or who were sentenced to death had their punishment 
actually carried out. In the BEF during the First World War, 3,080 soldiers were formally 
condemned to death; of these 346 (or 11.23%) were actually shot by firing squad.184 The 
                                                             
 
181 Saluting and ‘smartness’ were often used as proxies for discipline. LAC, RG 9 III B1, Series 1, Volume 661, D-86-
2, Discipline, 8th Reserve Battalion.  
182 Bell, Canada in War-Paint, 36. 
183 LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4563, Folder 1, File 3, ‘Circular Memorandum 26,’ 30 October. Another report, 
moreover, explained why sick leave was cancelled: “the reason given for remanding this man to his commanding 
officer is that it was considered in the best interest of disciple that he should be deprived of sick furlough and brought 
before his commanding officer to receive adequate punishment.” LAC, RG 9 III B1, Series 2, Volume 662, D-100-2, 
Discipline, Princess Patricia’s Red Cross Hospital.  
184 Babington, Capital Courts-Martial, 189. 
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fact that a soldier failed to do his duty to the utmost could result in execution was one that 
all ranks were cognizant of. One infantry subaltern, for instance, wrote that the troops 
became adept at following orders without qualm, and the soldiers 
dropped naturally into the habit of implicit and unquestioning obedience. He 
might grumble, but the job was done. The consequences of hesitation or 
disobedience [in the field] were serious, they were death.185 
 
Aside from hesitating or failing to follow orders, acts deemed cowardly or ‘unsoldierlike’ 
were also punished severely. As Charles Harrison in Generals Die in Bed: A Story from 
the Trenches explained, if the soldiers ran or deserted, they would be greeted by the firing 
squad.186 Another soldier wrote bluntly that “in the First World War you either went 
forward [in battle] or got shot.”187 Though not every soldier who ran or deserted was 
executed, let alone apprehended, the fear of death and of the shame associated with 
execution could act as a deterrent. It need hardly be said that few wanted to be executed, 
though as with suicide there were some who saw that any way out was preferable to the 
trauma and pain they were experiencing. Few, moreover, wanted to participate in these 
firing squads, though it must be admitted that some soldiers relished the opportunity to 
take part in these executions, believing that cowardly or deserting soldiers needed to be 
punished for their behaviour whilst their comrades managed to carry on. And in the 
army’s desire to make the greatest impression on the accused’s unit, the soldier’s own 
comrades often made up the firing squad.188  
  
                                                             
 
185 My italics, added for emphasis. Douie, Recollections of a Subaltern of Infantry, 40. Another soldier felt sick thinking 
about executing his own comrades. He seemed to justify it by writing “but there you are, we had to have discipline.” 
Arthur, ed., Forgotten Voices of the Great War, 204. 
186 Charles Yale Harrison, Generals Die in Bed: A Story from the Trenches (Toronto: Annick Press, 2002), 56. 
187 Reid, Personal Memoirs of the First World War, 172. 
188 Barnes recalled participating in a firing squad for a soldier executed for desertion. This was not something he wanted 
to participate in, and he stated “it was a job I never wanted.” Feelings of bitterness in his journal are evident. Cane, ed., 
The Haunting Journal of Deward Barnes, 15, 20.  
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Morale, Combat Motivation, Endurance, and Military 
Effectiveness 
The legal system and disciplinary regime used by the British Army had both direct 
and indirect impacts on the morale, combat motivation, endurance, and the military 
effectiveness of the soldiers. Regarding morale, the traditional army opinion, which 
survived to some degree throughout the war, was that units with good morale would not 
face extensive disciplinary problems, and those with good discipline would also have 
solid morale. The two concepts reinforced one another. An army memorandum of 
February 1917 indicated that “in regiments where discipline is strict, these irregularities 
[regarding slackness in saluting] do not take place.”189 In this view, reinforcing unit 
discipline and insisting on punishment would necessarily lead to solid, positive morale 
that would help all in the unit. And good morale would all but guarantee good results on 
the battlefield. This, of course, was a specious argument at best. Disciplinary problems in 
a given unit did not definitively mean that its soldiers were bad, but may have pointed to 
the reality of combat and trauma on the Western Front, and inadequacies of rotation or 
leave policies. Contemporary documents and anecdotal evidence suggests, however, the 
army belief that some soldiers were simply ‘bad apples,’ troublemakers, had “bad 
character,”190 and were unable (or perhaps unwilling) to follow discipline properly. The 
attitude and personal history of some individuals certainly made them less amenable to 
military life, but to suggest that entire units were bad was reductive. Issues of leadership, 
unit operations and casualties, equipment and supplies, cohesion and comradeship all 
played a crucial role in performance in combat.  
 The legal and disciplinary aspects of army life also played an important function 
in the combat motivation of the troops. With a legal structure designed with certain goals 
in mind, and with discipline used sparingly and sensibly, soldiers felt more comfortable 
                                                             
 
189 LAC, RG 9 III B1, Series 26, Volume 2180, Folder D-2-26 Volume 6, ‘Confidential Circular Memorandum,’ 
February 1917.  
190 And the author of a report on HMHS Araguaya, moreover, stated that discipline was largely good aboard the vessels, 
“with the exception of the usual two or three [soldiers] who are always out to make trouble.” This reinforces the idea 
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17-4, No. 3 Canadian Sanitary Section, Discipline document of 12 May 1919, and LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4577, 
Folder 5, File 6, H.M.H.S. Araguaya, ‘Discipline.’  
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doing their duty to the utmost, knowing that if they were driven to or beyond the breaking 
point, they would be treated with sympathy and leniency. This was not always the case, 
however, and the problems pertaining to the legal/disciplinary system of the British and 
Canadian forces may have compromised the motivation and commitment of the average 
soldier. The motivation of soldiers could be impacted by both carrots and sticks, or the 
promise of reward and the threat of punishment191 to induce or discourage certain 
behaviour. Training and lectures, moreover, could also assist in the process of motivating 
soldiers to fight. Training had several purposes, including strengthening discipline, 
assisting in fitness, developing self-confidence, and increasing the offensive spirit.192 And 
even when soldiers were out of the line, in need of a respite from the strains of war, this 
training continued. A soldier of the 26th Battalion wrote on 11 September 1918 that “we 
have had training almost every day of what is supposed to be our rest” period.193 And as 
the author of one training document suggested, “there can be no repose for any of us until 
the object before us – the defeat of the enemy – is accomplished.”194 The defeat of the 
enemy, as well as the desire to finish the war and return home, served as strong 
motivating forces for soldiers in the war. This motivation, and discipline of the troops, 
however, could be undermined by many factors, such as inclement weather,195 supply 
problems, ineffective leadership, futile attacks or the general lack of success in 
operations. For a soldier who had already been in the war for months or years, and with 
no apparent end in sight, sticking it out until the defeat of the enemy was a tall order 
indeed.  
 The legal and disciplinary aspects of soldier life in the war also had an impact on 
the endurance of the troops at the front and behind the lines – these had a direct bearing 
on the ability, and willingness, of the men to endure at the front. First-hand accounts and 
primary sources, and subsequent secondary analyses, illustrate that there were things 
                                                             
 
191 See, for example, LAC, RG 9 III B1, Volume 662, D-100-2, Discipline, ‘Princess Patricia’s Red Cross Hospital.’ 
192 LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3868, Folder 109, File 3, ‘Training – Division.’ 
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soldiers did in an attempt to stay in their unit and not go sick, or do something more 
drastic like desert or administer a self-inflicted wound (SIW). The use of alcohol and 
other drugs as coping mechanisms and fortifying forces was but one example of attempts 
to endure what was, in many ways, an unendurable existence. Scrounging for food to 
supplement meagre or monotonous army rations, as well as the receiving and sharing of 
food parcels from home also helped. Sufficient food, water, and alcohol helped with both 
the morale and health of the troops, both of which positively contributed to the ability of 
the soldier to remain at the front. Time out of the line, concerts and drinking, music and 
shows all helped in this process, and in the words of one MO, good food and company 
“did much to make us forget, for the time being, the squalor and dreariness of our 
surroundings and duties.”196 The question, however, was whether these distractions and 
coping mechanisms would be enough over the long-term. 
 Soldiers unable to endure, however, might be driven to commit a crime or do 
something drastic to escape the trenches and find a reprieve, even if it was brief or illegal. 
For instance, there were accusations that some soldiers purposely became infected with 
VD, likely after visiting brothels or prostitutes on leave.197 A member of the No. 10 
Canadian Field Ambulance stated that VD should be punished, as “with but very few 
exceptions venereal disease is contracted in immoral sexual connection.”198 The 
implication was that these soldiers got what they deserved, and should be punished. It is 
impossible to determine the veracity of these comments, especially the purposeful 
contraction of VD, and it is difficult to understand the motivations of a soldier who would 
purposely endure the shame and discomfort. An appreciation of the terrible trauma at the 
front, the sight and stench of bloated and discoloured corpses, and the other stresses and 
strains of war help us in this understanding, however. A soldier pushed beyond the 
breaking point might try almost anything to escape the horror of the front, and might even 
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risk serious debilitation, court martial,199 and other negative aspects for a much-needed 
reprieve.  
It seems, moreover, that wilful SIWs also fall into the category of a soldier, driven 
by desperation, doing something drastic to get removed from combat. The medical and 
military authorities, however, were aware that SIWs or ‘left-hand wounds,’ as they were 
sometimes known colloquially, were a well-known method of escaping the trenches and 
active service. In the words of the historian of the 1st Canadian Casualty Clearing Station: 
The penalties against men who deliberately made themselves casualties were 
heavy, and precautions were taken to apprehend such men. Consequently, all 
patients suffering from accidental or self-inflicted wounds were accompanied by 
documents, explaining the origin of such injuries. The breaking of a dental plate 
[for example] was always regarded as a highly suspicious case.200 
 
Even accidental SIWs could be punished due to negligence. If a soldier shot himself (or 
another) while cleaning his rifle, for example, he could still be charged for failing to 
follow orders properly. And if conclusive evidence regarding the SIW could not be found, 
the soldier could still be punished under the catch-all charge of “conduct to the prejudice 
of good order and military discipline” (section 40 of the Army Act).201  
 Contemporary evidence indicates that authorities believed discipline had an 
important role to play in the prevention and treatment of casualties. One of the most 
common problems in the trenches was trench foot. This condition, described by a 
                                                             
 
199 It was widely known in the army that SIWs, even accidental ones, were punishable by court martial. VD and trench 
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contemporary MO as constituting “dead-white, doughy feet that will later go black, with 
spongey, swollen soles,”202 became a serious problem for the authorities. Dr. Robert 
Atenstaedt in The Medical Response to the Trench Diseases in World War One wrote that 
trench foot mostly attacked the toes, but could also cause swelling up to the knees, and 
large blisters could form.203 The problems associated with terrible trench and frontline 
conditions, coupled with the “neglect of personal cleanliness,”204 ensured a steady stream 
of these casualties. Exposure to wet conditions, above freezing temperatures, also played 
an important role in the development of this affliction.205 Casualties could make both 
individuals and military units highly inefficient,206 which could in turn negatively impact 
the overall military situation in any given sector. Trench foot seemed to peak in winter 
months, not surprisingly, and during the war there were forty-one deaths from this 
affliction, and 10,000s of hospital admissions; this acted as a “severe drain on 
manpower,” and ultimately “constituted a grave problem in the British army” and 
affiliated units.207  
The prevention of trench foot entailed keeping feet clean and dry, and the frequent 
issuing of warm socks, which was not an easy task in the front lines. Furthermore, the use 
of good waterproof boots, the use of braziers in the trenches, the application of anti-frost 
grease, foot powder, and especially whale oil on the feet, and taking off the boots and 
puttees periodically to massage the feet all helped in prevention208 It was also important 
that MOs inspected feet frequently, and this “close surveillance by the military 
authorities” assisted in this process. The problem, of course, was that MOs could not fully 
control the conditions in which the men served, they were themselves under the authority 
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of unit COs and HQ, and the health of the troops was often subordinate to larger military 
goals.209 The most important aspect of prevention, however, was probably the need for 
periodic rest away from the conditions of the trenches. This was particularly difficult 
under active service conditions, especially as contemporary doctors suggested that tours 
of duty in wet or water-logged sectors should not exceed twenty-four to thirty-six 
hours.210  
The military authorities, though, seemed to believe that discipline was the most 
important factor in the prevention of trench foot casualties, and in the healing and 
treatment process for other casualties as well.211 As one MO argued, “the prevention of 
this disease [trench foot] is almost entirely a matter of discipline, and can only be carried 
out by the cooperation of the company and battalion officers” with the MO.212 The 
principles of prevention were published in general routine and standing orders, so that the 
soldiers would be aware of the precautions to be taken. COs, however, were “responsible 
that the instructions were carried out,” and that soldiers were equipped with the proper 
clothing and equipment to do so. One such instruction was that the troops were to remove 
their boots (and change their socks if possible) once every twenty-four hours.213 But just 
how possible or realistic was this under active service conditions? Units often spent 
several days at the front lines, and without proper dugouts and shelters, the use of funk-
holes was widespread and it was a practical difficulty to properly care for feet with shells 
dropping and snipers on the prowl. Soldiers had sentry duty and working parties, and 
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there were also raids and patrols which occupied their time, energy, and attention. Prior to 
going into the trenches, moreover, soldiers were to wash, dry, and apply grease to their 
feet.214 Grease and clean dry socks were not always available, however, and officers 
simply could not monitor every single soldier under their command to ensure that the 
proper precautions were taken.  
 The legal structure and disciplinary system that applied to Canadian troops also 
had a direct bearing on their military effectiveness and efficiency. Training documents 
and after-action reports, for instance, stressed the importance of discipline to the morale, 
combat motivation, and military prowess of the troops. One document on defeating 
enemy counterattacks stated that:   
If the discipline of the [machine gun] detachment is good, and if the men keep 
cool, they are bound to break up the enemy’s attack…[the success in defeating 
counterattacks depended on] tenacity, discipline, and bravery…it must therefore 
be impressed upon all machine gun detachments that, unless they have specific 
orders to the contrary, they are to remain in action even if surrounded.215 
 
The implication of this, of course, was that the sheer bravery and discipline of the 
defenders could defeat any counterattack; moreover, it was understood that troops should 
fight until surrounded, and to the death, if need be. Those who failed in their duty were 
often greeted with little to no sympathy, and even with a firing squad. This was the reality 
of life for soldiers on the Western Front, and was reflected in contemporary and post-war 
poems, literature, and other accounts, both patriotic and pacifist. The British novelist and 
poet Gilbert Frankau, for example, explored some of these themes in his poem “The 
Deserter:” 
‘I’m sorry I done it, Major.’ 
 We bandaged the livid face; 
 And led him, ere the wan sun rose, 
 To die his death of disgrace 
 
 The bolt-heads locked to the cartridge;  
                                                             
 
214 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3615, 25-7-1 to 25-7-6, Diseases, Miscellaneous, Generally.  
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 The rifles steadied to rest, 
 As cold stock nestled at colder cheek 
 And foresight lined on the breast. 
 
 ‘Fire!’ called the Sergeant-Major. 
 The muzzles flamed as he spoke:  
 And the shameless soul of a nameless man 
 Went up in the cordite-smoke.216 
 
This poem suggests that these executed soldiers died in disgrace, were quickly forgotten 
(a “nameless man”), and his comrades had turned away from his suffering and plight 
(“…colder cheek”). Extenuating circumstances were taken into account, at times, but 
generally soldiers were expected to do their duty until they were (physically) debilitated, 
or killed. As the CO of the PPCLI Agar Adamson explained, his long period of service in 
France began to take its toll on his health and ability to withstand the conditions at the 
front. He wrote in a letter to his wife Mabel in January of 1918 that “my nervous strain 
both in and out of the line is considerable; if anything goes wrong I will be hanged 
[executed], which is a minor matter personally, but a serious one to the Regimental 
records.”217 And despite the hyperbole of Adamson, he seemed to accept the need for 
discipline and punishment, as a good officer would have, and was more concerned with 
the reputation of his regiment than his own personal safety.  
It is important to remember, however, that discipline did not equate with military 
effectiveness or military prowess. The Australian soldiers, for instance, “were generally 
looked down upon by most of the Allies as tough and undisciplined, though hailed as 
great combatants” at the front.218 A Canadian artilleryman, furthermore, wrote that 
military executions were “generally speaking quite useless.” He explained that “the rest 
of us [in the unit] did not need the example, and the poor fellows who were shot for the 
most part could not help what they did,” in a rather sympathetic and thoughtful 
understanding of the situation. This soldier furthermore argued that:  
                                                             
 
216 Poem taken from Waters, A Corner of a Foreign Field, 134-135. 
217 Christie, ed., Letters of Agar Adamson, 330-331, Letter to his wife Mabel, from Zouave Valley, 21 January 1918. 
218 Reid, Personal Memoirs of the First World War, 4. 
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I doubt if any man ever did his duty from fear of being shot…[and] I am quite 
sure that the fact that he was pardoned three times after sentence of death never 
resulted in one single man deserting or shirking his duties.219 
 
This is of course just one example, but illustrates that not everyone in the military 
hierarchy believed that discipline was the most important aspect in fighting effectiveness 
and dedication to duty.  
  
Legal Aspects, Discipline, and War Weariness 
Discontent at the legal and disciplinary system which applied to the troops could 
be a contributing factor to the onset of war weariness. The unequal application of 
discipline, and the punitive nature of the military legal system could act as a demoralizing 
force, eroding the faith soldiers had in the system. Furthermore, the unfamiliarity of new 
soldiers, especially reinforcements and replacements, with the unit history and traditions 
made the maintenance of discipline more difficult,220 and could also compromise the 
morale of the individual and collective. Competent, paternalistic leadership was also 
important in the combat motivation of the soldiers and the disciplinary system of the unit; 
without solid leadership, unit cohesion and endurance suffered as a result, which only 
served to make the troops more vulnerable to war weariness and associated problems. 
Even volunteers might find that their commitment to the war effort and dedication to duty 
began waning after months, and then years, of war and combat. Repeated promises of 
victory came to naught. The situation was even worse for conscripts, whose commitment 
to the war effort, and their own personal involvement in it, were already questionable.221  
The enormous casualties suffered at the front, and the lack of tangible military 
gains, at least until the final months of the war, reinforced the notion that survival in the 
                                                             
 
219 Black, I Want One Volunteer, 28-29. 
220 Douie, Recollections of a Subaltern of Infantry, 52. 
221 One British soldier admitted that there was no Journey’s End [reference to R.C. Sherriff’s play of the same name] 
public school spirit in his unit, as they were all from factories, mines, shops and were “unwilling soldiers, conscripts.” 
At first, conscription/mandatory service was interpreted as an “escape from the dull drudgery of shop life,” or as an 
“escape from a life I hated.” He would soon be seeking escape from trench and army life, however. Anonymous, “The 
Deserter,” in The Atlantic – Special Commemorative Issue (Summer 2014): 70. Originally published as “The Deserter: 
Just As He Was,” September 1930. 
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war was minimal, and fleeting. Some soldiers were driven mad by the war, debilitated by 
shell shock, broken by mental health problems, war neuroses, and psychiatric casualties. 
Other soldiers, however, decided that they would rather risk the stigma associated with 
the failure to do one’s duty than attempt to carry on at the front. Firsthand accounts and 
other evidence illustrate that some soldiers actively sought a Blighty wound;222 others 
administered a SIW or contracted a self-inflicted illness; some troops became apathetic, 
overly cautions, or took to malingering; and still other soldiers sought to escape the front 
and active service by going AWL or deserting their units.223  
The reality at the front and the stresses imposed on the soldiers also contributed to 
the onset of war weariness amongst individuals and the unit. The lack of proper food and 
other shortages, demoralization, discomfort, death and disfigurement, and a host of other 
factors all contributed to this sense of futility or the erosion of commitment to the war 
effort. One soldier wrote that after months and years of war and with no end in sight, the 
troops were hungry, downhearted, and “talk becomes mutinous”224 as soldiers expressed 
their displeasure with the way the war was going, as well as their own personal 
involvement in it. The manifestations of war weariness, moreover, reflected this erosion 
of commitment to the war effort on both an individual and collective level. One Canadian, 
for example, admitted to disobeying orders of a superior officer, explaining that he was 
                                                             
 
222 A British soldier, for instance, broke his ankle which removed him from combat. He wrote that this was a “sudden, 
unexpected event envied by all the other chaps when it luckily took me back to England.” Ibid. The poem by German 
soldier Alfred Lichtenstein illustrated this desire for this type of wound nicely. His poem Prayer Before Battle included 
the lines: But suppose I have to take it/ Don’t let me get badly wounded./ Send me just a little leg wound/ Or a slight 
gash on the forearm/ So I go home as a hero/ Who has got a story to tell. Ferguson, The Pity of War, xxvii.   
223 One soldier wrote that after his return to health in hospital “I was in the machine again, being trained to kill and be 
killed.” He did not want to die, and so it became firm in his mind that he would not risk it any more. He justified it by 
saying that “what I felt and thought at that time may be called sheer cowardice by some patriotic people, but, as I saw it, 
it was the most primitive kind of common sense carried into action.” It seems that the survival and self-preservation 
instinct, coupled with reflection on his current situation, overwhelmed his sense of duty, discipline, loyalty to unit, and 
concern for comrades. Anonymous, “The Deserter,” in The Atlantic – Special Commemorative Issue (Summer 2014): 
70. Originally published as “The Deserter: Just As He Was,” September 1930. For apathy, caution, and the increasing 
unwillingness of war-weary soldiers to put themselves in harm’s way and follow orders blindly, see John Baynes, 
Morale: A Study of Men and Courage – The Second Scottish Rifles at the Battle of Neuve Chapelle 1915 (London: 
Cassell and Company Ltd., 1967), 101; Boff, Winning and Losing on the Western Front, 114 and Bourke, Fear: A 
Cultural History, 216. SIWs and illnesses were a way to escape the trenches; apathy, fatalism, malingering and slacking 
were coping mechanisms and ways to reduce risks to the individual; and AWL and desertion were other ways to escape 
the front and further duty, which would increase the chances of being killed or mutilated. 
224 Harrison, Generals Die in Bed, 213. 
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exhausted and “fed up.”225 This ‘fed up’ attitude was an important indicator of war 
weariness. A Private Cushman, moreover, was described in medical documents as “fed up 
with the Army,” and that he was “depressed and at times reckless of authority and 
discipline,”226 illustrating that this attitude began to shape the soldier’s behaviour as well. 
Personal and internal coping mechanisms allowed many soldiers to continue with duty, 
but there also needed to be institutional and external ways to ensure soldiers carried on at 
the front. The legal and disciplinary regime in place could not possibly deal with the 
myriad problems facing both individuals and military units. Indeed, some of the army’s 
responses to infractions and insubordination were problematic, and actually exacerbated 
pre-existing problems. Without sufficient and appropriate supports, the war-weary soldier 
was liable to take drastic action to remove himself from harm’s way. The lack of a proper 
response to the phenomenon of war weariness was bad enough, but the inappropriate 
responses and insufficient understanding of shell shock and other negative impacts of the 
war on the individual were even worse. It is to these health and medical problems that we 
will now turn in the next chapter, especially as there was much overlap between the 
contributing factors toward war weariness.  
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226 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3618, Folder 25-13-8 Mental Cases, ‘Medical Report on an Invalid.’  
74 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 – The Medical Aspects of Service 
The medical system that confronted the Canadian soldiers during the war, like the 
military legal system, allowed problems in the realm of health to be dealt with at a more 
local and personal level, or through more official institutional channels. Decisions had to 
be made as to whether the soldier was fit to return to duty, and if so, in what capacity.227 
The medical and legal authorities also had similar goals, namely, to defeat the enemy 
using all available means, which included ensuring that sufficient soldiers were at the 
front and on the lines of communication to carry out operations and attain common goals. 
So long as soldiers were deemed useful, and soldiers could do myriad tasks aside from 
combat, they were considered important cogs in the vast war machine. Only the worst 
soldiers or the most serious medical cases were discharged. In addition to this, the army 
medical and legal systems were designed to monitor the soldiers, punish them for 
breaches of conduct, treat them for ailments keeping them out of the trenches, and 
ultimately ensure they did their duty to the utmost. And finally, both of these systems 
only paid lip service to the issues of motivation and intention; a disobedient soldier who 
committed a crime while under active service needed to be punished for the good of the 
unit, overall system, and chain of command – regardless of why he committed this breach 
of conduct. Mitigating factors and circumstances could be taken into account, but the 
emphasis was always on the collective (over the individual), and the ends seemed to 
justify the means of motivation and persuasion.  
 This section was guided by several research questions pertaining to the medical 
structure of the British and Canadian troops during the war. How did this military medical 
system deal with the more problematic, and rising, evidence of war weariness? How did 
this medical system address indiscipline, and how did it interact with the army’s legal and 
disciplinary structures? And finally, how did this system actually deal with the casualties 
and reality of war, and how did this play out on the battlefield, especially in the periods of 
April-August of 1917, and July-November of 1918? This section will attempt to answer 
                                                             
 
227 There was a system of categorisation and classification for the soldiers, based on their health and fitness, and their 
capacity for combat and other non-combatant army work.  
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these questions, and identify the connections between the onset and manifestations of war 
weariness and the medical aspects of the war. And though war weariness and shell shock 
are not the same phenomena, they both reflect the impact of combat on the individual, 
and there is also overlap between their contributing factors and manifestations. Moreover, 
shell shock was a more serious problem than war weariness, although the latter was more 
widespread and concealed the cumulative decline by veteran soldiers. My project seeks to 
examine those soldiers who were pushed to, but not quite beyond the breaking point,228 
and how they were able to carry on despite their war weariness. 
Primary and secondary sources suggest that the medical system and reality for 
soldiers on the Western Front could be an indirect contributing factor toward the onset of 
war weariness. A sense of injustice regarding military medicine, for instance, could 
contribute to this fed up, apathetic, or cautious attitude that were indicators of war 
weariness. Moreover, in the military medical system the individual was nearly always 
subsumed into the collective; this dehumanization and loss of individuality may have led 
soldiers to question the war effort, or at least their own personal involvement in it. In 
addition to this, the routines and regulations regarding the medical aspects of service 
might have become tedious. The tendency of the military medical staff, as well as other 
authorities, to focus on the minutiae of discipline and medicine, rather than on larger 
issues such as the provision of adequate supplies and proper use of these resources, might 
also have demoralized the troops. Why focus on the health and physical well-being of the 
soldiers if the military authorities could not figure out a way to cross No Man’s Land with 
sufficient force to seize and consolidate positions against German counterattack? The 
health and sanitation229 of the troops was inconsequential if they lacked the technology or 
                                                             
 
228 For those troops driven to the point of breakdown, collapse, or shell shock debilitation, see Mark Humphries, A 
Weary Road: Shell Shock in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1918 (London: University of Toronto Press, 
2018). 
229 Each infantry division contained a Sanitary Section as part of their medical complement. It was the task of these 
officers and ORs to deal with the quality of water consumed by the troops, and with garbage, kitchen waste (such as 
grease and fat drippings), sewage, and other aspects. Moreover, the duties of the Sanitary Section were “chiefly 
inspectorial,” which included visiting units, and providing advice and guidance regarding the sanitary conditions of 
quarters, for example. The Sanitary Section was also responsible for continuity in unit turnover, ensuring that 
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infantry officers, town majors, members of the medical services, and others to fulfill their duties.  LAC, RG 9 III B2, 
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techniques to accomplish their military objectives. Medical problems during the war, such 
as disease, illness, and physical and non-physical wounds, all served to erode the health 
and fortitude of the troops. The medical and health problems of the troops, in both 
combatant and non-combatant branches of service, depleted the ranks, depressed morale, 
and decreased combat motivation and efficiency.230 Some medical problems, moreover, 
might also be partial manifestations of war weariness. After months and years of service 
at the front, even the most dedicated, strongest volunteers showed clear signs of wear and 
tear. Some soldiers, it seems, decided that they had simply had enough, and took steps to 
reduce or eliminate their participation in the war. Over time, most human beings 
eventually succumbed to the strains associated with service, and there were tangible 
indicators of an erosion of endurance and staying power at the front. Many war-weary 
soldiers, moreover, seemed to have been on the very cusp of shell shock, debilitation, and 
breakdown. Or, put another way, many of these soldiers indicating manifestations of war 
weariness were pushed to, but not yet beyond, the breaking point. However, there was 
some overlap between shell-shock debilitation and war weariness, and at times there was 
a fine line between them. Most war-weary soldiers were able to carry on, reluctant though 
they might become, whereas those troops debilitated by shell shock were unable to 
continue with service, though they might very well desire to stick it out. Their medical 
problems merely prevented them from doing so.  
There was also much overlap and similarity in the forces and factors that 
contributed to the onset of both war weariness and shell-shock debilitation. The long-term 
and near-continual exposure to war, and the trauma of combat in particular, both 
contributed to these two understandings of personal reactions to combat. War weariness 
can be understood as the reluctance (or unwillingness) to continue in combat, whereas 
shell shock debilitation was the inability to endure further combat. Aside from longer 
exposure to the stressors associated with battle, acute or intense exposure to trauma might 
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6, ‘Organisation and Establishment Sanitary Sections.’ 
230 Englander, “Discipline and Morale in the British Army, 1917-1918,” in State, Society and Mobilization ed. by 
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also accelerate the process of breakdown. The lack of proper rest, respite from trauma, 
and the inadequacies of the leave and rotation system also contributed to the development 
of both these problems.  
Military medicine was distinct from civilian medicine and peacetime medical 
practices and priorities. Military medicine was more concerned with the issues of overall 
numbers, manpower, and morale. The health, recovery, and wishes of the individual 
soldier were relegated to secondary consideration behind the need to maintain sufficient 
force to attain objectives. The army medical system, and other aspects of army life, 
prioritised the collective over the individual; military medicine was not really about the 
genuine health and long-term recovery of the individual patient/soldier as an end in itself, 
but rather as a means to an end. This also harks back to the discussion on the legal system 
facing the Canadian troops during the war – military law was also a means to an end, 
prioritised the collective over the individual, and was about discipline rather than on 
justice. Moreover, relapsing troops were certainly an issue for the authorities, and efforts 
were made to minimise the number of soldiers who had to be taken out of the line for 
treatment for previous health problems. The military reality, however, often necessarily 
took precedence over the well-being of the troops. This is reflected in the fact that 
soldiers were often returned to the front prior to their full recovery, as was the case 
during the emergency of the German offensives beginning in March 1918.  
 
 
Military Medicine as Surveillance and Control 
In addition to ensuring proper numbers in the firing line and on the lines of 
communication, the military medical system was also about the control and surveillance 
of troops. This ensured that there was a disciplinary and paternalistic element to the 
system. The well-being of the soldiers was important only in the context of the wider 
army itself and the attritional struggle that was the First World War. It was not as though 
the army, its officers, and medical authorities were necessarily callous and indifferent to 
the plight of the soldiers under their command and care, but rather that the individual was 
simply less important than the survival and victory of the Entente and way of life over the 
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alternative. Individual soldiers were a means to an end, and perhaps more cynically mere 
cogs in the vast impersonal war machine that developed to defeat the Central Powers.  
The concepts of proximity and immediacy were integral to the organisation of the 
army medical system. This might actually have prolonged war weariness and medical 
problems, however, as soldiers were unable to properly escape the source of trauma and 
gain genuine respite. The army sought to reduce the number of soldiers evacuated from 
the front, and from the war zone more generally, in order to maintain unit numbers. 
Proximity ensured that soldiers would be treated as close to the front lines as possible, 
whereas immediacy entailed sorting and treating casualties quickly (triage). Corps and 
divisional rest stations were designed to ensure that those soldiers worn down from 
combat, but without serious (physical) wounds, would be able to recover promptly. These 
rest areas sought to “save wastage in minor medical cases,” and only those who were 
“expected to require only a few days treatment medically are sent there.”231 The army 
emphasis on manpower and the control of troops was designed to reduce ‘wastage’ rates, 
for illness, wounds, and even psychiatric casualties. Minor cases, and also those labelled 
as NYDN (Not Yet Diagnosed - Nervous), a label for shell shock, or “overwrought 
mental conditions requiring a short period of treatment, will be retained in the divisional 
area.” The author of this report indicated that “it is [only] more serious cases that are sent 
to the special hospital”232 for war neurosis. This reflected the army’s desire to keep troops 
close to the front and their units, but also illustrates the acknowledgment that 
‘overwrought mental conditions’ could be directly attributable to service. And yet despite 
this acknowledgement, this classification also suggested that the medical authorities were 
reluctant to make a definitive judgment on the issue, and even sought to blame the soldier 
himself (as being predisposed to these problems or just simply ‘nervous’). The army 
sought to husband its resources, and prevent any apparently minor cases from slipping 
                                                             
 
231 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3752, Folder 2-9-4-8, File ‘1st Divisional Rest Station.’ Moreover, in relation to the 
conditions of Trench Fever and Pyrexia of Unknown Origin (P.U.O.), soldiers were only transferred back to the UK if 
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through the cracks and being evacuated to Blighty. Any soldier who might recover in 
relatively short order was to be kept close to the front lines. 
And yet, many cases were indeed evacuated to Britain, a problem that was 
identified by authorities by at least 1916. The MO T.P. Woodhouse wrote in November 
1916 that he was concerned that casualties of a ‘lighter’ nature were being evacuated too 
readily back to England. He argued that around 5% of these lighter casualties evacuated 
were  
of such a slight nature that recovery is effected within a period of about a 
fortnight…[and after recovery these soldiers were sent to reserve units, but] steps 
should be taken to avoid this great delay in getting men back to the fighting 
line…[some will inevitably be evacuated unnecessarily but] during normal 
periods, no slight case should be allowed to leave this country…I would therefore 
be glad if you will take steps to treat such cases in Convalescent Depots, instead 
of evacuating the[m] to England.233 
 
In many instances, it was war-weary soldiers and those experiencing the beginnings of 
shell shock who needed this rest and could recover in as little as two weeks. Inadequate 
rest only exacerbated this problem and encouraged more permanent breakdown. The 
army medical system was designed to ensure adequate control over the troops, but also to 
shape their behaviour and thinking. The many regulations to which the troops were 
subject convinced many reluctant soldiers that nearly every aspect of their existence was 
monitored or subject to bureaucracy. In terms of sexual conduct, for example, it was the 
duty of officers, NCOs, chaplains and MOs to ensure that all soldiers were aware of army 
rules and consequences for breaches of discipline. Instructions issued by the CAMC in 
March of 1915 ordered officers to supervise the men closely, to carry out regular and 
surprise inspections, and to provide lectures on prophylaxis and the benefits of early 
treatment.234 This was in the best interest of the individual soldier, but also helped with 
the manpower and morale issues in the army itself.  
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234 Canada, Army Medical Corps Instructions: General Orders, Militia Orders and Precis of Headquarters Letters 
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 The monitoring of the soldiers, and the careful control of their movements, took 
other forms as well. The severity and increasing number of psychiatric casualties became 
a serious problem for the medical and military authorities. To deal with this problem, and 
to minimize wastage and evacuation of soldiers, the British insisted on the use of the 
NYDN label for these casualties, in part to suggest that any diagnosis was only 
temporary, and also to reject the notion of psychiatric casualties altogether. As the British 
Army general routine order No. 2384 indicated, soldiers who were made militarily non-
effective but without any visible wound were to be diagnosed as NYDN.235 This was 
ostensibly to prevent the ‘needless’ evacuation of casualties or misdiagnosis, but also an 
attempt to reject non-physical wounds entirely. Nevertheless these cases were to be kept 
near the front under army discipline, as well as monitored closely, to look for signs of 
recovery, relapse, or malingering. The medical services were instructed to be very careful 
with the use of nomenclature and diagnosis, lest all these psychiatric and non-physical 
casualties be listed as wounded or battle casualties.236 Only when the issue was serious 
enough to warrant evacuation to the UK or if the director general of medical services, 
based on “the recommendation of a neurological board at the Granville Canadian Special 
Hospital,” decided this was to be classified a battle casualty.237  
And even if soldiers were evacuated to hospitals or convalescent centres, their 
progress was monitored closely. This was the case because the army needed to maintain 
sufficient numbers in each unit at the front. During the German spring offensives 
(Kaiserschlacht) beginning March 1918, the authorities were concerned that there were 
not enough troops in the line to stem the tide of German attacks. Because of these 
concerns, and the fact that “men were urgently wanted for the front,” there was much 
pressure on the medical services to ‘heal’ the soldiers promptly and send them back to 
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their units as soon as possible. As one report for the Canadian Special Hospital at Witley 
indicated,  
It was a time of stress at the front, and the number of days a patient spent in 
hospital was that number of days’ delay in training and taking his place in the 
firing line. For this reason hospital days were carefully watched, and all attempts 
made not to lose time…[while men were in hospital, they could not help defeat 
the Germans] it had long been felt that patients were wasting a great deal of time 
while in hospital. The average stay in hospital of a patient at this time was about 
five weeks. Many patients, of course stayed longer. The parades for treatment and 
physical training did not take up a great deal of their time, and they tended to lose 
physical condition and morale.238 
 
This was but another example of the military taking precedence over the medical, and the 
collective gaining priority over the individual. And though this was understandable given 
the situation, it likely alienated some individuals and undermined recuperation efforts. 
Soldiers suffering from wounds or problems deemed of a “slight nature” were to 
be returned to the front as soon as possible.239 Even more serious psychiatric casualties 
were kept in France and Belgium, especially if they were not definitively diagnosed as a 
battle casualty. Medical arrangements for the British XVII Corps in May 1918, for 
instance, noted that “ordinary sick,” NYDN cases, “slight gas cases,” and “trivial 
wounded” will be evacuated to the divisional rest station, and not to the casualty clearing 
station.240 The medical authorities apparently believed these cases were not serious 
enough for evacuation, and should be grouped in with other ‘slight’ cases. 1st Canadian 
Division Medical documents of March 1918 also stipulated that NYDN cases were to be 
sent to the No. 46 Field Ambulance, along with “sick (other than serious cases)” and 
“wounded (trivial)” casualties, and not to No. 8 Casualty Clearing Station. The MO also 
stated that the field ambulance “will only retain such cases as will be fit for duty within 3 
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days time.”241 Again, this suggests that psychiatric casualties, and those worn down by 
acute stress or cumulative exposure to combat, would be fit for duty in a relatively short 
period of time, and were depicted as less serious than other casualties.  Removing the 
soldier from frontline service and especially the source of their stress, even if only for a 
short while, did show positive results for many. For these troops, the transition from war 
weariness to shell-shock debilitation had not yet been completed. The failure to remove 
war-weary soldiers or those pushed to the breaking point, however, could lead to even 
further medical and disciplinary problems, as a desperate soldier sought any means of 
escape from the horror of the trenches.  
 
 
Treatment, Punishment, and Army Medical Facilities  
Many cases, however, required more than just rest and removal from combat. The 
types of treatment were nearly as varied as the ailments, problems, and types of casualties 
affecting soldiers.242 Treatment, however, often contained elements of army discipline, 
and even punishment. More traditional authorities believed that soldiers, invalided out of 
the line due to their own carelessness or neglect of orders, needed to be punished, under 
close army supervision and discipline, until ready to take their place in the line again. 
Others suggested that more stoic or dedicated soldiers would rather not leave their unit to 
go sick at all, but only if a serious (physical) wound or injury prevented them from 
continuing at the front. Captain Ralph Bell of the 1st Battalion refused to add the names of 
“at least half a dozen well-known scrimshankers to the roll of sick, lame, and lazy,”243 
which would remove them from duty, at least for a short while. Of the thirteen soldiers 
                                                             
 
241 Ibid, ‘A.D.M.S., 1st Canadian Division,’ 30 March 1918.  
242 There were advances in plastic surgery and facial reconstruction, as well as in the realm of prosthetics during the 
war. Other treatments included: surgery, the use of drugs, physical and remedial training, massage, electrical treatment, 
and use of games, training, and exercises to build physical strength. In the UK treatments included: remedial 
gymnastics, physical training, massage, hydro and electro therapeutics. Of course, there was a class and rank element to 
all this, as officers and ‘gentlemen’ were generally treated with more respect and sympathy than their lower class and 
OR counterparts. This also applied to non-physical casualties, with shell shocked officers generally diagnosed as 
Neurasthenic, but other ranks as suffering from Hysteria. See LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3597, 24-1-7 (Volume 4), 
Returns Only, Remedial Treatment and Volume 3493, 11-1-15 to 11-1-21, ‘Report of the Work Done in Remedial 
Gymnastics, Physical Training, Massage, Hydro and Electro Therapeutics in the C.A.M.C.’ 
243 Bell, Canada in War-Paint, 54. 
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who showed up for sick parade, nine were given medicine and duty, one was given light 
duty, and another removed from duty altogether. And of those forced to remain at duty, 
many were also required to take the hated No. 9 Pill, a general purgative, sometimes 
interpreted as a form of punishment. And to further discourage the nine who showed up 
on sick parade from trying to avoid duty in the future, they were given a nine-mile route 
march in heavy marching order; Bell noted approvingly that “next day there were no 
representative of ‘A’ company on sick parade.”244 The deterrence appeared to work 
splendidly. 
The army medical system incorporated different treatment centres to deal with the 
myriad types of casualties encountered in a war of this magnitude.245 Convalescent 
hospitals handled recovering soldiers prior to their return to the front, reinforcement 
depot, or unit. There were also hospitals dealing with specific aspects of service, certain 
types of casualties, or for particular patients. Special hospitals dealt with shell shock cases 
and other kinds of casualties.246 The CAMC in conjunction with the RAMC ran these 
facilities, and by war’s end there were dozens of hospitals and treatment centres under 
Canadian authority, which treated Canadian and other Entente troops.247 These facilities 
were a vital aspect of preserving the health and effectiveness of soldiers worn down over 
time. 
For a soldier wounded at the front, their treatment and evacuation followed a 
definite pattern248 designed to deal with these cases as efficiently as possible. Leaving the 
                                                             
 
244 Ibid, 57-59. 
245 These included more permanent structures, furthest from the front, including base, general, special, stationary, and 
convalescent hospitals; facilities closer to the line, such as  the CCS; storage and testing areas like medical stores depots 
and mobile laboratories; convalescent centres, corps and divisional rest stations; and closer to the line collecting 
stations, main and advanced dressing stations, and RAPs. In terms of hospitals, each type had a different function or 
priority. Stationary and general hospitals were larger facilities, further from the front lines, that could handle hundreds 
of patients (as measured in number of beds), and where surgery could be performed. 
246 For example the Westcliffe Eye and Ear Hospital. There were also Officer Hospitals, such as at Broadstairs, and 
private facilities like the Red Cross Special Hospital and the IODE Hospital. LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4716, Folder 
109, File 4, No. 3 Canadian General Hospital, ‘Historical Records.’ Entire volume is useful, however. 
247 There were, for instance, Nos. 4, 5, 11-16 Canadian General Hospitals, the military hospital at Epsom, Red Cross 
hospital, King’s C.R.C. Hospital, four C.C.H. facilities, Canadian Special Hospitals at Witley, Buxton, Ramsgate, 
Broadstairs, Folkestone, and Lenham, Etchinghill, and Granville Canadian hospitals. LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3686, 
30-0-0 (Volume 5), CAMC Units, Correspondence regarding Special Investigation Committee.  
248 Soldiers wounded in the line would first be treated by themselves, their comrades, stretcher bearers, or MOs. If 
needing to be evacuated within the war zone, they would first be sent to the RAP; then to an advanced dressing station, 
main dressing station, and finally the CCS. See Macpherson et al., Medical Services – Hygiene of the War Volume I, 
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wounded at the front was detrimental to morale, and might also impede military 
operations. The severity of the wound or injury, coupled with the soldier’s service record, 
also determined how far they were to be evacuated and how much sympathy they were 
given. An infantryman with a serious battle wound, who had performed his duties in the 
past and did not have a history of (even suspected) malingering, for instance, could be 
evacuated out of the battle zone, toward the coast, and even to Britain and beyond. 
Soldier treatment also depended greatly on the prevailing circumstances. During active 
operations, medical personnel had less time for treatment and triage, and added a sense of 
urgency to procedures. Of course, these policies might actually exacerbate war weariness 
in some soldiers, and even promote its transformation into more serious neurosis. The 
diary of a British doctor explained that:  
In the military [in contrast to civilian practice], your duty as a medical officer is 
not to put the patient first, but the battalion. Malingerers must be weeded out, 
‘swinging the lead’ reported, the wounded patched up and sent back to action, 
even if it worsens their condition. Triage on the battlefield is a necessity, 
prioritising treatment for those most likely to fight again, leaving those beyond 
help to die.249 
 
The casualty clearing station (CCS) and other facilities in close proximity to the 
front lines were operated by the field ambulance (FA) of each unit at the front.250 The 
most serious cases were sent to the CCS, a facility more equipped to deal with a larger 
number of patients,251 and a crucial cog in the medical evacuation and treatment system. 
The CCS worked in conjunction with other facilities, and was designed to relieve the FAs 
                                                             
 
284; LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3602, 24-3-2, Medical History of the War, ‘The Care of the Casualty’ and Norris, The 
Memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, 329. 
249 The editor of this diary noted that “this was a long way from the Hippocratic Oath.” In this passage the italics are 
mine, used for emphasis. Davidson, A Doctor in the Great War, 33. 
250 One MO described the field ambulance as having 11 officers and 232 ORs, and as a “versatile, mobile unit, able to 
serve three [infantry] battalions at once because it was divisible into three independent sections.” Moreover, “each 
section had a stretcher bearer subdivision for collecting the wounded and a tent subdivision for treating them. In 
addition to setting up advanced dressing stations and main dressing stations, not far from the front, field ambulances 
operated divisional and corps rest stations at the rear.” LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3602, 24-3-2, Medical History of the 
War, ‘The Care of the Casualty’ and Norris, The World War I Memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, 329. 
251 The CCSs were at first found in buildings and other permanent structures. But as the war went on, as destruction 
accumulated, these buildings became scarcer. Eventually, the CCS came to incorporate tents and huts. Macpherson et 
al., Medical Services – Hygiene of the War Volume I, 278. 
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of their sick and wounded. The MOs, nursing sisters,252 orderlies, and other doctors at 
these locations provided care for patients, and decided upon as well as organised their 
evacuation, return to duty, or further treatment. From the CCS, ambulance trains would 
take casualties to larger, more permanent hospitals closer to the coast. In the First World 
War these centres were often busy, with each handling thousands of patients each year.253 
The staff of the CCS faced serious difficulties in the performance of their duties. Aside 
from the horrific wounds associated with combat, medical personnel were also exposed to 
the stresses and trauma of war, without the ability to retaliate against the source of this 
trauma (the enemy). Being in range of enemy shell fire, the exposure to poison gas, and 
enduring German air raids all took their toll on medical staff. In addition, facilities often 
became overwhelmed with casualties, especially during and following operations. 
Hospitals and CCSs were “very full after the Vimy show,” for instance, and medical staff 
and resources were taxed to the utmost.254 This also served to exacerbate medical and 
manpower issues during the war, and illustrates the enormous pressures on both soldiers 
and medical staff. The lack of respite, rest, and the reality of exhaustion were all 
contributing factors to war weariness and medical problems.  
The CCS was important in the treatment and evacuation system, as it was 
connected with rest areas and convalescent centres. These facilities were established to 
deal with cases not yet ready for return to action at the front, yet deemed not serious 
enough for further evacuation down the line. There were both divisional and corps rest 
stations, where the MO “detains those not quite well and those who need a short rest,”255 
rather than hospitalization. The 1st Divisional Rest Station, for example, was established 
to “save wastage in minor medical cases…[and] cases as are expected to require only a 
                                                             
 
252 “The Nursing Sisters of Canada,” Veterans Affairs Canada, Government of Canada, last modified 28 November, 
2017, http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/those-who-served/women-and-war/nursing-sisters.  
253 To provide but one example, the 1st Canadian CCS during the war handled 65,441 cases, and of these 6,053 were 
returned to duty, 1,536 died of their ailments, 170 were sent to rest stations, 4,417 sent to other hospitals and facilities, 
and 53,265 were evacuated to base (hospitals). See Macpherson et al., Medical Services – Hygiene of the War Volume I, 
278 and DUASC, Clearing: The Tale of the First Canadian Casualty Clearing Station, BEF, 1914-1919 by Thomas 
Brenton Smith, MS-2-432 – SF 44-1, pages 2, 230, 310. 
254 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3752, Folder 6-3-1, Hospitals, France, Generally, ‘No. 3 Canadian General Hospital 
McGill.’ The presence of influenza in these facilities compounded the problem, especially as the virus spread amongst 
personnel and patients, despite the best efforts at quarantine and treatment.  
255 Davidson, A Doctor in the Great War, 259. 
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few days treatment medically are sent to this.”256 What constituted a ‘minor’ case was 
ambiguous, but retaining cases in the army area helped ease the burden on military 
hospitals. Rest areas were crucial to the continued functioning of the armed forces; a short 
rest out of the line, and especially respite from the direct sources of trauma, helped 
mitigate the worst effects of war weariness. These rest centres also minimised the overall 
numbers of sick and wounded. Some of the more understanding MOs, for instance, 
argued that it was better to send “exhausted men” to these facilities close to the front, 
rather than further down the line.257 This concept of proximity (to the front) and 
immediacy (in treatment) became important aspects of the army’s approach to psychiatric 
casualties as the war progressed. Further down the line and closer to the coast, 
convalescent depots were also designed to rehabilitate soldiers prior to their return to 
active duty. These supposedly “slighter” cases were retained “pending return to duty or 
transfer” to other medical facilities.258 These centres were reserved for “Canadians who 
are likely to be fit for service again…and given the opportunity to recover their strength” 
before being sent to reserve battalions or appearing before medical boards259 - and thus 
were appropriate for many war-weary troops. Moreover, each stationary and general 
hospital sent its recovering patients to facilities for further convalescence.260 These 
centres espoused military discipline, incorporated training, and were often understood as 
the penultimate step before a soldier returned to his place in the line. Convalescent 
centres and camps, furthermore, sought to make use of these soldier patients for labour or 
other purposes.261 
The most seriously wounded or ill patients would be evacuated to, and treated at, 
the more permanent hospitals furthest from the front. Along the lines of communication 
and at the French coast bases there were general,262 stationary, special, and convalescent 
                                                             
 
256 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3752, Folder 2-9-4-8, ‘1st Divisional Rest Station.’  
257 Davidson, A Doctor in the Great War, 260. 
258 Macpherson, Medical Services – Hygiene of the War Volume I, 278. 
259 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3602, 24-3-2, Medical History of the War, ‘The Care of the Casualty.’ 
260 LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4570, Folder 2, File 5, ‘Entertainment.’ 
261 These were “for men who, while temporarily unfit for duty with their units, could yet be used for light fatigues” and 
other duties. LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4717, Folder 111, File 1, No. 1 Sanitary Section, ‘Historical Records.’ 
262 General hospitals were typically the largest of the military medical facilities, with a capacity for 1,040 to 2,500 
patients (or beds). The case of the No. 3 Canadian General Hospital (McGill) is instructive. Its experience during the 
87 
 
 
 
hospitals, all serving a different purpose or different type of casualty. For those requiring 
further evacuation, or who were permanently debilitated, hospital ships conveyed these 
patients across the Channel to Britain,263 and from there to Canada, if need be. 264 Special 
hospitals were organised to treat particular types of casualties, those requiring more 
resources, attention, or specialist equipment. These hospitals were established in the war 
zone itself, along with neurological centres inspired by French practices, and 
incorporating the idea of proximity. Special hospitals were also established in the UK for 
longer-term treatment, and for “patients suffering from the more obviously psychological 
effects of shell-shock and war neuroses.”265 The idea was that psychiatric cases and 
functional nervous disorders could be treated, and perhaps even ‘cured,’ obviating the 
need for long-term disability or discharge from His Majesty’s forces.266 The 
understanding of war weariness was not quite as advanced, but policies to address 
incipient shell shock also helped with war-weary soldiers.  
 
 
Medical Personnel, Arrangements, and Evacuation 
The medical system required substantial personnel to ensure that it functioned 
according to guidelines laid down. Yet the medical personnel were still often over-
worked and were liable to exhaustion or worse. A letter from the OC No. 3 Canadian 
General Hospital to (Nursing) Matron Margaret Macdonald, for example, lamented 
proposals to increase the capacity of the hospital as problematic. Each hospital had only 
so many MOs and staff, and “with the very active work which we are carrying on here, it 
is very trying to every one of these who are taking on additional work.” The officer and 
                                                             
 
Battle of the Somme “taxed our efforts to the utmost,” in the words of one member. In a single day, the No. 3 hospital 
admitted over 800 patients, and discharged 1,100. And yet, by 6:00pm of that same day there were still over 1,000 
patients in the hospital. LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4716, Folder 109, File 4, No. 3 Canadian General Hospital, 
‘Historical Records.’ 
263 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3602, 24-3-2, Medical History of the War, ‘The Care of the Casualty.’ 
264 Ibid. The case of the No. 3 Canadian General Hospital (McGill) is instructive. Its experience during the Battle of the 
Somme “taxed our efforts to the utmost,” in the words of one member. In a single day, the No. 3 hospital admitted over 
800 patients, and discharged 1,100. And yet, by 6:00pm of that same day there were still over 1,000 patients in the 
hospital. LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4716, Folder 109, File 4, No. 3 Canadian General Hospital, ‘Historical Records.’ 
265 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3752, 3-1-4-2, Treatment of Shell Shock Cases at the Front, and ‘Treatment of War 
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hospital administrator continued, writing that after the loss of a key member of the staff, 
who had yet to be replaced, “Captain Rhea is doing the sanitary work in addition to his 
pathology, so you can see how his efforts are being considerably taxed, and…I am rather 
afraid that unless something is promptly done in this matter, that he will break down.”267 
This seems to be a clear acknowledgment that exhaustion and overwork could have 
serious and potentially long-term health effects on those subject to pressure. In addition to 
the MOs attached to each infantry battalion, there were also medical specialists who 
worked at the military hospitals in the war zone, along the lines of communication, as 
well as back in the UK. Moore Barracks Hospital in Shorncliffe, for example, employed a 
specialist in ‘mental diseases,’ who oversaw wards 24 and 25.268 Other specialist doctors 
that fell under the ‘mental diseases’ category were those such as Captain E. Ryan, an 
expert in ‘insanity.’269   
These doctors and specialists were supported by the Canadian Chaplain Service, 
the Canadian Army Service Corps (CASC), and private organisations such as the YMCA, 
Red Cross,270 and similar groups. The Canadian Chaplain Service, unit chaplains, and 
padres assisted with the health and well-being of the troops by providing them with 
comforts and entertainment while out of the line, but also in assisting with medical duties 
at the front and during operations. Chaplains helped organise sporting contests, concerts, 
and other events, and ensured that soldiers were given material comforts, such as 
chocolate, hot coffee, cigarettes, stationary to write home, and a place to relax behind the 
lines. In this sense, the chaplains assisted with the morale and mental health of the troops, 
which obviously contributed to their overall (physical) health and ability to endure the 
stresses of war. And during attacks and other operations, chaplains could be found 
helping with the wounded at dressing stations and field hospitals, and were also known to 
                                                             
 
267 The italics are mine, added for emphasis. LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4570, Folder 2, File 8, 3rd Canadian General 
Hospital, Establishments, Personnel – Beds, letter dated 15 March 1916. 
268 LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4577, Folder 4, File 7, Moore Barracks Hospital, Shorncliffe, ‘Inspection.’ 
269 Another specialist was experienced in ‘lung and nervous disease,’ others trained in VD, surgery, ear, nose, and 
throat, dental, pathology, and others. LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3601, 24-2-8, Army Lists, Corr. re., ‘List of Medical 
Officers in the CAMC,’ as of 22 September 1916. 
270 See, for instance, the medical arrangements for Vimy Ridge and the role of the Red Cross. Percy L. Climo, Let Us 
Remember Them: Lively Letters from World War One (Cobourg: Self-Published, 1990), 253. 
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go forward with the infantry (or just after), to assist in the care and removal of casualties 
from the battlefield.271 Chaplains could also be found at base hospitals and convalescent 
centres, along the lines of communication, and wherever soldiers were located. As the OC 
Buxton Military Hospital argued, chaplains rendered “important and valuable services, 
and I do not see how we can possibly do without them, or even release one.”272  
The army medical system and its evacuation procedures were designed to remove 
the most serious cases from the front lines, lest their presence undermine soldier 
morale,273 discipline, and endurance. During battles, frontline casualties were sent down 
the line using the FAs and stretcher bearers,274 and would pass through regimental aid 
posts (RAPs) where triage was performed. Some of the wounded were quickly patched 
up, others sent back to the firing line, and still some were left alone, being “beyond 
help.”275 Those able to walk on their own were sent to the advanced dressing stations, and 
also to the divisional walking wounded collection stations. Stretcher and more serious 
cases were sent via lorries to the main dressing stations, and ultimately to the larger 
hospitals beyond.276 This system of evacuation worked better during static trench warfare, 
when lines of communication had been worked out and medical facilities established in a 
more permanent manner. Routine and predictability aided in this process. During more 
                                                             
 
271 During battle, chaplains played a vital role for the troops. For example, during the operations at Lens there were 
seven coffee stalls and a soup kitchen established “during the fight.” Five of these were “under shell fire almost 
continuously…[and] two of our men were killed and one wounded.” Chaplain-run canteens were also “in the shelled 
area during the operations.” At these facilities they “issued free cigarettes, coffee, milk, sugar and biscuits.” During the 
action “thousands of men were served,” which was of great importance for their ability to carry on. LAC, RG 9 III C15, 
Volume 4664, Reports ADCS France.  
272 LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4654, Hospitals 7, Buxton. Chaplains helped with the recovery process, and were also 
tasked with providing dying soldiers with comfort, and for Catholic troops, the last rites. Military chaplains also 
oversaw burials, wrote to next of kin, and even visited the bereaved if possible. 
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and increased the chances a wounded soldier could be used again. Gaudet, ed., The World War I Journal and Poems of 
Pte. Frank Walker, x.  
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Folder 52. File 1, ‘First Division Report on Vimy Operations’ and Colonel W.W. Murray, The History of the 2nd 
Canadian Battalion (East Ontario Regiment) Canadian Expeditionary Force in the Great War 1914-1919 (Ottawa: 
Mortimer Ltd., 1947), 284. 
275 Davidson, A Doctor in the Great War, 80. 
276 Ibid. 
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open and mobile warfare, such as during the Hundred Days campaign, the movement of 
the troops complicated matters.  
Aside from evacuation, the CAMC and medical services had policies in place to 
address manpower and morale issues in the war zone. One way in which authorities 
attempted to reduce the overall number of casualties and those forced down the line or 
evacuated was to hold regular sick parades and inspections. These voluntary parades 
allowed troops who were sick or injured to be inspected by the unit’s MO, who would 
then decide whether they should be sent down the line for further treatment. This was a 
regular part of any medical officer’s duty,277 and was designed to be the ‘first line of 
defence’ for the authorities. However, there were some problems with this system. First 
of all as casualties mounted, especially during periods of heavy combat, there was only so 
much a battalion MO could accomplish, and only so much time he could devote to 
individual soldiers. This meant that hasty diagnoses were commonplace. This also meant 
that some soldiers genuinely deserving of a rest away from the stresses of the front fell 
through the cracks and were forced to remain at duty. Secondly, there was the problem of 
separating legitimate casualties requiring further treatment and evacuation, from those 
who were simply trying to escape the front, for whatever reason. As one MO noted, some 
soldiers seemed to “seek treatment too readily,” thus clogging up the system.278 The third 
problem, however, was the opposite of this, namely, that some dedicated soldiers avoided 
these parades altogether, even if they did have a genuine medical issue, “refusing to 
accept [that] they are ill” or wounded.279 There were myriad reasons why a soldier would 
reject medical treatment, including a stoic or traditional British ‘stiff-upper lip’ attitude, 
leadership responsibilities, a sense of commitment and duty, the unwillingness to let one’s 
comrades down, optimism, the fear of being viewed as weak, or plain denial.  
If soldiers were deemed unfit for further service at the front, there were certain 
procedures to be followed during evacuation and treatment. All patients undergoing 
                                                             
 
277 See, for instance, Norris, The World War I Memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, 253, 325. 
278 Davidson, A Doctor in the Great War, 232. 
279 Ibid. See also LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3751, Folder 2-4-1, Major G.S. Strathy, ‘War Diary August 1914 – 
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treatment and evacuation were required to have certain documents on their person. To 
provide but one example, all cases of “mental diseases” at Camp Bramshott were sent to 
No. 12 Canadian General Hospital, and were to be accompanied by Army Form B.179 
(medical history of an invalid) and Army Form B.183.280 These were to accompany the 
soldier in order to track their medical history and treatment, but also to ensure that certain 
types of casualties were not evacuated to Britain. For many medical and military 
authorities, there was a suspicion of, and hostility to, psychiatric casualties, war neuroses, 
and shell shock. The understanding of the very real effects of trauma on the human body 
and mind were underdeveloped, though the horrors of the Somme, Third Ypres, and 
similar battles provided many lessons regarding these casualties. Ultimately, however, the 
upper echelons of the military hierarchy and the generals only paid lip service to 
psychology during the war.281 The understanding of war weariness, moreover, was also 
underdeveloped, ensuring that pre-existing problems were exacerbated by the army 
medical system.  
The medical bureaucracy also included army medical boards, which were tasked 
with deciding the fate of many a wounded or sick soldier. Those who seemed to require 
(at least) six months of treatment were brought before these boards, sometimes with a 
“recommendation for invaliding back to Canada,”282 which would ease the burden on 
medical personnel and resources, at least in Europe. For soldiers requiring long-term care, 
but who were not invalided back to Canada, doctors would be kept informed as to the 
status of patients. The soldier’s stay in hospital was dependent upon the nature and 
progress of the case, as well as the wider military situation. Moreover, there were regular 
re-evaluations of patients to prevent shirking and to maintain manpower requirements.283 
Ultimately, however, the goal of the CAMC was to ensure that there were sufficient 
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troops in the line, and along the lines of communication, to accomplish military 
objectives and keep the enemy at bay. The role of the CAMC was to make men effective 
soldiers. It was evident that  
the first and greatest duty of the Army Medical Service is to keep the man well 
and fit. The second duty is, if sick or wounded, so to treat him that he will become 
effective again with the shortest possible delay.284 
 
It is telling that the MO who wrote this used the term ‘effective,’ rather than ‘healthy;’ the 
needs of the army took precedence over the well-being of the individual soldier. This 
ensured that many war-weary soldiers were unable to gain proper respite which promoted 
the transformation into more serious shell shock.  
Only the most seriously wounded soldiers were discharged from the forces 
permanently; others were expected to return to duty once they had recovered. As soldier 
Charles Douie wrote in his memoirs, it seemed that it was always the best leaders and 
bravest who died first, as they volunteered for the most dangerous duties and were often 
in the vanguard. These troops, “wounded time and again, they returned to the front”285 
only to be wounded once again, or ultimately killed in battle. For perceptive and 
reflective soldiers, it appeared that death was inevitable the longer one stayed at the front. 
This helps explain the adoption of a fatalistic attitude amongst combatant soldiers, but 
also the development of war weariness in ever larger numbers. The army desired to send 
soldiers back to their units as soon as possible after wounding, and there was a lack of 
appreciation for the nature, extent, and severity of psychiatric casualties. MOs had to 
decide those “who were likely to be fit for duty within a reasonable time” so as to retain 
them in the army area.286 It was the duty of the MO to balance the needs of the collective 
with those of the individual. This was made all the more difficult with long-serving 
soldiers, especially those “who because of long service in the front line needed a rest,”287 
but had no other medical problems to justify transfer or time out of the line. Without this 
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rest, a war-weary soldier might very well descend into more serious shell shock. Military 
authorities, however, believed these soldiers should stay with their units and remain at 
duty until rotated out of line with their comrades or granted leave. The problem with this 
approach was that by that time it might be too late; the soldier may have already been 
pushed beyond the breaking point. But MOs could help prevent this through their “timely 
insistence on a man’s transfer to a rest camp or light duty in the rear area…[and through 
which they] could avert a tragedy.”288 Superiors did not always accept these 
recommendations or interventions, however. 
Intervention on the part of MOs, commanders, and chaplains was crucial, but they 
were not always given leeway to ensure soldiers got the rest they needed. MOs were 
restricted in their diagnoses to prevent the evacuation of certain casualties,289 even if such 
evacuation could prevent more permanent breakdown and was thus better for the army as 
a whole. Addressing war weariness early on was preferable to more permanent 
debilitation and shell shock, though it was, admittedly, difficult to do so. Instructions 
issued to field ambulances and unit MOs admonished medical personnel to do whatever 
possible to reduce the sick (and presumably wounded) numbers at the front. Officers were 
to pay attention to “all matters that can conduce to the health of the troops,” including 
“securing all possible rest for the men whilst not in the trenches or on necessary duty.”290 
The problem, of course, was that there were times where the rest and rotation out of the 
line should have been given priority over trench and other ‘necessary duty.’ Even when 
troops were not in the trenches, they had many duties behind the lines, and still found 
themselves exposed to danger and stress.291 That further duty only exacerbated problems, 
and further contributed to their war weariness. Surely periodic and genuine rest from the 
                                                             
 
288 Ibid, 227.  
289 Medical documents of the (British) First Army instructed MOs that “special care must be taken to see that the letters 
N.Y.D.N. are not thoughtlessly placed on a Field Medical Card either to get rid of a useless man or to give a good 
soldier a much needed rest.” The italics here are mine. LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4551, Folder 1, File 7, ‘D.M.S. 
First Army 7 94/86.’ 
290 The author also suggested that hot food, bathing facilities, good water, estaminets, care of feet, sanitation, and other 
medical aspects contributed to the health, morale, and well-being of the soldiers. Of course, these were not always 
available, especially during the more mobile warfare of the final months of the war. LAC, RG 9 III C9, Volume 4530, 
Folder 12, ‘April 28th 1916 – O’s C Field Ambulances and M.O’s i/c Units.’ 
291 Behind the lines soldiers had to deal with disease, air raids and other dangers. See Cate, ed., A Soldier’s Memoir of 
World War I, 43; Caughill, ed., Letters to Janet, 106, 113, 136 and Lamin, Letters from the Trenches, 147. 
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strains of warfare to extend the ‘shelf life’ of the soldier was preferable to premature 
breakdown and long-term debilitation. The authorities, however, did not necessarily see it 
this way.  
 Medical officers also had to contend with the medical classification system. 
Medical personnel and boards were instructed to ensure that “all men proceeding to the 
front are physically fit to carry on with their respective units,”292 but what of 
psychological fitness for duty? This stubborn understanding of fitness as purely physical 
was perhaps naïve, and was certainly counterproductive in many ways. Clearly the 
military authorities were uncomfortable with the idea of psychiatric casualties in general, 
and did all they could to will the problem away. There was concern, for example, that 
merely acknowledging or mentioning the problem would actually legitimise it and 
increase its occurrence. This is, however, not really surprising given the traditional and 
unsympathetic understanding of these casualties from authorities of all stripes.293 Other 
MOs were reprimanded for trying to explain why soldiers had “failed in their duty” and 
for diagnosing soldiers with certain medical conditions “without due consideration of the 
military issues at stake,”294 emphasising the military over the medical. And the confusion 
and debates surrounding shell shock also complicated the role of the MO. There were 
disagreements and varying viewpoints as to the use of the term itself, its symptoms, 
treatments, long-term implications, and other aspects.295 Even the British War Office 
                                                             
 
292 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3751, Nos. 10 and 12 (British) FLD AMS, ‘Assistant Inspector of Drafts, Etaples.’  
293 Macphail wrote that shell shock was merely a “manifestation of childishness and femininity. Against which there is 
no remedy.” Medical boards and the classification of soldiers divided these cases into two, as a) “true shell shock” and 
b) “symptoms resulting from nervous exhaustion or loss of self-control.” Macphail, Medical Services, 278 and LAC, 
RG 9 III B2, Volume 3751, 2-3-6-2, ‘Documents for Troops Returning, Boards.’  
294 LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4546, Folder 6, File 2, ADMS 3rd Canadian Division (Notes on Various Battles), 
‘Extract from G.H.Q. Letter,’ 14 October 1916.  
295 Captain Dillon of the CAMC wrote that there was confusion surrounding the use of the term shell shock, partly 
because it had been “applied indiscriminately to cases incapacitated through shell explosion or other sudden shock of 
war, without showing signs of visible injury,” but obviously also had other causes as well. Many cases had been 
admitted under the label of ‘shell shock,’ including skull fractures, concussion, hysteria, and other afflictions. Another 
problem surrounded the mutability of symptoms, and the fact that not all psychiatric casualties were treated equally. In 
1916, for example, shell shock, neurasthenia, “nervous breakdown,” and those diagnosed as ‘Inability to stand shell 
fire’ were sent to No. 32 CCS to see a Specialist of Nerve Diseases and “will not be evacuated to base unless there are 
definite lesions and symptoms which show that the disability is thoroughly genuine.” This suggested that only those 
with physical indicators would be deemed ‘genuine.’ See LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4575, Folder 1, File 5, Bulletin 
of the CAMC, Volume I, No. 6 (September 1918), article entitled ‘On the Nature of Shell Shock,’ by Captain F. Dillon 
of the CAMC and Ibid, Volume 4551, Folder 1, File 7, ‘D.D.M.S. M.1/55,’ dated 7 November 1916 and ‘Shell Shock 
and Gassed Cases,’ dated 6 November 1916. 
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Committee of Enquiry into ‘Shell-Shock’ of 1922 only developed a rather ambiguous 
understanding of the problem in the years following the war.296 If the military authorities 
themselves could not agree on what constituted shell shock and related afflictions, it was 
even more difficult for MOs to grapple with the problem. War weariness, moreover, was 
a more difficult concept to understand, and the army medical policies, the emphasis on 
manpower and morale at the expense of nearly all other factors, served to exacerbate pre-
existing conditions and encouraged the development of war weariness into shell shock.  
 
 
Different Types of Casualties, the Categorisation and Classification 
of Soldiers 
Diseases and illnesses297 were problematic because they could be communicable, 
could make soldiers vulnerable to other health problems, and ultimately undermined the 
overall health, morale, endurance, and well-being of those in uniform - all of which could 
contribute to war weariness. Some diseases also affected the soldiers both physically and 
mentally. Syphilis, for instance, could lead to serious mental and neurological 
impairment. And the scourge of tuberculosis, as well as its treatment, could have a 
marked “mental effect” on the soldier patients.298 Long periods spent in hospital could be 
demoralizing, especially if troops felt they were letting their comrades down or if they 
missed a big ‘show’ (battle).  
Diseases/illnesses served to compromise the health and endurance of soldiers, but 
could also undermine commitment and morale, acting as a contributor to war weariness. 
                                                             
 
296 See, for example, Ted Bogacz, “War Neurosis and Cultural Change in England, 1914-1922: The Work of the War 
Office Committee of Enquiry into ‘Shell-Shock,’” 250. 
297 Other illness were related to gas poisoning, and there was also alcoholism, influenza, Scarlet Fever, smallpox, 
dysentery, measles, mumps, tetanus, scabies, and diseases of the ear, respiratory, digestive, and lymphatic systems. The 
drinking of water contaminated by gas, both Allied and enemy, was also cause of gas poisoning. The medical services 
developed tests to determine if local water sources were safe for ingestion, but not all types of gas could be tested in 
such a way. There was also an effort made to inspect water sources, and to educate the troops and COs about the 
dangers of drinking, especially stagnant, water. Shell holes often filled with water, and therefore “could be readily 
poisoned, especially with arsenical compounds.” One report suggested that Yellow Cross gas could be “rendered 
harmless by boiling.” LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4563, Folder 2, File 1, ‘Testing of Water Poisoned by Gas Shells;’ 
Ibid, Folder 3, File 3, No. 1 Canadian General Hospital, ‘October 1914 – March 1915’ and LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 
3615, 25-3-11, 25-3-12, 25-4-2 to 25-6-2, files ‘Scarlet Fever,’ ‘Disease: Smallpox, October 1914 to December 1918,’ 
‘Diseases, Miscellaneous,’ and ‘Non-Infectious Diseases.’  
298 Ibid, Volume 4576, Folder 2, File 7, ‘Tuberculosis.’  
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Suffering from disease or other medical problems did not guarantee the development of 
war weariness, but it did make soldiers more susceptible to it. These wounds, illness, and 
other problems illustrate the difficulties facing the soldiers, on both an individual and 
collective level. But they also suggest that the soldiers’ powers of resistance were 
weakened over time and contributed to the activation of self-preservation behaviours, not 
to mention self-reflection and calculations regarding long-term chances of survival. 
Because of the bloody nature of the war, and the fact that prior to the autumn of 1918 
there was no end in sight, soldiers might very well determine that their best chances of 
survival were to evade duty299 or escape service altogether. It was under these conditions 
that war weariness thrived.  
Especially problematic were the non-physical casualties, and the debates over 
what constituted a genuine wound and battle casualty. Shell shock, hysteria, 
exhaustion,300 and neurasthenia cases, depending on the MO, could be classified as either 
directly caused by (or related to) combat or frontline service, or alternatively, blamed on 
the soldier and attributed to his weakness, predisposition, mistakes, or similar defect. War 
weariness, though a very real phenomenon and reaction to combat, was more ambiguous. 
Those who were deemed honourable soldiers, who had done their duty and were wounded 
during service, were treated more sympathetically than those who were depicted as weak, 
cowards, or shirkers. There were, of course, rank, class, and cultural dimensions to this 
false dichotomy, as evidenced by both diagnoses and the awarding (or not) of pensions.301  
                                                             
 
299 See, for example, Different types of purposeful SIWs are explored in Black, I Want One Volunteer, 24-26, and 
accidental SIWs and their impact in Davidson, A Doctor in the Great War, 195-196. 
300 Medical reports on the flying services noted that some “aviators [were] suffering from exhaustion due to flying 
stress,” and that “this condition of relative incompetency rapidly passes off, and one will find that the [haemic] 
murmurs entirely disappear with a couple weeks’ rest.” Other pilots were diagnosed with Neurasthenia. The report 
stated that “one untoward experience may be sufficient to unbalance the nervous system of the stoutest pilot.” LAC, RG 
9 III B2, Volume 3493, 11-2-7/11-2-8, Reports MO DGMS, ‘Reports Medial Aspect Air Service,’ 20 August 1917. 
301 MOs and army medical boards looked for signs of “nervous instability” in soldiers. Moreover, by 1921 there were 
some 65,000 soldiers discharged from the BEF and still receiving pensions for Neurasthenia. Moran, The Anatomy of 
Courage, 162. The MO Macphail stated that there were 8,513 soldiers diagnosed with “nervous diseases” during the 
war, though it is not clear if he was referring to only Canadian troops, or the time period, or his methodology or 
sources. Macphail also noted that shell shock was a term used to describe a “variety of conditions ranging from 
cowardice to maniacal insanity,” suggesting that it was the soldier’s own fault, or he was already predisposed to mental 
illness prior to combat and service in the forces. Some MOs saw those suffering from psychoneurosis of war as merely 
slackers or malingerers. Macphail, Medical Services, 276-277. 
97 
 
 
 
The disagreements over what constituted a battle casualty highlights another issue, 
namely, how soldiers should be classified and what role they should play based on their 
health and strength. Some soldiers, due to their age or wound/illness, for instance, were 
no longer fit for frontline service. This was especially true for infantrymen, who were 
most exposed to enemy fire. These were the soldiers at the ‘sharp end’ of combat.302 Yet 
despite debility, these troops could still be useful along the lines of communication, in the 
CASC or similar units.303 These categories were developed to maximise manpower and 
efficiency, as well as to ensure that frontline units always had enough troops to carry out 
their duties. Because of this, some soldiers who should have been granted a temporary 
rest were forced to carry on. The classification system had five separate categories, from 
“A” to “E,” each of which also had sub-categories. Category “A” men,304 were deemed fit 
for general service, whereas “B” troops were deemed fit for overseas service, but not in 
combat units. These “B” troops thus could join forestry or labour units, as well as do 
sedentary work (such as clerks).305 “D” troops were considered temporarily unfit for 
service, while “E” troops were inadequate for military service of any kind, and were 
awaiting discharge.306 “A” soldiers needed to be able to withstand long marches and 
heavy physical exertion, to see properly (to fire a weapon), to hear well (to be able to 
respond to verbal orders), and be “able to stand active service conditions.” This last point 
was particularly problematic, as it was nearly impossible to screen-out those predisposed 
to breakdown – if there even were such individuals – and even good, loyal, hard-working, 
                                                             
 
302 This was the title of historian Tim Cook’s first volume on Canadians in the Great War. Tim Cook, At the Sharp End: 
Canadians Fighting the Great War 1914-1916 – Volume I (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2007).  
303 For one British infantry subaltern “it is not unreasonable to speculate that his later transfer [to the lines of 
communication in Italy]…was a recognition of the fact that he was no longer fit for further front line service in France 
and Flanders.” Douie, Recollections of a Subaltern of Infantry, ix. 
304 Troops classified as “A1” or “Ai” were believed to be ready for overseas service in terms of training and their 
“physical and mental qualifications.” Aii troops were ready for overseas service once their training was complete. Aiii 
soldiers were those casualties in hospitals or command depots, who were fit for Ai service “as soon as hardening and 
training is completed in reserve units.” Aiv troops were under 19 years of age, but otherwise healthy and fit for frontline 
service. LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3686, 30-0-0 (Volume 4), June 1918 – December 1918, General Correspondence, 
‘Instructions for Medical Officers,’ dated 21 August 1918.  
305 The PPCLI saw their active strength decrease as Private Robert Christie (Reg. # 51106) was downgraded from 
category “A” to “B1,” due to Neurasthenia. He was thus transferred to the Canadian Labour Pool and “struck off 
strength of the P.P.C.L.I. accordingly.” PPCLI Archives, 34 (3)-6, Battalion Orders, Daily Orders Pt. II, 1 January – 31 
December 1918.  
306 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3686, 30-0-0 (Volume 4), June 1918 – December 1918, General Correspondence, 
‘Instructions for Medical Officers,’ dated 21 August 1918.  
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and strong soldiers could break down due to acute or cumulative stress at the front.307 
And in many ways, ‘active service conditions’ were dynamic and unpredictable.  
Soldiers suffering from psychiatric casualties, or made militarily ineffective from 
combat but without physical wounds, were not always diagnosed as battle casualties. This 
meant these troops were often treated unsympathetically or prevented from escaping 
further frontline service, despite their inability to endure further combat and their 
potential for permanent and long-term debilitation.308 And in order to reduce the number 
of shell shock diagnoses, and to prevent the impression that authorities were sympathetic 
to these cases, there were certain rules and guidelines surrounding classification.309 Some 
MOs, for instance, were reprimanded by superior authorities for being too generous and 
too liberal in diagnosing certain (psychiatric) casualties as shell shock cases. In the 
experience of the No. 10 Canadian Field Ambulance, some believed this diagnosis of 
shell shock was “being abused [by medical officers].” Medical Officers were reminded 
that they needed to follow orders and regulations as “in some divisions a diagnosis of 
SHELL SHOCK is not permitted without an accompanying confirmatory note from [the] 
officer commanding, unit.”310 This simply reinforces the point that the needs and recovery 
of the individual soldier/patient were secondary to those of the army, especially 
manpower and morale considerations. Moreover, it also illustrates that medical officers 
were limited by army rules and regulations and, at least in this case, the commanding 
                                                             
 
307 The editor of one soldier’s journal wrote that “even among those who seemed steady and solid under the constant 
danger from enemy fire, the stress of service at the front had a cumulative effect on the soldier.” Roy, ed., The Journal 
of Private Fraser, 15. 
308 Practically speaking, this meant that these psychiatric casualties and shell shock cases might not be treated as 
traditional battle casualties, such as gunshot wounds, and could thus be denied pensions and further government support 
following discharge from the forces. One report, for instance, made it clear that the Army sought to limit government 
support for these types of casualties, and feared giving the impression to other soldiers that they were sympathetic to 
these cases. The author stated that “soldiers discharged from [the] Army for psychogenetic conditions (Neurasthenia, 
Shell Shock, Psychasthenia, Psycho-Neurosis, etc.) should not receive a ‘pension’ but rather a temporary allowance. 
The word ‘pension’ has too permanent a sound.” LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3618, 25-13-6, ‘G.R.O. 3867,’ 25 April 
1918 and ‘Report on Visit to Special Hospitals for Nervous Cases.’  
309 Routine Order No. 298 clearly outlined rules regarding the diagnosis and classification of casualties. Those listed as 
NYD [Not Yet Diagnosed] Gas were not to be listed as battle casualties, unless and until they were “definitely 
diagnosed as cases of gas poisoning” by a more senior officer. The report continued, stating that “the diagnosis of 
M.Os. in charge of fighting units cannot be taken as final.” This suggested that there was a rather high burden of proof 
for certain casualties, and that the medical authorities were not always trusted to do the right thing for the needs of the 
army (manpower and morale). LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4554, Folder 2, File 12, ‘Routine Order No. 298.’  
310 Ibid, Folder 1, File 4, ‘Notes to Medical Officers, No. 10 Canadian Field Ambulance,’ 28 May 1916.  
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officer (and not the MO) had the final say regarding the health and diagnosis of the 
soldiers. Nevertheless, due to the sheer volume of psychiatric casualties and other non-
physical cases during the war, the British Army developed a treatment and classification 
system for shell shock casualties, in order to maintain “prompt and efficient treatment”311 
to ensure they returned to duty as soon as possible. 
This classification and categorisation system was important for a few reasons. 
First of all, it meant that some troops were transferred to other units, for good or ill, or 
that they could be discharged from the forces entirely. When manpower demands were 
elevated, for instance during the German attacks of 1918, service and non-combatant 
units were ‘combed out’ for those who could undertake infantry duty at the front. A report 
of 15 April 1918 indicated that due to manpower demands the CO of a CASC unit would 
interview troops in the hopes of determining if category “A” soldiers could be released 
and replaced by “B” men. The idea was to select “for employment those men of the 
lowest category of physical fitness compatible with carrying on the work [of the service 
corps] required” of the unit, but also ensuring the “economy and efficiency of personnel 
desired.”312 Another report argued category “A” soldiers under the age of 40 currently 
serving in CASC units could be released and sent to the infantry.313 This classification 
system was also important as the misdiagnosis of soldiers could mean they were 
discharged from the forces prematurely or unnecessarily.314 In the interests of manpower, 
this was not an ideal arrangement. 
                                                             
 
311 Class I cases, for example, were given treatment from a few hours to several days. After which they were transferred 
to Class II, the “semi-convalescent class,” where soldiers were given further treatment and military training, such as 
fatigues, marches, and physical training. From there, they were sent to Class III, the convalescent section. In Class III 
the patient was returned to regular wards, as “up to this time the shell shock patients had been segregated from the other 
patients.” According to the author of this report this system apparently worked, as “75 per cent of the patients were 
returned to duty with very few relapses or recurrent cases.” LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4562, Folder 5, File 3, ‘Work: 
Resume of No. 3 Canadian Stationary Hospital,’ 1-5-17 to 10-7-18. 
312 LAC, RG 9 III C9, Volume 4533, File 1, ‘X.R. 27261,’ ‘To the OC No. 1 Canadian Field Butchery, BEF.’ 
313 Yet before CASC personnel were dismissed from the service it was important to ensure that they could not do 
another, presumably less strenuous, job instead. The report stated that “care should be taken to consider the man power 
situation and the difficulty of securing satisfactory replacements.”  
314 The officer in command of the Moore Barracks Canadian Hospital Shorncliffe, for instance, complained that “there 
are some cases suffering from mental disease who are now invalided to Canada and subsequently recover their mental 
balance.” He continued, writing that “this recovery sometimes takes place within a short time,” and thus they could still 
be useful as soldiers in some capacity. LAC, RG 9 III B2, volume 3618, Folder 25-13-7 to 25-13-10, ‘Moore Barracks 
Canadian Hospital Shorncliffe, 25 July 1917, officer i/c Hospital to A.D.M.S. Canadians Folkestone.’  
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Secondly, this classification system attempted to keep pace with the overall 
declining standards and requirements for frontline service over time. The system, after all, 
was established in part to make the most out of the available manpower and to ensure 
there were enough of each category of soldiers. Though often a source of ridicule on the 
part of serving troops,315 the decline in medical standards was a reality of the war, and the 
Army did what it could to ensure continuity of calibre, especially for the combat arms and 
services.316 Thirdly and finally, this categorisation ensured that medical officers, unit 
COs, and especially medical boards had an enormous influence on the fate of thousands 
of young soldiers. To provide but one example, the medical board at the British base at 
Étaples and the ‘Inspector of Drafts’ were to scrutinise all Canadian troops arriving in 
France, to re-classify those rejected from these drafts, as well as those returning from 
hospital and those sent to the base as temporarily or permanently unfit by MOs at the 
front. This medical board was “responsible that all men proceeding to the front are 
physically fit to carry on with their respective duties,”317 though it seems their emotional 
and psychological fitness were not taken into account. This, of course, was problematic 
for the individual troops as well as their units at the front, especially if the soldiers were 
unable to withstand the strains of combat. In such a situation, the war-weary soldier could 
quickly become more seriously shell-shocked, and ultimately, debilitated. For the military 
authorities, however, the health and well-being of the soldier in the long-term was 
subordinate to the collective needs of the army. After all, the medical services were 
designed to return men to duty as quickly as possible,318 despite the long-term 
consequences on the individual. 
                                                             
 
315 Various Authors, Mr. Punch’s History of the Great War (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, n.d.), 157. 
316 For declining medical standards, see LAC, RG 9 III C9, Volume 4533, File 1, ‘Disposal of Unsuitable CASC 
Personnel’ and ‘CASC Reinforcements.’ These documents indicated that “it is not to be expected that former standards 
of reinforcements can be maintained,” and that “new arrivals were not in many cases capable of carrying on.” See also 
Nic Clark, Unwanted Warriors: The Rejected Volunteers of the Canadian Expeditionary Force (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2015), Appendix A, B, and C (for example). 
317 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3751, Nos. 10 and 12 (British) FLD AMS, ‘Asst. Inspector of Drafts, Etaples.’ 
318 To provide but one example, experiments were conducted with oxygen chambers in an attempt to return soldiers to 
combat as soon as possible. The chambers were used on gassed soldiers in the hopes of making them “more ‘fit’ and 
capable of withstanding the strain,” which spoke to the wider function of the medical services, namely, that soldiers 
were merely a means to an end. LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3618, Folder 25-13-6, Gas Poisoning, December 1915 – 
May 28 1918, File ‘The Use of Oxygen in Gassed Cases.’ 
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Shell Shock, PTSD, War Neuroses, Psychiatric Casualties, and 
Breakdown 
Despite some harsh and rather unsympathetic attitudes toward breakdown and 
psychiatric casualties among the military and medical authorities, as the war dragged on it 
could not be denied that these casualties were real, and becoming a real problem. There 
was, for instance, a sense of inevitability toward breakdown,319 as though it was only a 
matter of time before all soldiers succumbed to the stresses and strains of war. And 
because both acute stimuli and cumulative exposure to the trauma of combat and war 
could elicit this breakdown, no troops, whether they were in combatant services or 
otherwise, were exempt from these dangers. Canadian MO Andrew Macphail, infamous 
for writing that shell shock was merely a manifestation of “childishness and femininity,” 
admitted that even the best soldiers could ultimately suffer from “anxiety neurosis” after 
years of war.320 And unlike previous conflicts, the First World War was a unique war in 
which for frontline soldiers the periods of genuine respite were insufficient, if not lacking 
entirely. This was a point made by the British MO Lord Moran, who argued that lack of 
respite drained the soldiers of their inner reserves and led inevitably to the “breaking of 
men” in uniform.321 For the troops stationed at the front, tours of duty in the trenches 
could be extended, and in contrast to previous wars, there was little break in the winter 
when the campaigning season was put on hold. The nature and intensity of the conflict, 
and during the final months of the war the pace of the conflict as well, served to assault 
the health and well-being of the troops regularly.  
                                                             
 
319 It was also true that for every soldier there came a time “when he can endure no further.” They may still be healthy, 
but there will soon come a day when he will break, and “the certainty that the break is coming fills him with dread,” and 
he betrays this dread in “little ways” that are noticeable to the perceptive officer. Laffin, Soldiers’ Stories from France 
and Flanders, 268. One British veteran recalled that during an attack or under an artillery bombardment “the noise 
would grow into a crescendo and at a certain point your nerve would break.” This suggests that there was a sense of 
inevitability about this, and it was not a question of whether their nerve would break, but rather when. Moreover, the 
feelings of helplessness or hopelessness, and the inability to strike back at your tormentor, could accelerate this process. 
One MO wrote that “the war is becoming a slow slide into inevitability – inevitable wounding, maiming, death, 
destruction.” Arthur, ed., Forgotten Voices of the Great War, 235 and Davidson, A Doctor in the Great War, 228. 
320 Macphail, Medical Services, 278 and 277. 
321 Moran, The Anatomy of Courage, 75. 
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 Shell shock and breakdown affected all types of soldiers and personalities – just as 
war weariness did – and even dedicated, hard-working, and strong individuals could be 
pushed to, and sometimes beyond, the breaking point. Canadian officer Ernest Black 
acknowledged this, writing that “courage, or lack of it, had nothing to do with shell 
shock…I never knew a braver man than” the one who succumbed to it in his battery.322 
Some broke down and suffered from psychiatric casualties after a particularly harrowing 
or intense traumatic experience, such as being buried alive or watching a pal get torn to 
bits by shells, whereas others experienced this only after months, or in some cases, years 
of combat.323 And Captain Harold McGill noted in his memoirs the warning signs of 
impending exhaustion, and the potential for more permanent breakdown. He explained 
that “the recent heavy work and extra exertion [of working parties on top of other duties] 
had brought these men, some of whom had given many months of excellent service, to 
the stage of rendering them medically unfit”324 for duty. This was not a case of lazy, 
unwilling, or malingering soldiers refusing to carry on with work, but rather dedicated 
troops being pushed too far and their bodies (and minds) giving in. The issue of shell 
shock was compounded by the fact that soldiers could be made medically unfit and 
militarily useless even without a physical wound. For some, the shock and trauma of 
combat overwhelmed their powers of resistance and endurance. One Canadian soldier, for 
instance, wrote of the pressure and concussion of artillery barrages 
that damages some men, some more than others. They don’t have a mark to show 
[on their bodies], but they are hurt. There was nothing wrong with a fellow who 
couldn’t stand it [any longer]. Some were just more mentally prepared than others. 
It was like a man who has led a scholarly life all of a sudden getting involved in a 
gang fight. It could be quite a scary experience.325 
 
                                                             
 
322 Black, I Want One Volunteer, 83-84. 
323 The MO Captain McGill wrote of his experience with a hysterical soldier. This man was in a state of agitation and 
stress at incoming shells and he explained in his memoir that “he was a brave soldier too, but it must be a harrowing 
experience indeed to lie helpless in a trench with shells exploding in all directions.” This was a case of a good soldier 
merely being pushed to the breaking point. Norris, The World War I Memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, 111 and 
Black, I Want One Volunteer, 83. 
324 Norris, The World War I Memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, 162. 
325 Reid, Personal Memoirs of the First World War, 172. 
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Though this reflects a rather sympathetic understanding of breakdown in combat, no 
amount of mental preparation could make any normal, rational individual immune to the 
effects of the war and the cumulative and acute strains of combat to which they were 
exposed. The results could be both devastating and pitiful.326  
 As with more traditional and physical wounds and illnesses, psychiatric casualties 
had both general and specific causes and contributing factors. The same pressures, 
stresses and strains that led to the onset and development of war weariness – the death 
and dying, hardships, exhaustion, sense of helplessness and hopelessness – also 
undermined soldiers and contributed to psychiatric casualties. Indeed, these two 
phenomena were on the same spectrum. But unlike physical wounds, it was not always 
easy to identify why a particular soldier suffered breakdown when he did. Put another 
way, the threshold for war neurosis and shell shock debilitation was not consistent, and 
some soldiers suffered breakdowns despite the fact that they never directly came in 
contact with the enemy. In this sense, both combatant and non-combatant troops suffered, 
provided they were exposed to sufficient trauma and were denied an outlet or ‘escape’ 
from this trauma. 
 The general service conditions under which soldiers existed contributed to their 
emotional and psychological problems. The intensity of the war, as well as the near-
constant exposure to the stresses associated with combat, ensured even the toughest 
volunteers and veterans were worn down over time. One MO made the link between 
“frayed nerves,” exposure to combat, and health problems, whereas others noted the 
“physical and psychological horrors of combat.”327 After all those serving in the war, 
even along the lines of communication, would be exposed to death and disfigurement on 
a regular basis. Furthermore, aside from frontline infantry and those in the combat 
services, support troops were exposed to mortal danger, but lacked the ability to directly 
retaliate against the enemy.328 Even the less sympathetic and traditionally-inclined MOs 
                                                             
 
326 See, for instance, the Wilfrid Owen poem “Mental Cases,” found in Waters, Poetry of the First World War, 180.  
327 Davidson, A Doctor in the Great War, 226 and Norris, The World War I Memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, viii. 
328 These labour and supply troops had a less “spectacular” job than the infantry or artillery, but were no less important 
to the war effort. With these duties “not only is the labour involved very considerable but the danger is constant.” This 
might encourage psychological casualties or a sense of helplessness as these troops could not directly respond to enemy 
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came to acknowledge that “the stress of war” was a direct contributing factor toward the 
onset of psychoneuroses, and that “active service conditions” could explain hysteria and 
other afflictions.329 Temporary conditions, based on the strains of war combined with the 
lack of rest and respite, could become more permanent if the soldier was not allowed 
rotation out of the front lines and away from the sources of trauma. Relapses were 
common, and worn -own soldiers could become permanently debilitated if not treated 
with care.330  A war-weary soldier, fed up with the war and worn down by long-term 
service, could become a more permanent casualty as war weariness transmuted into shell 
shock over time.  
 Aside from the strains associated with general and active service conditions, the 
cumulative exposure to the stresses and trauma of combat, as well as the lack of rest and 
respite, contributed to psychiatric casualties. British MO J.C. Dunn wrote that soldiers 
could become “temporarily unable to stand the strain,” and that he himself was “worn out 
through physical and mental strain” by 1917/1918.331 John Becker of the 75th 
(Mississauga) Battalion also noted the detrimental effects that cumulative strain imposed 
on the individual. He wrote that after exhibiting undue caution during an artillery barrage, 
“I realized then that my nerves were going and that I wouldn’t be much good in action if I 
kept at it many weeks longer.”332 With this candid admission that his ‘nerves were 
going,’333 Becker acknowledged that the stresses and strains of combat were, over time, 
                                                             
 
fire or ‘fight back.’ Moreover, ‘flight’ from danger was certainly not a legal option for them. Another officer argued 
that even troops not at the front, or indeed even in a combat role, could break down from the war. He wrote that “the 
men at the front do the showy work, and may get some honours and promotions, whilst men [behind the lines] who do 
heavy steady work until they break down receive no recognition.” My italics. See LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4714, 
Folder 104, File 5, Canadian Corps Ammunition Park, ‘Narrative of Operations,’ 2-14 June 1916 and LAC, RG 9 III 
C15, Volume 4656, Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, letter/report by C.W. Shelly. 
329 Macphail, Medical Services, 276 and LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3618, 25-13-7 to 25-13-10, ‘Medical Report of an 
Invalid.’ 
330 In one case a soldier had been exposed to intense stimuli and suffered a breakdown, and that “if [he] continued under 
the stress of active service conditions a permanent mental condition will ensue.” My italics, to illustrate that even 
regular service conditions had a certain level of stress and strain involved which could erode the powers of dedicated, 
otherwise-healthy soldiers. LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3618, 25-13-7 to 25-13-10, ‘Medical Case Sheet.’ 
331 J.C. Dunn, The War the Infantry Knew, 1914-1919: A Chronicle of Service in France and Belgium with the Second 
Battalion, His Majesty’s Twenty-Third Foot, the Royal Welch Fusiliers (London: Jane’s Publishing Company Limited, 
1987), xxxv-xxxvi. 
332 Christie, The Memoir of John Becker, 203 and Chartrand, The Canadian Corps, 16. Fraser wrote of a shell-shocked 
soldier whose “nerves and control were absolutely gone” at Vimy. Roy, ed., The Journal of Private Fraser, 268. 
333 A Private Robert Duncan of the 102nd Battalion also wrote that after a battle “I was so exhausted that I was almost 
delirious…the cooks had a hot breakfast for us and we ate like wolves but all the time we ate the lot of us cried like 
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eroding his ability to withstand duty at the front. The pressures placed on infantry were 
bad enough, but all soldiers334 required not only a physical rest away from the sources of 
danger, but also a psychological respite from these sources of trauma. The “symptoms [of 
exhaustion]…largely depend upon the kind and amount of work done in a given time,” as 
“repeated and prolonged exposure” to the stress of combat “produce[s] continuous 
cumulative stress, to which the human organism is compelled to give way” over time. 
Cumulative strain was especially problematic, and yet the reality of combat helps explain 
the prevalence, intensity, and unpredictability of psychiatric casualties during the war. 
Most Canadian soldiers serving in Europe were not the hardened frontiersmen, hunters, 
voyageurs, and lumberjacks of myth and lore, but were simple middle-class clerks and 
urban workers.335  
 Over time the cumulative stress and strain of wartime service led to war weariness 
and ultimately shell shock, but intense, unusual, or particularly traumatic experiences 
could also initiate or accelerate this process. The sense of absolute terror and helplessness 
that accompanied being trapped in an artillery barrage, for instance, was something that 
many veterans and contemporaries referred to. Captain Ralph Bell of the 1st Battalion 
wrote that being trapped in an artillery bombardment could lead to the onset of shell 
                                                             
 
babies…I couldn’t have told you why I cried excepting that my nerves were completely gone.” Grescoe, eds., The Book 
of War Letters, 169. 
334 Medical reports on the effects of flying on the human body and mind illustrate just how serious the impact could be. 
Pilots and other aircrew could face a shock, especially going from warmth to “intense cold; from relative quiet to a 
continual rush and roar; from a state of equilibrium to one of instability; from muscular and mental rest to highly-skilled 
and nerve-trying [situations]…from safety to possible death…[these pilots were] subject to intensive, intermittent and 
cumulative stimuli of a degree to which men has never been exposed before…[and] these unfavourable, afferent 
impulses produce perceptions of the most trying character, so that the individual’s RESERVE FORCE RAPIDLY 
BECOMES USED UP, and after many shows [or sorties] he becomes, to use his own expression, ‘dud.’ He lacks 
resolution, loses confidence in himself, becomes stale, and if he is not withdrawn for a rest usually comes to grief.” 
Capitalised in the original. LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3493, 11-2-7/11-2-8, Reports Medical Officer DGMS, ‘Reports 
Medical Aspect Air Service.’ 
335 Even if they were volunteers and healthy, dedicated young men, the nature, pace, and intensity of the fighting eroded 
even the strongest individuals. According to the British War Office, troops could be used for employment on the home 
front, including (former) “A” soldiers discharged “owing to nervous breakdown resulting from service in the present 
war.” Another officer (a chaplain) admitted that he was “desperately weary at times,” and sometimes “depressed” and 
discouraged, but that “I feel sure that it is only owing to the physical, nervous, and mental strain” of the war. Officers 
also acknowledged the strain and exhaustion of the troops, especially after “good hard fighting,” they were under 
“terrible strain.” See LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4576, Folder 2, File 9, ‘Discharges’ and newspaper clipping from 
The Standard, dated 30-4-17; LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4669, Chaplains Reports, ‘Hospitals 1,’ and LAC, RG 9 III 
C3, Volume 4214, Folder 1, File 10, Casualties, 2-3-17 to 1-1-18, CWRO, 387, ‘50th Battalion.’ 
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shock,336 even if there was no concussion or physical effect of the shelling. This was 
another problem with psychiatric casualties, namely, that they could emerge seemingly 
without physical derivation.337 Another soldier admitted that “during barrages I did see 
shell shock victims,” and that there was no cover at Passchendaele; “there was nowhere to 
run…there wasn’t a tree left in the area” to provide a modicum of protection.338 And 
Thomas Salmon wrote in The Care and Treatment of Mental Diseases and War Neuroses 
(1917) that during the war functional nervous diseases came to constitute “a major 
medico-military problem,” especially as sustained artillery bombardments339 undermined 
soldiers’ powers of resistance.  
 During the war medical authorities sought to understand the nature of shell shock 
casualties to a much greater extent than they did war weariness. Medical authorities, 
moreover, attempted to develop a classification and treatment plan to return soldiers to 
duty as quickly as possible. Medical reports on war neurosis, for instance, attempted to 
divide cases into those who experienced “prolonged” versus “exceptional” strain, 
reinforcing the point that it could be cumulative stress or particularly acute trauma that 
caused shell shock, or a combination of the two. In the view of some authorities, “the 
Neurasthenia class includes some normal individuals whose breakdown is the result of 
prolonged strain,” whereas the “shell shock cases are individuals with normal resistance 
subjected to exceptional strain” during duty.340 In other cases, medical services 
acknowledged that one particular event could exacerbate or bring shell shock symptoms 
to the fore. One such soldier, for example, seemed to be “suffering from Hysteria, caused 
                                                             
 
336 Bell, Canada in War-Paint, 161. 
337 Medical professionals argued that soldiers could develop symptoms without being buried alive, or without being 
exposed to shell fire. Even without a known physiological basis, soldiers could develop psychological issues that could 
not be ignored. An MO noted that explosions could leave troops physically intact but with “dishevelled minds,” and 
could be made ineffective “though there was no scratch upon him.” Some troops simply “cracked” due to stress over 
time, as intense emotional shock could strip them of their self-control and equilibrium. And medical documents of the 
50th Battalion noted that soldiers could be partially buried or have a shell burst very close to them “and yet be absolutely 
unaffected by it from a medical point of view.” See Salmon, Mental Diseases and War Neuroses, 28-29; Moran, The 
Anatomy of Courage, 21-25, and LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4214, Folder 1, File 10, Casualties, 2-3-17 to 1-1-18, 
CWRO, 387, ‘50th Battalion.’ 
338 Reid, Personal Memoirs of the First World War, 172. 
339 Salmon, Mental Diseases and War Neuroses, 27. 
340 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3752, Folder 3-1-4-2, Neurology, War Neuroses, ‘Treatment of Shell-Shock Cases at the 
Front.’ The italics are mine. 
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by general service conditions.” He had done capable duty in the trenches for 15 months, 
but was then buried alive, certainly a traumatic event. The author of the soldier’s medical 
case sheet concluded that “if [he] continued under the stress of active service conditions a 
permanent mental condition will ensue.”341 And if the strains related to ‘active service 
conditions’ could induce war weariness and psychiatric casualties, those “subjected to 
some extraordinary exposure not incidental to all military operations”342  could suffer 
even more. 
 Another factor in the onset of war weariness, and ultimately shell shock, was the 
conflict all dedicated soldiers felt between their duty, and their self-preservation instinct: 
the tension between the needs of the collective and those of the individual. The inability 
to reconcile these two conflicting motivations could cause temporary and more permanent 
psychiatric problems for individuals exposed to the trauma of combat. The social circles 
of the soldier all reflected and reinforced the hierarchical nature of the military system, 
and the troops were expected to contribute to group goals and conform to its rules and 
values. Human beings exposed to traumatic stimuli and mortal danger, however, will 
instinctively seek to protect themselves, and thus it was the role of comradeship, military 
discipline, group cohesion, leadership, regimental pride, “social tradition,” and other 
forces to counteract this biological fight or flight mechanism.343 This was one of the main 
issues facing contemporary authorities, namely, how to convince individuals to face terror 
and potential death or disfigurement when they had innate urges to ‘escape.’344 And even 
steadfast and experienced volunteers were beset by this problem, to say nothing of 
conscripts, untested, or reluctant soldiers. Pre-war tests and screenings to determine who 
                                                             
 
341 LAC, RG 9 III B2, volume 3618, 25-13-7 to 25-13-10, ‘Medical Case Sheet.’ 
342 LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4536, Folder 6, File 2, ADMS 3rd Canadian Division, ‘Extract from G.H.Q. Letter,’ 
dated 14/10/16. 
343 One soldier wrote that without friends and comrades, “I’d have sprinted back to the coast and hopped a steamer to 
Blighty long ago,” and that his chums did wonders “for a man’s resolve.” Caughill, ed., Letters to Janet, 109. W.H.R. 
Rivers referred to this tension as “the conflicts between the instinctive tendencies of the individual and the forces of 
social tradition,” and argued that “in the production of psycho-neurosis” there was “conflict arising out of…instincts, 
and especially that of self-preservation, [which] takes an active if not the leading role” in this production. W.H.R. 
Rivers, “Psychiatry and the War,” Science – New Series 49, 1268 (April 1919): 367-369.  
344 In a discussion on attempting to prevent ‘encouraging’ the problem, Salmon wrote that this was “the unending 
conflict between duty, honour and discipline, on the one hand, and homesickness, horror, and the urgings of the instinct 
of self-preservation on the other.” Many feared that making neurosis ‘a way out’ for soldiers would be seized upon by 
the men and an used as an exit or escape from their duties. Salmon, Mental Diseases and War Neuroses, 42. 
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could endure the fire of battle were limited, and the veracity of the concept of 
predisposition345 to breakdown is shaky at best. But experience in combat could be a 
double-edged sword. Experience could allow the soldier to expect and anticipate dangers 
at the front, as well as process powerful emotions inherent in battle. These experiences, 
however, also wore down the individual over time and reinforced the idea of the 
inevitability of death or disfigurement. And this sense of hopelessness or helplessness 
was characteristic of war weariness. 
 As military authorities grappled with the reality of psychiatric casualties, there 
was some debate over whether this was a new affliction, or if it was merely an updated 
version of problems seen in the past. In the nineteenth century victims of industrial 
accidents or railway crashes, for instance, seemed to exhibit some of the same symptoms 
that now affected thousands of soldiers in the war. Moreover, early on there was a largely 
physical understanding of shell shock, with an emphasis upon the bodily effects of shell 
explosions, hence the term ‘shell shock.’ This was problematic, as it became clear that 
psychiatric symptoms could emerge without physical origin; after experience and 
reflection, it was acknowledged that its cause could be primarily mental, or shell 
explosions themselves might be merely “the spark which releases deep-seated, psychical 
forces due to the strains of warfare” and especially combat.346 By 1917, shell shock came 
to represent “practically any nervous symptoms in soldiers exposed to shell fire that 
cannot be explained by some obvious physical injury,”347 and factors outside shell fire 
could also act as a contributing factor. According to one MO, the British Army and War 
Office ultimately agreed on three different types of psychoneurosis of war: shell shock, 
hysteria, and neurasthenia.348 The concept of war weariness was not well-developed 
                                                             
 
345 It was suggested that certain troops were more predisposed to breakdown than others, including those with an 
“unstable nervous organisation,” poor education, or poor surroundings [profession? upbringing? class?] to prepare the 
man. There were concerns throughout the war about recruitment and “the types of men predisposed to these 
disabilities,” and with “unfit recruits” and “general questions of prophylaxis.” Others who were apparently predisposed 
included “organic nervous cases,” “feeble minded soldiers,” “border types,” those with criminal tendencies, alcoholics, 
etc. LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3752, Folder 3-1-4-2, ‘Functional Nervous Disorders’ and Volume 3751, 2-4-1, ‘Duties 
of the Military Hospitals Commission.’  
346 Rivers, “Psychiatry and the War,” 367. 
347 Salmon, Mental Diseases and War Neuroses, 27. 
348 Macphail, Medical Services, 276-277. Many shell shock cases were depicted as Neurasthenia, as soldiers broke 
down after sustained periods at the front. This was often juxtaposed with Hysteria. Symptoms for hysteria included: 
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during the war years, however, but it is a useful concept for understanding the impact of 
combat on the individual, and as an important marker on the road to shell shock 
debilitation. Hysteria was characterised by panic-stricken and erratic behaviour, and was 
often applied to ORs and lower-class soldiers who were negatively impacted by the 
cumulative trauma of war, often set off by exposure to intense or extraordinary situations. 
Neurasthenia, on the other hand, was often reserved for officers and those from the upper 
echelons of society; these cases were the result of long-term service at the front, and 
resulted in more exhausted, apathetic, worn-down patients.349 And by the final years of 
the war, British authorities had established a shell shock classification system based on 
the prognosis and phase of treatment for soldiers,350 acknowledging that individuals 
reacted differently to trauma and some recovered in short order, whereas others never 
fully recovered. Medical authorities also made use of other expressions regarding the 
myriad symptoms related to combat service and traumatic exposure. Some of the these 
shell shock cases, for example, were subsumed into the larger category of ‘insanity,’351 
suggesting a more permanent debilitation, pre-war mental health problems, and hereditary 
predisposition.  
War weariness as a concept was most fully developed after war, though some 
contemporaries did use this expression. And aside from the shell shock designation, 
authorities made use of other terms and even euphemisms to describe this phenomenon. 
The complexity and confusion surrounding the nature of psychiatric casualties was one 
reason for this ambiguity and reluctance. But there were also cultural explanations for not 
                                                             
 
erratic behaviour, seizures, irritability, lack of focus, depression, and others. Grescoe, The Book of War Letters, 169 and 
LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3618, 25-13-7 to 25-13-10, ‘Medical Report of an Invalid,’ 4 June 1917. 
349 In MO McGill’s memoir it was noted that Neurasthenia was “the more commonly observed breakdown resulting 
from the cumulative exposure to the stress of combat,” but was still a manifestation of shell shock. Norris, The World 
War I Memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, 98. 
350 LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4562, Folder 5, File 3, Work, ‘Resume of No. 3 Canadian Stationary Hospital,’ 1-5-17 
to 10-7-18. 
351 The Hospital Ship HMHS Araguaya, for instance, had 65 “mental” cases aboard, or around 8.5% of its total number 
of cases. Of these cases, 16 were diagnosed with dementia praecox, 15 as delusional insanity, 10 with mental stupor, 6 
confusional insanity, 6 mania cases, 4 melancholia, 3 mental deficiency, and 1 each of mental instability, hysteria, and 
G.P.I., which suggests there was some difficulty in nomenclature and distinguishing between the nature and symptoms 
of these psychiatric conditions. MO Andrew Macphail also referred to concussion/fright neurosis, hysteria, 
neurasthenia, psychasthenia, reflex paralysis, and katatonic [sic] stupor. LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4577, Folder 5, 
File 6, ‘H.M.H.S. Araguaya’ and Macphail, Medical Services, 277-278. 
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drawing attention to these problems, as well as a widespread fear that giving these 
conditions a name would only legitimise them, and thus encourage its development in 
others. The term exhaustion,352 for example, was commonly used to describe troops who 
had been worn down by conflict, and were suffering the inevitable physical (and 
psychological) reactions to sustained combat. In other instances, NYDN was applied,353 
suggesting the authorities were unable or unwilling to acknowledge debilitation and the 
fact that soldiers were being made militarily ineffective but without a physical, tangible 
wound. The use of the term ‘nervous’ served to put the responsibility for breakdown 
squarely on the shoulders of those suffering these conditions, rather than on the nature of 
the war itself. Another expression used to emphasise the failings of the individual rather 
than highlight the extreme circumstances in which most frontline troops found 
themselves, was “temporarily unable to stand the strain” of combat.354 At least with this 
example, the word ‘temporarily’ suggested that this soldier had been able to endure 
trauma in the past, and with proper care, could do so again in the future. Other soldiers 
found themselves “all in,” and unable to carry on;355 others suffered a “crack up” or 
“cracked” under the pressure;356 and still others had a case of “nerves,” suffered from 
“shattered nerves,” or found that their nerves had “let go,” were “in pieces,” or their 
nerves “were going.”357  
                                                             
 
352 Without rest, exhaustion could make a normally robust soldier “break down” over time. A Canadian MO also wrote 
of “nerve and exhausted” cases, a “worn out and exhausted officer” as well as “badly shocked and exhausted men” at 
sick parade. Other soldiers were described as ‘tired’ and ‘worn out.’ See Bell, Canada in War-Paint, 184 and Norris, 
The World War I Memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, 156.  
353 Those diagnosed as NYDN found it more difficult to be evacuated down the line than other, more traditional or 
physical casualties. Moreover, there seemed to be some stigma attached to this designation, as though they were less 
deserving of army resources, time, sympathy, and the like. LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4541, Folder 2, File 4, ‘XCII 
Corps, Medical Arrangements No. 9’ and ‘A.D.M.S., 1st Canadian Division,’ 30 March 1918.  
354 Dunn, The War the Infantry Knew, xxxv. 
355 Bell, Canada in War-Paint, 182. 
356 Canadian artilleryman Ernest Black noted that when laughter did not work as an outlet or ‘safety valve,’ “sometimes 
there was a crack up” in the unit. Humour has been depicted by others as “an escape valve” as well for soldiers. Roy, 
ed., The Journal of Private Fraser, 21 and Laffin, Soldiers’ Stories from France and Flanders, 2, 178. Black noted, 
moreover, that in the Second World War this was called battle fatigue, but was known as shell shock in the First World 
War. Also, even the strongest troops, those “full of guts” could break down from shell shock. And Lord Moran wrote 
that some “cracked” due to stress over time. The conditions under which the soldiers fought “tested [even] the strongest 
of constitutions.” Gaudet, ed., The World War I Journal and Poems of Pte. Frank Walker, xi. 
357 Norris, The World War I Memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, 98, 154; Reid, Personal Memoirs of the First World 
War, 215; Graves, Goodbye to All That, 104 and Christie, The Memoir of John Becker, 203. 
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The contributing factors to the onset of war weariness could not be removed 
entirely, and thus prevention was perhaps the best approach to help minimise the worst 
effects of psychiatric casualties. Care for the health, morale, and physical well-being of 
soldiers helped with their endurance, giving them the best chance to stave off the worst 
effects of long-term service. The mental and physical state of soldiers, especially infantry, 
was important for success in combat, and training and “the condition of men are 
important factor[s]” to be considered. Moreover, troops should be lightly equipped in any 
attack, to avoid exhaustion, be well-fed prior to going ‘over the top,’ and be well-rested 
so as to be “fresh and can [therefore] fight better.”358 ‘Collapse’ was also especially 
troublesome in the cold months. Proper equipment and clothing, dry warm blankets, heat, 
and hot drinks were all helpful, and “all efforts are to be directed toward combating 
collapse during the cold season,”359 though it is not clear if they were referring to collapse 
of energy, will, health, or something else entirely. Alcohol, moreover, also helped prevent 
‘collapse,’ exhaustion, and other problems, at least to a point. Alcohol had the ability to 
induce a feeling of warmth and comfort, provided a sense of euphoria at first,360 calmed 
rattled nerves, and acted as a fortifying force. It was issued prior to attacks and other 
engagements, was used as an incentive to recruit volunteers for raids, patrols, and other 
missions, and often issued following combat to help soldiers cope with exhaustion and 
trauma. And for shell-shocked soldiers combatting the enemy as well as their own terrors 
and nightmares, booze was a welcome gift.361 Robert Graves in Goodbye to All That also 
referred to the healing effects of alcohol, especially in officers, who with their greater 
privileges had better access. Alcohol acted as a coping mechanism, but there were also 
problems pertaining to dependency and addiction.362 Humour, laughter, and even weeping 
                                                             
 
358 The Military Museums, W.A. Howard and Arthur J.E. Child Archives, TMM F00 81, John Cummer Fonds, Volume 
1, Series 1-4, 9-3-4, Folder 9, ‘Training: Trench Warfare.’ 
359 LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4554, Folder 2, File 2, ‘Dressing Stations, Organisation Of.’ 
360 W. Langdon Brown and J. Keogh Murphy, eds., The Practitioner’s Encyclopaedia of Medical Treatment (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1915), 153. 
361 Norris, The World War I Memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, 246. 
362 Graves also referred to a “two bottle” company commander, who relied too heavily on alcohol to cope with the 
trauma and terror experienced. Graves, Goodbye to All That, 152. The use of alcohol as a coping mechanism can also 
be found in fictional accounts of the war, such as Gail Bowen and Ron Marken, Dancing in Poppies (The Playwrights 
Guild of Canada, 1992). The tendency to use alcohol to dull the (emotional) pain can also be found in Fred Doucette, 
“Sick Soldiers: A Veteran with PTSD describes War’s Invisible Wounds,” The Walrus, 13, 2 (March 2016): 55-56. For 
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also acted as coping mechanisms, by providing psychological relief, reducing tension, and 
promoting adaptation.363 
The preconditions for the onset of war weariness could never be eliminated 
entirely, but the treatments and responses to psychiatric casualties were important to the 
future well-being of the individual. There were both official and unofficial treatments; at 
times, these cases were severe enough (and the soldiers militarily ineffective) to be sent 
down the line to be cared for by other medical personnel, whereas other cases were 
deemed moderate enough that treatments at or near the front was believed sufficient. For 
care near the front lines, it was important that the soldier be kept busy and occupied, so as 
not to dwell on their situation or be given much time for brooding. One MO speculated 
that more soldiers did not lose their sanity “because they had little opportunity to indulge 
in introspection.”364 Keeping the patients busy with exercise, games, or light employment 
helped “divert the patients’ mind from dwelling on his own symptoms”365 and 
deteriorating further. Other authorities insisted on treatment in close proximity to the 
firing line, “where the spirit of army discipline is most felt” by the soldier.366 In these 
treatment centres, army discipline, drill, and physical exercise were emphasised,367 so the 
individual would be treated more as a soldier than an invalid, and be given rest in the 
guise of military exercises or duties. 
For more serious cases, or with soldiers who dealt with sympathetic MOs, 
evacuation down the line to larger and more specialised medical facilities led to further 
treatment. Special Hospitals for shell-shock cases allowed for the concentration of 
specialists and equipment that could be tailored to these cases and problems.368 Aside 
                                                             
 
other information on alcohol and Canadian troops, see Tim Cook, “‘More a Medicine than a Beverage:’ ‘Demon Rum’ 
and the Canadian Trench Soldier of the First World War,” Canadian Military History 9, 1 (2000): 5-22. 
363 Black, I Want One Volunteer, 83-84; Teed, ed., Uncle Cy’s War, 12,  and Susan M. Labott and Randall B. Martin, 
“The Stress-Moderating Effects of Weeping and Humour,” Journal of Human Stress, 13, 4 (Winter 1987): 159-164.  
364 Norris, The World War I Memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, 198. 
365 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3752, 3-1-4-2, Neurology, War Neuroses, ‘Functional Nervous Disorders.’ 
366 Salmon, Mental Diseases and War Neuroses, 36. 
367 Ibid, 39. It seemed only the most serious cases were evacuated out of the front lines. Those classified as NYDN, 
with minor symptoms, or “overwrought mental conditions requiring a short period of treatment, will be retained in the 
divisional area; it is more serious cases that are sent to the special hospital.” LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3752, 3-1-4-2, 
‘Treatment of Shell Shock Cases at the Front.’  
368 For example the Granville Canadian Special Hospital at Ramsgate, in the UK. This hospital “gave the C.A.M.C. the 
opportunity to play a pioneer part in the Imperial Army in establishing remedial treatment for…the many forms of 
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from these hospitals, training schools were established to train officers and medical 
personnel to deal with these cases, and neurological centres were established in the army 
zones themselves. These were inspired by French practice and embraced the idea of 
proximity of treatment.369 Behind the lines, however, treatments and responses to 
psychiatric casualties comprised re-education of the soldier, including persuasion and 
hypnotism, drill and physical exercise, gymnastics, massage, hydrotherapy, and 
electrotherapy.370 Some ‘treatments,’ especially electro-shock therapy, bordered on 
torture, which is not surprising given that some MOs and doctors believed that shell 
shock was “a condition which is essentially childish and infantile in its nature,”371 clearly 
not conducive to a sympathetic attitude. Treatments outlined in the CAMC Journal 
emphasised the various techniques applied to an individual, including the application of 
electric shocks, but also explored the reality of relapse and the complicated nature of 
psychiatric casualties. An examination of one soldier indicated a “well-developed, well-
nourished man,” with normal heart, lungs, and reflexes, and his x-rays and tests were 
negative.372 This soldier, however, had become ‘shaky’ after a close call; following a stay 
in hospital, he returned to his unit but relapsed and broke down mere weeks later. He was 
ultimately sent to the Granville Canadian Special Hospital after both 
psychiatric/psychological and physical symptoms began to emerge.373 Needless to say 
                                                             
 
nervous disorders which at first were included under the term ‘Shell Shock.’” Special Hospitals were also established in 
Canada for more permanently debilitated cases, such as at Cobourg and Newmarket. Salmon, Mental Diseases and War 
Neuroses, 34, 41; LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4554, Folder 2, File 3, ‘Medical Arrangements, 25-6-17 to 20-12-17;’ 
LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3602, 24-3-2, Medical History of the War, ‘The Care of the Casualty,’ and Volume 3751, 
2-4-1, ‘Duties of the Military Hospitals Commission.’  
369 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3752, 3-1-4-2, Neurology, War Neuroses, ‘Treatment of War Psychoses.’ 
370 Ibid, 38-40. See also LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3752, 3-1-4-2, ‘Treatment of Shell Shock Cases at the Front’ and 
Volume 3493, 11-1-15 to 11-1-21, ‘Report on Remedial Gymnastics, Physical Training, Massage, Hydro and Electro 
Therapeutics in the C.A.M.C.’   
371 Salmon, Mental Diseases and War Neuroses, 40. 
372 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3602, Folder 24-3-1 (Volume 1), CAMC Journal, ‘An Unusual Psychoneurosis of War,’ 
by Digby Wheeler, Temporary Captain, CAMC. 
373 Ibid. The soldier came to France in September 1916, and “carried on without any trouble until buried by high 
explosive shell” on 27 April 1917. He was unconscious for roughly three hours, and then sent to a CCS by his MO after 
“having requested to be allowed to carry on.” But he was told he was ‘shaky,’ and needed respite. At the base hospital 
three days later he noticed he could not taste or smell. By May 1917 he was back at his unit, but “his M.O. would only 
allow him to carry on at the kitchens,” knowing he needed a break from frontline stress. While at the kitchens, though, 
he uncovered two rotting German corpses while digging a pit. By June 1917 he was sent again to the CCS for trench 
fever. While at the hospital this time, however, “he developed gross symptoms of shell shock, such as tremor and 
persistent occipital headaches.” He was then sent to Granville Special Hospital, where electric currents were applied to 
his muscles. The fate of this soldier is unclear.  
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this soldier had ceased to be an effective member of the military unit, had moved beyond 
war weariness, and was unable to carry on at the front. 
The ultimate goal, of course, was to treat the soldier and return him to his unit as 
soon as possible. It was important, for manpower and morale considerations, to ensure 
units were up to strength and soldiers were kept in the line save for the most serious 
cases. Perhaps the most effective treatment for minor to moderate cases of shell shock, 
however, was rotation out of the line, rest, and respite from the strains of war, as well as 
the trauma and tensions associated with combat. Importantly, rest was also crucial to 
stave off the worst effects of war weariness, and to prevent its further development. The 
contemporary Practitioner’s Encyclopaedia of Medical Treatment advocated for ‘rest 
cures,’ and argued that pain required rest, whether it be psychological or physiological in 
origin, and that “pain may persist apart from material causes.”374 Worry and mental 
tension could also manifest as pain, and victims naturally developed both physiological 
and psychical defences.375 In other situations, the intervention of the medical or 
commanding officer could make the difference between short-term and recoverable war 
weariness, and long-term debilitation from shell shock and ineffectiveness. The MO of 
the 31st Battalion, for example, distinguished between those who were too willing to 
parade sick, and those with an “apparently genuine case of nerves.” This latter soldier was 
allowed to “go back to the horse lines to do light duty” until the battalion was relieved at 
the front.376 Historian Pat Brennan argued that 
‘Light duty’ was a frequently employed treatment for so-called ‘deserving cases’ 
of battle stress/shell shock. Anything that removed the tension of combat, even 
briefly, helped all but the worst cases. Being kept close to their comrades aided in 
the steadying of such men, as did the fact that there was no stigma of malingering 
attached to such light duty assignments close to the front.377 
 
                                                             
 
374 Brown, Medical Treatment, 66-67. Soldiers sometimes developed defence symptoms “against an intolerable 
situation in the world.” Furthermore, there were generally three scenarios as it applied to rest cures. 1) Soldiers recover, 
and then relapse when put once more into the old situation. 2) The soldier “may be dominated by the idea that as soon 
he recovers he will have to go back to the intolerable situation, and remain un-influenced.” 3) The soldier sees things in 
a new light and finds a solution to the problem. 
375 Ibid. 
376 Norris, The World War I Memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, 102. 
377 Ibid, Footnote 13. 
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Rest, respite, and rotation out of the line, even for a short period, could do wonders for 
the health, mental stability, and general well-being of most cases. The problem, of course, 
was that not all would recover after a short time out of the line, and not all MOs, army 
doctors, or commanders agreed who were ‘deserving cases.’ Certainly some soldiers were 
killed or broke down permanently when they might have been salvaged had they been 
taken out of the line sooner.  
 This sympathy and intervention on the part of military or medical authorities 
could help prevent war-weary soldiers from becoming seriously shell-shocked, and 
assisted with the soldiers suffering from shell shock from deteriorating further. Captain 
McGill of the 31st Battalion saw many cases of “shattered nerves” during one particular 
battle. The worst were sent to the field ambulance, but “the majority I allowed to lie down 
in an adjoining dugout” and get some rest. Furthermore, some “partially-recovered” 
soldiers and “nerve and exhaustion” cases were kept in the vicinity and made up a fatigue 
party.378 It seems McGill here made a compromise, allowing the soldiers a rest from 
normal duties, but without allowing them to be removed from their units entirely or sent 
down the line for longer-term absence. Captain Dillon of the CAMC argued in September 
1918 that powers of resistance and especially repression are “voluntary and maintained by 
effort.” He wrote, however, that “long-continued strain, therefore, by exhausting the 
reserves of mental energy is apt to bring about a breakdown,” which can also be caused 
by “sudden and intense strain or shock of exceptional nature.”379 And both war weariness 
and shell shock or nervous exhaustion could be helped by rest and light duty. Despite the 
complexity and varying severity of these cases, in time some soldiers were sufficiently 
recovered to return to duty. One Canadian MO even boasted that in contrast to previous 
cases, “to-day the vast majority of those affected [by shell shock] are returned to the front 
                                                             
 
378 Ibid, 154-156. It is important to note that there were limits on the discretion of the MOs. One set of ‘Instructions’ 
issued in August of 1918, for example, indicated that “a medical officer will not grant an other rank more than 24 hours 
exemption from duty,” even if this short rest allowed the soldier to carry on in the longer-term. LAC, RG 9 III B2, 
Volume 3686, 30-0-0 (Volume 4), June 1918 – December 1918, General Correspondence, ‘Instructions for Medial 
Officers,’ dated 21 August 1918.  
379 LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4575, Folder 1, File 5, Bulletin of the CAMC, Volume I, No. 6 (September 1918), 
article ‘On the Nature of Shell Shock,’ by Captain Dillon, and File 6 ‘Categorisation.’  
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as efficient soldiers in the course of a few weeks” of treatment.380 The problem, however, 
was that the author did not provide much information on how these soldiers were treated 
nor the rates of relapse after returning to the front. Yet despite the long-term nature of 
many psychiatric casualties, some were indeed returned to a version of active duty. Some 
were placed in units on the lines of communication, rather than sent back to combat 
infantry duties, whereas some officers took on staff or training duties behind the lines. 
Others managed to get relatively safe or ‘bomb-proof’ jobs behind the lines,381 despite 
jeers of cowardice or malingering from those still at the front. And yet even after a full 
year of treatment and time away from the front, some cases “may never improve.”382 It 
was these soldiers who were permanently debilitated by shell shock and were no longer 
capable of being effective soldiers, and sometimes even effective citizens.383  
An examination of the symptoms and consequences of psychiatric casualties 
suggest serious suffering and implications for the individual, and his military unit. Shell 
shock was more serious than war weariness, although the latter was more pervasive and 
masked the real decline faced by long-suffering soldiers. The symptoms of war neuroses 
were various, affected everyone slightly differently, and were often based on the personal 
                                                             
 
380 There was also a well-entrenched belief that “only a very small proportion of men returning [to Canada] insane, can 
be pronounced hopelessly so,” and that “the majority of them will recover and the remainder who turn out to be 
incurable would be too small to justify large federal expenditure on buildings and other overhead expenses.” Other 
reports admitted that though some cases recovered, some were chronic and permanent cases. LAC, RG 9 III D1, 
Volume 4715, Folder 108, File 20, ‘Outside the Pale: Yet Another Canadian Hospital Bombed;’ LAC, RG 9 III B2, 
Volume 3751, 2-4-1, ‘Relations with M.H.C.’ and ‘Duties of the Military Hospital Commission,’ and Roy, ed., The 
Journal of Private Fraser, 15. 
381 One soldier admitted in June 1918 that his effectiveness had decreased over time, and was eventually transferred to 
the Ordnance Corps. He had requested the transfer over six months prior. He justified it by writing that “there were very 
few of the old mob left [in his unit] due to casualties,” and “I had already put in enough time ‘up the line.’” Rogers, ed., 
Gunner Ferguson’s Diary, 152-153. 
382 The statistics for the 65 “mental” cases aboard the hospital ship HMHS Araguaya are instructive. Of these, 18 were 
diagnosed as Dementia Praecox, 15 with Delusional Insanity, 10 Mental Stupor, six Confusional Insanity, four 
Melancholia, three Mental Deficiency, and one each of Mental Instability, Hysteria, and G.P.I. Of these 65 cases, 14 
were convalescents and fit for release, 24 might be fit within six months’ time, 10 may be fit in a years’ (12 months’) 
time, 12 may improve over an undisclosed or unknown amount of time, and five “may never improve.” And in some 
cases where the “psychic element” is the main feature, “these cases do not improve with ordinary convalescent 
treatment, and should be occupied by light duty as soon as possible.” LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4577, Folder 5, File 
6, ‘H.M.H.S. Araguaya’ and LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3751, 2-3-6-2, ‘Documents for Troops Returning, Boards.’ 
383  Many of these soldiers lived out the rest of their lives in sanatoriums or hospitals, needing constant care and mere 
shadows of their former selves. In the words of one MO, these were the “unfortunate men who had lost control of 
themselves and could only live on as useless wrecks of humanity,” no longer able to soldier or serve their country. They 
were those who, though they physically survived the war, were permanently debilitated by it nonetheless. LAC, RG 9 
III D1, Volume 4715, Folder 108, File 20, ‘Outside the Pale: Yet Another Canadian Hospital Bombed.’ 
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experiences of the individual. One contemporary medical assessment noted that in the 
symptoms of shell shock, “the soldier loses a function that either is necessary to continue 
military service or prevents his successful adaptation to war” and combat.384 The soldier 
converted psychological problems into physical symptoms, which were manifest in 
numerous ways. One report by the War Work Committee of the National Committee for 
Mental Hygiene in 1917 indicated that these symptoms of the disturbance of psychic 
functions included delirium, confusion, amnesia, hallucinations, nightmares, anxiety 
states; the disturbance of involuntary functions including heart disorders, low blood 
pressure, vomiting, and diarrhea; and the disturbance of voluntary muscular functions 
including paralysis, tics, tremors, convulsive movements, mutism, and deafness.385 Other 
symptoms included sweating, rapid heartbeat, headaches, weakness, sleeplessness or 
insomnia, loss of appetite, abdominal pain, vision problems, and others.386 Continued 
terror could induce relapse, and “the ultimate fitness of such men as soldiers is a matter of 
considerable doubt, owing to the probability of relapse under fire.”387  
These symptoms and the suffering of the individual were bad enough, but war 
weariness and shell shock also negatively affected the soldier’s military effectiveness and 
ability to carry on with duty. The most serious cases were removed from their units and 
sent down the line to hospitals and rest centres. In time, some returned to duty in some 
capacity, others were sent to base hospitals for longer-term treatment and hospitalisation, 
whereas the most serious cases were evacuated to England or even Canada.388 For those 
                                                             
 
384 Salmon, Mental Diseases and War Neuroses, 31. 
385 Ibid. Other symptoms can be found in LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4575, Folder 1, File 5, Bulletin of the CAMC, 
Volume I, No. 6 (September 1918), article ‘On the Nature of Shell Shock,’ by Captain Dillon.  
386 Others noted uncontrollable shaking, “signs of dementia,” night terrors, crying and weeping, and hysterical blindness 
and paralysis. Private Robert Duncan (102nd Battalion) wrote in a letter that after a battle “I was so exhausted that I 
was almost delirious…the cooks had a hot breakfast for us and we ate like wolves but all the time we ate the lot of us 
cried like babes…I couldn’t have told you why I cried excepting that my nerves were completely gone.” And aside 
from shell shock as an umbrella term, concepts such as Hysteria and Neurasthenia continued to be used. The symptoms 
of Hysteria included erratic behaviour, hysterical seizures, irritability, a lack of focus, and depression. Army medical 
personnel also noted the “varieties of nerve breakdown.” Others made reference to insanity, psychosis (such as 
schizophrenia), ‘diseases’ such as paranoia, dementia praecox, delusions, manic “depressive insanity,” excitive form, 
etc. LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3618, Folder 25-13-7 to 25-13-10, ‘Report on an Invalid,’ 4 June 1917; LAC, RG 9 III 
C10, Volume 4551, Folder 1, File 7, ‘D.D.M.S. 62/26’ and LAC, RG 9 III B1, Volume 392, C-9-1, ‘Casualties, 
Lunatics (B & T).’ See also Harrison, Generals Die in Bed, 126, 161; Norris, The Memoir of Captain Harold McGill, 
198, 246; Reid, Personal Memoirs of the First World War, 215 and Grescoe, The Book of War Letters, 7, 169. 
387 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3752, Folder 3-1-4-2, Neurology, War Neuroses, ‘Functional Nervous Disorders.’  
388 Ibid, ‘Treatment of Shell Shock Cases at the Front.’  
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returned to duty, the chance for relapse was real,389 and could turn a short-term problem 
into long-term debilitation. Addressing the very real problem of war weariness early on 
could thus pay substantial dividends before it transmuted into shell shock debilitation. For 
soldiers forced to stay at the front, or who convinced their CO or MO to allow them to 
‘carry on,’ there were other consequences of war weariness and shell shock. Some were 
made “helpless from shell shock,”390 or became paralysed by fear. These soldiers were 
obviously militarily ineffective, as were those who could no longer endure shell fire. This 
can be explained in part by the sense of helplessness and hopelessness – also 
characteristic of war weariness – that being trapped in an artillery bombardment could 
induce. One MO recounted that “a man reported in a state of nervous collapse and 
confessed that he could not bear the shell fire…I advised that he be employed behind the 
lines for a time,” giving the soldier a break.391 This erosion of combat effectiveness was 
noted by other participating soldiers as well. One argued that officers became less useful 
over time as Neurasthenia developed, and John Becker of the 75th Battalion admitted that 
his nervousness and jumpiness compromised his soldiering abilities.392 One medical 
report noted that a soldier became overly apathetic about his existence at the front, and 
did not “seem to worry greatly over his future.” This was certainly problematic for 
authorities, especially if the soldier became excessively cautious or reckless. This one 
soldier also illustrated a “marked indifference,” and was “nervous.”393 This probably did 
not inspire confidence in his comrades. 
The impact of shell shock and other psychiatric casualties went beyond the 
suffering of the individual, and also affected his military unit. These problems also went 
beyond war weariness; the reluctance of soldiers was becoming the inability to carry on 
                                                             
 
389 Army reports acknowledged that some Hysteria cases or “other neuroses” can relapse while in convalescent 
hospitals or after discharge. LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3752, Folder 3-1-4-2, Neurology, War Neuroses, ‘Functional 
Nervous Disorders’ and LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4575, Folder 1, File 7, ‘DMS Circular Letter No. 25.’  
390 Climo, Lively Letters from World War One, 249. 
391 This sympathy and understanding of the hardships endured was evident elsewhere in McGill’s memoir as well. In 
one section he wrote that “I sent four men who were too exhausted for trench duty back to the transport lines,” and that 
“the men appeared greatly fatigued and done in.” He also wrote that one soldier already sent to the rear for a rest felt 
“like a slacker” behind the lines cobbling boots; he requested to join a working party near the front, and McGill noted 
his “zeal to serve his King and country.” Norris, The Memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, 106, 164-165.  
392 Graves, Goodbye to All That, 152 and Christie, The Memoir of John Harold Becker, 203. 
393 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3618, 25-13-7 to 25-13-10, ‘Medical Case Sheet.’ 
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with duty. For infantry, recklessness or undue caution could imperil the unit or 
compromise its ability to seize battlefield objectives. Reckless behaviour could invite 
retaliation from the enemy or get the soldier and his comrades killed. Caution or fear 
could force soldiers to dig in or even withdraw, again hurting chances of carrying out 
orders. The author of a report on ‘Medical Aspects of Air Service’ noted that “after many 
[stressful sorties or] shows he becomes, to use his own expression, ‘dud.’” Soldiers driven 
to this point lacked “resolution, loses confidence in himself, becomes stale, and if he is 
not withdrawn for a rest usually comes to grief”394 or brings grief to his unit. And the very 
nature of shell shock casualties “endanger[ed] the morale and discipline of troops in a 
special way,”395 and therefore the army ignored or denigrated these casualties at its peril. 
The inability or unwillingness of authorities to acknowledge war weariness and shell 
shock problem certainly contributed to assaults on morale, discipline, and combat 
motivation.  
For the soldiers driven to, and then beyond the breaking point, yet forced to 
remain at duty, serious health problems, permanent debilitation, and sometimes even 
death were the result. One chaplain admitted that he was “desperately weary at times,” 
but also “depressed” and “discouraged,” largely “owing to the physical, nervous, and 
mental strain” induced by service.396 For some soldiers, especially those expected to stay 
at the front and endure the terror until killed, wounded, granted leave, or rotated out of the 
line, this depression and discouragement was simply too much too bear. Some soldiers 
could no longer withstand the pain, and used suicide as a permanent solution.397 Other 
                                                             
 
394 These pilots were “subject to intensive, intermittent and cumulative stimuli of a degree to which men has never been 
exposed before,” and these natural reactions and “unfavourable, afferent impulses produce perceptions of the most 
trying character, so that the individual’s RESERVE FORCE RAPIDLY BECOMES USED UP.” LAC, RG 9 III B2, 
Volume 3493, 11-2-7 / 11-2-8, Reports MO DGMS, ‘Reports Medical Aspect Air Service,’ 20 August 1917.  
395 Salmon, Mental Diseases and War Neuroses, 7. 
396 LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4669, Chaplains Reports, Hospitals 1. 
397 References to suicide, though, are relatively rare, but are still found in the historical record amid contemporary war 
diaries and medical documents. For example, one ‘mental case’ committed suicide; he had been described previously as 
“a melancholia – potential suicide.” LAC, RG9 III C10, Volume 4577, Folder 5, File 6, ‘H.M.H.S. Araguaya.’ See also 
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to commit suicide compared with non-PTSD veterans. Veterans with PTSD are also seven times more likely to commit 
suicide compared to the general civilian population. Janice H. Laurence and Michael D. Matthews, eds., The Oxford 
Handbook of Military Psychiatry (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 15-23. 
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soldiers acted in such a way that their behaviour would all but guarantee their death (or 
serious wounding) in combat. Though heroism and personal bravery were applauded, 
these acts often ran counter to discipline and orders, and the loss of experienced and 
veteran soldiers was difficult for both comrades and the unit to bear.  
Statistics on the number of soldiers suffering from shell shock and other war 
neuroses, of various kinds, are notoriously difficult to find. Each army had different ways 
to calculate which casualties constituted shell shock, and war weariness was not tracked 
at all. And even within national armies, at times these casualties were calculated in 
different ways. MOs were busy with treating casualties and prioritised manpower and 
morale; accurate record-keeping and follow-up treatments were secondary considerations. 
Some soldiers were both physically and psychologically wounded, but were often lumped 
in with more traditional, physical casualties. Furthermore, many casualty lists did not 
have a separate category for psychiatric or psychological casualties, again lumping them 
under the umbrella term ‘casualties.’ In other instances, casualty figures are 
incomplete.398 The numbers are also skewed by the fact that some soldiers suffered 
multiple breakdowns, or were diagnosed with shell shock, returned to duty, and then 
suffered a relapse. Should this be counted as multiple cases of shell shock? Or is it better 
to understand these cases as chronic?  
Furthermore, many military and medical authorities were unwilling to admit how 
many troops were afflicted with shell shock to varying degrees. And because there was no 
clear consensus on what constituted shell shock, it was “relatively easy for the military 
authorities in Britain and Germany to associate the condition with cowardice and 
                                                             
 
398 Jones and Wessely argued that “the collection of data about soldiers suffering from psychological breakdown was 
haphazard and inconsistent.” Unfortunately, the British Official Medical History only collected information for the first 
two years of the war. In these years, psychological disorders accounted for 2.5% of casualties (in 1914) and 3.8% 
(1915). The problem, however, was that “these percentages greatly understate the true figures as they do not include 
functional somatic cases.” Edgar Jones and Simon Wessely, “Psychiatric Battle Casualties: An Intra – and Interwar 
Comparison,” The British Journal of Psychiatry, 178, 3 (2001): 242-247. Another historian noted that in 1914 1,906 
cases of “behaviour disorder without physical cause” were admitted to hospitals. By 1915, this number had grown to 
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which armies this included. Kellett, Combat Motivation, 273. Colonel Nicholson argued that in the first two years of the 
war roughly 60,000 troops were returned to the UK from France with shell shock. Colonel G.W.L. Nicholson, Seventy 
Years of Service: A History of the Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps (Ottawa: Borealis Press, 1977), 104. 
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malingering.”399 It was more honourable, for example, to be torn apart by shell fragments 
than be made militarily ineffective by little-understood psychiatric problems. The army 
authorities did not want to emphasise these problems and the difficulties this created. Yet 
despite these limitations, some information on rates of shell shock can be provided.400 For 
example, a contemporary report on Mental Diseases and War Neuroses in the British 
Army stated that functional and nervous diseases represented one in seven discharges for 
disability in the Army, or one in three if (physical) wounds were excluded.401 And 
Macphail stated in The Official History of the Canadian Forces in the Great War 1914-
1919: The Medical Services that 8,513 soldiers were diagnosed with “nervous diseases” 
during the war,402 presumably in Canadian combat units alone, though this certainly 
seems like an understatement of the problem. It should also be noted here that Macphail 
was notoriously unsympathetic to these types of casualties, which also might help explain 
his calculations.  
Work done by historians and researchers in the years since the end of the war also 
provide some insight into the extent of the shell shock problem, and how it differed from 
war weariness. Historians Ian Beckett and Peter Leese in both wrote that there were 
approximately 80,000 war neuroses (shell shock) cases in the BEF during the war, 
representing 2% of all wounded.403 These cases also represented approximately 36% of 
post-war disability pensions to veterans.404 Martin Gilbert asserted that by 1916 “genuine 
cases of shell shock were also growing, reaching more than fifty thousand by the end of 
                                                             
 
399 Beckett, The Great War, 315. 
400 An understanding of the rates of shell shock diagnosis can give historians a rough understanding of the extent of the 
problem of war weariness as well, almost certainly more widespread than the former.  
401 Salmon, Mental Diseases and War Neuroses, 7. Another historian argued that by 1917 psychiatric admissions were 
four per 1,000 for those in the BEF, two per 1,000 for those on home service, and one per 1,000 for the civilian 
population. Richard Holmes, Firing Line (London: Jonathan Cape Ltd., 1985), 257. 
402 The medical authorities identified other conditions associated with the psychoneuroses of war, including aphonia, 
deafness, amaurosis, amblyopia, paresis, hemiplegia, paraplegia, amongst others. Macphail, Medical Services, 274 and 
LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3602, 24-3-1 (Volume 1), CAMC Journal.  
403 Beckett, The Great War, 315 and Peter Leese, Shell Shock: Traumatic Neurosis and the British Soldiers of the First 
World War (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 9, referencing the British Medical Diseases of the War, Volume 
II, published in 1923. See also Fiona Reid, et. al., “The Great Misconceptions of the First World War,” BBC History 
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historians dismiss [this number of 80,000] as impossibly low.” Gaudet, ed., The World War I Journal and Poems of Pte. 
Frank Walker, xv. 
404 Beckett, The Great War, 315.  
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the war,” presumably referring to the British Army alone. By 1920, roughly 65,000 ex-
soldiers were still receiving pensions for neurasthenia, and 9,000 of these were still in 
hospital. By March 1939, around 120,000 British veterans of the First World War were 
receiving pensions (or had received their ‘final awards’) for war-related “primary 
psychiatric disability.” These 120,000 veteran pensions represented 15% of all pensioned 
disabilities.405 Other historians, however, refer to the inadequacy of casualty lists in 
capturing the true extent of shell shock and the impact of combat on individuals. Peter 
Hart wrote that in addition to the roughly 9.7 million soldiers killed through military 
action in the war,  
roughly 21 million were injured: some recovered relatively unaffected, but many 
were scarred or maimed for life. Nor do these figures really take into account the 
mentally traumatised, ranging from shell-shocked men who would never be sane 
again to the millions suffering from what we would now recognise as post-
traumatic stress disorder [PTSD].406 
 
There were also soldiers who survived the war, but then perhaps months or years later, 
experienced psychological problems due to their war service. And psychiatric casualties 
also transcended national, linguistic, geographic, class, and rank lines. One historian 
argued, for example, that in the German Army 613,047 soldiers, or 4.57% of all those 
mobilised were treated for ‘nervous disorders.’407 Psychiatric casualties created a unique 
problem for MOs, and put them in an unenviable position, having to balance the needs of 
the individual patient with that of their employer, the army.  
 There was tension amongst MOs and other personnel in the CAMC related to their 
service, conflicting priorities and value systems, and differences between civilian and 
military medicine. It was army policy to be suspicious of certain types of casualties, 
namely, non-physical and psychiatric casualties. In the foreword to a medical officer’s 
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memoirs, one historian wrote that there were often “very fixed views about courage and 
cowardice,” though there was some leeway for individual MOs to be sympathetic to shell 
shock cases. There was a rudimentary understanding of psychiatric casualties at the time. 
Moreover, the “prevailing military ethos of ‘courage unto death,’” as well as “anxiety 
over any displays of fear in front of one’s peers” combined with the MO’s main duty of 
ensuring the “maximum number of his battalion’s soldiers were available for duty every 
day” militated against too sympathetic an understanding of these problems.408 And yet, it 
was official army policy that officers, even MOs, were not to coddle the men, but were to 
act in a paternalistic manner, expecting all soldiers to do their duty to the utmost. One 
MO noted, for example, that during a long and exhausting march many soldiers wanted to 
fall out or lie down, but the officers were expected to show no pity. Instead, they were to 
“curse them, cajole and coax, threaten and promise, appeal to their pride and power of 
endurance,”409 anything really to keep them going. And doubtless some wounds were 
treated more sympathetically than others. Physical wounds suffered in combat or during 
active service were always treated more sympathetically and generously than ‘invisible 
wounds.’410 Throughout the war, there was always some suspicion that those claiming 
shell shock were actually malingering, to escape further duty at the front. Those under 
suspicion were kept on the continent, and not discharged or evacuated to England,411 
pending further examination and diagnosis. Those without visible or serious wounds, and 
where shell shock could not be proven, were usually sent back to the front in short order. 
The emphasis on manpower and morale, the desire to discourage other shell shocked 
soldiers from ‘going sick,’ and the concern for “needless” evacuation and misdiagnosis412 
help explain this unsympathetic view.413  
                                                             
 
408 Patrick Brennan in Norris, The World War I Memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, ix. 
409 Ibid, 197. 
410 Salmon, Mental Diseases and War Neuroses, 17. 
411 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3618, 25-12-1 to 25-13-5, ‘D.M.S. Circular Letter No. 25 of 1917,’ dated 3 August 1917 
and LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4575, Folder 1, File 7, ‘DMS Circular Letter No. 25.’ 
412 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3618, 25-13-6, ‘G.R.O. 2384.’ 
413 This prompt return to the front, and the recuperative power of rest and respite, was also reflected in cultural 
understandings of the war. See, for example, the Robert Frost poem “Not to Keep,” found in Waters, A Corner of a 
Foreign Field, 175. It included the lines: Enough,/ Yet not enough. A bullet through and through,/ High in the breast. 
Nothing but what good care/ And medicine and rest, and you a week,/ Can cure me of to go again…And with his eyes 
he asked her not to ask./ They had given him back to her, but not to keep.  
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 The authorities often distinguished between legitimate cases of shell shock, and 
others. One MO in late 1916, for example, argued that it was necessary “for a disciplinary 
stand-point to distinguish between genuine cases of ‘shell-shock’ and those of loss of 
nerve power.”414 War weariness was even more difficult to diagnose. And even into 1917, 
many authorities were requiring a very high burden of proof and clinging to a very 
narrow, traditional, and physical understanding of shell shock, as a shell concussion or 
other physical origin to explain these problems.415 In this sense, there was a false 
dichotomy between legitimate wounds (mental or physical), suffered as a direct result of 
combat or enemy fire, and illegitimate problems suggesting cowardice or malingering. 
Many of the more traditional MOs subscribed to this latter view, suspicious that all 
claiming shell shock were ‘slackers’ or ‘swinging the lead.’ And even if MOs did 
acknowledge that the best soldiers, including volunteers and veterans, suffered from 
“anxiety neurosis,” war weariness, and other problems after months or years of service, 
many believed that their duty to the army trumped their Hippocratic Oath.416 
 And yet, military medical matters were complex and did not fit neatly into 
reductive black and white understandings of health. Not all soldiers reacted the same way 
to combat or stress, and family history, role in the forces, personal experience, length and 
intensity of service, duties performed, and hardships endured all could factor into how 
soldiers reacted to battle and service. Some soldiers broke down from shell shock after a 
relatively short period of time at the front, and cases of psychiatric casualties were also 
found in soldiers on the lines of communication behind the front.417 Some were able to 
                                                             
 
414 My italics. Authorities also sought to classify soldiers and distinguish between “true shell shock” and “symptoms 
resulting from nervous exhaustion or loss of self-control,” clearly privileging one over the other. Others distinguished 
between two types of ‘Insanity.’ One was ‘insanity,’ whereas the other was ‘Mental Deficiency,’ shock, or suffering 
from “mental shock or hysteria.” See LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4551, Folder 1, File 7, ‘D.D.M.S. M.1/55,’ dated 7 
November 1916; LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3751, 2-3-6-2, ‘Documents for Troops Returning, Boards;’ LAC, RG 9 III 
C10, Volume 4575, Folder 1, File 6, ‘Categorisation’ and PPCLI Archives, Courts Martial and Discipline, Part II, File 
No. 30 (22) – 5, ‘Memorandum – Courts Martial – Medical Evidence – Insanity,’ dated 1 May 1915.  
415 In some cases, authorities demanded “an authentic and definite statement by a witness of direct contact with the 
effects of an explosion” to secure a diagnosis of Shell Shock (Wounded). Ibid, ‘D.M.S. No. 794/86.’ In other instances, 
the authorities admitted the causes of and explanations for shell shock were complex. LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4214, 
Folder 1, File 10, Casualties, 2-3-17 to 1-1-18, ‘C.W.R.O., 387, 50th Battalion.’ 
416 Macphail, Medical Services, 277. 
417 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3752, 3-1-4-2, ‘Functional Nervous Disorders.’  
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recover in relatively short order after rest and time away from the sources of trauma.418 
Other troops required weeks or months of recovery time before being made effective 
again; some individuals never fully recuperated.  
Some shell shock and psychiatric cases were more ambiguous and difficult to 
classify, reinforcing the overlap between war weariness and shell shock. This reality, 
combined with the somewhat confused and even contradictory response of the authorities, 
placed further pressure on the MOs tasked with determining who was ‘fit’ to carry on 
with duty, and who was given a chance to recover behind the lines. For example, NYDN 
cases fell somewhere between healthy, committed soldiers and those debilitated by shell 
shock. The army recognised that their military effectiveness and well-being had been 
compromised, but whose problems were not yet serious enough to warrant evacuation 
from the continent or discharge. MOs were to use this term in soldiers who became “non-
effective” and lacked visible wounds, but were “presumed to have originated from the 
effects of weapons in action.”419 Furthermore, in some cases the CO of the soldier’s unit 
needed to confirm with the hospital that “the man had been subject to exceptional 
exposure” to justify a transfer and time out of the line. Later in the war, the British high 
command even prohibited the use of the term ‘shell shock’ altogether, or at the very least 
seriously circumscribed its use.420 Army policies and the desire to limit those evacuated 
from the front for psychiatric casualties compromised the ability of the medical services 
to properly and promptly handle casualties. In February of 1917, for example, a hospital 
staff member complained that “the hospital is getting clogged by the army regulations 
requiring evidence from the front before sending shell shock N.Y.D. and gas cases to the 
base”421 hospitals. In this case we see army rules and procedures, and emphasis on 
manpower and morale considerations, take precedence over the needs of individual 
                                                             
 
418 COs had to sign courts martial documents for those who “failed to go forward with the regiments,” which could 
result in death sentences. Adamson argued, however, that these courts were often too final of a verdict, explaining that 
“the mental state of a man means so much and so greatly govern his actions and I have known men who recovered their 
nerve after behaving badly and proved most gallant fellows.” In other words, many suffered short-term breakdowns and 
could subsequently recover and become effective soldiers once again. Christie, ed., Letters of Agar Adamson, 322. 
419 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3752, 3-1-4-2, ‘Treatment of Shell Shock Cases at the Front.’ 
420 See, for example, Ibid. The author of this document stated that the term ‘shell shock’ could only be used by the OC a 
special hospital in neurasthenia cases.  
421 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3752, 6-3-2, Hospitals, France, Stationary, ‘No. 3 C.S.H.’ 
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patients and long-term recovery. The desire to prevent seemingly ‘needless’ evacuation 
was deemed more important than the fact that hospitals were becoming overwhelmed, 
which compromised medical care. This was a reality that MOs had to conform to, at least 
in principle.  
And at times the orders to and expectations of MOs were contrary to civilian 
practices, where most Canadian medical officers began their careers, as well as 
ambiguous. In civilian medicine, the ultimate goal was the recovery and continued health 
of individual patients, so they could once again become an effective member of society. 
In military medicine, by contrast, the ultimate goal was to ensure the maximum number 
of soldiers at the front; soldiers were mostly means to an end, and the needs of the army 
were paramount. In terms of ambiguous or unclear orders, MOs were instructed to retain 
“as many light cases as possible [in the army zone] until such a time as they were fit to 
return to duty.”422 Of course, it was not always clear what constituted ‘light cases,’ and at 
times it was better to remove a soldier from frontline service for a short while rather than 
force him to remain at the front and risk a more serious breakdown. Preventative 
measures and sympathetic treatment were beneficial, even if they ran counter to official 
army policy.  
Despite the personal views of the MOs and their commitment to the Hippocratic 
Oath and civilian medical values and practices, they were nevertheless in a difficult 
position. Seeing patients suffering and dying was bad enough. Having soldiers die under 
their care, despite best efforts, must have shaken even the most hardened veteran doctors. 
Declaring a soldier fit for further duty and sending him back to the front, moreover, could 
be akin to a death sentence for that soldier. For those soldiers who were pushed beyond 
the breaking point and could no longer endure at the front, desperation sometimes drove 
them to evade duty or escape the trenches. Malingering, however, was considered a crime 
                                                             
 
422 DUASC, Clearing: The Tale of the First Canadian Casualty Clearing Station, BEF, 1914-1919, by Thomas Brenton 
Smith, MS-2-432 – SF 44-1, page 229. 
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by the military authorities, and some shell shocked soldiers were no doubt executed as 
malingerers, shirkers, and slackers – often for cowardice or desertion.423  
 
 
Impact on Behaviour and Attitude 
The stresses endured by soldiers serving at the front and on the lines of 
communication were enough to affect how they viewed the world, and their behaviour as 
well. The sights, smells, and sounds of death, coupled with the reality of suffering, 
witnessing and participating in terrible things, and the physical and emotional exhaustion 
all served to place an enormous burden on the individual. There was some comfort and 
safety in numbers, but each soldier dealt with trauma in his own way and was expected to 
do his duty and not undermine the unit. Support was offered in the form of chaplains, 
MOs, alcohol, and other fortifying forces, but each soldier faced difficulties at the front 
and were expected to endure until wounded, killed, or granted leave. After long and hard 
service, especially in combat units, some soldiers became reckless or apathetic, others 
fatalistic or overly cautions;424 some troops were driven by bloodlust and feelings of 
revenge, whereas others were determined to seek a Blighty or give themselves a SIW. 
Others ‘voted with their feet’ and sought to avoid further duty altogether. There were 
many soldiers, however, who attempted to maintain their composure and stick it out at the 
front despite their war weariness. Notions of duty, regimental spirit and pride, 
comradeship, patriotism, fear,425 and ‘carrots and sticks’ all help explain how and why 
soldiers tried to endure at the front, even if they were ultimately unable to do so. One 
                                                             
 
423 It was difficult to reconcile the natural self-preservation instinct with continued duty in intolerable situations. Flight 
and desertion could not always be prevented by ideals of duty, patriotism, honour, training, discipline, comradeship, 
and “herd reactions.” Moreover, soldiers were aware that cowardice “was punishable only with death, and [that] no 
medical excuses could be accepted” to mitigate the punishment. And yet, soldiers still risked this and went AWL, 
deserted, or found other ways to evade duty. Some were lacking in dedication or felt abandoned by the army system, to 
be sure, but this also suggests that many soldiers developed a level of desperation that drove them from duty, despite 
the potential consequences and all the forces keeping them in the line. Salmon, Mental Diseases and War Neuroses, 30-
31, 43; Graves, Goodbye to All That, 213 and Harrison, Generals Die in Bed, 56. 
424 Some soldiers seemed to accept their fate and the inevitability of their death in this war. Edward Thomas’ poem 
Lights Out included the lines: “There is not any book/ or face of dearest look/ that I would not turn from now/ to go into 
the Unknown/ I must enter and leave alone/ I know not how. Waters, A Corner of a Foreign Field, 141. 
425 The soldiers’ “subjection to strict military discipline, the fear of severe punishment or death from allowing their 
emotions to run riot, had a strong restraining influence” on their attitude and behaviour. T.H. Ames, The Prevention of 
War Neurosis, Shell Shock (Canadian Medical Association, New York Medical Journal, July 6 1918), 423. 
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infantry subaltern reflected that some soldiers sought to stay at the front and refused to be 
evacuated until the task at hand was completed,426 even if they were on the verge of 
breakdown and were quickly declining in health and ability. Many did not want to shirk 
their duty or let their comrades down, which was admirable, but sometimes misguided. 
Having an unfit soldier remain at the front could be counterproductive; a shell-shocked 
man in the front lines could be disastrous for unit morale, and despite their commitment, 
these soldiers might very well be less than effective militarily.  
 The hard fighting, heavy casualties, and extended periods at the front could also 
induce a sense of helplessness or hopelessness amongst long-serving veterans. The longer 
that one was ‘in country,’ the clearer it was that their chances of unscathed survival were 
marginal at best. Loss of hope and feelings of helplessness were damaging to morale over 
time, and certainly contributed to the onset of war weariness.427 This loss of hope and 
desire to end the pain and trauma once and for all drove some desperate soldiers to 
suicide and self-harm. If self-inflicted wounds and illnesses were a desperate act on the 
part of troops to evade duty and escape the trenches, suicide was a way to avoid further 
service and suffering permanently. The self-preservation instinct is strong, and thus few 
sought death consciously. Some, however, behaved recklessly or did commit suicide.428 
MOs noted deaths in their unit, including suicides and attempted suicides, as have other 
officers.429 At times, the stresses and strains of the front lines, combined with bad news 
from home – such as Dear John letters – proved too much for these worn soldiers to 
endure. In many cases, if a soldier committed suicide at duty it would not be reported as 
                                                             
 
426 Douie, Recollections of a Subaltern of Infantry, 148. 
427 Feelings of helplessness and hopelessness might also be characteristic of war weariness, rather than just a 
contributing factor. This loss of hope was one theme explored in Sassoon’s poem “Attack,” which included the lines: 
Lines of grey, muttering faces, masked with fear,/ They leave their trenches, going over the top,/ While time ticks blank 
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Waters, A Corner of a Foreign Field, 37 and Caughill, ed., Letters to Janet, 132. 
428 There was also the “unending conflict between duty, honour and discipline, on the one hand, and homesickness, 
horror, and the urgings of the instinct of self-preservation on the other.” Salmon, Mental Diseases and War Neuroses, 
30, 42. 
429 Graves explained that one soldier committed suicide thusly: “He went through the last push, sir, and that sent him a 
bit queer; on top of that he got bad news from Limerick about his girl and another chap.” Norris, The World War I 
Memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, xiv and 199 and Graves, Goodbye to All That, 91. Historian Niall Ferguson, 
however, argued that the number of SIWs and suicides were “never very high.” Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War: 
Explaining World War I (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 367. Canadian historian Tim Cook, however, made reference 
to several cases of suicide in his section on those pushed beyond the breaking point. Cook, Shock Troops, 245-246. 
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such, and their next of kin would be informed that their loved one died “a soldier’s 
death.”430 Lord Moran noted the seemingly spontaneous nature of some of these suicides; 
he wrote that one soldier “did not appear ill” or suicidal, but then killed himself. Moran 
admitted, however, that this man was “out of sorts,” sullen, dazed, morose.431 But in war 
and combat especially, dazed, sullen, or morose feelings were all too common. And 
Private Bert Cooke wrote of a comrade who “blew his brains out.” Apparently he was “a 
fine fellow, and no one would have thought he would have done such a thing…but this 
life is enough to make a fellow do anything.”432 What was it that pushed these soldiers 
over the edge? And how can we account for those soldiers who were pushed to the edge, 
but not over it?  
 Personal motivations for suicide during military service are difficult to determine. 
Some soldiers were simply pushed beyond the breaking point, and saw no other way out. 
One MO argued that soldiers committed suicide because they could no longer face the 
war, but did not want to bring disgrace to themselves or their unit,433 for example by 
deserting, surrendering, or otherwise acting in an undisciplined manner. In other cases, 
the guilt and shame of acting in such an undisciplined way, or being accused of such 
behaviour, contributed to the decision to end one’s life.434 Other suicides are perhaps 
explained by an impulsive idea generated in a time of great distress combined with 
readily available firearms. For others, the uncertainty and violence at the front was just 
too much to endure. The lack of control over one’s own fate could be disheartening, and 
some took the matter into their own hands;435 the act of suicide gave them a sense of 
control over a highly volatile existence and allowed them to leave this world on their own 
terms. It is certainly a sad state of affairs when suicide was deemed a better option than 
continued service at the front.  
 
                                                             
 
430 And not one of dishonour. See Graves, Goodbye to All That, 91. 
431 Moran, The Anatomy of Courage, 3. 
432 Walsh, The First World War Diary of Private Bert Cooke, 118. 
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Malingering versus Breakdown, and the Self-Preservation Instinct 
It was often difficult for MOs and commanders to determine whether soldiers 
were genuinely unable to withstand further duty, or whether they were simply fed up with 
the state of affairs and sought a way out. The differences between a war-weary soldier 
and shell-shocked soldier could be subtle. Of course, this is too simplistic an 
understanding of the problem, especially as some soldiers seemed willing to carry on, but 
were unable to endure. Conversely, there were also troops who were physically and 
psychologically healthy enough to remain at the front, but simply wanted, and probably 
deserved, a rest. The desire for a Blighty wound was a clear indicator of war weariness, as 
was the grumbling and complaining that was nearly ubiquitous in the forces. Grumbling 
and grousing, moreover, was understood by many authorities as a healthy outlet for 
discontent; by allowing critiques of the officers, for instance, this ensured that 
dissatisfaction did not become a collective problem and boil over into mutiny.436 A 
Blighty wound offered the soldier a brief reprieve from combat, as well as time away 
from the front and perhaps also hospitalisation. Canadian artilleryman Ernest Black 
described these wounds as “nothing to do any permanent damage but enough to get him 
to hospital in England and a furlough before he came back to France” and further duty.437 
It was certainly no secret that many long-serving soldiers dreamed of or even sought out 
‘cushy’ or Blighty wounds438 as an honourable way to avoid further duty, at least until 
partial recovery. A 2nd Battalion soldier recalled that “when you are really thoroughly fed 
up with the whole thing there, you would say, I wish I could get a Blighty.”439 One MO 
noted that for those serving – and suffering – in the trenches, “a cushy wound, a Blighty 
business, seems the most desirable thing in the world.” Some soldiers after calculating 
                                                             
 
436 To provide but one example, the comedy shows whereby officers would be ridiculed and army life satirised allowed 
for a ‘safety valve’ for soldiers to express discontent in a controlled environment, far from the battlefield. By tolerating 
this behaviour, it helped keep discontent at a simmer so as to not grow into more serious and collective discontent and 
insubordination/indiscipline. The author would like to thank Dr. Vance for these ideas, which emerged during one of 
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439 LAC, RG 41 B III 1, Volume 7, Interview with W.V.B. Riddell of the 2nd Battalion, n.p.  
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their odds of survival, however, took the next step and actually sought out these 
wounds.440  
 But for the soldiers who did not get their Blighty, and were forced to remain at the 
front for the foreseeable future, other actions were taken to avoid further service. At 
times, this was done with clear goals in mind; the soldier made a conscious decision to 
minimise his participation in the war as much as possible. At other times, the soldier was 
merely reacting to his body and mind, ensuring that he could survive to fight another day 
by reducing his participation in the present. This was an important distinction to make, 
one in which gave MOs and officers much trouble, but close contact with their 
subordinates, clear channels of communication, and quality leadership practices certainly 
helped in this regard.  
 The sick parade was one way for MOs to gauge the authenticity and severity of 
the ailments presented by the troops. But this was often difficult, especially with the 
fickle nature of psychiatric casualties. Furthermore, the unit’s worst malingerers and 
“scrimshankers” attempted to fool the MO by trying to “look their very worst.” Captain 
Ralph Bell noted that some soldiers showed up on sick parade after failing to shave, with 
improper clothing, and acted in an exaggerated or pitiable way to emphasise their 
problems.441 And at times, it worked, and they managed to get past the battalion MO.442 
Of course, many saw such behaviour as shameful and embarrassing, which could also 
bring disrepute on themselves and the unit. Indeed, some troops refused to go sick or 
leave their comrades, despite the fact that they were increasingly incapacitated and 
declining in utility. Major G.S. Strathy wrote that though some troops played up their 
symptoms, many seemed to want to stick it out at the front and claimed they were fit 
when they were not, “rather than be thought to be ‘swinging the lead’” at the front.443  
                                                             
 
440 Some soldiers lingered in areas known for heavy shelling in the hopes of getting “a Blighty one.” Moran, The 
Anatomy of Courage, 114 and 121. 
441 Bell, Canada in War-Paint, 54. 
442 DUASC, Clearing: The Tale of the First Canadian Casualty Clearing Station, BEF, 1914-1919, by Thomas Brenton 
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3751, 2-4-1, ‘Major G.S Strathy, War Diary,’ August 1914 – February 1918.  
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 It was a common viewpoint among MOs, even sympathetic ones, that only 
‘genuine’ cases of shell shock deserved rest and medical attention. This also complicated 
cases of war weariness, which affected soldiers who were no longer fit and enthusiastic, 
but not yet debilitated by shell shock. Harold McGill of the 31st Battalion argued that the 
term shell shock was “much-abused,” and often used by misguided MOs to “describe a 
condition that was nothing but terror.” True cases of shell shock did occur, but “in my 
experience [this] never occurred in the case of cowards.”444 McGill felt that those 
suffering from shell shock were often the best, hardest-working, and most committed 
soldiers of the unit, as 
The victims were men of finest moral courage. This combined with a high sense 
of duty and a lively imagination set the stage for the development of shell 
shock…[as the soldier’s] whole physical nature revolted from the sights and 
sounds of bombardment. This was much intensified if he was with troops holding 
a static position and obliged to sit still and take punishment without the 
opportunity of striking back…[in response to such stimuli] all the man’s natural 
physical impulses promoted him to take shelter, and to run away if 
necessary…[but his] spiritual courage, his faith to his duty and his discipline 
forced him to remain…the result was a conflict under which the nervous system 
collapsed and the soldier became a gibbering maniac.445 
 
The belief that some soldiers used shell shock as an excuse to evade duty was also 
espoused by other military authorities. One British MO acknowledged that when the term 
itself was coined, some “weaklings” saw it as an opportunity to malinger or escape the 
front,446 justified in their behaviour by official recognition of the impact of combat on the 
individual. There were times, moreover, when shell-shocked soldiers were blamed for 
their condition, even if it was authentic and caused by exposure to battle. Some soldiers, 
for example, were said to have developed “functional disorders of the nervous system” 
but “under conditions which would not affect an individual with a stable nervous system,” 
thus putting the blame squarely on the soldier, rather than on an inadequate medical or 
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rotation system, or the impact of the war itself.447 There was a fine line between 
breakdown and fitness for further service; those who were able and willing to carry on at 
the front one day could become debilitated by shell shock the next. There was also a fine 
line between war weariness and shell shock ineffectiveness. This emphasised the 
importance of MOs and commanders being familiar and in close contact with their 
subordinates.  
 In addition to conscious malingering and evasion of duty, soldiers reacted to the 
long-term exposure to combat and trauma in other ways, especially by succumbing to 
natural fear reactions. Fear, of course, was a natural aspect of wartime service. The 
human body and mind were placed in situations of extraordinary stress and mortal danger, 
and soldiers were also expected to endure and participate in traumatic and terrifying 
behaviours and circumstances. And despite the most rigorous and realistic training, one 
could never adequately prepare for the horrors of war, and combat in particular. In 
moments of extreme stress and terror, the natural response was to run and hide, anything 
to prevent continued exposure to such sources of fear. Leaving the battlefield and 
cowering in a shell hole were obviously frowned upon by military authorities; and indeed, 
these behaviours were illegal, not to mention deemed ‘cowardly.’448 And yet no amount 
of regimental pride, promises of rewards, appeals to tradition, masculinity, and authority, 
sense of duty, good leadership, and threat of punishment could keep all soldiers in the 
firing line indefinitely when fear rose to a certain level.  
 In all species the natural self-preservation instinct is paramount. This often 
manifests itself as a fight or flight response,449 when in the face of danger the victim 
needs to prepare to aggressively confront the sources of danger, or to flee this danger 
altogether. The problem for infantry soldiers of the First World War, however, was that 
especially during trench warfare the opportunities for direct retaliation and aggression 
                                                             
 
447 At times, moreover, with hysteria and other neuroses cases “there is a suspicion of malingering.” See LAC, RG 9 III 
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toward the enemy were limited, save during set-piece battles, patrols, and raids. Most of 
the time soldiers were in the trenches or behind the lines and exposed to enemy fire, but 
unable to properly retaliate. The inability to strike back at your aggressor as a cause of 
shell shock and other psychiatric casualties has been suggested by contemporary MOs,450 
and the chances to flee the battlefield without being apprehended or killed in the process 
were few and far between. Discomfort, stress, fear, and being under near-constant shell 
fire “from which every human impulse recoils…[and] every human instinct cries ‘go 
back!’”451 was difficult to endure, day after day. And yet, there were few opportunities for 
respite. 
One soldier acknowledged the power of the self-preservation instinct, and the 
“irresistible impulse to ‘take cover’” in these situations.452 This ‘irresistible impulse’ to 
run and hide, however, obviously undermined the unit’s ability to carry out orders and 
seize objectives.453 If all soldiers gave in to their natural instinct to run from danger, unit 
cohesion would collapse. Lord Moran argued that fear was simply the “response of the 
instinct of self-preservation to danger” encountered at the front. It was the soldier’s 
resistance to fear and fortifying factors that mattered, though this resistance could be 
lowered by wounds or illness, and intense emotional shock could strip soldiers of their 
powers of self-control.454 For those who gave in to their self-preservation instinct and 
went AWL or deserted, being captured by authorities meant courts martial, stigmatisation, 
even death. Medical explanations such as shell shock often fell on deaf ears in these 
situations, as MOs and commanders would have to agree to allow the soldier to leave the 
front, even for a short rest. Those who were not granted this privilege were depicted as 
insubordinate, cowardly, or even traitorous. Other authorities were dismissive of 
psychiatric casualties, interpreting them as childish, feminine, or degenerate. One wrote 
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Canada at War, 1914-1918: A Record of Heroism and Achievement (Toronto: The Canadian Annual Review Limited, 
1919), 393. 
452 Major William Bishop, Winged Warfare: Hunting the Huns in the Air (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1918), 48-
49. 
453 One MO admitted that before a raid he was “seized with an overwhelming desire to await the raiders’ return here in 
this deep dug-out with its immense sense of security” and safety. Moran, The Anatomy of Courage, 145. 
454 Fatigue, loss of sleep, and witnessing friends die also used up soldier’s will power. Ibid, 19-25. 
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that the symptoms of shell shock were merely “the result of the action of the natural 
instinct of self-preservation,” and that this was “a primitive instinct expressed by the 
emotion fear,”455 and would not be tolerated. It is thus no wonder that troops on the 
precipice of breakdown grew desperate and resorted to SIWs and illness, desertion, and 
other forms of evasion of duty. 
 
 
Links to Legal Aspects, Discipline, Criminality  
There were direct links between the health and medical reality of troops at the 
front, and the legal and disciplinary aspects of service. War-weary soldiers might very 
well neglect their personal health and the military policies designed to maintain it – a 
sense of apathy and helplessness were characteristic of pronounced war weariness. Some 
medical ailments, such as trench foot and VD, were understood as only occurring in units 
with poor morale, weak discipline,456 and ineffective leadership, or under extreme 
circumstances only. With the proper inspections, equipment and clothing, care for 
subordinates, and adherence to rules and regulations, it was argued, there would be very 
few cases of trench foot amongst units at the front. Good units and individuals with pride 
and commitment simply did not allow these cases to emerge. The reality, of course, was 
much more complex. Soldiers could also be punished and have their behaviour shaped by 
medical problems. Troops who had contracted VD, for example, were punished for 
failing to follow army regulations, but also needed to be controlled and perhaps confined 
in certain areas.457 Medical issues afflicting soldiers could compromise their ability to 
follow orders, stay in the line or formation, and ultimately seize military objectives. This 
                                                             
 
455 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3618, 25-13-7 to 25-13-10, Mental Cases, No File Title. 
456 The author of a document on trench foot argued that “the prevention of the disease is almost entirely a matter of 
discipline and can only be carried out by the cooperation of the Company and Battalion officers.” Moreover, in order to 
maintain fighting strength “great care will have to be exercised by all to keep the men with the battalions, and thus 
maintain the low percentage of sick evacuation heretofore enjoyed by the Canadian Corps.” LAC, RG 9 III C10, 
Volume 4546, Folder 7, File 7, ‘Trench Foot.’  
457 This was not always possible to achieve, especially with large numbers and in inhabited areas of the continent, but 
areas could be placed out of bounds, and leave to certain cities like Nice or Paris could be discontinued owing to the 
“great and increasing number of cases of venereal disease contracted in these places.” LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 4530, 
Folder 11, Leave, ‘Confidential: Cdn. Divn. A(a) 6-1 – 23-9-17.’ 
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impacted all soldiers in all arms and services, especially high stress positions such as 
those in the air force458 and infantry.  
There was a difficult balancing act to maintain. On the one hand, the medical 
authorities needed to care for their patients and ensure sufficient health and strength to 
continue fighting. At times, this meant time away from the sources of stress. On the other 
hand, medical personnel were subject to and expected to uphold military discipline,459 and 
were instructed to be more concerned with the collective rather than the individual. In 
many cases the needs of the army were privileged over those of individual soldiers, 
especially regarding matters of health. In the Canadian Hospital at Etchinghill, for 
example, close confinement of individual soldiers could retard recovery, but was still 
recommended and justified as “taken with a view to the best interests of military 
discipline and also with a view to the best interests of those other ranks as patients in this 
hospital.”460 In this case, the impression made on other patients and the need to uphold 
military discipline were deemed more important than the recovery of the soldiers 
themselves. It should also be remembered that this was a more communal society, and 
many of the troops were used to subordination, paternalism, close control and discipline 
(such as in the factory). It was argued that the very survival of Western Civilisation was 
at stake, so the authorities could be forgiven for taking liberties with the soldiers. 
Nevertheless, soldiers were often still punished, such as with courts martial, for “fail[ure] 
to maintain equilibrium” when engaging the enemy, even if they had been medically 
diagnosed with shell shock or neurasthenia.461 
                                                             
 
458 The high-stress environment of flying coupled with the negative impact on the human body led to “marked 
impairment of judgment,” headaches, insomnia, “relative insufficiency,” and other symptoms associated with 
“exhaustion.” Moreover, battle stress and near-death experiences could induce a sense of caution and hesitancy that 
could negatively affect comrades. In one example after almost crashing, a pilot in his next encounter “broke away from 
his formation knowing that he would be pounced upon by enemy scouts [fighters], preferring this to the strain imposed 
upon him by continuing in formation. This pilot, after a rest, did excellent artillery work.” LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 
3493, 11-2-7 / 11-2-8, Reports MO DGMS, ‘Reports Medical Aspect Air Service,’ 20 August 1917. 
459 The medical services, including the CAMC, were under military discipline as members of the Canadian armed 
forces, fighting as part of the wider BEF. They were thus subject to the KRO, such as Nos. 1099, 1100, and 1111. The 
medical services were expected to maintain proper army authority and military discipline whilst treating patients in 
hospitals and other medical facilities. LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3751, 2-4-1, ‘Relations with M.H.C.’  
460 LAC, RG 9 III B1, Series 2, Volume 661, D-98-1, Discipline, ‘Etchinghill Hospital.’ 
461 Those who failed to do their duty because they were “lacking in nerve stability…cannot be allowed to escape 
disciplinary action on the ground of a medical diagnosis of ‘shell shock’ or ‘neurasthenia’ or ‘inability to stand shell 
fire.’” The author of the report worried that too many officers and soldiers used the excuse of non-effectiveness to 
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The desire for a Blighty wound462 amongst soldiers was certainly not criminal, but 
going the next step and actually wounding oneself was. The administering of SIWs and 
illnesses was likely not widespread, but it did happen and the army authorities were 
concerned. Furthermore, the desire to attain a SIW and then hide evidence of it did 
suggest mens rea, a guilty mind.463 These soldiers knew that what they were doing was 
considered illegal and even cowardly, but they had had enough of the war and had grown 
desperate to escape further duty. There were also special procedures to be followed in 
cases of suspected SIWs, partly to ensure that further investigations could be made and 
partly to ensure these cases were not evacuated with other ‘legitimate’ physical 
wounds.464 It seems even these desperate soldiers with SIWs and illnesses had not 
suffered enough, and the authorities sought to punish them further and deter others from 
attempting such behaviour.  
 Active service conditions, hard fighting, heavy casualties, the terror of combat, 
and the stresses of war eventually drove even the most committed, strongest, most-
experienced volunteers to and beyond the breaking point. A minority of soldiers 
committed suicide465 or acted in such a way as to invite death. Some soldiers broke down 
                                                             
 
explain and justify why they “failed in their duty.” The author argued that MOs have fallen prey to this ruse, and 
“without due consideration of the military issues at stake, have accepted such cases as being in the same category as 
ordinary illness.” LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4546, Folder 6, File 2, ADMS 3rd Canadian Division, ‘Extract from 
G.H.Q. Letter,’ 14 October 1916. And a Canadian MO argued that there were many slackers and malingerers, and 
(army) doctors had a duty to the armed forces that trumped their Hippocratic Oath. MOs played an important role in 
determining whether soldiers were fit to stand trial, and thus be tried with and even executed for cowardice and other 
crimes. Macphail, Medical Services, 277-278. 
462 Some soldiers sought Blighty wounds, or even increased the chances of attaining one by lingering in dangerous areas 
or exposing themselves unnecessarily to enemy fire. Moran, The Anatomy of Courage, 114, 121. And one soldier 
recalled that “I saw some of the men lie down in a trench there and hold their feet up to see if they could get wounded.” 
Reid, Personal Memoirs of the First World War, 151. 
463 Or at least a recognition of the army’s prohibitions on such behaviour. One soldier sought a Blighty wound/SIW and 
suggested shooting into your leg, but “through a tin of bully beef (to avoid powder marks)” and evidence of self-harm. 
A good leg wound would certainly send soldiers down the line for treatment and hospitalisation, at least for a while. 
Reid, Personal Memoirs of the First World War, 216. 
464 Soldiers wounded with suspected SIWs were to travel with reports, crime sheets, and any evidence on hand. And “in 
all cases [a] note will be made on back of field Medical Card of Patient.” See LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4561, Folder 
1, File 8, ‘No. 3 Canadian Stationary Hospital, Orders, Second Army, D.M.S.;’ Ibid, Volume 4554, Folder 2, File 2, 
‘Self Inflicted and Accidental Wounds due to Negligence’ and LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3686, 30-0-0 (Volume 4), 
‘Instructions for RMOs in Bramshott Area.’ 
465 The authorities were able to punish and proscribe behaviour for living soldiers, but for those who took their own 
lives, there was little they could do save prevent it from happening to another. And because of the notion of equality in 
death, these soldiers were granted burials alongside their comrades (this was also the case of those executed for military 
crimes). Suicide was not condoned or encouraged by the army, even if their policies sometimes pushed desperate troops 
over the edge. Other troops had serious mental health problems prior to enlistment and transport to England, which 
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and were debilitated by shell shock; others sought to evade duty, legally or otherwise. Of 
the latter, troops removed themselves from duty with SIWs, feigned illness, or 
deserted.466 Those who served until wounded and removed from the line could expect a 
brief respite from duty, but only until sufficiently recovered to carry on at the front. Some 
were wounded several times, but never seriously enough to keep them from going back to 
the front for further action. As long as the soldier was not physically incapacitated by 
wounds, disease, or illness, he was expected to return and remain at duty until killed, or 
the end of hostilities.467 In one case, a clearly shell-shock soldier was apprehended for 
desertion, and after repeat offenses was sentenced to death by firing squad.468 He survived 
the war, however, as his sentences apparently were commuted or postponed each time; in 
this case, even desertion and a death sentence could not prevent this soldier from being 
returned to the front line.    
 
 
Preventative Measures, Mitigating Factors, Warning Signs 
Medical officers, commanders, chaplains, and other support personnel had an 
important role to play in the prevention and detection of war weariness. It was important 
to recognise the early signs of war weariness in the individual, before it transmuted into 
larger problems like shell shock. It was thus crucial to identify ‘warning signs’ and other 
indicators of breakdown.469  To identify the signs of war weariness, it was important also 
to understand what eroded the health and morale of the soldiers, both in the short-term 
                                                             
 
were only exacerbated by service on the Western Front. Still others were pushed beyond the breaking point, and felt 
that suicide was the best option for themselves and their unit. It was better to end it all and rid the unit of an 
increasingly useless soldier, than to desert or go AWL and bring disgrace to the battalion. Suicide is different than war 
weariness, but they both speak to the impact of combat on individuals, the role of medical problems (including 
psychiatric casualties) in the armed forces, and evasion of duty. On the 31st Battalion’s voyage to England one soldier 
committed suicide by jumping overboard the Carpathia. There were other references to suicide by jumping overboard 
ships in the archival record as well. One such document made reference to “an insane patient.” See Norris, The Memoir 
of Captain Harold W. McGill, xiv and LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3618, 25-13-11 to 15-14-9, ‘Suicide, or Deaths from 
Causes other than the Result of War Conditions’ and Moran, The Anatomy of Courage, 3-4 and 189. 
466 DUASC, Clearing: The Tale of the First Canadian Casualty Clearing Station, BEF, 1914-1919, by Thomas Brenton 
Smith, MS-2-432 – SF 44-1, page 88. 
467 Waters, A Corner of a Foreign Field, 175. 
468 Black, I Want One Volunteer, 28. 
469 And also other signals that the soldier was not faring well at duty. The cumulative stress, attacks on morale and 
health, exhaustion, trauma and other aspects of service served to wear down the soldier’s powers of resistance, even 
amongst the strongest and most dedicated volunteers. 
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and over longer periods. The transitions from war weariness to shell shock, from short-
term breakdown to more permanent debilitation, could not be prevented entirely, but with 
care and consideration could be minimised and the worst effects mitigated.  
 There were different views on how best to prevent psychiatric casualties, and both 
medical and military authorities had a role to play in this matter. An article published in 
1918 by the Canadian Medical Association offered some ideas on how to prevent 
psychiatric casualties, and to extend the effectiveness of the soldier. The author suggested 
that discipline had a role to play in the prevention of these casualties, but “discipline 
alone was not sufficient to prevent their occurrence;” discipline was no panacea. It was 
also important to be forthright with the soldiers and explain to them the reality of combat 
and especially reactions to it, such as fear. It was the duty of officers and leaders to assure 
the troops that “fear was nothing to be ashamed of,”470 and was only a natural response to 
terrifying situations. Fear and terror were in fact healthy reactions to this stimuli, and it 
had to be impressed on all ranks that it was normal “in the presence of danger, and came 
to all except the insane and the liar.” This frank and forthright attitude, and the acceptance 
that they could be afraid and still be good soldiers, was somewhat of a departure from 
traditional British understandings of duty, endurance, and ‘character.’ The reality of the 
war on the Western Front forced this reappraisal. 
 Leadership also played an important role in the prevention of serious war 
weariness, and the mitigation of its worst effects. Officers and leaders needed to play an 
active role in the maintenance of the health and well-being of their subordinates, to care 
for their welfare, and “take a personal interest in them.” This last point was essential, as 
close contact with the troops allowed leaders to determine what each soldier needed; 
some required a joke or humorous anecdote to relieve stress, some needed a quiet chat of 
reassurance, and still others required a stern hand and paternalistic oversight. Regular 
acquaintance and familiarity with the troops allowed authority figures to monitor the 
soldiers and watch for “the slightest change in a man’s demeanor or habits [which] should 
                                                             
 
470 It was important to impress upon the soldiers that as long as everyone was ‘doing his bit’ they would be fine. This 
bred confidence, and “confidence was essential” in war. Ames, The Prevention of War Neurosis, Shell Shock, 422-423. 
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be reported immediately.”471 It was important to keep the soldier occupied, interested, and 
distracted to “divert his mind from introspection” and dwelling on the negative aspects of 
service. Ultimately, it was crucial to treat the soldiers as “if they were human beings like 
themselves, and not as merely cogs of the machine” of war.472 
 Humanising the soldiers was an important aspect of endurance at the front. This 
reminded them that they had had a life prior to enlistment, had family and friends who 
loved them, and were more than just a regimental number. This was just one reason why 
tangible connections to home were so vital to morale and health, even if close and regular 
contact with home might actually increase stress. If leave to Canada was nearly 
impossible,473 packages and letters from home could regularly reach the troops at the 
front. Parcels were also often shared around the unit, building camaraderie and providing 
some break from the monotonous food of the trenches. Moreover, special care packages 
from charity and religious groups back in Canada (and the UK) also helped sustain the 
troops. For those recovering in hospital, these comforts helped with morale and might 
very well have assisted with recovery. In one case, convalescing soldiers received liquor, 
cooking ingredients (herbs, corn flower, chicken broth), fruit (apples and oranges), 
lemonade crystals, syrup, and other such foodstuffs.474 And for soldiers in the line, good 
food, equipment, and supplies helped disease resistance and general welfare.475 
 Concern for the general health of the soldiers also helped mitigate the worst 
effects of war weariness and assist endurance at the front. As the historian of the 1st 
Canadian CCS argued, the medical services and bathing facilities did wonders for the 
soldiers’ health and well-being.476 Bathing and de-lousing allowed the soldiers to get 
                                                             
 
471 Ibid.  
472 Ibid, 422. 
473 Generally, the only ones allowed to return to Canada were those invalided out of the forces, or those taking care of 
serious family matters, but this mostly applied to officers. Duncan MacDonald wrote on 23 October 1917 from a 
convalescent hospital that “I almost wish I was more sick, so I might get sick leave to Canada.” DUASC, Duncan 
Chisholm MacDonald Fonds, Collection No. MS – 2 – 520, Box 1, Folder 1 – 3, Letter of 23 October 1917.  
474 LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4564, Folder 2, File 5, ‘Medical Comforts.’ 
475 Good and hot food helped stave off exposure and trench foot. Fresh veggies and fruit, such as oranges, especially in 
winter, also helped maintain health. Macpherson, Medical Services – Hygiene of the War Volume II, 51, 45. 
476 Lice was also responsible for much sick wastage, as carriers of disease. See LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4575, 
Folder 1, File 6, ‘Sick Wastage from Lice;’ Atenstaedt, Trench Diseases of World War One and  DUASC, Clearing: 
The Tale of the First Canadian Casualty Clearing Station, BEF, 1914-1919, by Thomas Brenton Smith, MS-2-432 – SF 
44-1, page 257. 
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clean, to get new undergarments, and to have their clothes steamed to eliminate much of 
the itching caused by lice, at least for a short while. The lice would soon be back, of 
course, but these facilities reminded the men that they were human, and that the high 
command did care for their well-being. Regular bathing was not always possible, but it 
was something to look forward to. According to instructions issued to the CAMC, “at 
least one bath per week is requisite,”477 but this was not always realistic, especially during 
periods of more mobile warfare such as the Hundred Days. Care of the feet also helped 
the soldiers remain at duty. The issuance of dry and clean socks,478 appropriate clothing 
like solid footwear and gum boots, and supplies like whale oil and trench pumps, to the 
extent that they worked, were also important. Idleness was poison for morale, so soldiers 
took actions to improve their lot even if they were of questionable effectiveness. Soldiers 
needed their feet to march, stand, and fight properly, so the importance of foot care could 
not be overlooked.  
 Perhaps the most important factor in the prevention of serious health problems and 
in mitigating the worst effects of war weariness was regular rest479 and rotation out of the 
line. Time out of the line gave soldiers an opportunity to catch up on correspondence and 
sleep.480 Troops out of the line might still be expected to undergo training and contribute 
to labour parties, but it also meant increased safety if they were out of range of enemy 
guns, though gas and aircraft could still reach them. For combat infantry, pilots, and other 
high-stress services, rest and time away from combat allowed for the quieting of nerves 
and the rejuvenation of health. Removing the soldiers from the cause of their stress, 
allowing their natural response mechanisms to relax, and providing them with an 
“absorbing environment free from flying [and other combat] associations” provided both 
physical and emotional, mental, and psychological rest.481   
                                                             
 
477 Canada, Army Medical Corps Instructions, 170. 
478 Norris, The World War I Memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, 87. 
479 Rest was important for individual soldiers and the wider military unit. Prior to attacks, for example, it was crucial 
that the units participating were well-rested and prepared for the operation. LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4107, Folder 24, 
File 19, ‘Operations, Report On, 11 Canadian Infantry Brigade.’  
480 Climo, Lively Letters from World War One, 244. 
481 Bishop, Winged Warfare, 176 and LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3493, 11-2-7 / 11-2-8, Reports MO DGMS, ‘Reports 
Medical Aspect Air Service,’ 20 August 1917. 
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As the war dragged on, it became increasingly evident among perceptive officers 
that there needed to be a better system of rest and rotation. Even hard-working and 
committed volunteers could breakdown after the cumulative exposure to stress and 
trauma. One officer wrote that “ever since Canadian troops have gone to France…there 
has been no systematic rest for the troops.” This was problematic, as “many battalions 
have been six, eight and even nine months on continuous duty in the trenches, or in 
immediate support, with only a few days rest...no troops can efficiently perform such 
continuous service.”482 This is important for two reasons. First of all, even when soldiers 
were in immediate support, they were still exposed to stress and danger, and would be 
called into action if the occasion arose. This meant little genuine respite from the strains 
of war. Secondly, the reference to ‘systematic rest’ is telling, as a clear system of leave, 
known by the troops and adhered to, likely helped stave off the worst effects of war 
weariness. It also gave the soldiers something to look forward to and likely bolstered their 
endurance, knowing that if they did their duty just a bit longer they were entitled to a 
well-deserved and officially-sanctioned rest.483  
In addition to rest and sleep, leave and increasing the physical – and perhaps also 
psychological – distance between the soldier and the sources of stress played an important 
role in staving off the worst effects of sustained combat. Simply being rotated between 
front, support, and reserve positions was helpful. Going on leave also offered an 
opportunity to ‘get away from it all,’ to return to civilised life, and to do things one was 
unable to do in the trenches. Families in Britain could be visited, as could pubs, tourist 
sites, theatres, shows, brothels, and prostitutes. Eating a meal that was not bully beef and 
without shells falling was also a welcome relief. Many soldiers took the war and its 
trauma with them on leave, undoubtedly, but it did have therapeutic potential. And yet, in 
terms of minimising or neutralising the worst effects of war weariness, leave could be a 
double-edged sword. It allowed for the recuperation and rejuvenation of the individual, 
                                                             
 
482 LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4676, Folder 3, File 1, ‘Canadian Corps Historical Records.’  
483 One soldier wrote in late 1917 that he wanted to avoid getting killed so he could go on leave. Rogers, ed., Gunner 
Ferguson’s Diary, 127. 
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but the return trip could also induce panic and reluctance,484 and contribute to the onset of 
psychiatric casualties that were increasingly common. Nevertheless, lack of leave and rest 
was a common complaint at the front,485 and leave did help many soldiers survive the war 
and minimised the damage done by the twin dangers of war weariness and shell shock. 
Rest and rotation out of the line were important for the long-term sustainably of the 
troops, but leave was even more beneficial. One MO argued that even behind the lines 
“there was no such thing as one moment’s complete security,” and thus the importance of 
and “healing effect” of leave.486 And even if soldiers were unable to get extended leave to 
escape France and Belgium, there were other ways to provide them with recreation and 
time away from the front. Convalescent soldiers in hospital, for example, were sometimes 
allowed to go on day trips and sightseeing excursions,487 often planned by members of the 
Chaplain Services or other support personnel.488 Day trips and outings gave the soldiers 
some fresh air, allowed them to see the sights, provided a welcome distraction, and gave 
them something to look forward to.  
In addition to rest and leave, food, water, and alcohol helped stave off the worst 
effects of war weariness by contributing to the health, morale, and overall endurance of 
the troops. Without proper food and adequate (clean) water, soldiers were more prone to 
disease and decline; and the shortage of rations and delays in food deliveries to the 
trenches reinforced the idea that the soldiers were mere cogs in the war machine, and their 
officers cared nought for them. The lack of proper supplies and sustenance also 
contributed to the grousing and grumbling of soldiers, and, combined with other 
grievances, could boil over into collective indiscipline. Blame was often placed on the 
officers in ‘bomb-proof’ jobs. For unit COs, this was unfair in some ways, as many cared 
deeply for their subordinates and approached their task with a paternalistic attitude; and 
                                                             
 
484 See Hesler, ed., Interlude: 1916-1919, 43 and Walsh, The First World War Diary of Private Bert Cooke, 147. 
485 One soldier wrote, for example, that he had gone without leave for roughly 20 months. Lamin, Letters from the 
Trenches, 158. 2nd Division documents for August 1918 also indicated that there were 4,100 men in France who had 
been over 18 months without leave. See LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4088, Folder 17, File 1 ‘Leave: 26-9-17 to 30-8-
18,’ and Chase, “Unwilling to Continue, Ordered to Advance.” 
486 Moran, The Anatomy of Courage, 76. 
487 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3519, 2nd Folder, 21-1-0/CH1 to 21-1-0/CH4, ‘Accounts, Canadian Convalescent 
Hospital, Bromley.’  
488 Including the YMCA and other religious or charitable organisations. 
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there was not much that could be done about traffic congestion, pilfering along the lines 
of communication, and shortages. Some officers and COs also turned a blind eye to 
small-scale theft, ‘scrounging,’ and looting of the soldiers to supplement meagre and 
monotonous army rations.   
Food provided the soldiers with calories, crucial for mental and physical activity. 
The soldiers were expected to make do on the rations provided by the authorities, but 
there were opportunities to get different and extra food as well. Packages from home, 
bartering with and purchasing from locals, dining at estaminets, and taking advantage of 
surplus or looted food also helped. Army rations included bully beef, biscuits, tea, jams 
and preserves, and the increasingly rare fresh meat, bread, or produce which helped 
sustain the soldiers, but had many detractors. The love/hate relationship that the soldiers 
had with bully beef, for example, is emphasised in a poem of the same name.489 But 
despite these problems, Canadian soldiers were fed sufficiently throughout the war. And 
for soldiers recovering in hospitals or convalescent centres, it was even more important to 
provide them with healthy, ideally fresh, hearty foods. This aided in the recovery process, 
but also helped with morale. Major C.H. Reason of No. 3 Canadian Stationary Hospital 
noted that “patients at the front are men who have been living hard and at times on food 
which has lost much of its vitamine [sic] constituents,” and thus it was even more 
important for hospitals to compensate for that in recovering troops. Fresh fruit (apples, 
oranges, grapes) or lime juice, jams, fish, vegetables, bread, milk, and eggs were 
recommended, whereas “tinned food should be avoided”.490  
                                                             
 
489 This poem included the following stanzas: Madly tore the tough old lid off,/ With your bayonet’s rusty blade,/ 
Gulped it down in great big chunks,/ And cared not how it’s made. / It ironed out all the wrinkles,/ And for the likes of 
you and me,/ ‘Twas Bully Beef who licked the Kaiser,/ And he earned a D.S.C. Taken from Waters, A Corner of a 
Foreign Field, 136. 
490 Soldiers, of course, required sufficient food and water to carry out their duty. One army booklet acknowledged that 
the attack and consolidation phase of operations “entails great physical exertion,” and therefore an “ample supply of 
food and water is required, if physical energy is to be maintained.” The lack of food or water could hurt the ability of 
individuals and units to seize or keep their battlefield objectives. They also helped soldiers maintain focus, and helped 
prevent (further) exhaustion. See LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4546, Folder 7, File 5, ‘Training of Divisions for 
Offensive Action;’ LAC, RG 9 III B1, Volume 941, E-81-3, ‘Salvage Corps’ and LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4553, 
Folder 5, File 8, ‘Water Supply, Reports On, 2-8-16 to 20-11-18.’ 
LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4562, Folder 3, File 2, ‘Daily Orders No. 123, by Major C.H. Reason, CAMC, O.C. No. 3 
Canadian Stationary Hospital, 3-5-17’ and LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3602, 24-3-1 (Volume 1), ‘CAMC Journal.’  
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Alcohol, including the official rum ration, was also welcomed by many troops for 
its healing properties and its role in sustaining them. Alcohol such as spirits helped with 
the morale of the soldiers, contributed to their health, and assisted with sleeping.491 It is 
important to note that not all soldiers consumed alcohol; there were numerous teetotalers. 
For the rest of the troops, alcohol was welcome in helping take the edge off, providing 
‘liquid courage,’ and to help with the cold and damp. Private Southworth who went 
overseas with the 139th Battalion wrote that at Vimy the soldiers were preparing to attack. 
At 4:30 am “one of the officers came along the trench with the rum and I took a dandy 
and by 5:30 I was all nerve” and ready to fight.492 Many soldiers commented on the 
ability of alcohol to calm nerves; it played an important psychological role in the ability, 
and perhaps also willingness, of soldiers to continue with duty at the front. Artilleryman 
Ernest Black also referred to scotch as “that perfect medicine,” and claimed it cured him 
of influenza.493  
And yet all the alcohol and food could not prevent some soldiers from breaking 
down and becoming susceptible to war weariness. It was thus crucial that officers and 
COs were acquainted with their men and practiced good leadership. Close contact and 
mutual trust were important, as was communication up and down the army hierarchy. The 
authorities needed to be familiar with the contributing factors toward and symptoms of 
psychiatric casualties, and be watchful for indicators that soldiers were not faring well. 
Exposure to intense stimuli, as well as the cumulative experience of the stresses of war, 
drove many troops to the very edge of breakdown; it was the duty of medical and military 
authorities to minimise the numbers that were pushed beyond the edge. It was important 
for commanders to identify the individual limits of ‘courage,’ and remove those soldiers 
from combat before reserves ran dry. Exhaustion and the lack of genuine respite also 
contributed to this draining of courage. To use Lord Moran’s analogy, every day the 
                                                             
 
491 One battalion MO provided wet, cold, and hungry troops with ‘hot toddies’ to make them more comfortable and help 
them sleep. LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3751, 2-4-1, Major G.S. Strathy, ‘War Diary,’ August 1914 – February 1918.  
492 Climo, Lively Letters from World War One, 248, Letter of Pte. Southworth, from London, 18 April 1917 and 
Sherriff, Journey’s End, 54-56. 
493 Black, I Want One Volunteer, 127-128. 
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soldiers withdrew more and more from their accounts until “the credit in his bank of 
courage had run out” and breakdown was imminent.494  
It was thus essential that soldiers on the edge of breakdown were removed not 
only from frontline service, but from the battle area itself. This was done to prevent the 
transition from war weariness into shell shock, as “prolonged exposure to fear [and other 
aspects of service] leads to stress, which accumulates and causes the breakdown of a 
person’s normal performance.”495 More specifically, there were certain indicators of 
impending breakdown that COs could look for in subordinates. For example, troops who 
had in the past withstood artillery bombardments and other stressful situations but had 
begun to be rattled and visibly shaken by these things might indicate they were being 
pushed beyond the limits of endurance. Moreover, heavy drinking, recklessness, loss of 
concentration, caution, and disproportionate fear over personal safety could also be 
considered warning signs, especially if such things diverged from past behaviour. 
Physically, there were also indicators of impending breakdown; trembling, irritability, 
nightmares or insomnia, ticks and twitches all could indicate a physical response to 
psychological and mental stress or trauma.496 The need to intervene on behalf of the 
individual soldier before permanent debilitation ensured an important role for MOs, 
commanders, chaplains, and other authorities. Good leadership practices, close contact, 
trust, and familiarity with all ranks helped, as did a measure of sympathy and 
understanding toward those who were “mentally affected owing to the hardships of war.” 
It was important to identify and take action on those who had lost their “mental vigour 
and strength,” or who were not in their “right mind”497 because of the strains of war, both 
acute and cumulative. Some authorities acknowledged the conditions of the war and its 
“physical and moral exactions” which placed an enormous burden on the soldiers. It was 
                                                             
 
494 Moran, The Anatomy of Courage, xii-xiii, xvi. Moran defined courage as “an individual’s exercise of mind over fear 
through self-discipline.”  
495 Ibid, xiv-xv. 
496 Ibid, 27-37. For pilots and other members of the flying services, these warning signs also included flying higher (to 
avoid contact with the enemy), lack of offensive spirit, too little or too much dash, loss of concentration, too much 
concern over own safety, and staying in flight rather than finishing off a foe.  
497 LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4649, Chaplain Service, A.D.C.S., Lines of Communication, France 1, File 2, ‘Letter to 
D.C.S., OMFC,’ 7 June 1918. 
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thus “absolutely necessary that the tension of trench life and army vigilance be relaxed on 
every suitable occasion”498 with proper rest and respite, so as to prevent war weariness 
and breakdown.  
 
 
Morale, Combat Motivation and Effectiveness, Endurance, War 
Weariness 
The medical aspects of service and the health and well-being of the soldiers, both 
physical and otherwise, had a profound influence on morale, combat motivation and 
effectiveness, endurance, and ultimately, war weariness. The links between morale and 
medicine were complex, and could be reinforcing. For example, a good military medical 
system, with effective preventative measures, concern over sanitation, treatment, 
evacuation, and care could reinforce and bolster morale. Prior to soldiers going into 
combat it was reassuring that if they were hit, they would be treated by a competent and 
caring medical staff. On the other hand, the ignorant, harsh, or unsympathetic attitude of 
more traditionally-minded MOs could undermine morale, as even loyal volunteers 
worried what would happen to them if they could no longer withstand shellfire or service, 
or if they suffered a medical problem beyond their control.499 Service conditions 
conspired against the soldiers and their ability to endure indefinitely. Nearly-constant 
exposure to stress, fear, and trauma compromised both mind and body, weakened 
purpose, and sapped the will.500 There were many occasions, moreover, where the 
military requirements took priority over medical ones. An officer of the Canadian Special 
Hospital at Witley wrote that “men were urgently wanted for the front,” and there was 
pressure on the medical services to ‘heal’ the troops and return them to their units as soon 
as possible. Furthermore, during periods of panic and military emergencies at the front, 
                                                             
 
498 Ibid, Biographies 1, ‘The Canadian Chaplaincy.’ 
499 Graves argued that trench foot abounded in units which “had lost the power of sticking things out,” and only affected 
those who allowed it to. Moreover, trench foot was often interpreted as “almost entirely a matter of morale.” Battalions 
with good soldiers and good regimental spirit saw it as shameful to go sick, and poor units had many more cases of 
trench foot. Graves, Goodbye to All That, 153. 
500 Moran, The Anatomy of Courage, 88. 
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such as the German Spring Offensives (beginning March 1918), this pressure took on a 
more urgent tone. An officer at Witley argued that:  
it was a time of stress at the front, and the number of days a patient spent in 
hospital was that number of days’ delay in training and taking his place in the 
firing line. For this reason hospital days were carefully watched, and all attempts 
made not to lose time…it had been felt that patients were wasting a great deal of 
time while in hospital. The average stay in hospital of a patient at this time was 
about five weeks. Many patients, of course stayed longer…they tended to lose 
physical condition and morale.501 
 
Sending troops back to the front prematurely encouraged relapse and further health 
problems, but also assaulted morale. An excessive emphasis on training and military 
discipline in hospitals and convalescent centres could also retard the healing process. And 
finally, as morale was often whipped up to a fever pitch prior to attacks and operations, 
there was often a negative letdown following these engagements. As one infantry 
subaltern argued, the “morale of the infantry was bought at a great price.” These soldiers 
had been “keyed up to endeavour far beyond their normal powers, marching and fighting 
over great tracts of country throughout the last year, they suffered the inevitable reaction 
when their task was done and they might rest.”502 
 There were also important links between the health and medical well-being of the 
soldiers and their combat motivation and effectiveness. A soldier who was shot through 
the legs and was unable to stand was clearly no longer effective as a soldier. There were 
more ambiguous cases, however, where the men had their soldiering abilities 
compromised, but were nevertheless kept in the line. This might include less serious 
medical problems, but also war weariness. Those removed from the line for shell shock 
and other war neuroses were a detriment to their unit, or who had sympathetic MOs or 
commanders. For the rest of these cases, however, they were expected to carry on until 
relieved in the line, killed, or (physically) wounded.  
                                                             
 
501 LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4717, Folder 110, File 22, Historical Records, 3-10-17 to 9-3-18, ‘Canadian Special 
Hospital, Witley.’ This report, however, later suggested that training in the hospital actually increased morale.  
502 The italics are mine, used to add emphasis on the inevitability of breakdowns following the nature, pace, and 
intensity of the fighting in the final year of the war. Douie, Recollections of a Subaltern of Infantry, 16. 
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 The realities of combat and life on the Western Front undermined the health and 
well-being of the soldiers on a daily basis. Life in the trenches could be dirty, 
claustrophobic, and terrifying, but also afforded some measure of protection and 
predictability. During the more open warfare of the final months of the war, on the other 
hand, the sense of confinement might have been less, but there were other dangers to 
contend with. Casualties related to VD or trench foot were directly and indirectly related 
to life at the front; during the wet and cold winter months, for example, the “number of 
men having to recover high and dry, out of the trenches, begins to grow.”503 Other 
realities of combat also compromised the health of the soldiers. Overburdening the troops 
with too much equipment, for example, could undermine the ability of soldiers to seize 
battlefield objectives. Clothing and equipment were important parts of the soldier’s kit, 
but if it was too heavy it disturbed the “equilibrium between equipment and mobility,” a 
key factor in military success. Poor or damaged clothing could undermine fighting 
efficiency, and going into battle exhausted could mean defeat by an enemy with inferior 
“fighting qualities and equipment.”504 Medical authorities recommended that the load 
carried should “seldom exceed” 55 pounds, and that a load above 66 pounds was 
“oppressive.” And yet according to the Infantry Field Service Manual, the soldiers were 
already required to carry approximately 59 pounds, and other equipment “generally 
carried by the soldier” included their steel helmet (over two pounds), SBR (over three 
pounds), and ground sheet (over two pounds). In winter they needed to carry even 
more.505 
                                                             
 
503 Moreover, “ill-fitting or tight shoes, with uncleanliness of the feet, combine to disable the marching soldier.” 
Davidson, A Doctor in the Great War, 165 and LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3686, 30-0-0 (Volume 4), ‘Instructions for 
RMOs in Bramshott Area.’  
504 Carrying 70-80 pounds of clothing and equipment was “entirely too heavy for a long march.” In these marches, 
troops were falling out, to the wayside, and presumably “slept wherever they dropped.” This exhaustion affected all 
branches of service. For example, “the exhaustion of the crews of the tanks is very great after a heavy day’s fighting 
and if they are called upon again the next day, disappointment to the infantry may result.” See Macpherson et al., 
Medical Services – Hygiene of the War Volume I, 302-304; Norris, The World War I Memoir of Captain Harold W. 
McGill, 77 and LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3859, Folder 85, File 7, ‘Notes and Some Lessons Learned from the 
Experience gained during the Operations, August 8th to 12th, on the Somme.’  
505 In winter and during cold weather, the soldiers would also need to have on their person or in close proximity a coat, 
extra clothing, gloves, a second iron ration, etc. Too much weight was detrimental to the “health and efficiency of the 
soldier.” This weight additions increased the “expenditure of energy,” unevenly distributed weight, and anything over 
66 pounds entailed a “disproportionate expenditure of energy.” Muddy clothes and equipment only increased the 
weight. Excessive weight caused health problems, but also “lowers resistance and predisposes to disease of all kinds,” 
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 Exhaustion, fatigue, the lack of respite, and the cumulative effect of the strains of 
war served to reduce the effectiveness of the troops. This was especially problematic in 
attacks, when all available strength was required to overcome enemy resistance. After 
Arthur Currie visited the French sector at Verdun, he argued that attacks would be more 
successful if they were made by “absolutely fresh troops who had been specially trained 
for the work in hand.”506 Rest included both sufficient sleep, but also a lack of strenuous 
physical activity prior to going ‘over the top.’ Exhaustion in battle could mean the 
difference between success and failure, victory and defeat. To this end, it was crucial that 
troops went into the attack as light as possible, and did not bring any superfluous 
equipment. As the emphasis on firepower increased over time, there was unfortunately “a 
growing tendency to overload N.C.O’s and men in the attack,” but there were ways to 
lighten the load on infantry. It was possible, for instance, for troops to take less small 
arms ammunition with them than previously instructed, because ammunition could be 
taken from casualties; moreover, attacking troops should not be burdened with too many 
entrenching tools, as these could be left largely to the follow-up waves and consolidation 
troops.507 
 Exhaustion and other medical problems compromised the soldiers’ ability to carry 
out orders and attain battlefield objectives in other ways as well. For war-weary soldiers 
who had not yet become debilitated, and those wounded or ill but not removed from the 
line,508 there were a host of problems to contend with. Some soldiers suffering from 
exhaustion, for instance, were described as having “marked impairment of judgment,” 
                                                             
 
and “the evil effects are aggravated when men already fatigued both physically and mentally after duty in the trenches 
are called upon to carry an excessive load for many miles frequently under adverse conditions as regards both road and 
weather.” LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3894, Folder 59, File 25, ‘6272/1 (Q.A.1), First Army, by Lt-Gen. R.C. Maxwell, 
Quartermaster General, 27-2-17’ and ‘Memorandum on the Weight Carried in Relation to the Health of the Soldier,’ 27 
January 1917.  
506 Currie was the CO of the 1st Canadian Division at the time. LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3871, Folder 115, File 8, 
‘Notes on French Attacks, Northeast of Verdun in October and December 1916.’  
507 It was important to lighten the load because they were already burdened with much equipment and weaponry. In 
May of 1917 the average weight carried by a non-specialist was 68 lbs; for a bomber and rifle grenadier, 78lbs; and for 
Lewis gunners 92lbs. Ibid, File 9, ‘First Army No. 1215 (G)’ and ‘Canadian Corps G.761 109/23, 23 May 1917.’ 
508 The archival record contains a telling comment on a wounded soldier and his decreased abilities. This soldier “was 
wounded, and it is not possible for him to do very heavy work,” suggesting he was not yet fit to resume normal infantry 
work or trench duties. It is likely his physical abilities, including stamina, concentration, dexterity, and strength, were 
compromised. LAC, RG 9 III B1, Volume 390, B-23-1, ‘Requests for Billeting.’  
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which could imperil the rest of the unit.509 Hallucinations or falling asleep while on sentry 
duty could also put comrades in danger, and falling asleep at one’s post was a courts 
martial offense. And yet, this behaviour was understandable considering the troops were 
“unavoidably exposed to conditions of extreme hardship, exposure and irregular diet” 
which negatively affected their health and effectiveness.510 This was the reality faced by 
all soldiers on the Western Front, but not all commanders acknowledged this reality or 
were able to address these problems. The Corps commander Arthur Currie in October 
1917, in preparation for the battles of Third Ypres, decided that “getting the troops up to 
the line, with the minimum [of] fatigue” was indispensable. Moreover, “it was essential 
that the troops detailed for the attack should be fresh,” and not fatigued.511 Talk was 
cheap, but changes to army policy were not always easy to implement, especially for a 
corps commander answerable to British superiors and political leaders in Ottawa. Worn 
out individuals and units coupled with heavy casualties could negatively affect the 
military situation by forcing them out of the line, or by being unable to participate in 
subsequent operations. This placed more of the burden on other troops still in the line.512 
A cycle of exhaustion and over-reliance on worn units resulted. 
 War weariness also undermined the endurance of soldiers, and hurt their ability to 
carry on at the front. Proper care contributed to health and overall well-being, 
strengthened resistance to illness, and helped sustain morale during difficult times. Rest 
prior to and following operations, sufficient sleep and food, hygiene, sanitation, and 
regular bathing, the quantity and quality of water, alcohol and estaminets, and proper 
medical care all contributed to endurance.513 Lack of water could be detrimental to the 
troops and their ability to carry on. Poor and insufficient food in the trenches was 
                                                             
 
509 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3493, 11-2-7 / 11-2-8, Reports MO DGMS, ‘Reports Medical Aspect Air Service,’ 20 
August 1917.  
510 For hallucinations and falling asleep while on duty, see Davidson, A Doctor in the Great War, 146. For the quote on 
‘extreme hardship,’ see Macpherson et al., Medical Services – Hygiene of the War Volume I, 2. 
511 LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3852, Folder 67, File 1, ‘Notes on the Conference Held by the Canadian Corps 
Commander at 4th Canadian Division Headquarters Hazebrouck, October 14th, 1917.’ 
512 After the heavy fighting at Third Ypres, some units moved to ‘rest areas,’ whereas others were relieved in the line 
but still needed near the front. In another situation, “General Odlum’s forces had become so weakened that they could 
only be asked to play a secondary part in any future progress.” See LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4689, Folder 43, File 
17, ‘8th Brigade, October 1917’ and Folder 45, File 1, ‘11th Brigade, Historical Records.’  
513 LAC, RG 9 III C9, Volume 4530, Folder 12, ‘April 28th 1916 – O’s C Field Ambulances and M.O’s i/c Units.’  
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observed, as was the monotony of it outside the line. One soldier complained about the 
water situation, noting that “we never had water to drink,” or it was often tainted with 
gas, and they could also not drink the water collected in shell holes because it “was all 
full of blood and piss and shit.” Water, he concluded, “was a terrible thing” in the line.514 
And if the lack of sufficient food and water undermined performance and endurance, rum 
acted partly as an antidote to these troubles. One sergeant remarked regarding rum that “I 
often felt that that was one thing that kept them going,” despite all the problems on active 
service. In one example, a cold, tired, and wet soldier was given a double shot of rum and 
quickly went to sleep, even dozing through the firing of a fifteen inch howitzer in close 
proximity.515 This speaks to the utter exhaustion plaguing the troops, but also the little 
fortifying forces that helped with endurance and perseverance.  
 The reality of combat and general service on the Western Front did not always 
allow the soldiers to be granted what they needed to carry on. At times, it was impractical 
to remove individuals and especially entire units from the line, even if they deserved a 
rest. Pushing both individuals to, and then at times beyond, the breaking point obviously 
did not bode well for effective long-term service. But military necessity took precedence 
over the health and well-being of the soldiers. One officer complained in October 1918 
that “right in the midst of your big achievements, at a time when I thought you were all 
needing and entitled to a rest…you have had to go at it harder than ever around Cambrai.” 
This chaplain wrote, moreover, about the tenacity and endurance of the troops, thanking 
them and writing that “God bless you all for the way you stick at it and carry 
through…[during] the seriousness of the Spring situation” at the front.516 This short-term 
thinking ensured that military requirements were at least partly addressed, but also 
undermined the endurance of both individuals and entire units, encouraging more 
permanent breakdown. And even for troops taking part in rest and regular rotation, simply 
                                                             
 
514 Reid, Personal Memoirs of the First World War, 152. 
515 Ibid, 153. See also Sassoon’s poem ‘Does it Matter?’ regarding the use of rum to help soldiers “forget and be glad.” 
Foreman, ed., Poetry of the First World War, 76. 
516 He was referring to the German Spring Offensives. He wrote also that these efforts and victories in 1918 had a 
“wonderful effect upon the civil and military morale” at the time. LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4674, Chaplain Service, 
N.F. Davidson, Letter from Toronto, dated 9 October 1918.  
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enduring duty was taxing. There were “physical and moral exactions,” the “tension of 
trench life” and service more generally, and it was often difficult for soldiers to endure 
and stay at their posts while “under constant shell fire.”517 This was enough to drive 
anyone mad over time, not to mention contributing to the development of war weariness. 
Long-term service at the front wore down even the strongest and most committed troops. 
And this was also the case for members of all branches of the armed forces. For non-
combatants it was particularly taxing, as service at the front “has been found to be 
extremely exhausting, even demanding the recall in some instances of men who were 
physically incapacitated by the strain and burden of it” all.518 The health and medical 
reality of the troops on the Western Front had a direct bearing on the endurance of the 
soldiers, for both good and ill.  
Though it is difficult to find direct references to the phenomenon of war weariness 
in the archival record, there are mentions of the physical exhaustion that contributed to it 
and the attendant problems related to the phenomenon. Private Robert Cushman wrote 
that he was “fed up with the Army” and continued service at the front, employing a 
common euphemism for war weariness. Moreover, he wrote that the military authorities 
could “put me down as a malingerer or send me to a ‘Nut house,’”519 admitting that his 
behaviour bordered on criminal or irrational, but that he was unable or unwilling to 
continue service at the front, despite the consequences. Cushman had agency in this 
situation, and attempted to take fate into his own hands, even if it meant court martial or 
institutionalisation. Other soldiers, however, were not able to evade duty or escape further 
service.520 Even when units were rotated out of the line, they were expected to continue 
with labour and training, despite the pleas of COs who knew their men needed genuine 
rest and respite.521 This lack of rest and respite increased the vulnerability of both units 
                                                             
 
517 LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4649, A.D.C.S., Biographies 1, ‘The Canadian Chaplaincy.’  
518 This referred to a chaplain at the front. LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4669, Bramshott 1, ‘Miscellaneous Letters, 
1915-1917.’  
519 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3618, Folder 25-13-7 to 25-13-10, ‘Medical Case Sheet.’  
520 And for Canadian soldiers seeking an escape from service in the form of desertion, they had few options. Travelling 
unnoticed to Britain and thence to Canada without being noticed or apprehended was remote. 
521 One CO wrote that his soldiers should have at least two or three days’ actual rest “before training was commenced” 
in earnest. LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3868, Folder 109, File 3, ‘Canadian Corps G. 439 – Adv. First Army.’  
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and individuals to war weariness over long periods of time. Army authorities 
acknowledged the “weariness of war” and made references to “tired and worn out men,” 
suggesting two distinct phenomena: physical exhaustion (‘tired’) and war weariness 
(‘worn out’), or psychological exhaustion.522  
Even with proper care, preventative measures, and effective treatment, the reality 
of combat on the Western Front, coupled with general service conditions, wore down 
even the best volunteers and experienced soldiers. The heavy casualties, the acute 
exposure to trauma, and the long-term and cumulative impact of the stresses of war 
contributed to the onset of both individual and collective war weariness. And though war 
weariness and shell shock debilitation were different phenomena, they exist on a 
spectrum. War-weary troops were often reluctant and well on their way toward serious 
and more-permanent shell shock which rendered them useless as soldiers, whereas shell-
shocked soldiers could desire to carry on with service (be willing), but not physically or 
psychologically capable of continuing. The medical structures and aspects of service had 
a direct bearing on war weariness, and shaped how soldiers saw the war and their plight 
in particular. The medical and legal systems could contribute to these problems, and both 
these systems also had to deal with these issues once they developed. There were times, 
moreover, when the legal and medical realities of service actually exacerbated the 
problems of the soldiers, rather than helping alleviate them. For psychiatric problems like 
war weariness, an analogy could be made to physical ailments. If a soldier strained a 
muscle, for instance, it was likely understood by the medical and military authorities as a 
waste of resources to address this problem while it was relatively minor and did not 
prevent the soldier from carrying on with duty. If this strain led to a muscle tear or torn 
ligaments and the inability of the individual to carry a rifle or march, however, then it 
would be prudent for the army to address this problem as soon as possible. A soldier 
behind the lines in hospital was a soldier who could not directly contribute to winning the 
war. And just as war weariness did not necessarily preclude a soldier from pressing on, if 
                                                             
 
522 LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4663, Publicity, ‘Chaplains Serve up in the Front Line,’ newspaper article and Ibid, 
Volume 4675, Extracts from Chaplains’ Reports, ‘Work of Chaplains in France, R.C.’ 
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a soldier reached the point of breakdown, then this would have to be addressed by the 
army authorities.523 War-weary soldiers, though unhappy and discontented, could still 
continue at the front, whereas seriously shell-shocked soldiers were all but useless 
militarily. This was the situation that regular Canadian troops found themselves in during 
service on the Western Front, at Vimy Ridge and during Hundred Days campaign of the 
final months of the war.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
 
523 The author would like to thank Dr. Vance for this idea and analogy, which captures the distinction between the 
inability and unwillingness to continue, and how the authorities chose to address existing problems with limited 
resources.  
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Chapter 3 - War Weariness in the Canadian Corps, 
April-August 1917 
The introduction and the previous two chapters provide the foundation for our 
analysis of war weariness amongst Canadian troops during two distinct time periods: 
April-August 1917, and July 1918 to the signing of the Armistice in November 1918. 
During the April to August 1917 time period, the most important combat operation was 
the preparations, attack, and consolidation operations of the Battle of Arras, and in 
particular Vimy Ridge. The fighting around Vimy is a good place to start our analysis, 
and provides a useful opportunity to investigate the effects of combat on both the 
individual, and the collective (the military unit).  
 The Battle of Vimy Ridge and other operations around Arras is a starting point for 
our analysis of war weariness for a few reasons. First of all, the Vimy operations 
constituted the first large-scale set-piece battle of the war for the Canadian Corps, 
whereby all four Canadian divisions fought together in such close proximity with the 
same overall objectives. Second, the fact that the Corps was still under the command of a 
British General, Julian Byng,524 reflects the reality of fighting on the Western Front for a 
multinational force that was the BEF.525 The Canadians, though having seen action earlier 
in the war, were still undergoing the development of attack doctrines and absorbing 
lessons distilled from previous operations. In this sense, they were firmly in the middle of 
their ‘learning curve’ development, a process that would continue until the end of the war.  
                                                             
 
524 Born 1862 as Julian Hedworth George Byng. A soldier, he earned his commission in 1883, and served in the Sudan 
and South Africa. During the war he led the 3rd Cavalry Division at First Ypres, a Cavalry Corps by March 1916, the IX 
Army Corps in Gallipoli, the Canadians by March 1916 and at Vimy, and then the III British Army at Cambrai until the 
end of the war. Became 1st Viscount Byng of Vimy and Governor-General of Canada, 1921-1926. Died 1935. Magnus 
Magnusson, ed., Chambers Biographical Dictionary (Edinburgh: W & R Chambers Ltd., 1990), 240 and Holger H. 
Herwig and Neil M. Heyman, Biographical Dictionary of World War I (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982), 103. 
525 Vimy illustrates the problems of and advantages related to coalition warfare, and especially that the Canadians were 
but one aspect of a large multinational force that was the British Army in the war. Despite the increasing 
‘Canadianization’ of the CEF, and Ottawa’s increasing insistence on administrative control over its forces, the Corps 
was always reliant upon British staff work, artillery, the RFC, and later RAF, and other British arms, services, and 
support. This was evident at Vimy, and in nearly all Canadian operations. 
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Vimy is also a useful starting point for our discussion of war weariness in the 
Corps because, despite the battle being short,526 especially compared with the drawn-out 
attritional struggles at the Somme and Verdun in 1916, it was an intense combat operation 
nonetheless. The Battle of Vimy Ridge and First Scarpe lasted from 9 to 14 April 1917, 
but also involved months of extensive preparations and follow-up, mopping-up, and 
consolidation operations afterwards. In addition to the intensity of these operations, for 
many soldiers at Vimy this constituted the first major sustained action, with attacks and 
counterattacks, death and disfigurement, and close quarters action. Many of the 
participating troops had been in trench warfare and participated in small-scale raids and 
patrols, but the Battle of Vimy Ridge was different. And finally, this period is fruitful for 
an examination of war weariness because by 1917 most other armies were showing 
significant signs of ‘wear and tear,’ and beginning to breakdown both collectively and 
individually. And indeed, some would in fact break in this period, both on the Western 
Front and beyond. This period is thus useful for an examination of war weariness as it 
allows a discussion of the Canadian Corps within the wider context of the war and how it 
affected the other major combatant armies. Why the Canadians were able to carry on 
without mutiny, widespread indiscipline, or a serious reduction in military effectiveness 
will be examined below.  
 The operations at Vimy allow the historian to identify some of the more important 
forces that contributed to, and helped mitigate, the worst effects of individual and 
collective war weariness. Factors that contributed to its onset and negative manifestations 
included heavy casualties,527 a sense of disappointment or incomplete victory, and the 
wider military context in which these operations took place. Although the soldiers would 
not be familiar with all the developments outside their immediate area of operations, they 
                                                             
 
526 The Report of the Battles Nomenclature Committee of 1921 listed Vimy Ridge and First Scarpe as lasting between 9 
and 14 April, both under the Battle of Arras 1917. There were also other operations associated with this battle, 
including Second Scarpe, 23-24 April; Attack on la Coulotte, 23 April; Arleux operations, 28-29 April; and Third 
Scarpe or the Capture of Fresnoy, 3-4 May 1917. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 555.  
527 April of 1917 was the third worst month of the entire war for the Corps in terms of overall casualties (the two worst 
were August and September 1918). These enormous casualties, and the inability of these operations to create a lasting 
strategic breakthrough, was likely a contributing factor to the onset of war weariness and a major source of discontent 
after the initial enthusiasm of this limited success wore off.  
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did receive information through newspapers, official announcements, and rumours.528 
And if the soldiers were unable to appreciate the ‘bigger picture’ at the time, hindsight 
and subsequent historical analyses allows a deeper contextual understanding of the 
period.529 At Vimy, the Corps had fought effectively and achieved its objectives, despite 
heavy casualties and relative inexperience. Furthermore, the successes at Vimy 
illustrated, quite dramatically, that the power of the defensive could be overcome with 
existing and developing weapons systems and doctrines. There were also aspects of the 
operations that served to bolster morale and mitigate the worst effects of war weariness. 
The sense of limited victory and local success, coupled with an increasing sense of 
Canadian uniqueness or superiority, likely kept the growing war weariness at a simmer in 
the Canadian forces.  
 
Lessons and Implications of Home Front and War Weariness 
beyond the CEF 
An important lesson to be learned from these experiences of war weariness was 
the crucial link between the home front and the battle front. And as it was for the other 
combatant nations, so it was for Germany. With millions of men under arms and the near-
complete mobilisation of the economy and entire society to serve the war effort, problems 
emerging in one theatre could directly impact another. Firsthand accounts530 and 
                                                             
 
528 See, for example, Hesler, ed., Interlude: 1916-1919, 36. 
529 The spring and summer of 1917 witnessed the failure of the French Chemin des Dames offensive, and the 
subsequent mutinies in the French Army reinforced the sense of Allied despondency in this period. Moreover, hindsight 
allows us to appreciate that the success at Vimy was of a limited nature and the outright failure of other operations at 
Arras ensured that the ‘victory’ was pyrrhic and fleeting at best, and a bloody waste at worst. As the British Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff (CIGS) Sir William Robertson noted, with the British spring attacks of 1917 “we gained a great 
victory at Vimy,” but elsewhere the campaign was a disappointment. Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson, From 
Private to Field-Marshal (London: Constable and Company Ltd., 1921), 308. And the authors of the history of the 
Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR) stated that the careful preparation of the Corps “had paid its usual dividends,” and 
that the victory at Vimy “shone the more brightly amid the general gloom of the Western Front.” Ken Bell and C.P. 
Stacey, 100 Years: The Royal Canadian Regiment 1883-1983 (Don Mills: Collier Macmillan Canada Ltd., 1983), 64. 
The failure of the attack elsewhere was due to the inability to bring up sufficient guns, or the proper time to establish 
communications and register targets, lack of tanks, poor weather, and a lack of carefully-prepared plans for subsequent 
days. Hart, The Great War, 337. 
530 Though there are some issues with her account, the views of Princess Evelyn Blücher are illuminating. She noted the 
anxiety over food supplies, the distribution of anti-government leaflets, increasing demoralisation, and the links 
between the two fronts, as men on leave informed regular Germans of the truth about the military situation. Evelyn 
Princess Blücher, An English Wife in Berlin: A Private Memoir of Events, Politics, and Daily Life in Germany 
throughout the War and the Social Revolution of 1918 (New York: E.P. Dutton & Company, 1920).  
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subsequent literature531 point to the increasing and detrimental connections between the 
home and battle fronts, as war weariness and the undermining of commitment to the war 
itself on the home front served to encourage this development on the battle front, and vice 
versa. This dynamic appeared to be mutually reinforcing and got worse over time in 
relation to the overall war situation, and the breakdown in control over soldiers and 
information. This war weariness was coupled with the decline of morale and discipline at 
the front, and the increase of strikes and eventually anti-government and anti-war protests 
(revolutionary rhetoric) at home. Allied military authorities also noted the onset of 
German war weariness on the battle front, identifying the increase in unwounded POWs, 
the breakdown of officer control over subordinates, and evidence of individual 
agency/protest to legitimate military authority. The disappointment with the failure of the 
German Spring Offensives, equipment and supply shortages, the loss of faith in ultimate 
victory and increasing political aspects532 of protest were other indications of an 
increasing – and increasingly harmful – and widespread war weariness. War weariness 
afflicted all the major combatants and national armies on the Western Front, certainly by 
1918 if not earlier.533                                          
The problems affecting other armies largely goes beyond the scope of this project, 
but a brief analysis of war weariness in other formations helps illuminate the problems 
facing Canadians. For the French Army, military action in the field affected morale and 
                                                             
 
531 German disintegration in 1918 included the decline of motivation, the onset of war weariness, disillusionment, and 
exhaustion which seriously compromised fighting effectiveness. Watson, Enduring the Great War.  
532 Political aspects of protest included calls for a new government making peace at all costs, or even the overthrow of 
the German Imperial government altogether. The inspiration, literature, and symbols of the Bolshevik Revolution in 
Russia also came to play an increased role in uprisings as time went on.  
533 In the Russian Army there was an enormous gap between officers and ORs, and the harsh conditions facing the 
regular infantryman eroded confidence in the officer corps. These issues were also compounded by other deep-rooted 
problems in the army, and wider society. The Belgian army and its soldiers experienced the negative long-term effects 
of war and occupation, and the Italian and Austro-Hungarian armies also exhibited growing signs of war weariness by 
the 1918. And though the American forces were likely not experiencing collective war weariness on the same scale as 
its counterparts by 1918, there were indications of individual and small-scale war weariness due to sustained combat 
and the lack of proper coping mechanisms discovered by the other long-serving combatants. As the US case 
demonstrates, all major armies experienced some level of collective and widespread war weariness provided they had 
fielded military units for a sustained period of time. Historian Philpott argued that despite perceptions of relative 
strength “the reality was that all armies were on their last legs come 1918, with the exception of the slowly growing and 
green American army.” See Fiona Reid and Christine Van Everbroeck, “Shell Shock and the Kloppe: War Neuroses 
amongst British and Belgian Troops during and after the First World War,” Medicine, Conflict and Survival, 30, 4 
(2014): 252-275; Herwig, The First World War, especially chapter 9 and Philpott, War of Attrition, 311. 
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motivation, but orders, attitude, and expectations played an equally important role in 
determining the perception of success or failure. Expectations of victory in the Chemin 
des Dames offensive came to naught, and the large-scale collective indiscipline of mid-
1917 (the Nivelle mutinies) erupted as a result of this failure. Disciplinary problems were 
“magnified by previous expectations of victory,”534 and just as a disproportionate rise in 
morale can accompany successes on the battlefield when achievements surpass 
expectations,535 the opposite can also result. For the French poilus, hopes for a substantial 
breakthrough were dashed, they had been deceived by their own leaders, and expectations 
clearly did not match reality. In fact, the “great optimism that had swept over so many 
French soldiers helps to explain the disillusion that came next”536 in the form of combat 
refusals and other forms of collective indiscipline. This disillusion and sense of futility 
suggested war weariness, and were a main contributor to the mutinies that resulted.537 
Without the antidote of at least local successes to neutralise growing discontent in the 
ranks, it became evident “the ordinary French soldiers were becoming war weary,”538 and 
facing the prospect of further suffering with no end in sight. The attacks led to heavy 
casualties, and results did not match the rhetoric used prior to the offensive. And this 
failure was doubly dreadful “because of the damaging hyperbole he [Nivelle] had used to 
promote it.”539 Ultimately, the offensive was “psychologically disastrous,” and French 
morale was “shattered” by spring 1917.540 This was a perfect state of affairs for the spread 
of collective war weariness, which only further fuelled the morale and discipline 
problems plaguing the French at this point.  
With proper rest, leave, and rotation policies coupled with more effective tactics, a 
crisis might have been averted. And yet the “offensive turned what had been occasional 
                                                             
 
534 Kellett, Combat Motivation, 262.  
535 Ibid, 258. A sense of success or victory can raise morale and there is a “tonic effect of victory on exhausted troops.” 
536 Michael S. Neiberg, Fighting the Great War: A Global History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 242. 
537 Gwynne Dyer, War: The New Edition (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2005), 266. 
538 Hart, The Great War, 342 and 339.  
539 Ibid, 340-341. Hart also noted that the presence of tanks “raised the spirits of the long-suffering poilus” prior to the 
attack, but because they were largely ineffective led to further disappointment.  
540 Philpott, War of Attrition, 265 and DUASC, Folder MS-2-432, SF 44-1, Clearing: The Tale of The First Canadian 
Casualty Clearing Station, B.E.F., 1914-1919, by Thomas Brenton Smith. 
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localised indiscipline among battle-weary troops…into a crisis for the French army,”541 a 
development from individual and local war weariness into more general and collective 
manifestations. Continued costly attacks without adequate redress of grievances, these 
“fed up” men eventually refused to advance, commenced strikes and protests, while a 
growing number of homesick and hungry soldiers initiated a mutiny.542 Shell shock led to 
the increasing inability to carry on in combat, but there were also indicators of a 
developing unwillingness and reluctance to endure continued war and combat, an 
important distinction to make.543 Ultimately “defeat, failure, and even a prolonged 
absence of obvious success can have a devastating impact on morale,” resulting in further 
problems. Lack of success undermined combat motivation and willingness to endure at 
the front, and hence the chances for military success; it called into question belief in the 
cause, weakened faith in leaders or the army, lessened the sense of self-confidence and 
respect, undermined discipline, eroded group bonds, and had detrimental tactical 
repercussions.544 War weariness did not necessarily preclude soldiers from carrying on in 
combat, but did make their service increasingly contingent and conditional, to mention 
nothing of their attitude toward the war and their enthusiasm in its prosecution. It was the 
inability of the French military authorities to address legitimate soldier grievances545 that 
allowed the simmering war weariness to boil over into mutiny.546  
Regarding the Nivelle mutinies, there were both official and unofficial responses 
to war weariness, discontent, and disillusionment. With the problems afflicting the French 
Army by mid-1917 it was clear that military morale was an important factor. And though 
                                                             
 
541 Philpott, War of Attrition, 290. Moreover, the Nivelle offensive showed “cracks…in French morale,” which led to 
open protests and eventually mutiny. Norris, ed., The World War I Memoir of Captain Harold McGill, 287. 
542 Hew Strachan, ed., World War I: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 197. 
543 For the soldiers themselves, it could be difficult to distinguish between the inability and unwillingness to continue 
with duty. One soldier wrote, for instance, that going up the line some casualties “and others [were] so badly shaken 
and shell-shocked that they were either unfit or unwilling to proceed on the following night.” Roy, ed., The Journal of 
Private Fraser, 313. See also Reid, Broken Men, 29-40 on shell shock and war weariness.  
544 Kellett, Combat Motivation, 260-261.  
545 The strikes, mutinies, and disorders facing the French Army and nation arose primarily from “the circumstances of 
the war.” The grievances facing the troops included problems with the quality and quantity of food and drink, including 
wine, important for morale; pay and allowances problems; issues with a lack of clothing, shelter, warmth and other 
comforts; and especially a lack of rest and leave. See Ibid, 201. 
546 Of course hindsight allow us to appreciate that the French did not collapse into complete disintegration and 
revolution, which was partly explained by the timely and effective intervention on the part of France’s military leaders. 
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morale is an amorphous and complex subject, often difficult to pin down,547 we can 
narrow it down with definitions and by looking at the factors that contribute to (and 
compromise) morale. Laurence and Matthews in The Oxford Handbook of Military 
Psychology provide a specific, military understanding of morale, as “the emotional bond 
that holds the group together and is a result of unit cohesion and esprit de corps.”548 
Importantly, this links the individual to the group. One edited collection defined morale 
as a “spiritual quality…desirable in soldiers,” and “a sublime, self-denying state of being 
that transpires when groups such as mobs or armies imbibe a sense of purpose that 
transcends the personal welfare of their members,”549 again stressing the links between 
the individual and collective. Both individually and collectively, the prerequisites for 
strong morale were sorely lacking in the French Army by the mid-1917. Army life in 
general and combat specifically exposed the soldiers to the cumulative strains of war, 
including sleep deprivation, exhaustion, fear of mutilation or death, survivor guilt, and 
anxiety over friends and family. By 1917 infantry units also had their morale negatively 
affected by insufficient motivation and training, the lack of comforts and supplies, and the 
“lack of confidence in officers” or superiors.550 While the needs and respect afforded a 
soldier continued to be neglected, could the French troops really be expected to endure at 
the front, suffer, and ultimately die at the hands of a cold and callous high command with 
little regard for human life and no attendant compensating military successes?  
                                                             
 
547 Indeed, morale is “easier to detect than define,” and the term is complex, fluid, and contextual. Boff, Winning and 
Losing on the Western Front, 94. Moreover, “morale considered as a psychological condition was not tangible, 
measurable or localizable.” Englander ‘Discipline and Morale in the British Army, 1917-1918’ in State, Society and 
Mobilization ed. by Horne, 128. 
548 One historian wrote that “in the broadest terms, morale is concerned with the way in which people react to the 
conditions of their existence.” Baynes, Morale, 92.  Janice H. Laurence and Michael D. Matthews, eds., The Oxford 
Handbook of Military Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 3. A similar definition can be found in 
Richardson, quoting Field Marshal Slim: “high morale means that every individual in a group will work – or fight – 
and, if needed, will give his last ounce of effort in its services.” Major-General F.M. Richardson, Fighting Spirit: A 
Study of Psychological Factors in War (London: Leo Cooper, 1978), 3. 
549 Robert Cowley and Geoffrey Parker, eds., The Reader’s Companion to Military History (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company and The Society for Military History, 1996), 311. Strachan also defined morale in terms of the link between 
the individual and the collective. Morale as “an action-based, group-centred concept that summarized the relative 
combat-willingness of individuals and units.” [The italics are mine] Strachan, World War I, 191. James Ulio also 
describes military morale as connecting the individual soldier with the collective group (the military unit). He defines 
military morale as “that conditioned quality, in the individual soldier and the in the unit of command, which holds the 
soldier, holds the unit, to the performance of duty despite every opposing force or influence.” James A. Ulio, “Military 
Morale,” American Journal of Sociology 47, 3 (November 1941): 321-330.  
550 Beckett, The Great War, 303. 
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As soldier morale, enthusiasm, and uncritical acceptance of duty waned, 
disciplinary problems increased in the French Army. In response to collective indiscipline 
and insubordination, authorities relied upon a mixture of carrots and sticks551 to keep men 
loyal and units cohesive. In this sense, the French command employed a two-tiered 
approach, punishing the worst offenders or ‘ringleaders’ of the mutiny with the firing 
squad (although many death sentences were commuted), while implementing long-
overdue reforms on important matters such as tactics and leave policy. One of the first 
actions taken by the newly-appointed Philippe Pétain was to issue Directive No. 1, to 
restore order, discipline, and morale.552 The Directive ordered officers to keep track of 
their men and the conditions under which they served; to appear in the trenches regularly; 
to improve the food situation, including the provision of more fresh vegetables; and to 
“regularize furloughs and to grant extended leaves after long periods of combat.”553 As 
the nation was left increasingly vulnerable554 by dozens of striking or mutinying 
divisions, the military leadership sought to induce men back into their units – and into the 
firing line – by any means necessary. The most reasonable soldier grievances were 
addressed, coupled with a firm hand towards the worst mutineers in an effort to reassert a 
measure of top-down control. This mixture of positive inducements to behaviour and 
punishments for a select minority ensured the semblance of military cohesion,555 the 
maintenance of at least some divisions in the line, and the preservation of Allied unity. 
This top-down intervention was crucial, and it seems the regular French soldiers simply 
wanted to maintain their sense of humanity, be treated with respect, and for their officers 
                                                             
 
551 ‘Carrots,’ or positive inducements to behaviour, included promises of leave and other ways to address soldier 
grievances. The ‘sticks,’ disincentives, or punishments and the threat of punishment, included the use of courts martial 
and capital punishment for the most egregious offenders of military law.   
552 DUASC, Folder MS-2-432, SF 44-1, Clearing: The Tale of The First Canadian Casualty Clearing Station, B.E.F., 
1914-1919, by Thomas Brenton Smith, 218. Pétain combined heavy-handedness with concern over the men’s legitimate 
grievances. Neiberg, Fighting the Great War, 247. 
553 Herwig, The First World War, 321 and Neiberg, Fighting the Great War, 248. As Captain McGill also noted, “long 
overdue reforms” quelled the situation. Norris, Memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, 287. 
554 The French Army was “paralyzed” in this time period. Adam Tooze, The Deluge: The Great War and the Remaking 
of the Global Order (London: Penguin Books, 2015), 74. 
555 Though the veracity of his account and his motivation needs to be considered, German General Erich Ludendorff 
noted in his Memoirs that after the Nivelle Offensive he noticed a weakening of attacks and that many French units 
were inactive. Though why he did not take advantage of this apparent opportunity to exploit the enemy’s weakness is 
anyone’s guess. Ludendorff, My War Memories – Volume II, 424 and 428. 
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to acknowledge and ultimately address their genuine and long-standing grievances. 
Directive No. 1 also promised a change in tactics. There would be an end to unlimited, 
attritional-style attacks, and the French command promised to postpone any major 
offensive until the arrival of the vast American armies and mechanical implements to 
overwhelm the Germans.556 Attacks that were ordered, and deemed necessary to uphold 
the Coalition or to stabilise or consolidate the line, would be of only a limited nature, with 
set objectives, be well-planned, and supported by heavy firepower.557 These tactical 
adjustments proved a stimulus to morale and acted as a partial antidote to collective war 
weariness; and successful limited attacks at Verdun and Malmaison helped restore esprit 
de corps.558 Though limited attacks and changes in leave policy prevented further 
outbreaks of collective indiscipline, the French Army continued to deteriorate over time. 
Indeed by 1918, and certainly by the final months of the war, the troops were exhausted, 
“tired of life at the front,” but many troops were “sustained by a desire for retribution” 
which only increased as more areas of Belgium and especially France were liberated.559 
And thus despite the continuing and collective war weariness of the French soldiery, the 
desire for revenge allowed them to carry on and provided sufficient combat motivation 
and willingness to stagger to the finish line. 
An examination of the French mutinies provided lessons for other Allied forces, 
and helps us comprehend the phenomenon of war weariness, its origins, impact, and 
potential neutralising factors. First of all, this episode highlights that there is a perceptible 
and important link between the home front and battle fronts, especially in an occupied 
nation experiencing total war. These connections can help explain the expansion or 
transmutation of war weariness as a largely local or individual phenomenon, to a more 
collective and general one. Problems on the home front could ‘contaminate’ the fighting 
front, and vice versa, and issues at home were often directly related to the war effort.560 
                                                             
 
556 In other words, to wait for the ‘Tanks and the Yanks.’ Herwig, The First World War, 321. 
557 Neiberg, Fighting the Great War, 249 and Herwig, The First World War, 321. Moreover, Pétain’s motto apparently 
was ‘le feu tue,’ or ‘fire[power] kills.’ Foley, “Verdun,” 36. 
558 Strachan, World War I, 202 and Philpott, War of Attrition, 290. 
559 Lloyd, Hundred Days, 211. 
560 There were links between problems at the front and subsequent worker unrest in Europe. Tooze, The Deluge, 74. 
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Second, leave was a key component of soldier life. Troops experiencing the hardships of 
war required not only physical rest from combat, but also psychological respite from war 
itself, and hence leave and the return to the interior was important, despite the obvious 
(and potentially dangerous) connections between the home and battle fronts. Third, this 
deterioration of soldiers and units, even in victorious armies, was all but inevitable after 
years of total war and the enormous investment of lives and treasure. By 1918 the French 
Army was but a pale shadow of its former self, only capable of limited operations and 
holding the line. As the French approached total exhaustion, the lingering, collective war 
weariness561 undermined the ability and willingness of soldiers to seize objectives and 
contribute positively to the war effort. Luckily, France was part of a wider coalition that 
defeated the Germans in the field and forced its surrender. Fourth, the French mutinies 
illustrate the importance of maintaining a committed, healthy, and happy soldier as the 
means to attaining victory in war. A key role is played by medical services, who are 
partly responsible for matters of rest, convalescence, and the health and sanitary 
requirements of those expected to fight and if necessary, die in the service of their 
country. The supply and support services also played a significant role in their health and 
well-being. Ensuring that proper food, water, alcohol, equipment, and other supplies 
made it to the troops ensured they had the resources to carry out their duties. Bands, 
concert parties, chaplains and padres, and similar services also helped bolster the troops’ 
spirits and helped them endure the sometimes admittedly terrible conditions of service. 
Moreover, in order to feel respected and more than just a cog in the vast war machine, 
proper and attentive leadership helped the soldiers carry on with duty. Pétain tried to 
address this disconnect between the officers and ORs, and encouraged a “more open 
command style” with his Directive No. 1.562 Leadership was vital, and the onus was on 
the officers to know their men, address their grievances, look for signs of ‘wear and tear’ 
amongst subordinates, explain orders, and maintain cohesion and continuity. Moreover, 
the rhetoric and orders of the high command, and the propaganda given to the troops, had 
                                                             
 
561 The French mutinies were but “one manifestation of the general war weariness that gripped Europe during 1917,” 
suggesting the widespread nature of this phenomenon at this stage in the war. Philpott, War of Attrition, 291. 
562 Philpott, War of Attrition, 290. 
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to be grounded in reality and the experiences of the common soldier. The large gap 
between the expectations and promises of victory and the subsequent disappointment of 
the troops on the battlefield played an important role in precipitating the Nivelle mutinies.  
And finally, war weariness, collective indiscipline, and discontent in the French 
Army also illustrate the importance of an awareness of the changing circumstances and 
fortunes of war.  The act of liberating long-suffering civilians from occupation acted as a 
boost to morale and combat willingness. The changing circumstances in the final months 
of the war affected the motivation of those taking part in these final campaigns. The 
changing conditions provided a new sense of urgency; and the prospect of victory and 
battlefield success could bolster soldier endurance. The authorities needed to be cognizant 
of these changing circumstances, as during times of high morale or during successful 
military operations, a heavy-handed approach to discipline might be unwarranted, even 
counterproductive. And finally, this provides insight into the interplay and connections 
between the individual, collective, and the overall military situation, especially regarding 
war weariness and its impact on military operations. It is worth reiterating here that war 
weariness developed even in victorious armies, as was the case with the French. It did not 
preclude individuals from carrying on in combat, though it did compromise military 
effectiveness and commitment to the cause.563 French acute or long-term collective war 
weariness and decline was problematic in the second half of the war, especially in the 
spring of 1918 when the Germans were preparing their final offensives, but their erosion 
occurred in tandem with other armies.  
The British Army was eventually victorious in the First World War despite its 
own experience of war weariness and its detrimental effect on soldiers. After years of 
war, heavy casualties, and daily ‘wastage,’ by 1918 the BEF was composed “mainly of 
youthful conscripts.”564 And though a soldier’s commitment and dedication were not 
                                                             
 
563 The Russian Army also experienced substantial war weariness by 1917. See, for example, Beckett, The Great War, 
521-522; ‘Fraternization on the Western Front, April 1917,’ ‘Revolutionary Demands of the 202nd Gori Infantry 
Regiment,’ 4 November 1917 and ‘A Soldier Rails against Officers and Elites,’ 14 November 1917, in Daly, Russia in 
War and Revolution, 86-87, 115 and 129-130; Philpott, War of Attrition, 238, 119; Hart, The Great War, 247 and 
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necessarily suspect simply because they were conscripted, the Army had lost much of its 
veteran and long-serving soldiers.565 The nature of the fighting, the wider war situation, 
and the heavy casualties and conscript replacement help explain some of the disciplinary 
problems affecting the British Army by 1917. Historian Gerard Oram pointed out that by 
late 1917 there was much evidence of a deterioration of morale, but no corresponding 
increase in death sentences.566 This is curious, but courts martial death sentences are but a 
rough proxy of morale and discipline. Moreover, a ‘Report of British Armies in France,’ 
dated December of 1917, made explicit reference to the phenomenon of war weariness, 
relatively rare for contemporary and especially official documents. The report concluded: 
War-weariness there is, and an almost universal longing for peace but there is a 
strong current of feeling that only one kind of peace is possible [a peace of 
victory] and that the time is not yet come.567 
 
This is important for a few reasons. First of all, the report made direct reference to the 
phenomenon, acknowledging it as a widespread reality at the front. Second, it illustrates 
that war weariness involved an end to the war, the ‘longing for peace,’ or at least an end 
to an individual’s participation in the war. The men were fed up and frustrated with the 
slow progress of the war; the next step was to take action to remedy or address this 
situation. And finally, the report recognised that war weariness did not necessarily 
preclude soldiers from pressing on in combat, especially at this juncture of the war when 
the desire for victory and defeat of the enemy trumped the desire for an exit from the war. 
In this sense it might be said that at this point the British Army exhibited signs of 
individual war weariness, but had not progressed toward collective war weariness.  
                                                             
 
565 One of the negative aspect of an increasing proportion of conscripted troops was that because of the top-down 
dissemination of knowledge and lessons learned from previous attacks, much of this experience was lost as veterans 
died or were invalided out of the ranks. A constant influx of new troops might also compromise unit cohesion and trust 
in small group settings. Having a new CO, for example, could engender feelings of suspicion or resentment at the 
impositions of this ‘outsider’ or ‘newcomer,’ unfamiliar with the past glories and hardships of the unit. The constant 
influx of new men also complicated group morale and bonding. On the other hand, the fact that the army was composed 
increasingly of conscripts meant that these men were relatively fresh and new to the front, acting as a brake or 
mitigating factor on the development of war weariness. Moreover, because these conscripts were former civilians and 
not professional soldiers, it may have meant a more sympathetic or understanding attitude on the part of the high 
command or the officer corps. Minor breaches of discipline, for instance, might have been more leniently dealt with 
compared with a hardened veteran with much service experience.   
566 Gerard Christopher Oram, Military Executions during World War I (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 96. 
567 Oram, Military Executions, 96. 
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The strength, will, and commitment of soldiers could be destroyed suddenly, such 
as by undergoing heavy, prolonged shelling or by a bloody battle, like the Somme.568 
More problematically, however, was that one could also be worn down in a cumulative 
process after facing many stressful events and situations. As one historian put it, a 
soldier’s will “is gradually used up by monotony, by exposure, by the loss of the support 
of stauncher spirits on whom he has come to depend, by physical exhaustion, by a wrong 
attitude to danger, to casualties, to war, to death itself.”569 There were both external 
factors in the erosion of will and strength, such as exposure and heavy casualties, but also 
internal, more human factors.  
This wearing out of individuals was a problem faced by all armies undertaking 
sustained combat operations. Some military authorities believed that an army’s 
recruitment and training systems could watch for predisposition, or identify those most 
liable to break down. Major-General F.M. Richardson argued that even veterans and 
volunteers committed to the cause, and with good service records could erode to the point 
of military ineffectiveness. These “seasoned solders, often an NCO, who has sustained 
others, perhaps through several campaigns, but at the cost of drawing too heavily on his 
own reserves,” was liable to break down. He concluded that these soldiers are “just worn 
out,”570 a probable reference to war weariness. And as individual and unchecked war 
weariness entrenched itself in the British Army by the latter half of the war, the 
conditions were appropriate for the progression into more general and collective war 
weariness, which had a direct impact on military effectiveness. This could involve a 
wider collapse of military units. When the Germans launched Operation Michael on 21 
March 1918 in a bid to end the war, there was indeed evidence of collapse, at least in 
some units. And after years of hard fighting, enormous casualties, and insufficient gains 
on the battlefield, this type of collapse was all but inevitable; moreover, a “major crisis in 
                                                             
 
568 Martin Gilbert, The Battle of the Somme: The Heroism and Horror of War (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 
2006), 246. 
569 Ibid. And Moran also wrote that “men wear out in war like clothes” wear out over time. Moran, The Anatomy of 
Courage, xiii-xiv and xxii. See also Major-General F.M. Richardson, Fighting Spirit: A Study of Psychological Factors 
in War (London: Leo Cooper, 1978), 77. 
570 Richardson, Fighting Spirit, 75-77. Richardson also made the point that “the wise use of rest” was a key factor in the 
prevention of battle exhaustion, a concept closely linked with that of war weariness. 
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morale,” like the French mutinies or the collapse of the British Fifth Army, “tended to 
occur in all armies…between two and a half and three years after real entry into the 
war,”571 suggesting a cumulative and long-term process after prolonged exposure to war 
and combat. Furthermore, the loss of some unit COs, and the death of ten infantry 
lieutenant-colonels at this battle suggested “a collapse of morale at the lower level or a 
failure to provide support for higher authority,” both of which were present in the Fifth 
Army.572 This was a collapse akin to those experienced by the French Army in the spring 
of 1917 (during the mutinies), the Russian breakdown after the Kerensky offensive, and 
Italian collapse after Caporetto. There were also both individual and collective aspects of 
this disintegration, as “many of the units, worn down by the attrition battles of 1917,” 
were in a poor state for effective defence, and individuals “may simply have passed 
beyond the point of what was bearable by flesh and blood.”573  
Collective war weariness, however, did manifest itself in the British Army by 
1917-18.574 Inconclusive fighting, fear and discomfort, death and mutilation “had taken 
its toll of even the stoutest constitutions,” and when enough individual soldiers suffered in 
such a way, collective war weariness was but a small step away.575 This was marked by 
“collective defiance” among certain units, which was a clear threat to legitimate military 
authority, and was liable to spread to others. There was a mutiny at the base at Étaples 
and other “unruly incidents” at British base camps in France, some soldiers established 
councils (on soviet lines), and political subversion led to the collapse of the 16th Division, 
which all “seemed symptomatic of a loss of élan and a will to win,”576 both hallmarks of 
war weariness. The ultimate fear for British authorities, however, was likely that this 
defiance, disgruntlement, and war weariness would lead to collective, organised, and 
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violent rejection of the war.577 And though the authorities never had to deal with this 
consequence, there is no doubt the British Army experienced a crisis in morale and 
discipline, especially with the collapse of the Fifth Army during Operation Michael. 
 And yet the British Army did not totally collapse, and was able to recover from its 
military reverses and problems during the spring and summer of 1918. Indeed, the British 
Army, in tandem with its various Entente partners and associated powers, were able to 
rebound in strength and cohesion to defeat the Germans in the field, despite the fact that 
war weariness and logistics were a serious problem by the Hundred Days.578 In fact, some 
historians have argued that not only did it rebound, but that its morale actually surged 
with the victories of the final months. One asserted that “however war-weary British 
troops were during the Hundred Days, they had a morale advantage which only grew with 
every successful attack.”579 And yet, if morale did surge in the final months of the war, it 
was because the urgency of the campaign, evidence of German decline, and the prospect 
of military success and ultimate victory acted as powerful antidotes to the collective war 
weariness. 
For the German Army in the final years of the war the connections between the 
home and battle fronts were a key feature in the development of war weariness.580 As 
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some historians581 have pointed out, the problems facing the Germans on the battle front 
might have been endured were it not for the simultaneous deterioration on the home front. 
Soldiers were used to withstanding hardships in the service of their nation, but the 
inability of the government to care for its citizens at home put in peril the very people 
they were trying to protect. This connection between the home and battle fronts, and 
especially between material realities and commitment to the war effort, was explored by 
historian Holger Herwig. He noted that there was an increasingly evident connection 
between “hunger and peace,” as “hunger was gnawing at the nation’s social fibre, that 
war weariness had gripped large segments of the population” and that the uneven 
distribution of food was made worse by inefficient central control.582 This state of affairs 
thus compromised the ability to make war (on the home front), as well as prosecute the 
war effort (on the battle front). The troops were thus exposed to the problems of the home 
front, whether that be through leave, propaganda,583 rumour, or in the reality of daily 
shortage at the front. In a sense, then, the problems on the home front both reflected, and 
reinforced, the sense of war weariness on the battle front. 
The reality of the situation at home undermined the ability and willingness of 
German soldiers to endure in other ways as well. With the problems at home becoming 
ever more evident to soldiers in the line, this served as a constant distraction.584 As the 
Entente forces advanced and the food situation grew steadily worse in Germany, soldiers 
at the front was given no peace of mind, no reassurance that all was well and his family 
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was being adequately cared for. This is important for a few reasons. First of all, the 
deterioration taking place could not be masked by propaganda or censorship efforts, 
ensuring that soldiers became aware of the reality sooner or later. This could, amongst 
other things, result in a decline in faith or trust in authorities. A regular soldier, for 
instance, might start to question the government’s war aims, or the war itself, wondering 
why he should continue to suffer and die to uphold a regime that lied (or at least misled), 
could not care for its civilians, and was unable to exploit battlefield success and transform 
them into peace or victory. Second, this awareness of the situation at home speaks to the 
limits of blind loyalty and obedience. As knowledge of the reality of the problems of the 
home front became more widespread, regular troops could no longer ignore the plight of 
their family back home. If an individual determined that their current participation in the 
war helped prolong the conflict, they might conclude that their removal from the war - 
through the act of surrender or desertion - might hasten the end of the war and thus help 
alleviate the problems at home. Third, the links between the home and battle fronts 
emphasize the requirement of political and military authorities in wartime to ensure the 
proper focus on both guns and butter. There was a need to guarantee sufficient production 
of both military requirements and food and consumer goods for the home front. 
A final lesson to be distilled from German Army war weariness was that the 
morale and discipline problems in the final months were widespread, and not easily 
resolved. More important, however, was the fact that these problems affected previously 
loyal soldiers and effective units, suggesting that war weariness was a growing and 
prevalent phenomenon after years of brutal warfare. All individuals had their breaking 
point, and by the summer and autumn of 1918 many German soldiers had been pushed to, 
if not beyond, this breaking point. And contrary to the views of some subsequent 
commentators, these disciplinary problems such as desertion and other evasion strategies 
affected more than just ‘bad apples’ and troublemakers. In the words of the Crown Prince 
Wilhelm (the eldest son of the Kaiser and commander of German forces in the war), these 
stragglers and those “sick and tired of the war” represented a growing proportion of the 
German infantry. He wrote that these men 
…scarcely made an effort to hide their disinclination to rejoin their units. Nor 
were they all rascals; there was many a face there which showed that the nerves 
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had given way, that energy was gone, that the primitive and unchecked impulse of 
self-preservation had got the mastery over the recognition of the necessity for 
holding out or resisting.585 
 
It thus seems the Crown Prince was referring to both shell-shocked soldiers and war-
weary veterans. His comments also illustrate the importance of medical services; 
individuals, worn down by the cumulative effect of combat and exposure to trauma, 
needed to be monitored for signs of wear. The onset of individual, and then collective war 
weariness, illustrates the need for effective and equitable rest and leave policies. Respite 
for both individuals and military units acted as a mitigating factor for the worst and most 
pernicious effects of war weariness. The inability to tackle this growing collective war 
weariness, coupled with battlefield failures, ensured that it manifested itself in 
increasingly disruptive acts of indiscipline, ultimately undermining Germany’s ability to 
win the war.  
 A victorious army required the fortitude of its own personnel, and the endurance 
of the home front and its civilian population. And the strength and ability to endure the 
cumulative stresses and strains of war on the home front was indispensable for its army 
fighting in close proximity to its parent society. Moreover, the onset of war weariness 
could have real-world implications for both the soldier and the unit in which they served. 
It could compromise combat units to the point of ineffectiveness, and even lead to 
battlefield reverses or defeat. Certain ideas and attitudes, such as anti-war perspectives or 
defeatism, could spread and have an effect out of all proportion to the actual numbers 
involved. Ultimately, all major armies on the Western Front were experiencing collective 
war weariness by 1917. But the Canadians were largely spared this at the time, in part 
because they did not field a massive army in Europe until much later than the other 
nations,586 and hence delayed their disintegration by over a year.  
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Vimy Ridge in Context 
The attacks on Vimy Ridge by Canadian and British forces were part of a much 
larger campaign, the Battle of Arras. These attacks were also loosely coordinated with the 
French Chemin des Dames offensive, which began 16 April. The new French 
commander, General Robert Nivelle, “sought a major offensive in 1917 to pressure the 
Germans on two fronts,” with the British attack in the north near Arras, and the French 
attack between Reims and Soissons, along the Chemin des Dames ridge.587 The problems, 
however, were manifest. The Germans had already withdrawn much of their forces 
beyond the Hindenburg Line, and had solid defensive positions and undertaken thorough 
preparations in the area of attack. The offensive “proved to be a disaster,” and Nivelle 
was replaced by Pétain, “who inherited an army with a massive morale problem.”588  
 Other developments also had a direct impact on the war. The return of Vladimir 
Ilyich Ulyanov (Lenin) to Russia ensured the fall of the Provisional government and the 
nation’s exit from the war,589 and worker strikes and demonstrations in Germany 
indicated the erosion of the pro-war consensus there.590 In both Germany and Russia these 
events reflected and reinforced the destabilizing and war weary mood present there by the 
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early months of 1917. War weariness could be detected in the Russian and German 
armies by 1917 as well.591 And on 13 June, the first heavy bomber raid on London was 
launched. This, along with the ongoing zeppelin raids, reinforced the sense of total war in 
Britain and likely contributed to the developing war weariness on its home front. In this 
total war, the interplay between the civilian home front and the battle front(s) were 
complex, and ultimately crucial to the outcome of the war. Both home and battle fronts 
needed to maintain coherence, and be resilient in the face of strains associated with the 
war effort. These events reinforced the sense of despondency found in both soldiers and 
civilians of the major European armies by 1917, after having endured the stresses of war 
from the beginning (August of 1914).   
 The high casualty rate suffered in active operations and trench warfare, and the 
heavy casualties experienced by the major combatants on the Western Front also illustrate 
the stresses and strains placed on individuals during war, and during combat more 
specifically. But it also highlights the cumulative nature of war weariness and a loss in 
collective morale. Heavy casualties had a multi-faceted impact: the loss of friends and 
comrades hurt individuals, whereas the loss of leaders and important team-members 
compromised the cohesion and military effectiveness of units. These losses also 
undermined the power of the armed forces more generally, as morale and enlistment were 
negatively affected by news of military disasters, units destroyed, and the death and 
suffering of soldiers. And finally, the entire nation itself could be undermined by heavy 
losses and consistent casualties, especially if civilians and workers came to question 
whether it was all worth it. And 1917 was a bloody year indeed. The British on the 
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Western Front suffered 120,070 casualties in April 1917; 76,040 in May; 75,123 in June; 
84,695 in July; and 81,080 in August of 1917. This combined for a total of 437,008 
casualties over this five-month period.592 The numbers for the French and Germans in this 
period illustrate that high casualty rates plagued all major combatant armies on the 
Western Front, regardless of offensive or defensive posture at any particular time.593 The 
total strength of the Corps in this period also fluctuated, based largely on casualties, but 
also on transfers and other administrative changes. The total strength of the Canadian 
Corps at the end of each month reflects the offensive and defensive actions that affected 
the casualties and thus overall strength of the Corps in that particular month.594 One 
reality of the war was that understrength units tended to take heavier casualties than full-
strength ones, even if objectives were seized and held.  
 
 
Training and Preparations for Vimy Ridge and Affiliated 
Operations 
Training and preparation for major offensives in the First World War did not 
always pay off for the attacking forces. The power of the defensive, and the sheer number 
of variables ensured complexity, confusion, and that things did not always go according 
to plan. The weather could turn, supplies could fail to arrive, weapons systems could 
become inoperable, and thousands of other variables could directly affect the outcome of 
the battle, for good or ill. Much in war cannot be controlled, no plan ever survives contact 
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with the enemy, and war is necessarily the realm of uncertainty.595 Nevertheless realistic, 
thorough, and extensive training and preparations could certainly improve the chances of 
success, as well as provide the attacking troops, especially ‘green’ ones, with an 
understanding of what might be expected regarding the mechanics of combat and the 
dynamics of human beings under hostile fire. And though no training course or teaching 
syllabus could adequately prepare for the horror of the modern battlefield, work on tactics 
and technology could be useful. These preparations inform our discussion of war 
weariness in two related, yet seemingly contradictory ways. On the one hand, the 
thorough preparations prior to the offensive contributed to the fatigue suffered by troops 
undertaking these operations, encouraging the onset of war weariness at a local and 
individual level. On the other hand, these preparations helped mitigate the worst 
manifestations of war weariness and prevented its transformation into a more collective or 
general expression. It must be emphasised that these preparations were not about 
combatting war weariness – they were about increasing the chances of success and 
ensuring victory. But they did have a direct, positive impact on the soldiers, which helped 
with the embryonic war weariness.  
 As the section on the disciplinary and legal aspects of Canadian Corps made clear, 
much training and preparation for combat was based on the “immediate and implicit 
obedience to orders,”596 both in and out of action, on the parade ground and in the midst 
of combat. This was designed to increase the likelihood that when soldiers were in 
combat they would remember their training and follow orders without hesitation, not 
allowing their biological fight or flight response to override their duty; the entire notion of 
military obedience depended on it. Aside from instilling basic discipline, there was 
specialist and tactical training in the lead-up to Vimy. The Corps Commander in this 
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period, Julian Byng, ordered that units slated to take part in the upcoming attack were to 
be relieved in the line prior to operations, to ensure adequate training and preparation. For 
units still in the line, they were to take over frontage similar to that of the Vimy sector, 
and “partially trained” officers and ORs were to receive a minimum of three weeks 
additional training prior to the offensive.597 This individual training sought to instill in the 
officers and men the confidence and skills required to succeed in combat.  
 This supplemental training included both individual and unit preparation for the 
coming attack. Training schedules were organised at the divisional, brigade, battalion, 
and down to the company and platoon level weeks and even months in advance. The CO 
of the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade (CIB), for example, wrote that after he assumed 
command in February 1917, preparations for the attack on Vimy had already begun. The 
Brigade was holding trenches to the left of the Ridge (with Brigade HQ at Aix Noulette), 
and “during the month of March the Brigade was withdrawn for training in anticipation of 
the attack”598 on Vimy. Moving units to the sector during the planning phases was also 
important, as it allowed the different branches and services to acclimate to the region and 
its various features. Aerial photos needed to be taken, barrage maps drawn up, 
ammunition and supplies stockpiled, and the location of RAPs and headquarters 
determined. All of these preparations took time, but were crucial. Infantry had to work in 
harmony with the other infantry units, especially those on the flanks and who would leap-
frog them in the attack; the infantry would also have to coordinate their attacks with 
artillery, engineers, CAMC,599 and other services. Only through this thorough planning 
and cooperation could an operation of this magnitude hope to succeed against a well-
entrenched enemy dominating the high ground.  
 As attack doctrine, tactics, and technology evolved throughout the war, there was 
an increasing emphasis upon all-arms cooperation, and the coordination of the different 
branches of the armed forces. This allowed the Entente to play to their strengths, and 
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ensured that each service would complement the others and contribute positively to the 
overall goal of the operation. This developing attack doctrine and the competent use of 
technology were important to the ultimate success at Vimy Ridge.600 And yet, despite all 
the efforts at all-arms cooperation and use of all means at one’s disposal to increase 
firepower, the First World War remained a largely infantry-artillery conflict. Field and 
siege artillery, howitzers, and mortars accounted for the vast majority of casualties during 
the war,601 despite the popular notions of the war as one of MGs, gas, tanks, and aircraft. 
In a sense, then, the success of Vimy was based not so much on mastery of all-arms 
cooperation, but on proficiency in artillery and infantry cooperation. For the Battle of 
Arras, and Vimy in particular, there was an increased emphasis upon counter-battery and 
suppressive fire.602 The former was designed to locate the presence of enemy artillery 
batteries, and then systematically destroy them prior to or during the attack itself.603 
Suppressive fire, on the other hand, was predicated on the idea of neutralizing the enemy 
by forcing him to take cover during bombardments. An enemy taking cover in trenches, 
or finding safety and refuge in deep bunkers/tunnels, was hindered in his ability to 
operate MGs and defensive positions promptly. The outstanding work of the artillery (and 
gas services) contributed positively to the ability of the infantry to seize their objectives, 
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1918), 94 and 66-80. In terms of counterbattery fire, aerial reconnaissance and sound ranging allowed for the 
identification of German gun batteries. And ultimately 80% were systematically destroyed by the Canadian/British fire 
plan. Bercuson, The Patricias, 97. 
603 See, for instance, Dale Clarke, World War I Battlefield Artillery Tactics (Oxford: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 2014). 
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and ultimately to the success attained at Vimy. And after the Ridge was seized, the 
artillery and gas services then turned their attention on German reinforcements and 
counterattack staging areas as well as on enemy communications systems, to great effect. 
The training of the Corps was but one aspect of the thorough preparations that took place 
prior to the Vimy attack. As with any large operation, preparations were of a myriad sort, 
covering medical, administrative, personnel, intelligence, and other aspects of a major 
attack involving thousands of soldiers. For the Vimy operation, an extensive set of 
tunnels604 was dug to shelter troops and provide jumping-off points for the infantry in 
closer proximity to the enemy lines. Moreover, equipment had to be accumulated, orders 
issued, ammunition stockpiled, and the launching of artillery and gas to wear down the 
German defenders before the troops even went over the top.  
 An important aspect of preparation was ensuring that soldiers going in were well-
prepared, and units well-trained and at or near full strength. The Canadian staff, infantry 
and other units involved had roughly three full months to prepare for this operation.605 
Some units had more time than others, but the experience of the 11th CIB seems typical. 
For this unit, preparations for Vimy began in February, and “continued without 
interruption”606 right up until the attack itself. This is also compared favourably to the 
amount of time afforded Canadians for future operations, such as in later 1917 and into 
1918. Sometimes the staff had only a few weeks to prepare complex operations, and at 
times during the final months of the war they were only given a few days; this put added 
stress on those forced to carry out these complex and dangerous operations. For the 2nd 
Battalion, the months prior to Vimy were used to gain and acclimate reinforcements for 
the unit, and there was a period of “comparative inactivity” to get the battalion up to 
                                                             
 
604 Chaplains also worked in the tunnels at Vimy, tending to wounded and “helping to keep the lists.” LAC, RG 9 III 
C15, Volume 4664, ‘Battle of Vimy Ridge,’ 4th Canadian Division. The role of caves and tunnels at Vimy was also 
invaluable for the success attained there, especially in the preparation phase. Reid, Personal Memoirs of the First World 
War, 143; Bercuson, The Patricias, 97; Tim Travers, “Vimy Ridge,” in Reader’s Companion to Military History ed. by 
Cowley and Parker, 495; Hart, The Great War, 334 and Pierre Berton, Vimy (Markham: Penguin Books Canada, 1987). 
605 Humphries, ed., The Selected Papers of Sir Arthur Currie, 108. 
606 LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4689, Folder 45, File 1, 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade, Historical Records, including 
‘Synopsis of Operations.’ This document also indicated that the “severe weather and discomforts of wet, cold trenches 
served rather to steel the youthful Canadians for the supreme effort [rather] than damped their spirits.” 
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strength and provide rest.607 This final point was crucial, as infantry units up to strength 
generally took fewer casualties than worn, depleted, or understrength units. For the 
PPCLI, this meant the promotion of officers through the ranks to compensate for 
casualties, and the return of wounded men to the unit.608 Returning soldiers to the unit 
from hospital or convalescent camp, provided they were able to carry on, was perhaps 
preferable to incorporating entirely new troops into the group. 
 Plans for Vimy also included the preparation of defensive features, jumping-off 
points, artillery battery platforms, and communications. And though Canadian troops 
entering the sector were taking over from British troops, and before them French forces, 
there was much work to be done for a large set-piece attack. Infantry of the 16th Battalion, 
for example, contributed to large working parties prior to the offensive,609 ensuring that 
there were sufficient personnel to construct important positions and physical structures 
required for an attack of this nature. When units entered the frontline trenches or came to 
a new section of the line for the first time, there was often much to be done to improve the 
positions. Units engaged in working parties, digging new trenches, repairing older 
sections of the line,610 and generally shoring up the positions in front of Vimy. Even when 
the PPCLI were out of the line, its members took part in working parties. There was much 
to be done in terms of labour and construction, and little was left to chance. Much labour 
was conducted under the supervision of units of engineers. The engineering corps made 
use of additional labour in the form of infantry working parties, pioneers, as well as their 
own Labour Corps units. One important task was the establishment of adequate sources of 
water and distribution channels611 for the troops and draught animals taking part in the 
assault. Without sufficient water, any sustained effort would quickly break down, and 
                                                             
 
607 Murray, History of the 2nd Canadian Battalion, 155. 
608 The return of PPCLI men to their own unit, rather than being funnelled through the Canadian Corps reinforcement 
depot and assigned to a more or less random unit, meant that “traditions were maintained.” PPCLI Archives, 16-1, 
World War I Battles, File #: 16 (20)-1, Section 10: Vimy Ridge. 
609 H.M. Urquhart, The History of the 16th Battalion (The Canadian Scottish) Canadian Expeditionary Force in the 
Great War, 1914-1919 (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1932), 207. The PPCLI also engaged in 
working parties after they moved into the Vimy sector. PPCLI Archives, World War I Battles, File #: 16 (20) – 1, 
Section 10: Vimy Ridge.  
610 PPCLI Archives, First World War, Regimental History and Summary, Part IV, File #: 16 (1.6) – 1. 
611 LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3844, Folder 47, HQ General Staff, File 2, Engineers, Medical and Transport, 6-1-17 to 
7-4-17. 
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good sources of water were important for both the health and morale of the troops.612 In 
addition, there was also an emphasis upon communications613 networks, the ability of 
different groups to send messages to one another, and the movement of supplies and other 
important material across space. The labour and working parties were involved in burying 
cables, and ensuring alternative means of communication such as visual, wireless sets, 
pigeons, and preparing for runners and dispatch riders.614 
 Communications were crucial during all phases of the Battle of Vimy Ridge, from 
preparation and planning through to the consolidation and mopping-up operations. One 
key element of any battle plan was the artillery preparation – the development of fire-
plans and timetables; the working out of which field and siege guns, mortars, and 
howitzers would fire and when, the different types of ammunition employed; the 
identification and elimination of enemy batteries (counterbattery fire), with the assistance 
of the RFC;615 and plans for wire-cutting,616 destructive, neutralizing, and creeping 
barrages to assist the advance. Communications were crucial to the preparatory 
bombardment phase,617 as forward artillery observers needed to be in direct contact with 
the batteries they were directing fire for. Delayed information in the form of handwritten 
notes might be hours out of date, and thus erroneous. Moreover, efforts were made to 
prevent the Germans from having a clear picture of the developments and preparations on 
the Allied side of the line. To this end, patrols and outposts were established to thwart 
                                                             
 
612 Shortages of food and water during the Vimy operations saw some soldiers scrounging water from corpses or food 
from fields. This might have been interpreted as a breach of discipline and soldierly conduct. Duguid, History of the 
Grenadier Guards, 153. Others noted that soldiers purchased food behind the lines, ‘acquired’ food from local farms, 
stole from comrades, or looted stores or corpses to supplement official rations. Nic Clarke, John Cranfield and Kris 
Inwood, “Fighting Fit? Diet, Disease, and Disability in the CEF, 1914-18,” War & Society, 33, 2 (may 2014): 80-97. 
613 Communications in this sense refers not only to the transmission of messages between two or more parties, via 
telegraph, telephone, wireless messaging sets, letter, carrier pigeons, or other means, but also the infrastructure to 
transmit these messages, such as roadways, telephone wires, and the like.  
614 LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4678, Folder 11, File 11, 1st Canadian Division, April 1917, ‘Battalion Narratives,’ 
including Arleux Operations, Fresnoy and Vimy Front. Regarding communications and carrier pigeons, see also Tim 
Cook and Andrew Iarocci, “Animal Soldiers: Whether they were Mascots, Beasts of Burden, or Pets, Animals brought 
Solace to the First World War Soldiers serving at the Front,” Canada’s History (October-November 2013): 20-27. 
615 Preparations prior to Vimy included attempts to try and gain air superiority over the sector, and then artillery 
spotting. Neiberg, Fighting the Great War, 237-238. 
616 LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4680, Folder 18, File 13, 4th Canadian Division, April 1917, ‘Vimy – Communications 
and Intelligence.’ 
617 Ibid, Volume 4678, Folder 11, File 11, 1st Canadian Division, April 1917, ‘Battalion Narratives,’ including Arleux 
Operations, Fresnoy and Vimy Front. 
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enemy efforts to ascertain assembly locations, to discourage German working parties, as 
well as to allow for the artillery observers to be as far forward as possible.618  
The artillery plan for Vimy, furthermore, was designed to protect the element of 
surprise. To this end, the preparatory artillery and MG barrage would not increase prior to 
zero hour and the launching of the infantry attack proper.619 In the past, an increase in fire 
had alerted the Germans that an attack was imminent, and the planners at Vimy wanted to 
avoid tipping the enemy off.620 The successful artillery plan was also predicated on the 
notion of near-perfect timing; the guns would have to fire according to a carefully 
calculated timetable, and the infantry would have to advance in synchronicity with the 
creeping barrage and its various ‘lifts.’621 The plan also relied on the stockpiling of 
supplies and ammunition for months prior to April 1917, and sought to degrade German 
morale622 and defensive capabilities over time. It also needed to protect the infantry in its 
                                                             
 
618 LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3844, Folder 48, File 3, Canadian Corps Scheme (Correspondence), ‘Notes on 
Conference held at Canadian Corps Headquarters.’ See also LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4680, Folder 18, File 13, 4th 
Canadian Division, April 1917, Vimy – Communications and Intelligence. 
619 LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3844, Folder 48, File 3, Canadian Corps Scheme (Correspondence), ‘Notes on 
Conference held at Canadian Corps Headquarters.’ 
620 Despite attempts at maintaining surprise, the defenders opposite the Canadian front could not fail to notice an 
increase in activity. The German 79th Reserve Division in a report dated 30 March 1917 stated that there was a “very 
marked concentration of British troops,” and expected an Entente spring offensive “in this vicinity.” This report also 
stated that opposite the 79th Reserve Division “are Canadian troops” of the 3rd Division, who entered the line at Vimy in 
mid-March, and the 2nd Division were to the left of the 3rd Division. In addition to these warning signs, the Canadians 
now occupied a smaller frontage and “echeloned” in depth and “this formation points to operations on a large scale.” 
The report continued, arguing that “Canadians are known to be good troops and are, therefore, well suited for 
assaulting. There are no deserters to be found amongst the Canadians.” And in addition to this, a Canadian POW 
confirmed to his captors that the attack would be launched between 20 March and 6 April. LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 
3844, Folder 47, File 4, ‘Translation of a Captured Secret Document.’  
621 LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3845, Folder 50, File 5, Vimy, 4th Division (“B” Division), ‘Summary.’ 
622 Anecdotal evidence suggests that the preparatory bombardment phase of Vimy was at least partly effective in 
undermining German health, morale, and combat motivation. Documents of the No. 10 Canadian Field Ambulance 
indicated the week leading up to the attack on Vimy was known as ‘Hell Week’ for the defenders. German POWs told 
their captors that during this period two men “driven mad by the strain [of the bombardment] shot themselves dead.” 
LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4715, Folder 107, File 20, No. 10 Canadian Field Ambulance, Historical Records, 
‘Synopsis of Operations.’ Others attested to increasing German dissatisfaction in some units. According to captured 
German POWs, discipline was becoming more lax, drunkenness had become a problem, and the clear disobedience of 
orders had been observed. The interrogating officer, however, suggested caution, stating that the “prisoner’s morale is 
poor, but this should not be taken to apply to his regiment as a whole.” Nevertheless, the German divisions holding the 
line at Vimy suffered heavy casualties before and during the attack. LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3854, Folder 23, File 4, 
Intelligence Summaries, April 1917, ‘Information from other Sources,’ including ‘Laxity in Discipline.’  
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attack, and to work in conjunction with MGs, tanks, aircraft,623 gas, and smoke.624 After 
the identification of German artillery batteries, Allied guns were concentrated, there was a 
preparatory bombardment of several days, attempts to cut wire, and the effective use of 
gas and artillery killed enemy horses and forced German commanders to move their 
reserves back.625 This artillery and gas bombardment also wore down the health and 
morale of the German troops forced to endure these attacks. As a communique of 18 
April 1917 by the Corps General Staff attested, German POWs captured at Vimy reported 
a “great falling off in the morale of the 1st Guard Reserve Division.” There were, 
moreover, references to a ‘laxity of discipline’ in the German forces.626 
 Raids and patrols launched prior Vimy also served an important role in the 
preparation phase, for a few reasons.  First of all, these patrols and especially raids 
allowed for the acquisition of knowledge unattainable in other ways. Observation from 
the air was limited, and inclement weather could ground aircraft and stymie aerial 
observation efforts.627 Ground-based patrols, however, could monitor German activity, 
making note of enemy movements, defensive positions, and barbed wire.628 When the 
PPCLI moved into the sector they almost immediately undertook aggressive patrols and 
                                                             
 
623 Attempts to gain air superiority over the Vimy sector came to be known as ‘Bloody April,’ as the RFC sought to 
control the skies and protect the troops below. There were complications and setbacks, but the Vimy offensive was 
marked by “careful planning, meticulous preparation, and effective air-artillery cooperation.” Strong air support was a 
factor in success on the battlefield, and there was a ground-support role for aircraft, especially in harassing German 
artillery and infantry below. These air-to-ground attacks of the war were rudimentary by later standards, but reflected 
the desire of Allied planners to employ as much firepower as possible, and to use an all-arms approach to overwhelm 
the enemy. Having Entente aircraft overhead might also have reinforced the confidence of the infantry below. S.F. 
Wise, Canadian Airmen and the First World War: The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force – Volume I 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press in cooperation with the Department of National Defence and the Canadian 
Government Publishing Centre, 1980), 405, 401, 410-411. 
624 LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3846, Folder 51, File 5, ‘Report on Operations of the Canadian Corps against Vimy.’ 
625 Neiberg, Fighting the Great War, 237-238. The widespread use of gas and artillery in preparation for the infantry 
attack had the added advantage of preventing the Germans from using roads and known communication paths too 
liberally. LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4680, Folder 18, File 13, 4th Canadian Division, April 1917, Vimy – 
Communications and Intelligence.  
626 LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4677, Folder 7, File 4, April 1917, Canadian Corps (General Staff), Unit Narrative, 
Communique 18 April 1917, report entitled ‘The Capture of Vimy Ridge,’ Intelligence Summaries, Intel Report 27 
April 1917. It is also important to point out here that by April of 1917 the German Army designation of “Reserve” 
Division was largely meaningless. Dr. Holger Herwig Address, The 28th Canadian Military History Colloquium, held at 
Wilfrid Laurier University, hosted by the Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies, 5 May 2017.  
627 By 1917 the RFC was engaged in attacking observation balloons, bombing rail centres and aerodromes, and carrying 
the fight into German territory. Bad weather, however, could restrict flying and visibility. Wise, The Official History of 
the Royal Canadian Air Force, 398-401. 
628 LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4680, Folder 18, File 13, 4th Canadian Division, April 1917, Vimy – Communications 
and Intelligence.  
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trench raiding; good intelligence on enemy defences would be crucial for the upcoming 
attack.629 The regimental historians of the 2nd and 16th Canadian Battalions also recalled 
sorties and raids launched in the weeks leading up to Vimy.630 Second, aside from 
knowledge gained from observation, patrols and raids were to capture German POWs to 
gain important intelligence which could assist in the forthcoming assault. Prisoners might, 
for instance, be persuaded to divulge important information to their captors related to 
potential artillery targets, such as communication trenches, company and battalion 
headquarters, assembly and rest areas.631 Moreover, prisoners might contain written 
intelligence or documents that could be useful to Allied staffs and intelligence officers. 
And losing soldiers to enemy raids might undermine the morale of defending troops still 
in the line. Third, these raids and patrols were useful in testing German defensive 
capabilities, the strength of their positions, and the response time of local units to threats 
on their front.  
And finally, raids allowed for lessons and refinements to new tactical ideas and 
methods of organisation. An officer of the 31st Battalion wrote in his memoir that tactical 
organisational changes in this period included the incorporation of “so-called specialists” 
such as machine gunners and rifle grenadiers into infantry platoons;632 they would no 
longer remain a wholly separate branch of service. The idea was to make use of fire and 
movement tactics, to bring as much firepower to bear on the enemy without sacrificing 
the power of manoeuvre and flexibility. These new organisational principles of the 
platoon were designed to allow for the close cooperation between riflemen, Lewis 
gunners, bombers, and rifle grenadiers.633 The different arms and services would work in 
conjunction with one another, seeking to achieve common goals with complementary 
technology and tactics. 
                                                             
 
629 PPCLI Archives, First World War, Regimental History and Summary, Part IV, File #: 16 (1.6) -1; World War I 
Battles, File #: 16 (20) - 1, Section 10: Vimy Ridge; and 34 (8) – 8, General Operations, 1st Canadian Division, Vimy. 
630 Murray, History of the 2nd Canadian Battalion, 159 and Urquhart, The History of the 16th Battalion, 205. 
631 LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3844, Folder 48, File 3, Canadian Corps Scheme (Correspondence), ‘Notes on 
Conference held at Canadian Corps Headquarters.’ 
632 Norris, ed., The World War I Memoir of Captain Harold McGill, 262. 
633 Different infantry ‘specialists’ would also work in close conjunction with other technologies such as artillery and the 
more mobile Stokes Mortar. PPCLI Archives, 34 (8) – 8, General Operations, 1st Canadian Division, Vimy.  
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In addition to organisational, tactical, and technological changes, preparations 
took other forms as well. In order to increase the chances of battlefield success and to 
give participating troops as much information as possible about the terrain and landscape, 
scale models were built. Captain Walter Moorhouse of the 4th Canadian Mounted Rifles 
(CMRs) remembered that in preparation for Vimy, plaster models of the battlefield were 
constructed, and every officer and OR studied them.634 In addition, soldiers were guided 
over taped courses in which routes and pathways were outlined on terrain similar to that 
of the upcoming attack.635 One regimental historian described this battle practice as 
“arduous training” for the Vimy operation, which also included thorough explanations as 
to what was expected of each unit and individual. Just as important events require 
practices and controlled run-throughs, members of the PPCLI remembered that 
reconnaissance, training, and “meticulous rehearsal”636 contributed materially to the 
success at Vimy. And though it was risky to do so, maps of the sector with unit 
dispositions, tentative objectives, and other important features, as well as aerial photos, 
were distributed to the lower echelons of the military hierarchy by mid-February.637 This 
allowed even more time for the dissemination of important information and the proper 
preparation and planning of the complex operation that was the attack on Vimy Ridge.  
The preparations went beyond the material, however. For any large-scale military 
operation, it was important for the troops to have the right frame of mind going into 
action, and to believe that their participation would positively contribute to objectives. To 
this end, the leadership had a duty to impress upon all ranks the reality of the situation, 
and be honest about what they would encounter, without intimidating them. In a sense, 
                                                             
 
634 Reid, ed., Personal Memoirs of the First World War, 143; Murray, History of the 2nd Canadian Battalion, 157 and 
Bercuson, The Patricias, 96. 
635 Urquhart, The History of the 16th Battalion, 208. The PPCLI, moreover, was engaged in thorough training and 
preparation for Vimy, which included practice over models and taped courses. PPCLI Archives, 34 (8) – 8, General 
Operations, 1st Canadian Division, Vimy.  
636 PPCLI Archives, World War I Battles, File #: 16 (20) - 1, Section 10: Vimy Ridge. In addition to these preparations, 
there was much explanation and practice prior to the attack itself. The success was based on “the faith they had in this 
plan, every detail of which had been explained to and practised by them.” The men knew the ground and the objectives 
as well. Urquhart, The History of the 16th Battalion, 212. 
637 Urquhart, The History of the 16th Battalion, 206 and Bercuson, The Patricias, 96. 
187 
 
 
 
the psychological preparation was as important as the material preparation.638 This 
psychological preparation oftentimes took the form of expressions of confidence in the 
soldiers and their ability to overcome the obstacles in their way. Prior to the attack the 
GOC 6th Brigade visited each of his Battalions (the 28th, 29th, and 31st) for some final 
words of encouragement and reassurance.639 This personal, paternalistic touch was 
intended to be inspiring and comforting for the troops preparing for the assault. And the 
men were also given a hot meal and some rest leading up to the attack, which helped as 
well. In this type of preparation, the role of chaplains and padres was indispensable. 
Captain Frank Buck of the Canadian Chaplain Service, for instance, recalled prayers and 
hymns prior to the attack acting as a sort of spiritual and psychological preparation, 
steeling the men for the coming storm.640 Conversely, however, too much reflection or 
rumination prior to a large-scale attack could also be detrimental. One veteran recalled 
that before Vimy he and nearly everyone else were “mainly thinking of whether I might 
be killed or wounded,”641 which could be demoralizing at the worst possible moment. 
Ideally, the high command and officer corps would seek to inculcate a positive attitude 
amongst the troops, and a “spirit of confident expectation” during preparation.642 The 
soldiers needed confidence in the attack plan, their leaders, the system of resupply and 
                                                             
 
638 With both the French and Russian Army in 1917, the substantial gap between the orders, rhetoric, and attitude of the 
high commands with the reality on the ground caused serious disciplinary, morale, and motivational problems. In the 
case of the French, the mutinies of 1917 represented a serious threat to the authority of French leadership, whereas the 
revolutions in Russia swept aside the old Tsarist system entirely and eventually led to withdrawal from the war itself. 
639 LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4688, Folder 42, File 20, 6th Brigade, April 1917, ‘Unit Narrative, Operations Vimy 
Ridge.’ 
640 The chaplains played an important role regarding the morale of the soldiers, prior to, during, and after attacks. 
Chaplains held Easter services before the attack, but also worked at field ambulances, conducted battlefield burials, 
worked in the tunnels, helped with MOs and stretcher-bearers, established coffee stalls for wounded and those marching 
into and out of the line, ran canteens, etc. Their work was invaluable. LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4666, Vimy Ridge, 
Canadian Chaplain Service, Report – ‘During Vimy Operations’ and Volume 4664, Extracts – Captain Frank H. Buck. 
The historian of the 22nd Battalion, moreover, argued that both physical and mental preparations prior to battle were 
key. Bernier, The Royal 22e Regiment, 55. 
641 Kellett, Combat Motivation, 225. See also Cate, ed., A Soldier’s Memoir of World War I, 59 and Teed, ed., Uncle 
Cy’s War, 12. And James Adams wrote that “this is the most trying thing imaginable as it is better not to have time to 
think of the possible consequences of what is to come.” Caughill, ed., Letters to Janet, 138. Bourke also argued that 
imagination can contribute to soldiers “going all to pieces.” Those who could imagine their own death very vividly 
might therefore become paralysed by fear. Bourke, Fear, 216. And imagination is in part a “generator of ideas,” and 
that imagination “creates potentiality, and often creates the very means whereby potentiality is brought into actuality.” 
David Bakan, “Some Philosophical Propadeutics toward a Psychology of War,” in The Psychology of War and Peace: 
The Image of the Enemy, ed. by Robert W. Rieber (New York and London: Plenum Press, 1991), 57. 
642 LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4715, Folder 107, File 20, No. 10 Canadian Field Ambulance, Historical Records, 
‘Synopsis of Operations.’  
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medical evacuation, in their weapons, and, ultimately, in themselves and their ability to 
seize the objectives. 
The final aspect of preparation was the stockpiling of supplies, and the 
distribution of equipment to those taking part in the assault.643 The accumulation of 
important equipment and supplies needed for a set-piece attack, on a fortified position 
like Vimy, began months in advance. The CASC and infantry quartermasters worked in 
conjunction with their British counterparts to ensure that supplies were ordered, 
transportation arranged, and the paperwork was in order. Planners and staff had to ensure 
adequate supplies of ammunition (in dumps), water, and military stores, and for the 
establishment of supply refilling points.644 Plans and routes for bringing forward supplies 
during the attack were also arranged, and an emphasis placed on ensuring that extra 
rations were provided for the troops.645 A dearth of supplies, food, or clean water could 
undermine even the strongest and most steadfast of soldiers, imperilling an otherwise 
well-prepared attack. 
And immediately before the attack was launched on the morning of 9 April, troops 
awaiting the order to proceed were busy with last-minute checks and preparations, and 
were to assemble in silence. For the infantry, rifles would have to be cleaned and loaded, 
with plenty of ammunition and bayonets fixed for the attack.646 The thorough training, 
preparations, and instructions issued for the attack on Vimy illustrate the enormous 
complexity of the operation.647 These preparations also served to help stave off the worst 
                                                             
 
643 The troops were equipped with supplies such as Mills bombs, flares, shovels, picks, wire-cutters, S.O.S. signals, iron 
rations, ammunition (170 rounds for small arms), sandbags, and water. See LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4688, Folder 
42, File 20, 6th C.I.B., April 1917, Unit Narrative, ‘Operations Vimy Ridge;’ RG 9 III C1, Volume 3845, Folder 50, File 
5, Vimy, 4th Canadian Division (“B” Division), ‘Summary’ and LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3845, Folder 49, File 5, 
Vimy Operations, 1st Canadian Division, Instructions for Brigades, ‘Dress and Equipment.’ 
644 LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3846, Folder 51, File 5, ‘Report on Operations of Canadian Corps against Vimy’ and 
Beadon, The Royal Army Service Corps, 132. 
645 Ibid, Folder 52, File 1, 1st Division Report on Vimy Operations, ‘Willerval-Arleux and Fresnoy Operations.’ 
646 Ibid, Folder 50, File 5, Vimy, 4th Canadian Division (“B” Division), ‘Summary.’ And at Hill 70 in August 1917, the 
attacking infantry were loaded down with even more weight in the form of weapons, clothing, and equipment. Each 
soldier was expected to carry a gas mask or SBR, helmet, at least 120 rounds of small arms ammunition, two No. 5 
Mills hand bombs (grenades), two flares, three sandbags, one iron ration, one water bottle and “special parties” had to 
carry even more, such as wire-cutters, S.O.S. rockets, entrenching tools, etc. LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3851, Folder 
64, File 3, ‘Instructions for the Offensive Hill 70 – July 1917.’  
647 Instructions issued to the 1st Division indicated all the myriad aspects that planners and staff officers would have to 
be aware of in an operation of this complexity. There were instructions for: artillery, communications, MGs, engineers, 
assaulting troops, tram lines, dumps, water, medical aspects, battle stops, POWs, salvage and burials, craters in no 
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effects of embryonic war weariness. Plans and thorough preparations were not designed 
to counter war weariness, but they had this unintended effect nonetheless.648  
 
 
The Battle of Vimy Ridge, Arras, and other Operations 
Justification for the attack on Vimy began with the fact that it was an important 
position, in an important sector of the Western Front. The Ridge was key to the French 
city of Arras and the Douai Plain, and it was also an important feature of German 
defensive positions in the theatre.649 After all the preparations, training, and preparatory 
bombardment, the attack on Vimy Ridge itself began at 5:30 am on the morning of 9 
April, 1917. In terms of dispositions, the Canadian infantry were organised with the 4th 
Canadian Division on the left (or northwest end) of the line, and then the 3rd and 2nd 
Divisions in the centre of the line, and the 1st Canadian Division on the right (or 
southeast) end of the line.650 Nearby British units also helped bolster the attack and 
provided much needed support and firepower.651 But the main attack would be in the 
centre of the line, conducted by the Canadians there. 
To better understand these dispositions, the 1st Division will be examined more 
closely. At Vimy, the 1st Division attacked with infantry of two leading brigades, the 3rd 
and 2nd Brigades, with the 1st in reserve. Each brigade in turn attacked with three 
battalions, and one in reserve. The 2nd CIB sent in the 5th, 7th, and 10th Battalions, with the 
8th in reserve, and the 3rd Brigade slated the 15th, 14th, and 16th Battalions for the attack, 
with the 13th in reserve. After the first objective was reached (the ‘Black Line’), the next 
two objectives were assaulted with the reserve brigade, the 1st Brigade, and the 1st, 3rd, 
                                                             
 
man’s land, reliefs, transport, maps, preparation and planning of RAPs, collecting posts, advanced and main dressing 
stations, evacuation routes and plans, battle and straggler stops, and collecting posts. LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3845, 
Folder 49, File 4, Vimy Operations, “X” Division (1st Canadian), ‘Instructions.’ 
648 In the final months of the war, on the other hand, the Canadians would not be granted such comprehensive 
preparations, which contributed the onset and development of war weariness in that period. 
649 Prior to April 1917 there were three separate battles for the Ridge, and in 1915 the French alone lost nearly 150,000 
troops in a “futile attempt to retake” the position. Neiberg, Fighting the Great War, 234-237. British C-in-C Douglas 
Haig also saw value in Vimy, and assigned the job of seizing the Ridge to Henry Horne’s First British Army.  
650 Cook, Shock Troops, 95. 
651 To the south/right of the Canadians were the British 51st, 34th, 9th, and 4th Divisions, just north of the town of Arras 
itself. Other British units were placed south and east of the Arras railway, and south of the Scarpe River. For a map and 
unit dispositions at Vimy Ridge and Arras, see Neiberg, Military Atlas of World War I, 83. 
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and 4th Battalions.652 By the end of the attack, all brigades of the 1st Division were used in 
the assault and consolidation operations at Vimy, though not all at once or at the same 
time. In another area, a brigade of the 2nd Division used its battalions a bit differently, 
with two sent into the attack, one kept in reserve, and one battalion used as “moppers up” 
and for carrying parties.653 
The story of the successful Canadian attack on Vimy Ridge has been told by 
different historians, participants and others in the years since April 1917,654 so there is 
little sense in covering this well-trod ground here. To better understand the problems 
facing the troops at Vimy, however, a closer examination of some difficult aspects will be 
examined. Two geographic and defensive features of the Ridge, ‘The Pimple’ and Hill 
145, provided the attackers with extra problems beyond those typical of First World War 
attacks. These positions directly contributed to the problematic assaults on soldier morale, 
combat motivation, and endurance, but thorough training, all-arms cooperation, and 
effective supply management helped overcome these issues. These two positions offered 
the stoutest German resistance to the attack, and both had the potential to compromise the 
attack at Vimy. These positions were ultimately overcome, but at high cost. 
At the most northerly section of the Canadian line, the terrain rose even above the 
heights of Vimy to a geographic point colloquially referred to as ‘The Pimple.’ This was 
in the sector tasked to the 4th Division, and lay between Souchez and Givenchy-en-
Gohelle. This position dominated the surrounding areas, and with excellent vantage 
points the German defenders could rain fire down on the attackers. The 4th Division, 
moreover, was the most recent addition to the Corps, and though was composed of some 
seasoned units, many of its troops were experiencing sustained combat for the first time. 
To make matters worse, the weather of early 1917 was not conducive to complicated 
military operations. The cloud cover and precipitation meant little to no visibility for 
                                                             
 
652 LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3844, Folder 48, File 7, ‘Vimy Scheme;’ Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 
544-545, Appendix “B;” Chartrand, The Canadian Corps in World War I, 14 and Cook, Shock Troops, 95. 
653 LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3844, Folder 48, File 7, ‘Vimy Scheme.’ 
654 Some good works on Vimy Ridge, and with various perspectives, include: Ted Barris, Victory at Vimy: Canada 
Comes of Age April 9-12, 1917 (Toronto: Thomas Allen Publishers, 2008); Tim Cook, Vimy: The Battle and the Legend 
(Toronto: Allen Lane Canada, 2017) and Geoff Hayes et al., eds., Vimy Ridge: A Canadian Reassessment (Waterloo: 
Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007). 
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aircraft, and there were accounts of both rain and snow during the attack itself.655 A 
General Staff officer stated that the “very trying weather has imposed a severe strain on 
our troops and has considerably retarded progress.”656 Military combat is stressful and 
difficult in the most ideal conditions, and inclement weather only added to the complexity 
and strain of this operation. The 10th CIB was originally tasked with seizing ‘The 
Pimple,’ but the 11th Brigade was forced to take over from the 10th. One problem was that 
the soldiers of the 11th were less familiar with this sector of the line, and because of the 
urgency of the situation and the need for haste – the position was causing problems for 
units in other parts of the line and impeding progress – there were no written orders 
issued, only verbal.657 Nevertheless, despite difficulties and the intense strain imposed on 
the troops of multiple brigades, the position was seized and consolidated.  
The feature of the Ridge known as Hill 145 also imposed substantial strain on the 
attacking troops. Units of the 11th CIB were tasked with the capture of Hill 145, as well as 
the “labyrinth of trenches” which converged on this position. In the end the CO of the 11th 
Brigade, Brigadier-General Victor Odlum, was forced to use all the battalions under his 
command in the attack. Ultimately the 102nd Battalion “went forward with characteristic 
dash”658 and eventually seized the position. This comment on the attitude and morale of 
the soldiers, of their ‘characteristic dash,’ allows us to consider the veracity of comments 
on combat.659 The men of the 102nd Battalion were often, if not always, flush with morale 
and enthusiastic to go forward in battle or ‘over the top.’ The truth, however, is often 
                                                             
 
655 An account by Philip Gibbs referred to poor weather and rain. The Official Announcement by the CWRO, moreover, 
referred to three waves of an infantry attack, a rolling barrage, and snow. Horne and Austin, eds., Source Records of the 
Great War: Volume V – 1917, 154 and 159. 
656 LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4677, Folder 7, File 4, April 1917, Canadian Corps (General Staff), Unit Narrative, 
‘Communique’ 18 April 1917, report ‘The Capture of Vimy Ridge,’ and ‘Intelligence Report,’ 27 April 1917. 
657 LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4689, Folder 44, File 10, 10th C.I.B., April 1917, Unit Narrative, Vimy, Arleux, Fresnoy, 
‘A Summary of Operations.’ 
658 LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4689, Folder 45, File 1, 11th C.I.B., Historical Records, ‘Synopsis of Operations.’ 
659 Problematically, during the war itself commentaries and operational reports were often written to highlight the 
positive aspects, whilst downplaying the negative. This also explains the tendency to ignore, sanitise, or neglect to fully 
explore more unseemly, yet realistic, aspects of the war, pertaining to myriad issues such as VD, the killing of 
prisoners, shell shock, alcoholism, looting, theft and the like. And sometimes these accounts of combat were downright 
fanciful. The regimental historian of the 10th Battalion, for instance, wrote that the men attacking at Vimy advanced 
“stolidly and imperturbably; indifferent to the bullets which sang and hummed” all around them. J.A. Holland, The 
Story of the Tenth Canadian Battalion: 1914-1917 (London: Charles and Son, n.d.), 29. Moreover, the report writers 
usually did not want their unit or its officers depicted in a negative light.  
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more nuanced and complicated than that; in operations at Vimy, for instance, the 
casualties, problems, and frustration related to the inability to seize objectives may have 
undermined the morale and compromised the attitude of attacking troops, forced to fight 
an intense battle, in a disadvantageous position, especially after the benefit of surprise 
was lost. However in this situation, the men of the 102nd Battalion did indeed seize ‘The 
Pimple,’ though it took longer than anticipated660 and may not have reflected the rosy 
interpretation offered by Odlum and his staff. This also highlights the importance of 
hindsight and historical analysis, especially in fleshing out ideas and trends that may not 
have been discernable to contemporary participants and observers. War weariness is 
certainly one of those ideas that was not fully understood at the time, but historians can 
now gain a better understanding of it with careful research and reflection.  
The capture of the strong defensive positions on Vimy did not herald the end of 
the battle for Canadian and British troops involved, however. After these objectives were 
seized, the participants were required to ensure the safety of the battlefield by ‘mopping 
up’ the area and neutralising any remaining pockets of resistance. Prisoners were 
collected, defensive positions cleared, and the area made safe for additional troops. This 
phase was also responsible for clearing out dangerous areas, and dealing with hazardous 
devices left behind by withdrawing German forces. The 2nd CIB, for instance, established 
a special party of infantry to investigate former German dugouts, especially for delayed-
action mines and booby traps.661 To make use of these shelters and defensive positions, 
they would have to be made safe for occupation first. Moreover as German doctrine 
dictated, immediate counterattacks were launched against the recently-lost positions at 
Vimy, and the Canadians would have to fight off these responses as well. Much work, 
however, needed to be done to prepare for these counterattacks. The capture of the Ridge 
                                                             
 
660 Horne, Source Records of the Great War: Volume V, 157. 
661 LAC, RH 9 III C1, Volume 3851, Folder 64, File 6, 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade, ‘Operational Order No. 212.’ 
Because of the hasty and “disorderly retreat” of the German forces, they left behind guns and were unable to destroy 
everything. Moreover, a report of one sector found the Germans had no time to “leave behind the cunning and fiendish 
traps in which the German mind delights.” The report noted, though, that there were fires and explosions in German 
positions which suggested withdrawals. Yet another report claimed that according to ‘prisoners’ statements,’ the 
Germans had mined many of the cellars they were using prior to retirement. See LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4677, 
Folder 7, File 4, April 1917, Canadian Corps (General Staff), Unit Narrative, ‘Communique’ 18 April 1917, report ‘The 
Capture of Vimy Ridge,’ and Intelligence Summaries, ‘Intelligence Report’ 27 April 1917. 
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was crucial to the overall operation, but the consolidation phase was just as, if not more, 
important than the actual capture of the Ridge. Destroyed defensive positions would have 
to be repaired, new trenches and communications networks established, fire-steps 
reversed, and other activities designed to make the newly-won positions impervious or at 
least defensible to countermeasures and attacks in the future. Units of the 1st Division 
took part in consolidation, and beginning on 13 April sent patrols to extend the line and 
gather intelligence. In addition, the units that had actually fought at Vimy were relieved in 
the line and subsequently went into support and reserve.662 These exhausted soldiers 
certainly deserved a rest and respite from combat, especially if war weariness was to be 
checked. In this period immediately following the capture of Vimy one of the main goals 
was to advance and consolidate the gains made at much bloody cost. This “skillful patrol” 
fighting was important in this regard, as the Corps had to ensure hostile enemy units 
could not exploit defensive weaknesses. Consolidation entailed digging new trenches, 
repairing roads, bringing up guns, and advancing buried cable and communications.663 
And as an integral aspect of First World War defenses, copious amounts of barbed wire664 
were also positioned in front of the newly-capture Ridge. 
As part of the larger Battle of Arras, the Corps assisted in further operations on the 
flanks of Vimy and in other sectors. To help with these attacks, Canadians brought up 
guns and stockpiled ammunition, contributed working parties, and even launched their 
own attacks on the British flanks on 23 April, and then again on 28 April. During the 
attack on 23 April,665 however, instead of facing a beaten and demoralized enemy, the 
Canadians found themselves facing “determined resistance” by the German forces and 
“severe fighting” ensued.666 This British attack made little headway against “stubborn 
resistance,” and therefore the success of the Canadian units was “the more remarkable” 
                                                             
 
662 LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4679, Folder 15, File 7, April 1917, Battalion Narratives, ‘Vimy.’  
663 LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4677, Folder 7, File 4, April 1917, Canadian Corps (General Staff), Unit Narrative, 
‘Communique’ 18 April 1917, report ‘The Capture of Vimy Ridge,’ and Intelligence Summaries, Intelligence Report 27 
April 1917. On 11 April a request was made for 500 additional trench boards, likely for shoring up defences in the 
process of consolidation. LAC, RG 9 III C9, Volume 4533, File 6, ‘Army Book 152.’ 
664 LAC, RH 9 III D1, Volume 4689, Folder 44, File 10, 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade, April 1917, Unit Narrative, 
Vimy, Arleux, Fresnoy, ‘A Summary of Operations.’ 
665 The Second Battle of the Scarpe. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 555-556, “Appendix F.” 
666 LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4677, Folder 7, File 7, ‘Operations of the Canadian Corps during April, May, and June.’ 
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because of this.667 Again on 28 April Canadians attacked and made an “important 
advance…at light cost, across ground that presented great difficulties to the attacking 
forces and corresponding advantages for the defence.” Local successes like this, in the 
wake of a victory like Vimy, against heavy odds, and in contrast to other non-Canadian 
units, served to reinforce the sense of Canadian difference, and ultimately, sense of 
superiority. These successes also acted as a mitigating factor for the onset of war 
weariness. If gains were made and tangible results achieved, and the thorough 
preparations and training for attacks seemed to pay off, war weariness might be kept at 
bay, at least for a time and provided rest followed these operations. In many ways the 
Canadians were fortunate at Vimy, though this luck would not last.  
There were, however, operational aspects that assaulted the morale and motivation 
of the soldiers of the Corps, and thus contributed to war weariness. During the Canadian 
attack on Fresnoy, for example, its seizure was short-lived. 668 Losing key positions, 
especially in combination with the death and wounding of good and effective soldiers in 
the capture of these positions, could be demoralizing, to say the least. In these situations, 
the casualties suffered and stresses imposed on the surviving soldiers all seemed for 
naught – this was the nature of indecisive fighting on the Western Front.669 Perhaps it is 
not surprising that the battle around Fresnoy resulted in the loss of the position. A 
Canadian Corps communique of 13 May 1917 made reference to “some of the bitterest 
hand-to-hand fighting which has yet occurred.”670 This type of close-quarter fighting 
whipped up the emotions of participants, and the sheer violence involved was not easy to 
endure. Adrenaline and exhilaration only went so far in neutralising the negative effects 
of violence and trauma. And even for veterans and those who had previously been in 
combat, this was a new type of fighting, which required them to kill, neutralize, or 
capture their opponents at close-range. Moreover, the use of close-range weapons had a 
                                                             
 
667 Ibid. The Germans had also used the improving weather to strengthen their defences all along the line. 
668 The British unit which replaced the Canadians in the line subsequently lost this position. Ibid. 
669 This situation was again repeated in March and April 1918, as Entente forces fell back in the face of the German 
Kaiserschlacht offensives. One such position that was abandoned at this time was Passchendaele Ridge, captured at the 
cost of roughly 16,000 Canadian casualties, and 10,000 of others, just months prior. 
670 LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4677, Folder 7, File 7, April, May, June Summary of Operations, ‘Canadian Corps 
Communique,’ 13 May 1917.  
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deeper impact on attacking (and defending) troops; the need to drive the bayonet home, to 
shoot someone point blank, or to throw Mills bombs a few metres ensured this was a 
more intimate way of killing.671 Looking into the eyes of your victim and witnessing their 
last breath was certainly traumatic, regardless of the loyalty, experience, comradeship, 
sense of duty, training, or any other factor associated with army service. Sooner or later 
soldiers broke down as a result. And the greater the distance between attacker and victim, 
the easier it was to kill – and to live with this killing. Range provided both emotional 
(psychological) and empathic distance,672 and served as a kind of protection against 
trauma and negative consequences. Moreover, soldiers in battle can intellectually 
understand horror and what they are participating in, but emotionally, the distance 
allowed them to deny this to a great extent. At closer ranges, initial feelings of euphoria 
for having done your duty and contributed to group objectives quickly give way to guilt 
and remorse; having to kill at close-range served to increase the trauma on the attacking 
soldier. And in closer and especially hand-to-hand combat range, it was difficult to deny 
the humanity of your enemy, greatly increasing the chances of psychological trauma.673 
Though this psychological trauma is more often associated with shell shock and war 
neurosis, it was also a contributing factor toward war weariness, as soldiers who had not 
yet broken down from combat sought to avoid this all but inevitable fate. The health and 
well-being of the troops had a direct impact on their ability and willingness to endure. 
In the end, German counterattacks eventually seized Fresnoy and drove the British 
and Canadians from the position. Some German POWs informed their captors that they 
were to re-capture lost positions at Fresnoy “at all costs, and were warned that they would 
not be relived until they had done so.” This acted as a powerful motivator, and it is thus 
no wonder that the Germans were desperate and determined to effect an Allied 
withdrawal. The possession of the trenches and positions went back and forth, but in the 
                                                             
 
671 This was the subject of historian Joanna Bourke’s An Intimate History of Killing: Face-to-Face Killing in Twentieth 
Century Warfare and is also a theme discussed by Grossman in On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill 
in War and Society. In the latter book, moreover, Grossman examined killing at different ranges, including maximum 
and long-range, mid and hand grenade range, close range, edged-weapons range, hand-to-hand combat range, and 
killing at sexual range. See Section III, Chapters 2-7. 
672 Grossman, On Killing, 97-98. 
673 Ibid, 112, 119 and 122. 
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end the Germans retained control of Fresnoy. Both sides suffered heavy casualties, but 
the Germans also seemed “greatly demoralized”674 by the end of the battle. This is 
important, as in an attritional and largely static struggle that was the war on the Western 
Front, even victorious and successful armies could become demoralized and have war 
weariness affect them, both individually and collectively.  
Following the capture of Vimy and the First Battle of the Scarpe, the Corps was 
involved in operations designed to assist British attacks elsewhere, but more importantly 
to support French attacks to the southeast, and keep the pressure on the enemy.675 The 1st 
Canadian Division, for example, participated in operations at Willerval-Arleux and at 
Fresnoy to straighten out the line after Vimy and to consolidate the area.676 Trenches and 
lines needed were extended, flanks secured, and defensible positions attained. The actions 
and operations of the 1st CIB are instructive. The Brigade went into the Vimy attack on 9 
April, and after its successful operation was relieved in the line. Following this, it was 
ordered “back into the line again on several tours of duty,” and were at the Battle of 
Fresnoy. After this attack there followed a period of “ordinary trench duty interspersed 
with periods of relief and rest”677 until 15 August, when the attack on Hill 70 began. The 
Army attempted to minimise casualties and maintain the striking power and cohesion of 
units by rotating infantry units between the front line, support, and reserve trenches. The 
10th Brigade was in the line for eight days, reserve for eight days, in support for eight 
days, and then back into the line for another tour of over a week.678 Yet even while units 
were in ‘ordinary trench duty’ or in supposedly ‘quiet’ sectors, they were still exposed to 
the strains of war, and continued to suffer daily casualties.679 This the army called 
‘wastage,’ and it served to slowly bleed units to death. This also negatively impacted the 
                                                             
 
674 LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4677, Folder 7, File 7, April, May, June Summary of Operations, ‘Canadian Corps 
Communique,’ 13 May 1917. 
675 After Vimy the Corps was engaged in the operations at Second Scarpe, the attack on la Coulotte, Arleux, Third 
Scarpe (capture of Fresnoy), “affairs south of the Souchez River,” the capture of Avion, and the Battle of Hill 70. 
Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 555-556, “Appendix F.” 
676 LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3846, Folder 52, File 1, 1st Canadian Division Report on Vimy Operations, ‘Willerval-
Arleux and Fresnoy Operations’ and LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3847, Folder 54, File 1, ‘Arleux-Acheville Operation.’ 
677 LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4687, Folder 40, File 1, 1st C.I.B., Historical Records, document dated 7 June 1918.  
678 LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3849, Folder 60, File 4, ‘Proposed Relief of Brigades.’ 
679 Steward, An Infantryman on the Western Front, 165 and Brandt, “Sky Above, Sea Below,” 38. 
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health and morale of individuals – there never seemed to be any genuine respite from the 
mortal dangers of duty,680 and even careful and veteran soldiers could be killed by a stray 
shell or sniper, gas or air attack. The allotment of replacements certainly helped units 
sustain losses, but these troops were inexperienced, and perhaps unfamiliar with the 
traditions of the battalion. In the ranks new troops could compromise unit cohesion, and 
comradeship might also suffer with the loss of trusted leaders and friends; some veterans 
and ‘old hands’ simply did not trust new troops.681 Moreover, by 1917 enlistment 
numbers were drying up, to say nothing of the declining medical standards for infantry 
combat service.682 
And yet despite manpower issues the Corps did not remain idle during the spring 
and summer of 1917. Aside from the operations at Vimy, the Corps began preparations 
for Lens and Hill 70. The Battle of Hill 70, 15-25 August,683 saw a preparatory phase 
between May and July, whereby the Corps began to threaten the German hold on the city 
of Lens. By June 1917, Canadian infantry were trying to maintain continuous and 
harassing pressure on the enemy, to prevent the enemy from thinning his line in this 
sector and sending reserves elsewhere; coordinated attacks with other forces were 
designed to put maximum pressure on the enemy. The Canadians were tightening their 
grip on Lens, or “rather the shattered remains of the city,” after all the destruction caused 
by artillery.684 Other preparations included attacks southwest and west of the city (for 
                                                             
 
680 This war was unprecedented in terms of the stress imposed on the troops, as “soldiers were hardly ever completely 
out of danger, even in reserve areas.” This meant they wore down more quickly. Kellett, Combat Motivation, 273. 
681 One soldier stated that he did not trust the new men in his unit, and simply hoped that they would not get killed or 
get the rest of the men killed. And the CO of the PPCLI argued that due to heavy casualties his unit was “short of men.” 
At Passchendaele they had to fill the NCO ranks with “inexperienced youngsters who do not know the job, either in or 
out of the line.” Wheeler, The 50th Battalion in No Man’s Land, 255 and Christie, Letters of Agar Adamson, 331. 
682 Canada’s Official History outlined the appointments and enlistments in the CEF by month. The totals for each year 
are as follows: in 1914 59,144 soldiers and officers enlisted in the CEF; in 1915 158,859; by 1916 this had risen to 
176,919; by 1917, however, the numbers were only 63,611 enlistments and appointments. The numbers for 1918 were 
better at 156,441, but this is misleading, as of this figure a total of 142,588 were “enlisted under the provisions of the 
Military Service Act.” Without these conscripts, the figure for 1918 would have been a mere 13,853, totally inadequate 
to deal with the enormous casualties suffered by the CEF, and especially the Corps as the war dragged on. Nicholson, 
Canadian Expeditionary Force, 546-548, Appendix “C.” For information on the declining standards of medical 
requirements, see Nic Clark, Unwanted Warriors: The Rejected Volunteers of the Canadian Expeditionary Force 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2015), especially Appendices A-C. 
683 Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 555-556, Appendix “F.” 
684 LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4677, Folder 7, File 7, ‘Operations of the Canadian Corps during April, May, and June” 
and Ibid, Folder 7, File 9, June 1917, Unit Narratives.  
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instance on 28 June), followed by a “period of comparative quiet” used for the 
improvement of roads and communications, patrols, and the use of MGs and snipers in an 
effort to “let slip no opportunity to inflict casualties on the enemy.”685 The nature of 
trench warfare and adherence to an attritional strategy ensured this. The lull in the 
fighting and preparatory phase was also used for counter-battery work, wire-cutting, and 
destructive artillery and gas bombardments on dumps, roads, and communications 
infrastructure. This thorough preparation suggested that the Corps and its staff officers 
had learned a great deal about how to deal with German defences, especially from the 
recent Vimy operations.  
Despite the dissemination of lessons in both a top-down and bottom-up manner, 
the fight for Hill 70 was a bloody,686 confused, and exhausting affair. There were, of 
course, many difficulties encountered by attacking troops. In July and especially August 
1917, the infantry and other arms of the 6th Brigade were involved in “very desperate 
fighting”687 both prior to, and during, the attack on Hill 70. Some of its constituent units 
were able to seize their objectives, despite heavy casualties which, over time, eroded their 
fighting power. In an attack on a single strongpoint, for example, three officers were 
killed trying to take the position.688 The loss of leaders and officers was especially 
difficult for small units to deal with; they provided leadership and a sense of continuity, 
helped maintain unit traditions, and were the linchpin of cohesion. Soldiers often looked 
up to these leaders, and sought guidance and strength from them. The loss of a 
particularly well-liked officer or charismatic personality might very well demoralize an 
infantry unit when it needed strength and solidarity the most.689 The lack of sufficient 
                                                             
 
685 LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4677, Folder 8, File 1, July 1917, Unit Narratives, ‘Operations of the Canadian Corps: 
July 1917.’ A Major-General of the British First Army praised plans, preparations, and the “soldierlike determination 
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688 Ibid. 
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as well. See Arthur, ed., Forgotten Voices of the Great War, 200; Davidson, A Doctor in the Great War, 75; Douie, 
Recollections of a Subaltern of Infantry, 2; Murray, History of the 2nd Canadian Battalion, 180-181; Cane, ed., The 
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communications networks, moreover, meant that it was exceedingly difficult to bring up 
the required amount of ammunition and supplies to sustain the attack. 
Perhaps it was some consolation for the attacking troops that “very heavy 
casualties were inflicted on the enemy during this fighting.”690 It was perceived that this 
would compensate for the heavy casualties and loss of trusted leaders and close friends in 
combat. This comment also indicates that even successful and ultimately victorious 
armies suffered appalling loss of life and other casualties, and the enormous difficulties in 
overcoming entrenched and prepared defences, especially against a committed and alert 
enemy. Moreover, after the war of movement and flanking attacks broke down in 1914, 
many attacks were designed to inflict casualties on the enemy, as well as erode their will 
to fight, even if they were officially designated as breakthrough attacks. By late 1917, 
though the Germans had suffered hundreds of thousands of casualties already, the Entente 
was still a long way from defeating the enemy’s armies in the field. The question seemed 
to be, which side would break first?  
The operations of the 27th Battalion also illustrate the enormous difficulties facing 
attacking troops, and the stresses of combat which, over time, eroded the will to fight and 
endure. The 27th suffered casualties691 even before the assault began, which reduced the 
numbers in each attacking party, and therefore diminished the striking power of these 
units. Early casualties also had the potential to negatively affect the morale of the troops; 
things seemed to be going awry even before the operation began, and this was not a good 
portent for things to come. The 27th had a tough task, and faced German defences and 
concrete-fortified houses, stoutly defended by MGs, snipers, and bombing parties. Hard 
fighting and heavy casualties were the order of the day, and due to persistent and strong 
counterattacks, the 27th Battalion was ultimately forced to withdraw from Cinnabar 
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Trench.692 And in an attempt to put a positive spin on the operation, the author of the 
Battalion Narrative wrote that 
The spirit and drive shown by all ranks during this operation which included the 
hardest and most difficult fighting ever encountered by this Battalion was 
conclusive evidence of the confidence of the men in themselves and their 
Officers…[and that] the cheerfulness and untiring energy  
 
of carrying parties allowed the infantry to carry on and repel counterattacks.693 This 
confidence in the officers, however, might very well have been shaken after realising that 
not all objectives could be seized, and certain attacks ended in failure. When the 27th was 
withdrawn from the line it had suffered 306 casualties, including fourteen officers, a 
substantial percentage of the nominal strength of a battalion. The unit also captured forty-
one German POWs.694 But were these captures worth the hundreds of casualties to 
experienced veterans? This is a question that many soldiers perhaps dwelled on as the 
units were withdrawn to lick their wounds, and begin the process of reconstituting the 
battalion from the left out of battle (LOB) group. And despite the manpower advantage of 
the Entente, an attritional strategy would need to inflict far more casualties on the 
Germans than suffered by the attacking forces.695 This could not be guaranteed. 
 In tandem with the problems of the 27th, each company of the 28th Battalion had 
its own difficulties in the attack on Hill 70. These problems, both acute and cumulative, 
contributed to the onset of war weariness as well. “A” Company, for instance, discovered 
that mist, dust, and smoke obscured the battlefield and increased the problems for 
attacking troops.696 The training, preparation, and issuance of maps prior to the attack 
were for naught if the troops were unable to see the terrain they were to be attacking over. 
Shell craters, outdated maps, and the destruction of landmarks all exacerbated this 
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problem. These environmental factors also contributed to the enormous confusion on the 
battlefield, and this and uncertainty could be a disorienting and stressful. This, combined 
with a sense of helplessness to remedy the situation, were contributing factors toward war 
weariness. For “B” Company of the 28th Battalion, the problems facing the unit served to 
compromise the ability –and perhaps willingness – of the troops to seize objectives. On 
this front, for instance, the lack of Mills bombs, small arms ammunition, and equipment 
imperilled the advance. And as the author of one report stated clearly, “…a retirement 
took place shortly afterwards, owing to failure of supplies.” This comment directly linked 
the failure of logistics with failure on the battlefield, but this is also perhaps reductive, as 
combat is complex and can be explained by both material and non-material factors. 
Nevertheless, not having the proper equipment and in sufficient numbers could drive a 
wedge between the planners of attacks, and those actually ordered to carry them out. 
Supply problems were often well beyond the control of staff officers and COs, but for the 
‘poor bloody infantry’ at the sharp end, this might be tantamount to abandonment. Heavy 
casualties and a lack of sufficient reinforcements could also stymie even the best planned 
attack. Ultimately, “B” Company was forced to retire and fall back, which no doubt 
undermined the already-fragile morale of the unit.  
 The experiences of “C” Company were much the same: heavy casualties and 
sustained attacks on morale, combat motivation, and endurance. “C” Company was 
ordered to move up and join another unit to assist in tackling a particularly difficult 
position, but there was a failure in seizing objectives. Owing to heavy shelling and the 
absence of cover, one officer explained that “it was unnecessary at that time to take the 
risk of moving the company through very heavy shell fire,”697 despite orders to do so. 
This suggests that the problems encountered on the battlefield and the mortal danger 
facing the troops induced a sense of reluctance or unwillingness to follow orders to the 
letter. This may have been prudent, but the high command expected bold attacks and the 
adherence to plans, regardless of the circumstances on the ground. This also suggested a 
measure of agency exercised by officers, who decided that the casualties in this case were 
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simply not worth the potential gains. The Lens and Hill 70 operations were designed to 
keep pressure on the Germans, inflict casualties on them, and ultimately seize all 
objectives in the assault. Attacks on 21 August were planned to seize, consolidate, and 
hold Green Crassier and the city of Lens. The problem, however, was that the German 
defenders were keen on withstanding the attacks and were not giving up Lens. 
Counterattacks, moreover, forced the retirement of some Canadian units. And yet, 
“nevertheless, our progress continues and at very moderate cost to ourselves the circle is 
being drawn ever tighter and tighter around Lens,” though the understanding of ‘very 
moderate cost’ might have been disputed by the infantry actually take part in these costly 
attacks. In the week of 23-30 August, for instance, the Corps suffered a total of 2,962 
casualties, including 68 officers and 2,894 ORs.698 These casualties, with little 
appreciable gain, could reinforce a sense of futility amongst the infantry, no doubt 
contributing to the war weariness simmering below the surface of both individuals and 
military units.  
 In addition to the Battles of Vimy Ridge and Hill 70/Lens undertaken by the 
Corps between April and August of 1917, Canadian units were also engaged in smaller-
scale raids, patrols, and other actions. These sought to prepare troops for further combat, 
to test out new weapons systems, equipment, and refine tactics; to assess and gain 
intelligence on German defences; to support flanking units; and to keep the enemy off 
balance and inflict casualties at every opportunity. The problem, of course, was that these 
raids and patrols, even if executed perfectly, still resulted in casualties for the Canadians. 
Between 28 June and 5 July, for example, consolidation operations, raids, patrols, 
sniping, and trench mortar (TM) activity resulted in forty-two officer and 1,029 OR 
casualties.699 Raids on German lines opposite the Canadian front were also designed to 
inculcate the offensive spirit, and to contribute positively to the development of morale. 
Successful raids could reinforce a sense of confidence, assurance, and trust, whereas 
unsuccessful raids could result in a sense of demoralization; the key question being, were 
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these casualties worth it? Could the High Command justify these casualties for limited 
military intelligence and intangible gains on a relatively narrow front? On the evening of 
22/23 July, a large raid was launched with the intention of destroying enemy dugouts and 
capturing POWs. A report on the raid indicated that “our casualties were very light, being 
little greater than the number of prisoners captured,” suggesting that on balance, these 
casualties were in fact worthwhile. But unless the experience or intelligence gained 
proved decisive, there was no way these types of costly attacks could win the war by 
themselves. This kind of cold calculation contributed to the onset of war weariness after 
years of attritional warfare on the Western Front.  
 If raids were specially designed actions launched through No Man’s Land and into 
the enemy lines with clear purposes and objectives, patrols were more regular operations 
to monitor and, if need be, defend certain sections of the front. In this period, there were 
times when patrols were sent out every night, to observe No Man’s Land and to gather 
intelligence.700 In the immediate aftermath of Vimy, these patrols were often launched in 
conjunction with consolidation operations, designed to ensure German counterattacks and 
hostile parties were kept at bay. Patrols also served to keep the enemy off-balance on the 
opposite side of the line. By May 1917 these patrols were having a direct impact on 
enemy activity. Patrols in connection to the Arleux and Fresnoy operations, for example, 
fired on German communications networks in the evening, and kept a close watch on 
enemy guns and defensive positions. And patrols launched into No Man’s Land itself 
meant that “the enemy appeared to be very nervous and threw several bombs in front of 
his own posts.”701 Because of these aggressive patrols, Canadian outposts could be 
pushed forward and connected up with trenches to assist with the defence of the area. 
 The experience of the 11th CIB in June 1917 illustrates the daily stresses facing 
the soldiers. In order to maintain the initiative and prevent German working parties from 
operating too freely, units were involved daily in artillery, TM, and MG firing. And 
though there is some historical evidence suggesting daily firing took on a more theatrical, 
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unenthusiastic, or perfunctory element in certain sectors and at certain times,702 these 
hostile actions did contribute to frequent casualties and daily wastage. Snipers and 
distance weapons, such as rifle-grenades, ensured that there was little respite for a soldier 
during a tour in the frontline trenches, even during supposedly quiet periods or in quiet 
sectors of the line.703 Boredom and monotony, routine and work, combined with periods 
of mortal danger and trauma, characterised soldier life during trench warfare. And it was 
this lack of genuine rest for regular soldiers that wore so heavily on the troops, and 
contributed to cumulative stress experienced by all combatants during the war. These 
patrols had multiple functions; they could act in both a reconnaissance and offensive role. 
Patrols were at times tasked, for example, with preparing and cutting gaps in enemy wire, 
often a prelude to subsequent infantry operations. The 11th Brigade in the week ending 13 
June conducted several raids and minor operations, capturing seventy-two German POWs 
and three MGs, and destroying other enemy mortars and MGs in the process. In addition, 
Canadian raiding parties also bombed or destroyed sixty enemy dugouts, at times with 
mobile charges. Perhaps most important, according to German prisoners artillery and 
attacks cost them roughly 460 casualties in this period alone.704 Inflicting casualties and 
destroying weapons and equipment were worthwhile, but whether the information gained 
during these raids was worth the casualties is another question. This reality also reflected 
the limitations of Entente strategy, the problems inherent in trench warfare, the power of 
the defensive, and the fighting prowess of the German Army.  
 Both acute and cumulative stresses contributed to the onset and eventual 
manifestation of war weariness on both an individual and collective level, especially after 
years of attritional and indecisive warfare. Private Fraser of the 31st Battalion, for 
                                                             
 
702 See, for instance, the concept of the ‘Live and Let Live System’ in Tony Ashworth, Trench Warfare 1914-1918: The 
Live and Let Live System (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1980). Moreover, at Vimy a captured German prisoner 
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instance, wrote on 9 April that the experience at Vimy “proved a trying ordeal and called 
up all the stamina and perseverance which the body and mind could muster.”705 Infantry 
unit accounts, in the form of war diaries and regimental histories, provide the historian 
with an understanding of how these groups experienced and overcame the difficulties 
inherent in combat. Colonel Murray, for instance, outlined some of the difficulties facing 
the soldiers of the 2nd Battalion, which, over time, undermined the morale, endurance, 
combat motivation, and military effectiveness of this unit. These included the fact that 
heavy casualties and unforeseen difficulties could slow, and even imperil, the entire 
attack. Problems during the advance led to much anxiety on the part of the troops, and the 
loss of respected leaders and officers could be devastating and demoralizing.706 When 
certain individuals came to be seen as symbols of the regimental spirit, these losses 
weighed particularly on others in the battalion. Murray admitted regarding the loss of one 
particularly well-liked member of the team that “the unit without ‘Tubbie’ was simply not 
the 2nd Battalion.”707 These losses undermined unit cohesion, contributed to 
demoralisation, and put added pressure on the surviving soldiers of the unit. And over 
time, the loss of these indispensable personnel was a direct contributing factor to the 
onset of war weariness. 
 The experience of the PPCLI also provides some insight into the difficulties 
inherent in offensive operations at this phase of the war. Even with thorough preparation 
and precautions taken to preserve secrecy, there were concerns that the Germans would 
be prepared for the attacking troops. There were worries that “leakage of information 
through documents falling into the hands of the enemy or of enemy agents”708 would 
reveal the objectives, start date, or plans of attack. In the end, these concerns were largely 
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706 Murray, History of the 2nd Canadian Battalion, 166, 169, 180. The 2nd Battalion, in five days of operations, suffered 
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groundless, but highlight the difficulties in organising such a complex operation, the 
uncertainties, and the myriad things that could go wrong right up until zero hour, to say 
nothing of the problems that could materialise after the attack was launched. 
Nevertheless, according to unit records the assault was “a model of” a limited set-piece 
attack, that succeeded due to thorough reconnaissance, training, and “meticulous 
rehearsal.” Moreover, the new flexibility in tactics, and especially fire and movement,709 
allowed the companies of the PPCLI to carry the day. And yet, even in a successful attack 
like that of the Princess Pats, casualties were inevitable. By the time the unit was 
withdrawn it had suffered 222 casualties, including eighty-three killed. In 1917 each 
battalion had a nominal strength of roughly 1,000 troops, and thus hundreds of casualties 
could have an impact on the performance of the unit out of all proportion to the actual 
numbers involved. The casualty list for 9/10 April, inclusive, also listed those who had 
died of wounds (six), were missing (ten), or other types of casualties. One wounded 
soldier George Blanchard, for example, was listed as invalided with Shell Shock.710 This 
suggests that even in successful attacks, war neuroses and psychiatric casualties still 
occurred. Sometimes these numbers were staggering, too. The cumulative pressure placed 
on individuals, and the strains imposed on military units over time led to the onset of war 
weariness, but also the more debilitating and potentially permanent shell shock. 
 The experiences of the 2nd and 3rd Brigades also provide some insight into the 
reality of fighting at Vimy. The 3rd Brigade, in the southern section of the line and 
attacking toward Thélus, suffered casualties to its infantry battalions (14th–16th 
Battalions), MG companies, and TM batteries.711 Despite these and the difficulties 
encountered, the Brigade and its constituent units were able to seize their objectives of the 
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Black and Red Lines,712 and capture enemy positions and dugouts. Upon the capture of 
these, however, some important observations were made. The enemy, apparently, had 
been “well fed and cared for, and seem[ed] to have plenty of food, cigars, trench 
cookers,”713 and other conveniences that made life in the trenches more bearable. This 
was often also in stark contrast to British trenches and positions. Reports and assurances 
that the Germans were suffering badly and lacking in morale might have been 
exaggerated, or perhaps applied only to certain units or sections of the line. Many of the 
dugouts captured, moreover, were of excellent design and construction, were deep and 
formidable; some even had electric lights. But instead of negatively affecting morale, 
reports indicated that “our troops are in good spirits…the enthusiasm and vim displayed 
were excellent.”714 Understandably, this ‘enthusiasm’ might not have persisted had the 
attack not been so successful and swift. In later phases of the war heavy casualties and 
hard fighting, with little attendant military success, acted as a demoralizing force, greatly 
contributing to war weariness and other problems. In the words of the historian of the 16th 
Battalion, the Germans made use of clever tactics, such as the use of gas and artillery 
barrages and feigned counterattacks, to undermine the ability and willingness of the 
attackers to attain their objectives. These tactics and ruses were a “policy well calculated 
to undermine fighting morale.” And yet, despite the opposition and heavy casualties 
suffered by the 16th, this “neither impaired Battalion morale nor depressed the spirits of 
the men;” the soldiers of the unit came to believe that “the gains [at Vimy] had justified 
the losses.”715 But dissent, doubt, war weariness, and worse set in when this rational 
calculus failed and the soldiers started to believe that the fighting and heavy casualties 
were no longer worth it. At this point, the military reliability of both individual soldiers 
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and entire units were called into question. Though there is a lack of substantive evidence 
for this at Vimy, it played a larger role in later operations, most notably at Third Ypres 
and during the final campaign of the war.  
 The 2nd Brigade at Vimy also suffered heavy casualties, but had some 
compensation as well. The Brigade suffered heavy casualties in only two days (8-10 
April) of initial fighting, with 1,109 casualties. And after the early fighting at the Ridge, 
the Brigade suffered a further 218 casualties in the operations between 10 and 20 April. 
Brigade strength was 3,479 soldiers during the attack, meaning roughly 38% of the unit 
became a casualty.716 These losses were (apparently) compensated for, however, by the 
captures made, including 779 POWs seized, five guns, eighteen MGs, nine minenwerfers, 
975 rifles, three listening sets, and copious amounts of engineering material seized by the 
infantry. These were also tangible reminders of a successful attack, which could act as a 
buoy to morale and help offset the worst aspects of war weariness. It was compensating 
aspects, the capture of war material and objectives, and the casualties and suffering 
inflicted on the enemy,717 which made these attacks seem worthwhile to the troops 
actually tasked with the assaults. The loss of a trusted leader or comrade could perhaps be 
made more bearable, and provided some consolation, if the objectives were seized and the 
enemy undermined, physically or psychologically. Of course everyone dealt with grief 
differently, but it would have been even worse if these casualties were suffered without 
the military successes. But did these local actions really contribute to the ultimate defeat 
of the German Army? Both propaganda and military policy dictated that Allied soldiers 
were informed the enemy was suffering from the attritional nature of the fighting, and the 
German Army itself was certainly but a pale shadow of its former strength. The Allied 
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adoption of a defensive posture after the Third Battle of Ypres and the failure of the 
Cambrai attack718 belied this view, however, and the fact that the German Army made 
substantial progress during the Kaiserschlacht offensives made it difficult to reconcile the 
reality on the ground with the rhetoric of the High Command. Losing a close friend to 
‘the cause’ was difficult; but losing a close friend to a cause that seemed no nearer 
completion was more difficult still.719 
 The death of a close friend, or the heavy casualties suffered during operations as a 
matter of course, might have elicited a different response from soldiers, however. Instead 
of demoralization in response to the death of comrades, one might also respond in a way 
that actually encouraged subsequent aggressive behaviour. Numerous firsthand accounts 
included remarks related to wrath, and the desire to avenge fallen mates as a motivating 
factor and an impetus for behaviour.720 This phenomenon was noted by serving infantry, 
as well as in other services and amongst other combat arms, such as the air services.721 
Though blood-lust and a desire for revenge might act as a motivator factor for 
combatants, it could also compromise decision-making and encourage reckless, 
undisciplined, even suicidal behaviour. This behaviour might very well reflect the war-
weary soldier who was pushed to the edge, and decided that these actions were preferable 
to a continued existence under the status quo.722 Boldness, aggression, and confidence can 
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he was duelling with conjured up feelings of hate, and he subsequently engaged in reckless behaviour to continue the 
210 
 
 
 
certainly be positive attributes in combat, but reckless or individualist behaviour could 
also undermine leadership and discipline, and increase the danger on comrades through 
irresponsible behaviour that invited retaliation or put them in vulnerable positions. 
Furthermore, some were able to endure the stresses and strains of combat by coming to 
enjoy the action.723  
 Compensating factors, and other aspects that helped stave off the worst effects of 
war weariness, were also found at Vimy. Seeing the attack pay off, and the important 
gains made, acted partially as a mitigating force which allowed infantry to endure the 
conditions of frontline service a little longer.724 By the end of the Battle, the Corps had 
consolidated their gains and sent out patrols, defeated at least three German 
counterattacks, captured three battalion COs, fifteen other officers, and over 2,000 NCOs 
and other ranks.725 The reality of the victory and the physical spoils of war726 perhaps 
compensated for the heavy casualties sustained by the attacking troops. Despite the 
bloodshed, the attack was a great success and proved that limited, set-piece attacks could 
prevail over an entrenched enemy.  
 
 
Medical Aspects and Arrangements, April-August 1917 
The medical realities of the war, including the near-constant threats to life and 
limb, created numerous problems for armies. The true nature of warfare and especially 
combat on the Western Front, and how the authorities dealt with certain types of 
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casualties had the potential to undermine morale, reinforce war weariness, and directly 
contribute to the onset of shell shock. The medical arrangements and evacuation 
procedures during operations, however, helped with the morale of the troops taking part; 
knowing that one would be cared for if wounded acted as a bolstering force, instilling a 
sense of confidence in the medical system.727 And prompt medical attention could reduce 
suffering and save lives.728 For COs, manpower was paramount, ensuring that military 
medicine was an integral aspect of any battle plan. The reality of combat in this period, 
including shell shock, can help inform our discussion of war weariness because, although 
they were different phenomena, they existed on a continuum and there was some overlap 
between these two ways of understanding the impact of combat on the individual. Much 
historical writing on shell shock has focussed on its contributing factors, responses, and 
ways to mitigate this problem, and these same approaches can also be applied to war 
weariness.  
 One of the first tasks prior to any battle or impending operation was to select sites 
for collection and medical treatment areas. During the preparation phase sites would be 
identified, and equipment brought up. RAPs, advanced and dressing stations, divisional 
walking wounded collecting stations, and rest stations would all have to be established 
and stocked, in addition to larger facilities such as casualty clearing stations, medical 
stores depots, and laboratories all before evacuations reached the railhead behind the 
lines. Ambulance trains would take more seriously wounded to more permanent facilities 
behind the line, and eventually to base hospitals on the coast. For the Arleux operations, 
casualties were funnelled to the advanced and main dressing stations, and separated by 
mobility and severity, with walking wounded sent to one location, and stretcher cases to 
                                                             
 
727 A prompt and efficient military medical system helped with the morale of troops, especially when it came to 
treatment of comrades. As one historian argued, the “abandonment of comrades does not enhance dedication to duty.” 
Robert J.T. Joy, “Medicine, Military,” in Reader’s Companion to Military History ed. by Cowley and Parker, 294. 
728 LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4125, Folder 5, File 4, ‘Report on Operations,’ Hill 70, 29th Battalion.  
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another.729 Evacuation routes730 were also identified in an attempt to avoid confusion and 
congestion after zero hour. Following the launch of the Vimy attack, further aid posts 
were established and dressing stations moved up as the infantry attacked, advanced, and 
ultimately consolidated positions.731 The medical system needed to have flexibility and 
mobility, and respond to changes in the wider military situation.  
 Thorough preparations, however, could not prevent problems arising, or the over-
work and exhaustion of medical personnel. In anticipation of a battle leave and passes 
were often cancelled, ensuring that with staff ‘all hands were on deck’ for the upcoming 
arrack.732 During large operations, which resulted in heavier casualties concentrated into a 
relatively short time period, medical personnel became fatigued both physically and 
mentally, both of which could negatively affect performance and decision-making. And 
with the stakes so high, a bad decision or mistake could be fatal. Officers of the 2nd 
Division wrote that at Vimy this frontline and “forward work is the most trying from a 
physical as well as mental standpoint,”733 which could compromise the health and 
effectiveness of individuals, and affect the wider military situation. A battalion lacking in 
healthy soldiers might very well fail to take its objectives, even if it had the willingness to 
do so. And even after a unit seized its objectives and was looking forward to relief, 
further medical duties remained. For the 1st Division at Vimy, it was clear that: 
If a unit is relieved [in the line], it is still responsible for the evacuation of its own 
wounded from the Front Line and should leave behind the Regimental Medical 
Officer and sufficient personnel to carry out this duty.734 
                                                             
 
729 Stretcher cases were collected at the ADS, placed on trench tramways, and conveyed to the main dressing station 
further to the rear. Walking wounded cases, after being processed, were collected and then “conveyed in horsed 
[ambulance] wagons” to the main dressing station. LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3847, Folder 54, File 5, Arleux-
Acheville Operation, ‘Miscellaneous.’ For information on the use of trench tramways, see Steven Trent Smith, “Narrow 
Path to Victory,” Military History, 34, 2 (July 2017): 54-61.  
730 LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3845, Folder 49, File 4, Vimy Operations, “X” Division (1st Canadians), ‘Instructions.’  
731 Murray, History of the 2nd Canadian Battalion, 164 and LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4715, Folder 107, File 20, No. 
10 Canadian Field Ambulance, Historical Records, Synopsis of Operations, Mt. Sorrell to Mons. 
732 This was to ensure that all medical personnel were available for duty, as well as to deal with any emergencies and 
expected heavy casualties. LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4562, Folder 3, File 2, No. 3 Canadian Stationary Hospital, 
‘Daily Orders No. 98,’ 9 April 1917. 
733 See a report on the role of chaplains and padres in medical treatment and evacuation work. LAC, RG 9 III C15, 
Volume 4664, ‘Summary of Work done by Chaplains During Battle of Vimy Ridge: Second Canadian Division.’ 
734 LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3845, Folder 49, File 4, Vimy Operations, X Division (1st Canadian). And furthermore 
“there was but little time for rest in the strenuous few weeks after April 9th” 1917. See LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 
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Stretcher bearers and other staff were often assisted by infantry, especially during 
engagements with heavy casualties. This ensured that even after the achievement of 
objectives, there was much work to be done which only increased the strain placed on 
infantry and others. This reality also reinforced the sense that there really was no genuine 
respite on the Western Front, for soldiers to recuperate properly.  
 Yet despite thorough planning of medical arrangements and evacuation, 
confusion, and congestion did occur at Vimy. Partly, this was inevitable, considering the 
casualties required to overcome entrenched defensive positions, and the power of the 
defensive, generally, in the war.735 Another problem was that during the preparatory 
bombardment as well as during the attack itself, destruction compromised the ability of 
medical units to reach and evacuate casualties. Roads became churned up by bombs and 
shell explosions, and shell fire itself compounded the problems facing medical 
workers.736 With the sheer number of personnel in the immediate vicinity, coupled with 
the destruction of roadways and other communications, congestion and delays were the 
result. This increased the time required to evacuate casualties, but also ensured difficultly 
in bringing up rations and medical supplies through mud, shell holes, and “crowded and 
fiercely shelled roads.”737 Without sufficient supplies, the potential for casualties only 
increased. Congestion was partly overcome by the use of light railways and trench 
tramways, but, according to the records of the No. 10 Canadian Field Ambulance, “it was 
extremely hard to avoid congestion of wounded.”738 Any added problems to the medical 
services could result in further casualties.  
                                                             
 
4715, Folder 107, File 20, No. 10 Canadian Field Ambulance, Historical Records, Synopsis of Operations, Mt. Sorrell 
to Mons.  
735 For tactics and technology to overcome defensive positions and attain success in the War, see Rawling, Surviving 
Trench Warfare: Technology and the Canadian Corps, 1914-1918; Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The 
British Army’s Art of Attack 1916-18; Griffith, ed., British Fighting Methods in the Great War; Gudmundsson, 
Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army; Bidwell and Graham, Fire-Power: The British Army Weapons 
and Theories of War 1904-1945; Travers, How the War Was Won: Factors that Led to Victory in World War One; and 
Clarke, World War I Battlefield Artillery Tactics.  
736 LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4714, Folder 106, File 4, ‘Operations Vimy Ridge: Report on the Collection and 
Evacuation of Wounded,’ 9 April 1917.  
737 LAC, RG 9 III D1,  Volume 4715, Folder 107, File 20, No. 10 Canadian Field Ambulance, Historical Records, 
‘Synopsis of Operations, Mt. Sorrell to Mons.’ 
738 Armies more generally also made use of light railways and tramways. Ibid; Brown, British Logistics on the Western 
Front, 162; Smith, “Narrow Path to Victory,” and Hesler, ed., Interlude: 1916-1919, 25. 
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Medical personnel at Vimy also faced other issues based on the reality of combat. 
For example, medical personnel lacked adequate stretcher bearers. This was compounded 
by the fact that German POWs used as bearers only made one-way trips;739 at the end of 
their journey they were escorted to POW cages (or concentration areas). This shortage of 
medical personnel during attack and follow-up operations ensured that those MOs, 
orderlies, medics, and bearers who did remain were driven to the point of exhaustion. 
Some medical units worked for twenty-four hours straight, before given a “short and 
[much] needed rest.”740 Exhaustion can lead to mistakes, and mistakes on the operating 
table could be fatal. Amongst medical personnel, the work of a stretcher bearer was 
exhausting,741 dangerous, and often thankless. Carrying a soldier over shell holes and 
through mud was fatiguing at the best of times, but under shell fire this job was even 
more dangerous and arduous. Medical personnel, moreover, as non-combatants were 
unable to retaliate against the enemy, the source of the mortal danger they confronted.742 
The ability to shoot back at the enemy served as “a psychological release if nothing else,” 
and bearers were also unable to duck for cover when under fire.743 The inability to 
                                                             
 
739 LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4714, Folder 106, File 4, ‘Operations Vimy Ridge: Report on the Collection and 
Evacuation of Wounded,’ 9 April 1917. 
740 LAC, RG 9 III D1,  Volume 4715, Folder 107, File 20, No. 10 Canadian Field Ambulance, Historical Records, 
‘Synopsis of Operations, Mt. Sorrell to Mons.’ The medical facilities themselves also became overwhelmed with 
wounded, especially during sustained and intense operations. At Vimy, accommodation at the main dressing station was 
“taxed to the utmost,” which caused further delays and problems.  
741 Ibid. At Vimy Ridge even with six-man stretcher bearer teams “frequent reliefs were necessary.”  
742 This was also the case with other non-combatants, such as those from the Service Corps. The historian of the British 
RASC wrote of the “specially strenuous nature” on logistics, transport, and supply troops. Moreover, “the fact that there 
could be no respite made that task a heavy mental and bodily strain – mental, because whatever punishment it received 
from the enemy it had no opportunity to retaliate, but had to deliver its loads to the troops – physical, because of the 
long hours over difficult ground added to what every mounted man knows, that with animals to be cared for, the work is 
but half done when he re-enters his billet or bivouac.” Colonel R.H. Beadon, The Royal Army Service Corps: A History 
of Transport and Supply in the British Army – Volume II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931), 129. And 
some argued that non-combatants suffered the highest level of psychological breakdown, because they had little outlet 
for aggressive behaviour. The opportunity to strike back and kill the enemy was linked to better ability in “coping with 
fear on the battlefield.” Striking back also allowed for the release of adrenalin and glycogen. And if a “combatant could 
not act, he was more susceptible to fear,” and thus breakdown over time. Joanna Bourke, Fear: A Cultural History 
(Emeryville: Shoemaker & Hoard, 2006), 206-210. And the ASC personnel were “within a few hundred yards of enemy 
trenches,” but generally these units “do not have the same chances of military ‘glamour’ on the battlefields, theirs is a 
story of endurance and determination.” Graeme Crew, The Royal Army Service Corps (London: Leo Cooper Ltd., 
1970), 129. 
743 When carrying a stretcher and under fire these bearers “literally had to stand and take it.” Gaudet, ed., The World 
War I Journal and Poems of Pte. Frank Walker, xv. 
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properly strike back, or the feelings of helplessness which this engendered, were 
important contributing factors to the onset of war weariness.  
The physical features of this sector of the front, the weather, and even the time of 
day also become problematic for medical personnel at Vimy. For No. 10 Canadian Field 
Ambulance, inclement weather, “the ancient enemy,” compounded the problems they 
faced. Mud and precipitation hindered evacuation efforts, and medical personnel found 
themselves battling enemy fire, as well as snow and rain.744 The arrival of night brought 
its own problems,745 and the danger of slipping into the mud or drowning in water-filled 
shell holes was a real one. The medical arrangements for the Battle of Hill 70 in August 
1917 seemed to adopt some of the lessons learned during Vimy. The medical actions and 
responses at Hill 70 were largely successful, in part because of the rapid and effective 
evacuation and treatment of casualties. Adaptations for weather, sufficient transport 
facilities, and “the provision of alternate routes” in the face of congestion all contributed 
to successful evacuation.746 The medical arrangements for this battle, however, were 
unable to anticipate and accommodate the presence of civilians in the area.747 These 
civilians and refugees not only complicated the operations of the Corps, but by requiring 
varying degrees of medical attention and supplies they also contributed to the over-taxing 
of medical resources and personnel.  
The casualties inflicted on the attacking forces had a direct impact on the military 
units taking part in these operations through the summer of 1917. Some officers, such as 
chaplains, were given respite and rest periods after sustained operations. In one case, G.H. 
Andrews was returned to Canada “in accordance with the policy…for recuperation after 
an arduous term of service.”748 Of course chaplains and other non-combatants were often 
                                                             
 
744 LAC, RG 9 III D1,  Volume 4715, Folder 107, File 20, No. 10 Canadian Field Ambulance, Historical Records, 
‘Synopsis of Operations, Mt. Sorrell to Mons.’ During the Battle of Hill 70, moreover, reports indicated that poor 
weather usually added extra “hardship” on the troops and medical personnel. LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4714, Folder 
106, File 5, ‘Report on the Evacuation of Wounded in the Canadian Corps: Operations for the Capture of Hill 70.’ 
745 LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4715, Folder 107, File 20, No. 10 Canadian Field Ambulance, Historical Records, 
‘Synopsis of Operations, Mt. Sorrell to Mons.’ 
746 LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4714, Folder 106, File 5, ‘Report on the Evacuation of Wounded in the Canadian Corps: 
Operations for the Capture of Hill 70.’ 
747 Ibid.  
748 LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4615, C-A-7, Andrews, G.H., ‘Cablegram from the Overseas Minister to the Minister 
of Militia and Defence, dated 23 April, 1917.’ 
216 
 
 
 
granted special privileges or secured more leeway than regular infantryman, but the date 
of this cablegram indicating this policy of recuperation was 23 April 1917, just weeks 
after the capture of Vimy and its attendant arduous fighting. The loss of trusted officers 
and support personnel was difficult for military units, but infantry battalions also had to 
deal with the loss of their riflemen. For instance at Vimy, one Captain was wounded 
(presumably prior to the assault), but “pluckily insisted on going in with his company for 
the attack.”749 On the surface, this seemed like a laudable decision, but it may also have 
caused some problems, too. His behaviour might also have acted as a deterrent on 
subordinate troops’ decision to go sick or to seek medical attention for wounds or other 
casualties.750 And finally, the captain’s decision to go forward with his men might also 
have negatively affected his unit if his performance, decision-making, or stamina were 
compromised. Weakened soldiers had their abilities undermined by medical problems, 
and instead of rest and treatment, carrying on in the line could prolong or exacerbate 
health issues.  
Regardless of the medical arrangements and evacuation procedures in place, a 
certain proportion of casualties had to be evacuated from the battle zone, sent back to 
Britain,751 or even be invalided back to Canada. Those returned to Canada were the most 
serious cases, deemed unable to return to the front for at least six months. Returning them 
to Canada allowed for a longer respite back home, and helped ease the burden on medical 
facilities and personnel in the UK. In July of 1917, for instance, H.M.H.S. Letitia 
                                                             
 
749 LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4688, Folder 42, File 20, 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade, April 1917, Unit Narrative. 
750 There is evidence, for instance, of soldiers deciding to stay in the firing line despite the fact that they were wounded, 
physically or otherwise, or other troops who sought to nurse a wound in secret lest they be deemed a coward, 
malingerer, or seen as suffering a SIW. When it came to psychiatric casualties, the biggest concern was the chance for 
relapse if a soldier stayed in the line beyond the breaking point. In one case, a shell shocked soldier was sent to the CCS 
by his MO “after having requested to be allowed to carry on” at the front. This soldier was apparently ‘shaky,’ often a 
clear indicator of advanced or acute shell shock. Less than a fortnight later (27 April to 5 May), however, he was back 
at his unit, “but his M.O. would only allow him to carry on at the kitchens,” ensuring he was only on light duty behind 
the lines. The MO knew that this soldier required respite, but also knew that the unit required all the soldiers it could 
muster. Unfortunately for both the soldier and his unit, he relapsed again by June 1917 and developed “gross symptoms 
of shell shock.” This case illustrates some of the tensions and dilemmas facing MOs in the war, and the precarious 
nature of mental health of soldiers experiencing cumulative and intense trauma. LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3602. 24-3-
1 (Volume 1), CAMC Journal. 
751 This return to England, or ‘Blighty,’ was such a popular destination and desire for soldiers that the type of wound 
that would bring them back there, a wound that was serious enough for evacuation but not serious enough for 
permanent debilitation, came to be known almost universally in the British armies as a ‘Blighty wound’ (or ‘Blighty 
one’). See also the legal and medical chapters above for more information on Blighty wounds.  
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transported soldiers back to Canada suffering from hysteria, epilepsy, “marked 
neurasthenia, and similar troubles” of this nature.752 Unlike physical wounds, however, 
the treatment period for psychiatric casualties could be quite unpredictable. Some 
required only a few days and removal from the front lines to recover their self-control and 
equilibrium; other cases required weeks or months, whereas some individuals were 
invalided for the balance of their lives. Others committed suicide,753 or self-medicated 
with alcohol. In a report from Moore Barracks Canadian Hospital (Shorncliffe) the officer 
in command lamented that “there are some cases suffering from mental disease who are 
now invalided back to Canada and subsequently recover their mental balance.” He 
continued, writing that “this recovery sometimes takes place within a short time,” and 
thus recommended keeping these types of cases in hospital for a time and if they failed to 
recover, they could then be returned to Canada “without the stigma of having been insane 
attached to them.”754 As was the case with war weariness, at times these casualties only 
needed rest, respite from service, and an understanding and responsive medical system. 
During the operations at Vimy the No. 3 Canadian Stationary Hospital (in April 1917 
alone) received 468 shell shock cases “when there was marked activity on that front.” The 
average monthly total, however, was 335 cases per month,755 an increase of nearly 40%. 
The casualties suffered at Vimy and other engagements between April and August 
1917 illustrate that this loss of close comrades and well-liked leaders could be devastating 
to the unit, whether that be the company, battalion, or even brigade. In less than a forty-
eight hour period, for example, the 31st Battalion of Alberta suffered one officer and 
fifteen ORs killed, as well as three officers and sixty-one other ranks wounded, and four 
ORs missing in action (MIA).756 Depending on the severity of the wounded casualties, 
some of these soldiers might very well return to their unit after a stay in hospital and 
                                                             
 
752 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3618, 25-13-7 to 25-13-10, ‘The O.C. Troops, H.M.H.S. “Letitia,”’ 25 July 1917.  
753 See, for instance, Julian Humphries, “How were Suicide Cases dealt with in the Frontline Trenches during the First 
World War?,” BBC History Magazine, Volume 15, No. 08 (August 2014): 97. 
754 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3618, 25-13-7 to 25-13-10, ‘Moore Barracks Canadian Hospital Shorncliffe, 25 July 
1917, Officer I/C Hospital to A.D.M.S. Canadians Folkestone.’  
755 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3752, Folder 3-1-4-2, Neurology, War Neuroses, File ‘Treatment of Shell Shock Cases 
at the Front.’  
756 Chartrand, The Canadian Corps in World War I, 15 and Norris, The Memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, 281. 
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convalescent centre; the dead, and in all likelihood the missing, were lost to the Battalion 
for good. And though replacements could help bring the unit back up to nominal 
strength,757 the individuals lost could simply not be replaced. In wartime and other 
traumatic situations, strong bonds can form between those forced to endure these 
hardships. The loss of these trusted comrades could in turn be devastating for the 
survivors in the event of heavy casualties. In addition, new soldiers sent to any unit would 
perhaps lack the intimate knowledge of the history and traditions of the unit. It was this 
regimental spirit and unit cohesion that created such a potent striking force in action. 
Other units also experienced similar losses to that of the 31st Battalion at Vimy Ridge.758 
By 1917, it was nearly impossible to reconcile these casualty rates with the pool of 
reinforcements available – something would have to give.  
 Medical officer experiences provide insight into the different types of casualties 
suffered, and their impact on both individuals and units. Exhaustion, both physical and 
otherwise, for instance, could render soldiers militarily ineffective, even detrimental to 
the goals of the group. As Captain Harold McGill, MO of the 31st Battalion explained, a 
set of orders for 8 May 1917 for the battalion to move up into the line and begin 
operations was cancelled. And in his view “this was fortunate, for the men were in no sort 
                                                             
 
757 The problem, of course, was that by 1917 voluntary recruitment in Canada had all but dried up. The passing of the 
MSA (conscription) helped fill the ranks again, but the training, experience, and dedication of these replacement 
soldiers were called into question from the very beginning, perhaps unfairly. Many of these MSA soldiers served 
admirably, but there likely remained a gulf between ‘green’ troops and the ‘old sweats.’ Will Bird, for example, did not 
trust a new officer sent to the 42nd Battalion, lamenting his lack of experience and the negative implications this had for 
himself and his comrades. Bird, Ghosts Have Warm Hands, 110.  
758 The 1st Brigade suffered losses at both Vimy, and operations at Fresnoy. At Vimy, the Brigade suffered 583 total 
casualties, including 556 ORs killed, wounded, and MIA. And though brigades had a larger recruitment and 
reinforcement pool, the battalions of the brigade still suffered heavily from these operations. The problem, moreover, 
was that casualties were hardly ever spread evenly amongst the battalions, ensuring that some units suffered more than 
others. At Fresnoy, the Brigade lost 13 officers killed and three wounded, 182 ORs killed, 712 wounded, and 140 
missing, totalling 1,080 casualties, or more than the entire strength of a full infantry battalion. LAC, RG 9 III C1, 
Volume 3846, Folder 51, File 1, 1st C.I.B., Operations Vimy, ‘General Observations.’ At Hill 70 the 29th Battalion 
experienced heavy casualties, and one of its units suffered nearly 100% casualties, with all of its officer and NCOs hit. 
LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4125, Folder 5, File 4, ‘Report on Operations,’ Hill 70, 29th Battalion. And the 11th Brigade 
at Vimy saw every officer of one of its battalions become a casualty, clearly undermining leadership and cohesion. 
LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4689, Folder 45, File 1, 11th Brigade, Historical Records, including a ‘Synopsis of 
Operations.’ And Adamson wrote to his wife that “we lost 12 officers, killed or wounded, out of 21 who I took over the 
top.” This works out to a 57% casualty rate, clearly unsustainable in the long-term. Christie, ed., Letters of Agar 
Adamson, 275, Letter to wife Mabel, dated 14 April 1917. See also LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3847, Folder 55, File 4, 
1st C.I.B., ‘Reports on Operations, Fresnoy – 3rd May, 1917.’ 
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of physical condition to undertake further active operations without a rest.”759 McGill 
here also touched on a point that was crucial, if controversial, during the dangerous and 
often-monotonous experience that was life on the Western Front, namely, that a short rest 
could act as a powerful rejuvenating force for the soldiers. This rest and respite helped 
mitigate the worst effects of both war weariness and shell shock. Unfortunately, this vital 
aspect of recovery and recuperation was often in short supply.  
 The nature of combat on the Western Front, however, ensured that despite rest 
policies, war weariness and psychiatric casualties still occurred in alarming numbers. 
These were based on active service conditions as well as the rigid nature of the army 
system. And even the War Office acknowledged these casualties, stating in the context of 
the classification system that some soldiers were discharged “owing to nervous 
breakdown resulting from service in the present war,” and could be hired by companies at 
home without fear of being called up for service.760 It was accepted that they would never 
soldier again. A report on ‘Mental Cases’ in military hospitals also acknowledged that 
soldiers could suffer “from a disability due to his being a soldier.”761 Moreover, a patient 
report at Moore Barracks Canadian Hospital in July 1917 indicated that “there were no 
symptoms of definite mental disease other than those of a hysterical nature, such as are 
induced by the strain of service conditions acting on a youth.”762 This illustrates the belief 
on the part of some authorities that certain types of soldiers had a predisposition763 to 
breakdown, while still acknowledging these problems could be initiated or exacerbated by 
                                                             
 
759 McGill also wrote that the soldiers of his unit began to fear that they would never be comfortable or warm again. 
And when the 31st Battalion did get rotated out of the line, this was “like a taste of paradise.” This gave the troops an 
opportunity to remove their dirty and lice-infested clothes after 15 days in the trenches. Moreover, the battalion band 
“gave much pleasure to all ranks in our short respite from the squalor and misery of the trenches.” Norris, The World 
War I Memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, 285.  
760 RG 9 III C10, Volume 4576, Folder 2, File 9, Discharges, newspaper clipping from The Standard, dated 30 April 
1917. Another report on the Department of Militia and Defence in Canada indicated that in one particular case the 
insanity of the soldier “is not the result of his military service,” suggesting that in some cases the insanity of the soldier 
was the direct result of service. LAC, RG 9 III B2, 25-13-7 to 25-13-10, Department of Militia and Defence – Ottawa 
31 December 1917.  
761 Ibid, Folder 4, File 3, ‘Hospitals for Mental Cases.’  
762 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3618, Moore Barracks Canadian Hospital, 20 July 1917. My italics.  
763 Some of these individuals included those with “unstable nervous” dispositions, poor education, upbringing and 
surroundings that might explain their inability to stand combat. These ideas of predisposition and prediction of who 
might succumb to the trauma of combat were, of course, bogus. LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3752, Folder 3-1-4-2, 
Neurology, War Neuroses, ‘Functional Nervous Disorders.’ 
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the ‘strain of service.’ And though these sorts of candid appraisals of the impact of 
combat on the individual were relatively rare, by the end of the war the authorities were 
unable to deny the very serious, and sometimes permanent, negative impact of war 
service on these soldiers. This was evidenced, in part, by the post-war debate and 
discourse that resulted in the British War Office Committee of Enquiry into Shell-Shock, 
launched in 1922.764  
 The victories at Vimy Ridge and Hill 70 were certainly impressive, and tangible 
gains were made against stubborn and entrenched opposition. Casualties were inflicted on 
the enemy, and prisoners and war material were captured by the attacking troops. The 
issue, however, was whether these losses were deemed worth the gains attained.765 
Moreover, what constituted a successful offensive for the high command might have 
looked very different for the soldiers at the sharp end. The statistics tabulated for 
Canadian casualties in this period indicate that Vimy, especially, was a costly victory, 
with 3,598 killed and 6,664 wounded, for a total of 10,262 casualties766 for this operation 
alone. And in April of 1917 the Corps suffered 14,301 casualties in operations on the 
Lens-Vimy front.767 In addition to the overall number of casualties suffered, the severity 
of these casualties also set the Vimy battle apart. In battles and engagements of the First 
World War, the ratio of walking wounded to stretcher-bearer casualties was generally 3:1. 
But at Vimy, both groups were roughly equal;768 this was a bloody battle, with lots of 
severely wounded, and military or territorial gains were attained at very high cost. The 
                                                             
 
764 At this the British government formally recognised shell shock as a condition of the war. Beckett, The Great War, 
316. In the end, however, it seems the Committee sought a compromise understanding of it as both mental and physical. 
Ted Bogacz, “War Neurosis and Cultural Change in England, 1914-22: The Work of the War Office Committee of 
Enquiry into ‘Shell-Shock,’” The Journal of Contemporary History, 24 (1989): 227-256.  
765 One soldier noted, for instance, that though there were substantial gains made by the attacking troops, they were 
“heavily paid for.” Cate, ed., A Soldier’s Memoir of World War I, 59. 
766 Terry Copp, “The Military Effort, 1914-1918,” in Canada and the Great War: Essays in Honour of Robert Craig 
Brown, edited by David Mackenzie (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 52. 
767 Bill Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare: Technology and the Canadian Corps, 1914-1918 (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1992), Appendix B, 240. Rawling pointed out that between 9 April and 3 May the Corps (as of 7 April) 
had a strength of 172,486 including attached units, or 97,184 excluding attached units, suffered 16,649 casualties, but 
only received 9,459 reinforcements, a shortfall of 7,190. The operations of the Corps in this period included Vimy, as 
well as Gavrelle and Fresnoy. In March 1917 the CEF had a strength of 304,585 all ranks, but by the end of April 1917 
it was 301,296, a decline of 3,289. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, Appendix “C,” 546. 
768 LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4714, Folder 106, File 4, ‘Operations Vimy Ridge: Report on the Collection and 
Evacuation of Wounded, 9 April 1917.’ 
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key question was whether these gains, impressive though they were, were actually worth 
the very heavy cost in lives lost, maimed, or psychologically destroyed. Some soldiers 
certainly felt that the casualties and the loss of friends was worth it, and these sentiments 
were often expressed by soldiers themselves, in letters home, for instance. And though 
there are issues regarding self-censorship and the desire to paint a rosy picture for those 
back home, these sentiments often came across as genuine, if naïve. James Jackson 
Woods of the 3rd Entrenching Battalion, for example, wrote in a letter dated 15 February 
1917, that  
I tell you I miss Earl. It was hard to say good-bye. But I think that we will be able 
to get to-gether again soon….But I know that we would rather be here and do our 
bit and take what ever comes…[rather than have people tell] our parents that we 
were afraid to [do] our duty. For what is worth living for is worth fighting for.769 
 
The fact that Woods was not infantry, and the timing of the letter predated the large 
battles of 1917, including Vimy and Passchendaele, might account for his continued 
commitment to the cause and his sanguine attitude. Woods might also have just been a 
generally cheery and optimistic person by disposition, or perhaps had yet to become 
disillusioned as to the true nature of Western Front service. One can also read a sense of 
commitment and stoicism in Woods: we will endure and do our duty, come what may. 
Victor Wheeler of the 50th Battalion, though he never actually stated it was not worth it, 
lamented the loss of his comrades and the negative effects it had on the survivors. Aside 
from deaths reinforcing a sense of hatred and longing for revenge, the loss of a friend 
meant “a close and valued companionship of more than two war-years had snapped, and 
my throat was choked with sobs.” A comrade, having lost his brother, “wept bitterly, a 
lament burning deep within him…there had been an inseparable bond between them”770 
which could not be repaired or replaced. Any comment on the contribution this made to 
                                                             
 
769 The spelling and other errors of this letter are kept just as they are, in order to preserve the authenticity of this 
correspondence. Letter from Private J.J. Woods, to Mrs. Johns, from ‘Somewhere in France,’ dated 15 February 1917. 
Found on the Canadian Letters and Images Project, http://www.canadianletters.ca/content/document-11028.  
770 And after leaving the Vimy sector, Wheeler remarked that the men were “utterly fatigued but proud of a job well 
done, sad at the loss of so many of our comrades but thankful for our own delivery.” Any comment on the contribution 
this made to overall victory was noticeably absent, however. Wheeler, The 50th Battalion in No Man’s Land, 99-103. 
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overall victory was noticeably absent, however. Grief might also conjure up certain 
emotions and cloud rational thought.  
 The Corps General Staff, however, felt that the gains at Vimy were worth the cost. 
A unit narrative of April 1917 indicated that at Vimy the casualties suffered were “not 
disproportionate to the success achieved,” and since 9 April the Corps had captured some 
4,500 German POWs.771 Other staff documents from later in April also conformed to this 
view. In one, the author expressed that “our own losses were light in proportion to the 
results achieved,” which included the capture of 1,000s of German POWs, including 87 
officers, and 63 guns, 124 MGs, and 104 TMs.772 At Hill 70, one report indicated that the 
results were worth the casualties sustained, and the losses were “light,” and “within 
moderate bounds.” In exchange for these casualties, the divisions at Hill 70 had inflicted 
heavy losses on the enemy, capturing 1,378 POWs, along with MGs and trench 
mortars.773 And though the Germans had sustained heavy casualties, they had mandatory 
military service in place, and a much larger manpower pool in which to draw from. The 
Canadians, on the other hand, were already scraping the bottom of the barrel in terms of 
volunteer infantry reinforcements, and could therefore not afford such costly casualties. 
The British were also concerned with manpower problems by this phase of the war; the 
balance of 1917 and 1918 would be trying times indeed.  
 
Lessons Learned, Results, Conclusions, and Interpretations 
The operations of the Corps between April and August 1917 illustrate the factors 
that contributed to success on the battlefield, as well as those that compromised chances 
for success, and ultimately, contributed to failure. The reality of failure and a sense of 
futility could certainly encourage the onset of war weariness, though this reaction to 
combat was not confined to unsuccessful armies and individuals. Conversely, war 
weariness manifested itself in the Corps in the final months of the war when there were 
                                                             
 
771 LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4677, Folder 7, File 4, April 1917, Canadian Corps (General Staff), ‘Unit Narrative.’  
772 Ibid, ‘Communique’ 18 April 1917, report ‘The Capture of Vimy Ridge,’ and Intelligence Summaries, ‘Intelligence 
Report,’ 27 April 1917.  
773 LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4677, Folder 8, File 2, August 1917, ‘Summary of Operations, including Hill 70, Report 
on, and Summary of.’ 
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tangible markers of success. Though no two military engagements were the same, some 
common elements can be distilled, especially as to factors contributing to the overall 
success of operations. Discipline was one such factor that helped individuals overcome 
difficulties,774 and acted as a form of control from without, ensuring that soldiers 
remained obedient and did their duty. Discipline could be capricious, uneven, and did not 
always work properly, but with a disciplinary system in place and every soldier doing his 
part this paid dividends during the traumatic experience that was combat. Discipline 
helped keep the troops in the line, despite powerful forces encouraging distance between 
the individual and sources of trauma. The problem with the focus of the authorities on 
discipline was that they often equated this with military effectiveness or battlefield 
prowess, which was mistaken. One set of orders issues to the 2nd Canadian Division, for 
instance, indicated that  
a good fighting division is always a good division in camps and billets, and this is 
shown by the clean turn-out of the individual soldier, the smart saluting, and the 
general good behaviour, all of which are evidence of the pride that every man 
takes in the good name of his division.775 
 
However, just because a unit looked smart on parade and saluted superiors promptly, this 
did not guarantee a good fighting unit in battle. Effectiveness in training and drill, and 
good appearance on the parade ground did not necessarily translate into combat success. 
Conversely, just because a unit seemed to be lacking in formal discipline and deference to 
authority did not indicate poor fighting prowess.776 It was crucial for all ranks to be made 
aware of these policies, orders, and procedures. NCOs, in particular, needed to act as a 
mediator between subordinates and officers,777 and this had the added benefit of 
                                                             
 
774 Men kept advancing at Vimy despite the fact that their comrades were falling all around them, with McGill 
remarking that “that was the kind of discipline that made the taking of Vimy Ridge possible.” Norris, Memoir of 
Captain Harold McGill, 268. 
775 LAC, RG 9 III C9, Volume 4530, Folder 3, ‘To all Commanders 2nd Canadian Division,’ 15 November 1917. 
776 The Australians were notorious for their indiscipline and informality, yet were also touted as one of the most 
effective fighting formations on the Western Front. Their casual demeanor and egalitarianism were seen as 
undisciplined, especially by the British. Beckett, The Great War, 312. There were, however, instances of collective 
indiscipline amongst the Australian forces. Dancocks, Spearhead to Victory, 212. 
777 LAC, RG 9 III C9, Volume 4530, Folder 14E, ‘Daily Orders No. 175,’ 25 June 1917. 
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increasing the familiarity of ORs with their superiors, and encouraged trust and unit 
cohesion. 
 Discipline contributed to battlefield success, but good morale was also a key 
contributing factor to victory. An important aspect of morale was the troops’ confidence 
in their leaders, equipment, their supply lines and medical system, and the attack plan 
they were ordered to carry out. One way that officers of the Corps expressed concern for 
their subordinates was to ensure sufficient food,778 water, and rum. These acted as 
fortifying forces, and contributed both to the health and morale of the troops. A well-fed 
soldier was better able to concentrate, exert energy, and withstand illness and hardship. 
Proper caloric intake also helped prevent somnolence and lethargy, which could be fatal. 
Though it was difficult to ensure adequate sources and supplies of water,779 in quantity 
and quality, extra effort prior Vimy helped ensure sufficient water for the troops. And 
before going ‘over the top’ it was imperative that the soldiers had a hot meal, and went 
into battle with extra rations, lest they be wounded or stranded in No Man’s Land. 
Adrenaline, excitement, and physical exertion expended lots of calories, and the dearth of 
food could halt an attack in its tracks. And after the assault was launched, and during the 
consolidation phase, it was vital that food and water were brought forward in sufficient 
quantities.780 Exhaustion and hunger could imperil an advance, just as a lack of 
ammunition or reinforcements could. Rum and alcohol, but also other drugs like caffeine 
and nicotine, helped the soldiers calm themselves prior to going ‘over the top,’ helped 
them endure the trauma of combat itself, and assisted in their recovery and grieving 
                                                             
 
778 Field rations included meat (fresh, frozen, or preserved), bread or biscuits, bacon, cheese, vegetables (fresh or dried), 
tea, jam, butter, sugar, oatmeal (thrice weekly), rice, salt, mustard, pepper, and (condensed) milk. Nic Clarke, John 
Cranfield and Kris Inwood, “Fighting Fit? Diet, Disease, and Disability in the CEF, 1914-18,” War & Society, 33, 2 
(may 2014): 80-97, and Duffett, The Stomach for Fighting: Food and the Soldiers of the Great War (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2012).  
779 Engineers and MOs had important roles to play in ensuring that proper, potable, and safe water supplies were 
available. Difficulties ensued when shell fire caused breakages and damages to water systems. LAC, RG 9 III C1, 
Volume 3844, Folder 47, File 2, ‘Engineers’ and Volume 3851, Folder 63, File 9, ‘Report on Operations,’ 50th 
Battalion, 17-26 August 1917. 
780 Ibid, Folder 48, File 3, Canadian Corps Scheme (Correspondence), ‘Notes on Conference held at Canadian Corps 
Headquarters.’ This water also needed to be brought forward whenever possible, or “taken up during a lull” in the 
fighting. PPCLI Archives, 34 (8)-8, General Operations, 1st Canadian Division, Vimy. Food was crucial to the attacking 
soldiers, and could affect both morale and psychological health. Nic Clarke, John Cranfield and Kris Inwood, “Fighting 
Fit? Diet, Disease, and Disability in the CEF, 1914-18,” War & Society, 33, 2 (may 2014): 80-97. 
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processes.781 The importance of rum prior to Vimy was nicely captured in the words of 
historian David Bercuson:  
Down the line came the panacea to top all panacea, the rum issue…an 
unbelievably generous one, about triple the ordinary…now, gone were gloom and 
apathy. A wave of quick and confident elation followed the magic-medicine down 
the line.782 
Rum was crucial on the day of attacks, but also on subsequent days of operations to give 
the soldiers extra help in enduring combat and dealing with the various stresses and 
emotions related to it.783  
 The morale of the troops, and the confidence they had in leadership was also 
predicated on the idea of being well-equipped for combat, and having the right equipment 
and clothing to accomplish the task at hand. For the PPCLI, success at Vimy (and Arleux 
and Fresnoy) was partly based on providing the proper equipment, tools, and supplies to 
carry out orders. An adequate supply of Mills bombs, sandbags, candles and matches 
(helpful in dugouts) were important for the attack and consolidation phases. Moreover, 
issuing chocolate and chewing gum also helped, if only to raise troops’ spirits.784 And just 
as water and food needed to be brought forward during the attack to reach the advancing 
troops, so too did equipment and tools need to reach them during the consolidation phase. 
To this end, special carrying parties and follow-up troops needed to bring up ammunition, 
and entrenching tools and wire to help the infantry dig in and repulse counterattacks.785 
 These operations provided lessons for the Corps during the war itself – to allow 
refinement of tactics. During combat, confusion and chaos often reigned, and even 
                                                             
 
781 A soldier wrote that after a rough day “never did rum taste so good!” Roy, ed., The Journal of Private Fraser, 309. 
782 Bercuson, The Patricias, 98. 
783 LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3851, Folder 64, File 3, ‘Instructions for the Offensive Hill 70,’ July 1917. For the 
importance of rum, see Tim Cook, ‘“More a Medicine than a Beverage:’ ‘Demon Rum’ and the Canadian Trench 
Soldier of the First World War,” Canadian Military History 9, 1 (2000): 5-22; LAC, RG 41 III B1, Volume 7, Interview 
with Col. H.S. Cooper of the 3rd Battalion, page 15, and Pugsley, On the Fringe of Hell, 66. 
784 PPCLI Archives, 34 (8)-8, General Operations, 1st Canadian Division, Vimy and LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3846 
Folder 52, File 1, ‘1st Division Report on Vimy Operations, Willerval-Arleux and Fresnoy Operations.’ Moreover, a key 
role in this process was played by the Chaplain Service. At Vimy, they established canteens and coffee stalls near the 
front and on the lines of evacuation. Here the troops received hot drinks (coffee or cocoa), as well as some food and 
stationary for letter-writing. The chaplains also wrote letters for wounded, helped at the main dressing station, prepared 
bodies for burial, organised the evacuation of wounded, worked with burial parties, and many other thankless, but vital, 
tasks. LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4664, Battle of Vimy Ridge, 2nd Canadian Division.  
785 LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 3846, Folder 55, File 1, Arleux-Acheville Operation, 5th British Division, Extracts from 
13th Infantry Brigade (Imperial), ‘War Diary.’  
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dedicated, loyal soldiers could get lost and disoriented. Shell explosions could deafen, 
landmarks and other physical markers destroyed, gas could temporarily blind, and fog and 
smoke could obscure the battlefield. On top of battle confusion and ‘fog of uncertainty,’ 
enormous pressures were placed on the individual during these times, and the strains of 
combat could override a sense of duty and discipline, rational thought and common sense, 
and activate the body’s natural fight or flight response. Shirkers, malingerers, and 
deserters needed to be apprehended and punished, of course, but regular troops who had 
lost their way or needed a brief respite or rest from battle should be treated with more 
understanding – sometimes soldiers just needed a hot beverage and a firm, but 
encouraging word. At Hill 70, trench police established battle stops to deal with 
“stragglers,” as well as a ‘Battle Stragglers Collecting Post.’ The latter was established at 
9:00am on zero minus one, to apprehend stragglers, deserters, and those going AWL 
during the preparation and forming-up phase.786 Similar arrangements were made at 
Vimy, where the ‘Battle Police’ reported to the Assistant Provost Marshall (APM), and 
the posts themselves were manned and patrolled by mounted troops.787 
 Another important lesson gleaned from the operations of April-August 1917 was 
that exhaustion, and war weariness more generally, could imperil an advance; conversely, 
the need for ‘fresh’ troops was paramount, especially when undertaking offensive 
operations against an entrenched defender. Ways to address the fatigue and exhaustion of 
the troops was to ensure that battlefield objectives were realistic, that preparation was as 
complete as possible, that sufficient reserves close by, and that rest and rotation policies 
were in place to limit the number of soldiers exposed to the trauma and mortal danger of 
combat for extended periods. One report on the operations at Hill 70, for example, 
emphasised that the final objective selected should be 
a suitable tactical feature for resisting counterattacks. Its distance should not be so 
great that the troops detailed to take it are exhausted upon arrival – they should 
                                                             
 
786 LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3851, Folder 64, File 3, ‘Instructions for the Offensive Hill 70 – July 1917’ and Folder 
64, File 4, ‘Administrative Arrangements.’ The Military Police (MP) also had duties regarding tracking down offenders, 
such as absentees and deserters. At times, these soldiers showed up in the UK, where they either surrendered to 
authorities or were apprehended. LAC, RG 9 III B1, Volume 3471, 10-4-11, ‘ORs, Absentees, Etc.’ MPs also ensured 
that soldiers went ‘over the top’ when they were ordered to, and also rounded up stragglers. Bourke, Fear, 220. 
787 LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4163, Folder 10, File 1, Operations Vimy, 23-12-16 – 26-2-17, ‘8th Brigade.’  
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reach it [the final objective] as fresh as possible and be capable of meeting beating 
off counter attacks.788 
 
This report highlighted the importance of avoiding exhaustion, and the need for the 
careful planning of operations, and the thorough and up-to-date knowledge of German 
defensive tactics and positions.   
The study of other armies, their operations, experiences, and problems, both 
Allied and enemy, also served to provide the Corps with some lessons to be applied to 
their own upcoming and future operations. During the bloody and protracted French and 
German battle at Verdun, for instance, Arthur Currie, then in command of the 1st 
Division, travelled to the sector to study the operations there. His report highlighted the 
importance of reconnaissance, training, and preparation for attacks, including platoon and 
company training incorporating the latest weapons and using the leap-frog (instead of 
attacking in waves), mutual support, and bite-and-hold tactics.789 More importantly, 
however, was the need to ensure that the troops had high morale, were well-rested and 
prepared for future operations. Indeed, after Vimy the troops required much recuperation. 
One soldier wrote on 16 April 1917 that he had been in the line for 9 days, and “it was 
Hell.” He survived to be taken out of the line “for a few days rest, and, believe me, we 
need it.”790 To prepare for future operations, when out of the line the troops should be “re-
equipped, re-clothed, fed particularly well,” provided with entertainment and 
“consequently returned to the line absolutely fresh and highly trained.”791 These were 
                                                             
 
788 The italics are mine. LAC, RH 9 III C1, Volume 3850, Folder 62, File 1, ‘Report on the Capture of Hill 70.’ 
789 Bercuson, The Patricias, 96. 
790 McClare, ed., The Letters of a Young Canadian Soldier during World War I, 107. Another soldier remarked on 8 
April that “believe me, [we had had] enough for one day.” By 14 April he admitted that “we were very tired.” McGrath, 
The World War I Diary of William Hannaford Ball, 89, 91.  
791 Currie wrote that the French troops at Verdun were specially-trained ‘storm’ troops “on a large scale and their 
morale and esprit-de-corps were consequently very high.” LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3871, Folder 115, File 8, ‘Notes 
on French Attacks, North-East of Verdun in October and December 1916.’ Part of maintaining the health and military 
effectiveness of the troops was also ensuring that their morale was solid. Lessons from Vimy were also applied to 
subsequent operations. Prior to the 7th Brigade raid on the evening of 8/9 June, for instance, the unit was taken out of 
the line for training. These preparations took place in the mornings, but “during the afternoon and evening sports and 
concerts were arranged, with the result that the men came into the line in excellent health and very keen.” RG 9 III D1, 
Volume 4689, Folder 43, File 9, 7th Brigade, June 1917, ‘Unit Narrative, Vimy Front.’ Currie’s visit allowed for the 
analysis and adoption of new tactics, and these lessons were applied to the planning of the Arras and Lens/Hill 70 
attacks. Beckett, The Great War, 229. 
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lessons that his 1st Division, and ultimately the entire Corps, could benefit from. Currie 
seemed to recognise this fact, and argued that Canadians would be more successful “if 
these attacks were made by absolutely fresh troops who had been specially trained for the 
work in hand,” rather than thrown in piecemeal or without proper training.792 Though it 
was not always possible to implement these policies or ensure troops were ‘fresh,’ this 
knowledge helped the Corps leadership understand the factors and forces that undermined 
chances of battlefield success.  
 Attacking soldiers, aside from being well-trained and ‘fresh,’ needed to be 
properly equipped for battle. This included sufficient clothing, equipment, weapons, and 
supplies. During all phases of battle, including preparation, attack, consolidation and 
mopping-up, special weapons and equipment were required for the troops to fulfill their 
duty. The attack phase at Vimy required a copious supply of Mills bombs for the infantry 
to successfully assault and capture positions. The infantry riflemen, as part of the new 
platoon organisation, moreover, were to cooperate and complement the work of Lewis 
gunners, bombers, rifle grenadiers, and TM crews.793 And during the consolidation and 
mopping-up phase of the attack, respectively, sandbags and entrenching equipment, as 
well as “P” (phosphorus) bombs for clearing dugouts, were also helpful. Other lessons 
suggested the need for concealment of assembly and thorough preparations, including 
previous intelligence assessment and observation, which were deemed “absolutely 
essential.” Furthermore, close cooperation with flanking units, and communications with 
the military hierarchy were crucial. Another lesson was that stick grenades were easier to 
throw than the British Mills bombs, giving the Germans an apparent advantage. And 
finally, it was argued that though rifle grenades were essential, better range for the 
                                                             
 
792 LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3871, Folder 115, File 8, ‘Notes on French Attacks, North-East of Verdun in October 
and December 1916.’ 
793 In order to further alleviate the exhaustion facing Lewis gunners in the attack, the use of slings to help carry these 
weapons would help. At Arleux, moreover, the bombers were to carry 10 Mills Bombs, the grenadiers to have 8 rifle 
grenades, and the riflemen to carry an extra bandolier of small arms ammunition, 2 Mills Bombs, 2 flares, and 48 hours 
of rations. LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 3846, Folder 52, File 1, ‘1st Division Report on Vimy Operations, Willerval-
Arleux and Fresnoy Operations’ and, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3847, Folder 55, File 2, ‘2nd Brigade, Operations Arleux, 
Reports on Operations from April 21st to May 4th 1917.’ 
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weapons and more training for grenadiers would be helpful.794 For the soldiers actually 
undertaking these operations, clear evidence that the high command and staff officers 
were doing all in their power to improve the chances of success was important in keeping 
war weariness to a simmer, rather than boiling over into indiscipline and outright refusal.   
The capture of Vimy Ridge and the subsequent operations of the spring and 
summer of 1917, impressive though they were, could not and did not win the war for the 
Entente. There was still much fighting that needed to be done to defeat the enemy, but, on 
balance, the evidence for widespread war weariness in the Canadian Corps at this period 
is largely lacking. The fact that these operations were successful, combined with the 
thorough preparations, respite periods afterwards, and time between these engagements 
ensured that war weariness remained at a simmer. These campaigns were generally short, 
and well-spaced out (after Vimy, the next big operation at Hill 70 was more than three 
months later). The same could not be said for the final months of the war, where there 
was little ‘down time’ and operations occurred in close succession, ensuring that war 
weariness began to boil over into a more serious and collective problem. It is also 
important to note that by the spring and summer of 1918 – when the first signs of 
‘cracking’ begin to appear amongst the Canadians – the Corps had been in the field 
roughly as long as their counterparts on the Western Front had been when they 
experienced similar problems in 1917.795 There were indicators of individual and 
localised war weariness at Vimy, but it was not until later in the war that cumulative 
strain on long-serving soldiers began to have a more significant impact, as experienced 
during the Hundred Days. And because the Canadian forces mostly avoided the worst 
effects of war weariness between April and August 1917, the authorities were less 
prepared for this phenomenon when it did begin to impact individuals and units in 1918. 
After Vimy, the attritional struggle with Germany would have to continue, and the Allied 
                                                             
 
794 LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3847, Folder 55, File 2, ‘2nd Brigade, Operations Arleux, Reports on Operations from 
April 21st to May 4th 1917.’ 
795 During the First World War armies in the field first began experiencing serious and widespread morale and 
commitment problems, and a decline in military effectiveness, after roughly two and a half years of warfare (anywhere 
from 30-40 months). This is based on the war beginning in August 1914, with the major armies all experiencing serious 
complications by 1917. If the Canadians did not enter combat until April 1915 this would suggest problems emerging 
by the spring and summer of 1918, which will be explored below.  
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offensives needed to drive the German Army from occupied France and Belgium, to say 
nothing of the need to subdue Germany itself. It was only by convincing the Germans, 
and the other Central Powers, of their own imminent defeat in the war that would finally 
force the enemy military and political authorities to sue for peace. To that end, the 
Canadians, in tandem with the other Allied armies and nations, would need to destroy the 
Germans’ ability, and will, to continue the fight. The operations at Third Ypres, and the 
continued campaigns into 1918, were designed to attain this objective, however long and 
bloody that process might be.  
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Chapter 4 - War Weariness in the Canadian Forces, 
July-November 1918 
The final period of the war, the five months (July-November) prior to the signing 
of the Armistice in November of 1918, is useful for our examination of war weariness. 
This helps us understand the origins and contributing factors toward, but also the 
characteristics and manifestations of, war weariness on both an individual and collective 
level. In this period there were many aspects, events, and dynamics that induced feelings 
of war weariness so near the end of the war. After years of combat, and war more 
generally, the soldiers had been pushed to, and at times beyond, the breaking point. 
Furthermore, as an attritional, industrial, and total war, the societies and civilians of each 
combatant nation were also reaching the limits of their endurance due to the stresses and 
strains associated with the war effort. The Hundred Days presented individual soldiers, 
but also their military units, with unique challenges. The nature of the fighting in the 
summer and autumn of 1918 helps explain the enormous stresses imposed on the soldiers, 
and the difficulty in maintaining momentum in attacks. This period was characterised by 
sustained combat, with little time for preparation for upcoming operations. Aside from the 
need for physical preparation, there was also little time for emotional and psychological 
preparations, arguably just as important as stockpiling ammunition and ensuring 
sufficient food and water. The war-winning strategy of Allied Commander-in-Chief 
Ferdinand Foch called for nearly constant pressure on the enemy, ensuring they had no 
respite and could not regain the initiative or prepare proper defensive positions. The 
problem with this, of course, was that it afforded less respite for the attacking troops as 
well. The hasty preparations and insufficient time for planning was problematic, to be 
sure, but the lack of time following operations and in anticipation for upcoming 
engagements was also challenging. In 1916/1917, units would be removed from the line 
for extensive periods of rest, training, acclimatization of replacements, and other duties 
after extended or particularly strenuous operations or tours of duty at the front. Thus after 
the Somme or the Third Battle of Ypres, Canadian units that participated were withdrawn 
from the line, sent back to lick their wounds and regain their confidence, strength, and 
morale. During the Hundred Days, however, there was little time after operations to 
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recover, rest, make good on losses, revise doctrine and tactics, replace equipment, and 
integrate reinforcements. This lack of respite, and forcing soldiers to remain in combat 
without sufficient mitigating factors and outlets, was an important contributing factor 
towards the onset of war weariness.  
 An important part of the period following combat operations was to receive, train, 
and integrate replacements. Without this influx and steady stream of reinforcements, and 
without surviving members of the unit to help reconstitute shattered battalions, these 
formations would quickly cease being effective military units, and would ultimately be 
destroyed. The Hundred Days constituted some of the heaviest fighting for the Corps and 
wider British Army, and included some of the bloodiest months, in terms of casualties, 
for the entire war. And as voluntarism had long since dried up in Canada, the Corps was 
reliant upon conscripted and inexperienced Military Service Act (MSA) soldiers, and on 
the very veterans that had suffered so much, for so long. The influx of conscripted troops 
brought its own problems with morale and unit cohesion, but also put added pressure on 
the veterans of the unit. Continuing to use worn soldiers, however dedicated they were, 
eroded their ability to endure the strains of war.  
 We are now able to appreciate that the Hundred Days ensured the defeat of the 
German forces on the Western Front. To the soldiers engaged in these operations at the 
time, however, it was not clear that the war would be successfully concluded in 1918, if at 
all. Others were sanguine that 1919 would be the year of victory, even if it would require 
much heavy fighting and thousands of further casualties. As German power declined and 
its army was unable to halt successive Allied attacks, the writing may have been on the 
wall for Canadian and British participants – and yet, these soldiers were still engaged in a 
war that was mostly won, but not yet over. The acknowledgement of this war as never-
ending trauma was definitely a contributing factor toward the onset of war weariness. The 
reflective soldier knew that his chances of unscathed survival diminished with each 
passing day in the field, and it seemed only a matter of time before he was wounded or 
killed. It was nearly sacrosanct amongst the troops that one could not avoid a shell or 
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bullet “when your number’s up.”796 The inability to reconcile this belief in all but 
inevitable death or disfigurement797 with the need to carry on in combat, directly 
contributed to the development of war weariness. 
 The period from July to November 1918 presented the attacking troops with other 
problems as well. As the defeat of the Germany accelerated after the Entente victory at 
the Second Battle of the Marne, more and more POWs fell into Allied hands. Both 
contemporaries and historians attest to this reality,798 as Germans were overrun, forced to 
surrender, or decided upon it for self-preservation. The capture of all these prisoners 
meant that there were fewer (veteran) enemy troops in the line, and likely encouraged the 
surrender of further Germans as well. It also sent a positive message to the Entente forces, 
supporting the belief that the war might very well come to an end. But these captures also 
had negative consequences. The great upsurge in POWs meant an increase in stress on the 
Entente, a strain on resources, especially food supplies, and there was always the fear of, 
and potential for, treachery on the part of enemy soldiers, especially during capture and 
escort. The period also presented the attackers with other problems such as booby traps 
and scorched-earth tactics; the increased presence of civilians and refugees; and issues 
pertaining to supply and logistical delays. 
 This period provides a useful case study on the contributing factors toward, and 
implications of, war weariness on both an individual and collective level, as well as how 
the legal/disciplinary and medical systems impacted the troops. Between August and 
October 1918 the Corps was engaged in several Vimy-sized battles, starting with the 
Battle of Amiens, beginning 8 August, and then through the Battles of Arras/Drocourt-
Quéant Line in late August and early September, and the Battles of the Canal du Nord 
and Cambrai in late September and into October. In these bloody engagements, all four 
                                                             
 
796 Indeed, this was the title of Morton’s monograph on Canadian soldiers of the First World War. Desmond Morton, 
When Your Number’s Up: The Canadian Soldier in the First World War (Toronto: Random House of Canada, 1993). 
See also LAC, RG 41 III B1, Volume 10, Interview with Allan McNab of the 21st Battalion, Interview 2 of 2, page 6. 
797 Canadian War Museum, George Metcalf Archival Collection, ‘Lt. Charles MacQueen, CEF,’ 20070039-002.  
798 The British Army in France, for instance, took less than 10,000 German POWs between 2 and 29 July 1918, but 
captured over 40,000 POWs in the period 30 July to 26 August, and 27 August to 23 September. Between 24 September 
and 21 October, the British Army seized nearly 70,000 POWs, and between 10 October and 19 November, a further 
20,000 plus POWs. Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War: Explaining World War I (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 370, 
citing the British War Office, Statistics of the Military Effort, 632.  
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divisions of the Corps were involved, at one time or another, and enormous gains were 
made. These gains were attained at enormous cost in lives, however, and it was this 
reality that wore down even the most dedicated, experienced troops, even volunteers.  
In terms of mitigating factors to the development of war weariness, the belief that 
victory was imminent,799 advances (operational or tactical), or at least the perception of 
success on the battlefield acted as a powerful motivating force and helped worn-out 
troops stave off the worst effects of war weariness, at least for a time. German surrenders, 
desertion, withdrawals, and the inability to stem the Entente advance were also tangible 
reminders that the troops might finally be marching to victory, however slowly and costly 
it might be. This was in contrast with earlier in the war, where gains had mostly been 
costly, minimal, and temporary. The military emergency that had been the German Spring 
Offensives had also been defeated, and the Allies were once again on the march through 
German-occupied Europe. The Entente had survived these enemy attacks, and the 
initiative had turned decisively in their favour. American forces were finally arriving in 
Europe in formidable numbers, France and Italy had remained in the war; and though 
they were largely incapable of extended offensive operations, they still held down 
thousands of German and Habsburg forces and manned hundreds of kilometres of front. 
By September and October 1918, Germany’s allies fell one by one, leaving Germany 
increasingly vulnerable. And finally, the economic, financial, and industrial might of the 
Allies was now making a perceptible difference on the battlefield, with technology 
making a real impact on combat. The sheer volume of guns and shells, their increasing 
strength and sophistication, and raw numbers of tanks also began to be felt by both 
Entente troops, and the enemy. The actual performance of the tanks left much to be 
desired, but in terms of psychological impact, they were invaluable. The same could also 
be said for the Allied use of gas warfare; refined doctrine, advanced delivery systems, and 
the willingness to use this weapon all paid dividends for the Allies in the final months of 
the war.800  
                                                             
 
799 A soldier wrote in mid-September there was “a general feeling of victory in the air.” Caughill, Letters to Janet, 127. 
800 The widespread use of gas, however, was a double-edged sword. Liberal use of poison and lachrymal gas could 
cause enemy casualties and force withdrawals, but also Allied casualties with the mere shifting of the wind. The 
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And yet there were also numerous factors that contributed to the onset of war 
weariness, and thus compromised the soldiers’ ability and willingness to endure at the 
front. Aside from heavy casualties, the loss of good soldiers, especially officers, trusted 
comrades, and veterans was difficult for the individual, and the unit to deal with. The 
number of soldiers lost could be replaced in relatively short order, but personalities, trust, 
cohesion, and comradeship could not be. It was difficult to deal with the loss of close 
friends, especially after mid-October when German defeat appeared all but inevitable, if 
not imminent. Logistical problems and supply issues, moreover, negatively affected both 
the health and morale of the troops. And as the front was advancing, in some cases 
several miles each day, this put added pressure on the already overburdened Service 
Corps. The road and railway system could only handle so much traffic. Hindsight informs 
us that Germany did not need to be invaded to effect the defeat of its army in 1918, but 
for the weary infantryman in early November this was not known, and the German 
frontier was a long way off. As any reflective soldier might have asked at this juncture, 
was it worth it? Could I survive this phase of the war? Will my death materially 
contribute to the defeat of the enemy? Such questions were both symptomatic of, and 
reinforced, the deepening war weariness by the final months of the war. 
 
 
Problems Pertaining to Open and Mobile Warfare, and Other 
Issues in the Hundred Days 
With the resumption of more open warfare in the final months of the war, the 
soldiers were relieved they would be out of the dangerous, confining, dirty trenches. Open 
warfare exacerbated some of the problems inherent in trench warfare, but also caused 
entirely new problems. With open warfare, an attacking unit’s flanks were extremely 
vulnerable; the more a unit advanced, the more exposed its flanks and the further it was 
from its own lines and supplies. Shortages and supply problems were the inevitable result 
                                                             
 
extensive use of gas also ensured that attacking troops would need to advance with their SBRs attached; this meant a 
decline in visibility, difficulties breathing and communicating, and served to exhaust the already over-burdened 
soldiers. Furthermore, some gas (like Mustard) could linger in water and shell holes for weeks, causing problems and 
casualties long after it was delivered.  
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of all this (comparatively) rapid movement, and the liberal use of shells and gas only 
increased transportation problems. With destruction of the landscape, it was difficult for 
planners and attacking troops to identify landmarks and other physical features of the 
terrain. As one soldier noted, “maps were completely useless at times, because of the 
countryside being so chewed up.”801 Roads and other features were sometimes non-
existent – how could the troops find their way in this lunar landscape? And with this new 
type of warfare, it was not always clear when or where an attacking force should dig in.802 
With relatively static trench warfare aerial observation and photos, raids and patrols, 
underground tunnelling and mining, and extensive analysis of enemy positions, maps, and 
terrain made it easier for planners to decide where an attack should stop, preferably on a 
natural defensive feature that could be defended, adequately supplied, and reinforced. 
This was especially true as immediate and aggressive counterattacks were an integral 
aspect of German defensive doctrine.803 
 Major Arthur Bick, an artillery officer of the 1st Division, also recognised these 
problems. He noted that the extensive use of HE shells created craters and holes on the 
battlefield, which impeded infantry and armour, and delayed movement.804 The torn-up 
roads and destroyed communications infrastructure directly contributed to congestion and 
                                                             
 
801 Reid, ed., Personal Memoirs of the First World War, 221. 
802 Arthur, ed., Forgotten Voices of the Great War, 289. There were some bad habits picked up by the men while in 
trench warfare and it was sometimes difficult for the infantry to adapt to the new type of open and (more) mobile 
warfare. One document referred to the “tendency [of attacking troops] to take up positions on reverse slopes where 
there was little field of fire.” Moreover, another ‘bad habit’ was the tendency on the part of troops in the line to 
withdraw before relieving troops were actually in position to replace them. LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4189, Folder 8, 
File 4, Notes on Operations, 28-3-18 to 18-10-18, ‘Notes on Recent German Attacks.’ 
803 Currie wrote that in the fighting beyond the Canal du Nord the Germans “have fought us here very, very hard,” and 
that “these counter-attacks were the most violent in character, heavily driven home and made in large numbers.” 
Another soldier noted at Cambrai the Germans resisted in a “severe and stubborn way,” with numerous counterattacks. 
And “the key feature of the German defense became the timely counterattack to destroy the attacker at the moment 
when he was most off balance.” Humphries, ed., The Selected Papers of Sir Arthur Currie, 121; Renison, “A Canadian 
Epic of One Hundred Days,” in Canada at War, 395 and Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics, 94. 
804 Bick, ed., The Diary of an Artillery Officer, 78, 102, 105, 119, 123, 149. At this phase of the war, despite the 
manufacture of thousands of new guns each year, many old artillery pieces were still in operation. With the pace of 
operations it was difficult to remove guns from the line for repair and recalibration; this meant the rifling inside the gun 
barrels became increasingly smooth and worn down over time, affecting the range and accuracy of the shells fired. This 
could destroy roads and other vital pieces of infrastructure and communications. See also pages 79, 102, 118, 131-133. 
The increase in the wear and tear of the guns meant nearly constant repairs and adjustments to maintain accuracy and 
effectiveness. LAC, RG 9 III C12, Volume 4588, No. 81 Canadian Ordnance Mobile Workshop, Folder 3-4. 
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supply problems,805 as well as to confusion, which further undermined the combat 
effectiveness of the affected units. The Germans also contributed to this destruction of 
infrastructure, in an attempt to frustrate and delay the Entente advances. These delaying 
actions also provided the enemy with time to regroup and fall back to well-established 
defensive positions, such as the Hindenburg Line (Siegfriedstellung).806 The Germans 
also covered their retreat to the Canal du Nord with artillery, gas, MGs, and rearguard 
actions, taking the time to blow up most of the bridges across the Canal. In addition, they 
flooded key areas807 in front of the advance by manipulating the dykes and drainage 
system. This was a defensive tactic used multiple times in the final months, with varying 
degrees of effectiveness. At the Canal de la Sensée, for example, German defenders broke 
the dyke bank of the canal, which forced delays on the attacking troops as supplies were 
brought up and engineers were required to repair and build bridges.808  
References to German scorched-earth tactics emerge in contemporary firsthand 
accounts. The physical destruction of important historical or cultural buildings was noted 
by the Entente since August 1914,809 and used extensively in propaganda efforts. But as 
the Allies closed in and Germany’s allies fell into defeat this destruction took on an added 
urgency in the final months. An officer of the PPCLI noted that Cambrai had been 
                                                             
 
805 Ensuring effective communications between the front lines, HQ, and command posts further to the rear was 
especially difficult. As one soldier recalled, telephone and other communications cables would have to be buried, but 
were subject to “frequent breaks and [therefore required] continual supervision.” The inability to communicate properly 
between leadership and attacking forces, as well as between different units, could be disastrous. Reid, Personal 
Memoirs of the First World War, 213, 221, 218-219. Other soldiers noted very heavy traffic and congestion at the Battle 
of Amiens. One remarked, moreover, that all they had to eat in this period was their iron rations “and what we could 
pick up.” Others noted that medical supplies never ran out, but they “sometimes ran short of rations,” which 
compromised the health, morale, and effectiveness of the soldiers.  
806 The Hindenburg Line, as it was known to the Allies, contained the German front system east of Monchy-le-Preux, 
the Fresney-Rouvroy Line, and the Drocourt-Quéant (DQ) Line, which contained the Vis-en-Artois Switch, amongst 
other defensive positions. The Hindenburg Line was “a very strongly prepared defensive system held in great depth by 
the enemy.” Bick, Diary of an Artillery Officer, 108 and 117-119. And in Currie’s Interim Report on the Operations of 
the Canadian Corps during the Year 1918 his description of the German defences illustrated formidable positions 
indeed. He wrote of “a succession of ridges, rivers, and canals, which formed natural lines of defence of very great 
strength…often mutually supporting, [which] had been abundantly fortified…[and] represented years of intensive and 
systematic labour. Barbed wire entanglements…machine gun positions innumerable, and large tunnels had been 
provided for the protection of the garrison.” There were also four main systems of defence, including: the “old German 
front system east of Monchy-le-Preux,” the Fresnes-Rouvroy Line, the DQ Line, and the Canal du Nord Line. 
Humphries, ed., Papers of Sir Arthur Currie, 261-262. 
807 Bick, Diary of an Artillery Officer, 128, 131, and 136. 
808 Ibid, 172 and 178. The Germans also flooded terrain near Mont Houy and Valenciennes to slow the Allied advance. 
809 John Horne and Allan Kramer, German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2001). 
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partially destroyed prior to evacuation, and that many houses had been looted with the 
removal of metal, blankets, furniture, pictures, and the like. At Douai, the Germans 
shelled the town “to pieces,” destroyed bridges, looted homes, set booby traps and 
explosives,810 and blew canal locks to flood “a large portion of the country[side].”811 This 
destruction only exacerbated the logistical difficulties facing the attacking troops. As the 
Germans retreated across France and Belgium they shelled roads, compromised the water 
supply, mined roads, and set explosives to hinder the advance.812 And the city of 
Valenciennes only fell after a bitter struggle in which every bridge and canal was 
destroyed, and every road mined by the withdrawing enemy.813 The destruction of 
bridges, roads, railway crossings, and canals had a dramatic impact on the 
communications infrastructure of the region, slowing the advance and adding to the strain 
already placed on the attackers. As the troops moved further beyond the supply depots 
and railheads, “considerable strain was placed on available lorry resources” and other of 
transport.814 Without proper supplies, the troops could not be expected to maintain the 
same level of combat motivation and effectiveness. 
Though the German Army was declining rapidly in cohesion and combat 
effectiveness, there were still disciplined units able to put up stout resistance. As artillery 
officer Bick noted, the Allies were facing “stubborn” resistance, and many of the 
defenders were fighting with a marked desperation and sense of urgency. The rearguard 
units and machine gunners were especially deadly, causing casualties, slowing troops, 
creating uncertainty, inducing caution. The defenders did not give ground easily; 
                                                             
 
810 The archival/historical record noted the German tendency to make use of booby traps, ruses, and explosives in this 
time period. Prior to their withdrawal, defenders often set up traps, explosives, mines, and these were often attached to 
likely souvenirs. Some explosives were fitted with long-delay action fuses, to kill or maim soldiers long after the 
Germans had departed. The Germans also made widespread use of mines, and set up traps in cupboards, beds, dugouts, 
cellars, and old trenches. See LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4551, Folder 1, File 14, ‘Instructions Re. German Mines and 
Booby Traps,’ 24 August 1918. 
811 Christie, ed., Letters of Agar Adamson, 344-347. 
812 Renison, “A Canadian Epic of One Hundred Days,” in Canada at War, 388. 
813 Ibid, 411. Moreover, archival records of the 9th CIB noted that the Germans blew craters in roads, set fire to a row of 
houses in the city, and the area in front of the Escaut Canal was flooded. LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4189, Folder 8, 
File 1, Operations, Valenciennes, 21-10-18 to 9-11-18, October 1918, 9th Brigade, ‘Field Messages’ and ‘Narrative of 
Operations,’ 43rd Battalion 21-24 October.  
814 LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3946, Folder 64, File 4, ‘Artillery Notes on Attack by Canadian Corps: August 8 th 
1918,’ and Folder 66, File 1, ‘Interim Report Covering the Operations of the Canadian Corps during the year 1918’ (by 
Lt.-Gen. Sir A.W. Currie). 
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transport infrastructure was blown up, crops were destroyed, and villages set ablaze prior 
to evacuation.815 Some accounts of wanton German destruction might be apocryphal or 
exaggerated, nevertheless there was indeed much destruction and delay in the path of the 
Allied advance. This destruction complicated attack plans and compromised the supply 
situation, but also put added pressure and stress on the attacking troops themselves. For 
the ‘poor bloody infantry,’ the war had always been one of physical labour and 
demanding duties. Route marches over long distances was just an accepted aspect of 
soldiering. During the Hundred Days, however, distances and demands grew 
substantially. Private A.E. Smith of the 116th Battalion wrote to his mother from France 
on 11 August 1918 stating that his current billet was, just days ago, six kilometres behind 
the German line. He explained that “it is a long route march to the front line and it is 
getting longer every day,”816 only adding to the strain. Many soldiers were glad to finally 
be making progress, but these exertions wore down even the strongest troops over time. 
The demands placed on the soldiers were also exacerbated by inclement weather 
and other problems associated with open warfare. Although the trenches were not luxury 
accommodations by any stretch of the imagination, there were funk holes, covered 
sections, dugouts, and underground tunnels and chambers where soldiers could escape the 
terrible conditions, at least temporarily. The foetid smell and vermin were perhaps a small 
price to pay for periods of relative safety. During the Hundred Days, however, these 
shelters were left behind as the troops continued to advance. One soldier remarked that in 
the final months “the weather was our worse enemy,”817 suggesting that for some at least, 
the weather was just as hated as the Germans. And just as the enemy could cause 
casualties and undermine the strength of units, so too could the weather and atmospheric 
conditions. As the advance continued beyond the old trench lines out into the open, many 
                                                             
 
815 Bick wrote that the Germans were pillaging and “burning towns, villages and crops as they retire.” It seems that 
while retiring they destroyed “trivial things – sacking a chateaux, burning furniture etc.” but also systematically blew up 
crossings, highways, bridges and the like. Bick, Diary of an Artillery Officer, 149, 163, 165, and 173.  
816 Climo, Lively Letters from World War One, 285 and 288, taken from The Cobourg World, Friday 20 September, 
1918, Page 1:4, ‘Letters From Men at the Front (In France),’ Letter dated 11 August 1918. The editor of this collection 
stated that “hardly any letters from soldiers have been published in October due to the men at the front being too busy 
chasing after the retiring Germans” to write much.  
817 Reid, Personal Memoirs of the First World War, 214. Currie also wrote that adverse weather was one of the main 
difficulties faced by the advancing troops in this period. Humphries, Papers of Sir Arthur Currie, 301-302. 
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soldiers were forced to sleep out in open fields, exposed to the conditions.818 Another 
soldier noted that the weather, the cold tea and food, and the lack of blankets undermined 
their health, morale, and combat motivation. Living in cold and wet trenches, under 
constant shell fire, “from which every human impulse recoils…every human instinct 
cries, ‘Go Back!’”819 did not bode well for the future ability and willingness of soldiers to 
carry on. But carry on they did. 
Another contributor to war weariness in the Hundred Days was the fact that by 
late October 1918, the war was simply not yet over. The decline of the opposition, the 
problems on the German home front, and the fall of its allies all but ensured the ultimate 
defeat of Germany. And yet, the war continued throughout October and into November, 
with heavy casualties being inflicted on both sides all the while. This reality certainly 
contributed to the fed-up attitude increasingly evident amongst the soldiers. Most 
remained committed and loyal, to be sure, yet others worried that they would be killed or 
maimed before the war finally ended. This was a fear exhibited by troops throughout the 
war, but in these final months it took on heightened importance. For many in the line, “it 
had become evident that Germany could not win;” they had lost the war, “but the Allies 
had not yet won it,” ensuring that these troops continued to face mortal danger daily.820 
Thousands would be killed in the final months before the Armistice took effect. Though it 
is often difficult to cut through the hyperbole and hindsight found in soldier memoirs 
written after the conclusion of hostilities, there was a sense among some Canadian troops 
that they were being pushed too hard by their own officers. This perception was made 
worse by evidence of imminent German collapse which only increased in the autumn of 
1918. A soldier of the 49th Battalion remarked that his comrades were “mad about it [the 
order to take Mons], we didn’t want it…they were all grumbling to beat hell, and they 
knew the war was coming to an end…what the hell do we have to go any further for?”821 
                                                             
 
818 Reid, Personal Memoirs of the First World War, 217. 
819 Renison, “A Canadian Epic of One Hundred Days,” in Canada at War, 393. 
820 Francis Rolt-Wheeler and Frederick E. Drinker, eds., History of the Great War: A Comprehensive and Authentic 
History of the War by Land, Sea and Air (Washington: National Publisher Co., 1919), 116. 
821 Another soldier wrote that there was “no need to expend the lives of a lot of men to prove how good we were” at this 
phase of the war. See LAC, RG 41 B III 1, Volume 14, Interview with C.P. Keeler of the 49th Battalion, Interview 2 of 
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Indicators of decline were everywhere, and local German successes like effective 
rearguard actions and counterattacks could not mask wider defeat. One Canadian wrote 
that losses in the final weeks were difficult to bear, especially those “who were sacrificed 
when the victory was in sight.”822 The term ‘sacrifice’ suggests, at the very least, 
disappointment at the (perceived) callousness on the part of Allied leadership. Will Bird 
of the 42nd Battalion recounted that after his sergeant-major informed the troops that 
Mons was to be taken, “every man argued bitterly and it was difficult to get them ready” 
for the attack. Soldiers from another platoon even suggested they attack their own HQ. 
Bird remarked, somewhat pithily, that “the officers were worse enemies than any 
German.”823 It was important that the signing of the Armistice occurred when it did, as 
these attitudes and the war weariness they represented could not remain at a simmer for 
long. And once these sentiments boiled over there would be enormous implications for 
the morale, discipline, commitment, and combat motivation of the soldiers at the front.  
The Corps commander in the Hundred Days, Sir Arthur Currie, also wrote of the 
hard fighting, and the fact that many enemy soldiers fought on to the bitter end. In late 
August 1918 the German Army was “far from defeated,” he wrote, and “was staging an 
orderly withdrawal, desperately trying to stabilise the front along a new defensive 
line.”824 Many enemy units remained in the field, and the liberal use of gas, stout 
rearguard actions, and deadly MG teams ensured that heavy casualties were inflicted on 
the Entente forces whenever they advanced. Both individual soldiers and the military 
units were approaching exhaustion, and yet the fighting continued. And even in 
November, just days before the end of hostilities, Currie wrote of “stiff fighting,” the 
“enemy fighting very stubbornly,” and casualties incurred on the attackers.825 It was this 
                                                             
 
2, page 10; Ibid, Volume 10, Interview with C. Howard of the 20th Battalion, page 23, and Chase, “Unwilling to 
Continue, Ordered to Advance,” 112, 116. 
822 Renison, “A Canadian Epic of One Hundred Days,” in Canada at War, 411. 
823 Bird, Ghosts Have Warm Hands, 147-148. Bird also wrote that “no one wanted to run into any trouble” or get killed 
so near the end of the war. 
824 Humphries, ed., Selected Papers of Sir Arthur Currie, 108 and 126. 
825 On 26 October, Currie wrote that “the Germans fought us exceedingly hard all the way…” and “you must not 
assume that we have been out of the line and resting.” On 1 November Currie wrote to Kemp: “since August 8 th the 
Corps, as you know, has been continuously engaged.” Currie also referred to the “continuity of the operations” and 
“very hard and continuous fighting.” During the Canal du Nord Battle Currie explained the negative impact that these 
operations were having on the military effectiveness of his troops. He wrote that “the tremendous exertions and 
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reality that contributed to the growing war weariness amongst Canadian troops, and wore 
down even the most stoic and committed veterans.  
After years of war and especially combat, Canadian soldiers were experiencing 
the negative repercussions of this long-term service. Not all soldiers were long-serving 
veterans, of course, but nor were they all young, ‘fresh,’ and healthy. Substantial 
experience at the front, and years spent in uniform, were positive in the sense of 
providing personal understandings of the reality at the front, and tips for survival in this 
environment. Service also brought comradeship, confidence, and a sense of purpose. The 
cumulative effect on individuals, however, could be negative as well, as they were worn 
down by trauma, physical exertion, health problems associated with high-stress living, 
and the lack of genuine respite. As Ernest Black explained, most troops taking part in the 
Amiens attack in August “had been in a [big] push before,”826 such as the Somme, Vimy, 
and Third Ypres. The pace of the Hundred Days, however, was all part of the plan to 
conclude the war as quickly as possible. The Germans suffered because of this, but so too 
did the Entente soldiers forced to carry out these plans.  
The CO of the PPCLI also wrote about the problems facing individuals. He 
lamented the loss of friends and fellow officers in costly attacks, where at Arras “one 
whole company was wiped out.” These were not just faces and statistics, these were 
human beings with fears and desires, needs and experiences. In a letter to his wife dated 
27 August 1918, Adamson admitted that “I fear our next casualty list will be a severe one 
as, from all accounts, the fighting has been most intense,” and that it was Foch’s idea to 
“put a Division in the line and let it push for all it is worth for 10 days and then take it 
out.”827 Adamson knew the negative effects of combat took their toll on all troops, 
regardless of their experience, duties, demeanor, or health. By September 1918, the pace 
                                                             
 
considerable casualties consequent upon the four days of almost continuous fighting had made heavy inroads on the 
freshness and efficiency of all arms.” And after five days of fighting at the Canal, he remarked that “to continue to 
throw tired troops against such opposition, without giving them an opportunity to refit and recuperate, was obviously 
inviting a serious failure.” And finally, during the pursuit phase prior to reaching Valenciennes “the 1st Canadian 
Division had now been in the line for two weeks without having an opportunity to rest and refit since the hard-fought 
battle of the Canal du Nord.” Ibid, 299, 127, 131, 280-281, 293-295. 
826 Black, I Want One Volunteer, 164. 
827 Christie, ed., Letters of Agar Adamson, 340-341, Letter to his wife Mabel, dated 27 August 1918.  
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and intensity of the fighting had negatively impacted both individuals and the units they 
served in. Regarding the latter, some units “were all kept very much on the go and I am 
more than ever convinced that the present open fighting is a young man’s job,”828 
suggesting that this type of fighting was more taxing than trench warfare. Another soldier 
of the 26th Battalion wrote in September that despite his unit being “depleted and 
exhausted,” they were expected to attack again.829 The heavy fighting of the period also 
reinforced the notion, present throughout the war, that breakdown in combat, due to the 
cumulative effects of the strains of warfare, was all but inevitable for long-serving 
veterans. In a letter of 3 September, Adamson wrote that “Charles thinks he will crack, 
but wants to stick it for a couple of months…Donald Gray is very anxious to take 
command, becoming second in command to Charles till he cracks.”830 This suggests 
breakdown was expected, but also that Charles sought to remain at the front in a show of 
dedication and duty, but also based on notions of masculinity and social expectations.  
The Hundred Days presented the Canadians with other unique challenges, namely, 
the presence of substantial numbers of civilians, refugees, and other non-combatants in 
the war zone. This increased the pressure placed on soldiers, and meant more work for 
them as well. Civilians in the area complicated attack plans, and induced a sense of 
caution on the part of planners. For example, forces needed to be careful with artillery 
barrages, and according to one artillery officer, “shooting promiscuously is not allowed” 
due to the presence of civilians.831 Attempting to maintain the moral high ground in 
relation to the enemy meant altering attack plans to take these civilians into account. And 
as the Corps continued, they encountered ever more civilians and refugees on their lines 
of advance. One officer noted that by November roughly a third of the soldiers’ rations 
were being shared with locals.832 The presence of civilians, however, might also have 
                                                             
 
828 Adamson, Letters, 341, Letter to his wife Mabel, dated 3 September 1918, Chateau de la Haie.  
829 Caughill, ed., Letters to Janet, 122. 
830 The italics are mine, to emphasise that breakdown was all but inevitable for long-serving veterans. See Ibid. 
831 Bick, Diary of an Artillery Officer, 174. 
832 Christie, Letters of Agar Adamson, 344-347. Another soldier noted that by November the Corps was feeding and 
caring for over 75,000 liberated civilians. Cate, ed., A Soldier’s Memoir of World War I, 76. 
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contributed to the morale of the troops, as they relished the role of liberator and finally 
saw tangible evidence of the positive impact they were making.  
Another difficulty facing the advancing troops was the water situation. This was 
connected to transportation and logistical problems, as well as to German destruction and 
scorched-earth policies. One 2nd Division report of 25 August 1918 indicated that “wells 
in recaptured area are reported contaminated with Arsenic…all water must be tested 
before drinking.”833 It is unclear whether the retreating enemy purposely poisoned wells 
or this was an unintended consequence of combat in the area, though the results were the 
same. Another report indicated that in the forward area “it is unlikely that many of these 
wells will be available for some little time,” ensuring that these shortages could not be 
mitigated by local sources. In some cases, despite the best efforts of support and service 
troops, it was “impossible to obtain water tank lorries to convey water forward under 
divisional arrangements,” which meant the troops would be reliant upon a limited number 
of supply tanks and chlorinating tablets.834 These problems served to undermine both the 
health and morale835 of the participating troops, and were a direct contributing factor 
toward war weariness in the final months of the war.  
Ultimately it was the nature of the fighting during the Hundred Days that eroded 
the strength and will of the long-serving veterans still fighting and dying on the Western 
Front by the summer and autumn of 1918. The hardships and discomfort, hard fighting 
and heavy casualties, the “violent nature of the fighting in 1918, the rapid…movement 
from place to place, and the fact that the troops were almost constantly in action”836 wore 
down even the strongest, most committed veteran soldiers. It was fortuitous that the 
fighting ceased when it did in November 1918, but in August there was still much heavy 
fighting, and suffering, to remain.   
                                                             
 
833 LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4553, Folder 5, File 8, ‘Ref. No. 3-4/4869,’ A.D.M.S., 2nd Canadian Division. 
Purposeful poisoning of wells was also a claim made by some historians. See, for example, Brown, British Logistics on 
the Western Front, 161. 
834 Ibid, ‘Water Supply, Reports On,’ 2-8-16 to 20-11-18, No. 6 CDN Field Ambulance, C.A.M.C. 
835 Because water was in short supply or even unobtainable, at times support services like the YMCA, Salvation Army 
Huts, or Chaplain Services were unable to provide the troops with sufficient coffee, cocoa, or tea. This likely acted as 
an assault on their morale. LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4664, Report ADCS France, and ‘Reports – France.’ 
836 LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4667, Chaplains Reports 12, and Volume 4674, Lt.-Col. W.T. Workman, including a 
‘Report: The Canadian Catholic Chaplains Overseas.’ 
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July-November 1918 and the Hundred Days Campaign in Context 
The period from July to November 1918 was the busiest of the entire war for the 
Canadians in terms of actions and engagements. There were more days in action and in 
preparing for operations than in any previous phase of the war. The Corps fought large 
set-piece battles, and participated in urban warfare, follow-up, mopping up, and pursuit 
operations, and by October nearly-constant advancing. During July 1918, the Corps was 
mostly out of the line and preparing, training, and practicing for the upcoming offensive 
in August. Following this respite, the Corps was nearly always in the line until the signing 
of the Armistice on 11 November, and Canadian troops participated in three large-scale 
battles, and a number of minor operations. The first major action of the campaign took 
place in early August. Between 8 and 11 August the Corps played an integral role in the 
Battle of Amiens.837 Following the successful conclusion of these operations, the Corps 
moved to a different sector of the front to take part in the Second Battles of Arras, 
between 26 August and 3 September.838 And, according to Canada’s Official History, the 
third major battle in which the Corps was engaged was the Battles of the Hindenburg 
Line, including the Canal du Nord, capture of Bourlon Wood (27 September-1 October), 
and the capture of Cambrai (8-9 October).839 Following the capture of Cambrai, pursuit 
                                                             
 
837 Canadian troops, or at least detached units or sub-units, also participated in “actions round Damery” (15-17 August) 
and the Second Battles of the Somme, 1918, including Albert (21-23 August) and Second Bapaume (31 August-3 
September). G.W.L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919: Official History of the Canadian Army in 
the First World War – With an Introduction by Mark Osborne Humphries (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2015), Appendix “F,” 554-556. 
838 During the Battle of Arras aspects of the Corps were also at the Scarpe, or capture of Monchy-le-Preux (26-30 
August) and the Drocourt-Queant Canal (2-3 September). Ibid. Currie also noted that the attack to break the Fresnes-
Roubroy Line began before dawn on 26 August. And the attack on the DQ Line (and DQ Switch) began at 5:00am on 2 
September. Humphries, ed., Selected Papers of Sir Arthur Currie, 110-114. The Corps attacked on 26 August east of 
Arras, with troops on the right bank of the Scarpe. And by 2 September, they had broken through the DQ Line. LAC, 
RG 9 III D1, Volume 4677, Folder 9, File 4, August 1918, ‘Operation Orders’ and Volume 4680, Folder 18, File 18, 4th 
Division, September 1918, ‘Operations DQ Line, Report on.’ 
839 The Battles of the Hindenburg Line included actions at Havrincourt (12 September), Epehy (18 September), St. 
Quentin Canal (29 September-2 October), and Beaurevoir Line (3-5 October). Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary 
Force, 555. The attack on the Canal du Nord began on 27 September, one of the riskiest and most dangerous operations 
of the entire war. Humphries, Selected Papers of Sir Arthur Currie, 118. See also Wheeler, The 50th Battalion in No 
Man’s Land, 261 and 284 and LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4231, Folder 23, File 1, Operations, Canal and Bourlon 
Wood, 20-8-18 to 28-9-18. The Cambrai battle began at 4:30am on 8 October. Allied forces in this period also captured 
the Hindenburg Line north from Marcoing to Lens, and then captured Cambrai, Lille, and Douai. Rolt-Wheeler and 
Drinker, History of the Great War, 125, 127. An officer of the Corps wrote that the 3rd Division was “fighting 
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operations commenced, with the Corps chasing the enemy toward their frontier and 
attempting to keep contact with the retreating Germans. The enemy made a stand at the 
city of Valenciennes, however, and between 1 and 2 November the Corps fought and 
captured the city (as well as Mont Houy).840 This was the final set-piece battle prior to the 
end of the war. After this there was still fighting, but was on a lesser scale.  
Especially compared with the operations of the past, this constituted a very heavy 
period of sustained fighting for the Canadian Corps. The pace of fighting ensured a lack 
of time for preparation, and insufficient time to recuperate following operations. Both 
soldiers and units required time to take certain actions and recover properly. But it was 
this lack of respite, combined with the continued use of long-serving soldiers, which 
directly contributed to the onset and development of war weariness in the final months of 
the war. The collapse of the German Army in the field and the subsequent signing of the 
Armistice was fortuitous, as continued combat of this nature would have led to further 
morale, disciplinary, and commitment problems, not to mention further medical issues.  
During this final phase of the war political,841 military, and other developments 
had a direct bearing on the operations on the Western Front, and on the perception of the 
troops engaged. The perception of battlefield success and tangible aspects of progress, for 
example, might have staved off the worst effects of war weariness on both an individual 
                                                             
 
continuously for twelve days from the crossing of the Canal du Nord on September 27, until it entered Cambrai on the 
9th of October,” suggesting very little respite from the fighting for these units. Cambrai was fully captured by 10 
October. Lt.-Gen. E.L.M. Burns, General Mud: Memoirs of Two World Wars (Toronto/Vancouver: Clarke, Irwin & 
Company Limited, 1970), 76. 
840 After the capture of Cambrai, Canadians were involved in the Battle of Ypres, 1918 (28 September-2 October), 
Pursuit to the Selle (9-12 October), Battle of Courtrai (14-19 October), Battle of the Selle (17-25 October), 
Valenciennes and Mont Houy, Battle of the Sambre (4 November), Passage of the Grand Honnelle (5-7 November), 
and capture of Mons (11 November). The operations at Valenciennes and surrounding areas only began on 1 
November, after the capture of Denain, on 19 October. On 2 November, troops of the British First Army seized 
Valenciennes, the last major battle of the war. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 556; Horne and Austin, eds., 
Source Records of the Great War: Volume VI 1918, xxxvi and 390; and LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4214, Folder 2, File 
3, Operations Valenciennes, November 1918, 47th Battalion, ‘Narrative of Operations’ and report of 13-11-18 by J.M. 
Ross, CO 10th C.I.B; Wheeler, 50th Battalion in No Man’s Land, 274-277, 297 and LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4677, 
Folder 9, File 6, October 1918, ‘Address from L’Abbe O. Podvin, Cure Doyen of Denain, at the Church of St. Martin, 
re. the Deliverance of Denain, by the Canadian Corps, 27th Oct. 1918.’ 
841 The commitment of the US to the war, and the growing number of troop ships arriving in Britain, provided the Allies 
with hope that the enemy could be defeated. The enormous industrial, economic, financial, and demographic strength of 
the US provided a psychological and morale boost; the fact that US forces were inexperienced, insufficiently trained, 
and lacked modern weapons was almost beside the point. US divisions were stronger than their counterparts, and the 
technological superiority of the Entente helped mask the qualitative deficiencies with the quantitative. 
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and collective level, at least for the Allied forces. For the Germans, however, military and 
political developments were a harbinger of worse things to come.842 By 25 September 
Bulgaria sought an armistice with the Entente,843 and Turkey concluded an armistice on 
30 October.844 Continued Entente military victories and advances, combined with 
increasing and sometimes intractable problems on the home front, ensured that war 
weariness began to have serious consequences which could no longer be denied, hidden, 
or properly dealt with. Political changes in Germany and military reverses845 indicated 
this decline and heralded the ultimate defeat of its army. War weariness was not exclusive 
to individuals, and affected large groups of people as well. Indeed, after years of warfare, 
and by the final months whole societies including civilian workers and of course armed 
forces were suffering the negative effects of war weariness. Canadian soldier Coningsby 
Dawson wrote that troops looked to the US for firmness and resolve in the face of 
German calls for leniency, “for the reason that she [the US] is not war-weary, and 
because millions of her men who are in khaki have yet to prove their manhood to 
themselves.”846  
The strength of the Canadian Corps at the end of each month between July and 
December 1918 also reflects the heavy casualties suffered in the final months of the war, 
and the disruption this involved. The charts in Appendix I clearly illustrate the steady 
                                                             
 
842 Regime change in Russia, and the murder of the Tsar and the Romanov family (16 July 1918) began the destruction 
of the old order. This had a deleterious effect on the other monarchies of the continent, not least of which were 
Germany and Austria-Hungary. The peoples of Europe were inspired that they could throw off the shackles of imperial 
government, however radical and violent the process. By 15 September, Vienna called for an international peace 
conference, in an attempt to salvage something from the disintegration caused by the war. Inspired by the words and 
ideas of US President Woodrow Wilson and Bolshevik leader V.I. Lenin, Czechoslovakia declared independence on 21 
October. Barring a military and political miracle, the final defeat of the Habsburgs was only a matter of time. This also 
had a negative effect on Germany and the other remaining Central Powers. 
843 This came less than a fortnight after the Allies attacked the Bulgarian Army at Salonika, on 14-15 September. This 
illustrated the will of the people and the recognition on the part of Bulgaria’s leaders that the war could no longer be 
prosecuted effectively, especially with the dissipation of the pro-war consensus. 
844 To protect and expand its Empire, and to accelerate the defeat of the Turks, the British launched attacks across the 
Middle East and elsewhere. For example, a small British force occupied Baku on 4 August, the last major operation in 
Palestine, which began 19 September, and Damascus fell to British (and allied Arab) forces on 1 October. 
845 By 18 July the French forces had counterattacked at the Marne, driving the Germans back. US forces launched an 
offensive at St. Mihiel on 12 September, followed closely by a combined Franco-American offensive at Meuse-
Argonne on 26 September. The British also recaptured Bapaume on 29 August, and On 24 October Italian forces 
launched the Battle of Vittorio Veneto, which ensured the final defeat of the Habsburg Army. The final Allied offensive 
on the Western Front began 4 November, and by 8 November Maubeuge was re-taken by British forces. 
846 Dawson, Living Bayonets, 215-216. 
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decline in the overall number of available soldiers, especially in terms of ORs. And the 
Corps was also increasingly reliant upon long-serving veterans and recently-trained, 
inexperienced MSA men.847 The substantial loss of life and disruptions this caused the 
Canadian forces were also experienced by other armies. And though British artillery 
production reached its zenith in 1918,848 increased technology could not fully compensate 
for manpower and morale problems. Increasing the overall numbers and sophistication of 
weapons systems was helpful, but increasing firepower was only beneficial if there were 
still sufficient troops to operate this technology, which often required specialist training. 
The final months, especially August to October, were especially bloody periods for the 
British Army on the Western Front, and only July and November saw their casualties dip 
below 35,000.849 In August 1918 they suffered 122,272 casualties; in September 114,831; 
and for October were 121,046. As expressed in a chart, the number of casualties evidently 
spiked during the heaviest fighting of the period. And the number of casualties and losses 
to the French and German armies in this period were equally sobering.850 For Germany 
                                                             
 
847 The MSA did not provide the CEF with as many troops as it could have. In some ways, its impact was a case of ‘too 
little, too late.’ According to the figures provided by the Departments of Justice and Militia and Defence, there had been 
401,882 Class 1 registrations, but of this figure 221,949 were granted exemptions. Of these 179,933 remaining, 24,139 
were unapprehended defaulters, and 26,225 were available for military service, but not called up. This left 129,569 
available for military service, who reported for duty. Of this number, 8,445 were allowed to enlist in the British forces, 
such as the RFC/RAF. This left a balance of 121,124 taken on strength in the CEF. Of these, 16,108 were struck off 
strength as medically unfit or otherwise exempted. This left 105,016 available for service in CEF units. A further 8,637 
were discharged for miscellaneous reasons, leaving a total of 96,379 on strength with the Canadian forces on 11 
November 1918. Of this number, however, only 47,509 proceeded overseas, and of this group only 24,132 were 
actually taken on strength with units in France/Belgium. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 551, Appendix 
“E,” citing Report of the Director of the Military Service Branch to the Honourable The Minister of Justice on the 
Operation of the Military Service Act, 1917, dated 1 March 1919, Canada Sessional Papers No. 246, and Memorandum 
Respecting Work of the Department of Militia and Defence No. 5 and No. 6.   
848 British industry turned out 10,680 new guns in 1918, the most to date. Moreover, 4,873 guns were repaired and 
returned to service, again the highest number during the war years. British industrial output had accelerated throughout 
the war, which was also reflected in the decline in the number of guns manufactured in the US for the UK in 1918 
(213), which was lower than 1916 and 1917. Dale Clarke, World War I Battlefield Artillery Tactics (Oxford: Osprey 
Publishing Ltd., 2014), 25, 60.  
849 Casualties to the British Army on the Western Front for July 1918 amounted to 32,562. For November, the number 
was 20,925. Churchill, The World Crisis, 845, citing British War Office, The Military Effort, 253. 
850 In the French Army, Between July and November of 1918 (the ‘Campagne Offensive de 1918’) 110,000 soldiers 
were killed on the field of battle, or became prisoners. A further 35,000 died in military hospitals in the war zone, 
presumably from wounds and illness sustained in combat; roughly 18,000 died in hospitals in the interior; and 368,000 
were evacuated from the front to the interior. These numbers also appear to exclude officers. Ibid, 846-847, citing 
Journal Officiel, Documents parlementaires, Session Extraordinaire 1920, Annexe 633, Séance du 29 Mars, 1920, 
proposition de resolution Marin and Statistics of the Reicharchiv. German casualties opposite the combined Franco-
Belgian-British fronts (in the West) between July and November were substantial. In this five month period 78,196 
soldiers died on the battlefield alone, 347,867 were missing and taken prisoner, and a further 359,670 were wounded 
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especially, these losses, combined with the dwindling prospect for ultimate victory, 
contributed to their collective war weariness in the final year of the conflict.  
 
 
Training and Preparations 
In the weeks leading up to the offensive at Amiens, the Canadians were engaged 
in training, practicing, and preparing for the upcoming attack. Training included that for 
open and more mobile warfare generally,851 and for more specific operations. Prior to the 
attack on Valenciennes, for example, the 58th Battalion needed to reconnoitre the area, 
coordinate with neighbouring units, and plan for the attack itself.852 Training was also 
designed to help units recuperate from previous operations, and to assimilate 
replacements. As the editor of one soldier journal made clear,  
Even though the [19th] Battalion had just come through an intense period of 
fighting, it had to keep up a regimen of training to help integrate reinforcements 
and to allow newly promoted NCOs to exercise their authority. By keeping the 
men busy [moreover], it helped to distract them from the trauma they had just 
endured.853 
 
Training thus continued throughout the Hundred Days, and when units were taken out of 
the line they were to maintain strict discipline and continue drilling. The 116th Battalion 
was given instructions to carry on “training as there was a temporary lull in the advance” 
at one point in this period.854 These ‘lulls’ were few and far between, and thus authorities 
wanted to ensure that these times were not wasted. Training ensured that lessons from 
recent operations would be studied, and perhaps integrated into doctrine, but also that 
there was little respite for the soldiers actually taking part in operations. This contributed 
to the emerging war weariness. 
                                                             
 
851 The Military Museums, W.A. Howard Library and J.E. Child Archives, TMM FOO 81, John Cummer Fonds, Series 
4-6, 90304, Folder 3, Notebook: Open Warfare.  
852 Cooperation with other units was often based on the use of liaison officers, who were to make contact with and 
coordinate with units on the flank, and to keep their CO apprised of the situation elsewhere. LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 
4163, Folder 12, File 3, Operations Canal du Nord (Bourlon Wood), ‘Narrative of Events.’ 
LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4189, Folder 8, File 1, Operations Valenciennes, 21-10-18 to 9-11-18, ‘58th Battalion.’ 
853 Cane, ed., The Haunting Journal of Deward Barnes, 250. 
854 LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4189, Folder 8, File 1, Operations Valenciennes, 21-10-18 to 9-11-18, 116th (Ontario 
County) Canadian Infantry Bn., ‘Narrative of Operations from October 21st to October 24th, 1918.’ 
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 Training occurred throughout the period, though was concentrated just prior to the 
launching of the offensive; Canadians during the campaign itself were too busy with 
operations to carry on much training behind the lines. When out of the line, training 
involved much exertion, physical exercise, and always army discipline. But this was still 
time out of the line, where soldiers could partially recuperate after fighting. This respite 
was only short-lived, however, but could do wonders for health, morale, and endurance. 
Any relief from the strains of war helped keep war weariness at bay, which is why the 
pace and intensity of the campaign led to such deterioration – there was precious little 
time for such relief. Training and preparation was thus designed, in part, to help the 
troops recover before being thrown back into the maelstrom. For those taken out of the 
line, it was important to take advantage of “rest conditions”855 before returning to the 
front. Support personnel were busy bringing up supplies and stockpiling ammunition, 
whereas infantry and other arms prepared for their roles in the attack. Training for 
combat, however, was much different than the real thing. Once the campaign was 
underway and during periods of heavy fighting, there needed to be time and opportunity 
for recuperation.856 And as the campaign continued, one soldier noted confusion as they 
were given only a “few hours’ notice” for the attack at Arras, and thus little time to rest 
after Amiens.857 Lack of rest and genuine respite was detrimental to individuals, but could 
also compromise the wider military situation itself.  
 The heavy casualties of the period meant time was also required to integrate 
replacements into units. These were soldiers transferred to the infantry, or called up under 
the MSA. Moreover, prior to Amiens Currie ordered a thorough re-organisation of the 
Corps, and these troops would have to be trained in their new roles and acclimate to their 
new surroundings, roles, and units. And as manpower shortages became dire in 1918, fit 
(Category “A1”) soldiers in the support services and non-combatant branches, such as the 
                                                             
 
855 LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4653, Historical 1, ‘Precis, July 1918.’ Artilleryman Ernest Black wrote that during the 
Hundred Days ‘Rest’ meant “a change of activity and we spent the time practicing open warfare.” See Black, I Want 
One Volunteer, 80 and LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4189, Folder 8, File 1, ‘Operations Valenciennes, 58th Battalion.’ 
856 H.M. Urquhart, The History of the 16th Battalion (The Canadian Scottish) Canadian Expeditionary Force in the 
Great War, 1914-1919 (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1932), 301. 
857 Cane, ed., Journal of Deward Barnes, 236, 240. 
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CASC, were ‘combed out’ and sent to infantry units.858 These troops, along with recently-
added MSA men, needed to be inculcated into the life of infantry. This took time, and 
also entailed inspections and drilling.859   
 Before moving into the line, units were required to prepare positions. This 
included repairing trenches and wire, creating defensive positions, establishing jumping-
off points, and ensuring proper communications infrastructure. Units moving into the line 
required time and effort to choose appropriate assembly areas for concentrating troops, to 
examine the ground to identify problem areas and potential routes of advance, and 
establish positions.860 As the advances continued, units were frequently entering new 
sections of line where much work was required. During the battles at the Canal du Nord 
and Bourlon Wood, for example, the 4th CMRs needed to establish an observation post 
when entering a new sector.861 This in turn put added responsibilities on the infantry, who 
often supplemented engineering and Labour Corps personnel with additional working 
parties. And prior to any major attack time, effort, and personnel were required to 
reconnoitre the area and launch reconnaissance patrols.862 Prior to Arras the 2nd Battalion 
sent out parties to reconnoitre approach routes, assembly areas, as well as a possible HQ 
and dressing station location.863 In October 1918, moreover, orders for the next day’s 
action only reached the 52nd Battalion “late at night,” leaving little time for proper 
preparation. Nevertheless, the CO, intelligence officer, and others sent out patrols,864 
crucial to the chances of success. Another Canadian soldier wrote that “an attack made 
without enough time for reconnaissance and preparation will usually fail.”865 It was, 
                                                             
 
858 LAC, RG 150, Volume 247, Canadian Motor Machine Gun M.T. Company. 
859 LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4715, Folder 107, No. 10 Field Ambulance, ‘Historical Records, Operations, Synopsis 
of, from Mount Sorrel, 2nd June 1916 to Mons, 11th November 1918, File 20, 1 November 1918.’ 
860 Urquhart, History of the 16th Battalion, 288, 301. 
861 LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4163, Folder 12, File 3, ‘Narrative of Events.’ 
862 This was crucial in the planning phase, and it was the duty of commanders and staff officers to determine the best 
avenues for attack and medical evacuation, for establishing important positions, and to generally be cognizant of the 
important features of the area. 
863 Murray, History of the 2nd Canadian Battalion, 278. This was also the case for the 16th Battalion, who required time 
to reconnoitre approaches to the front to determine assembly areas. Urquhart, History of the 16th Battalion, 288. 
864 LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4189, Folder 8, File 1, ‘52nd Battalion, 21-24 October 1918.’ Prior to their attack toward 
Valenciennes, the 58th Battalion also sent out parties to reconnoitre the area. Ibid, ‘58th Battalion.’ The launching of 
patrols, and the analysis of the information gathered, were important aspects of any preparation for upcoming attacks. 
See, for instance, Urquhart, History of the 16th Battalion, 301. 
865 Burns, General Mud, 79. 
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however, not always possible to heed this advice, putting extra strain on those forced to 
carry out attacks. 
 Patrols and reconnaissance parties were designed to research the immediate area 
and gather intelligence, which assisted planners and helped staff officers devise 
appropriate plans. Preparations for the Canal du Nord in September 1918, for example, 
were as extensive as the time allowed. The intelligence gathering included information on 
the dimensions of the canal itself,866 as well as the local terrain and potential obstacles. 
And after this information was ascertained, it needed to be analysed, and disseminated to 
planners and decision-makers. To this end, conferences and meetings were held for 
company COs and others who would lead their troops into battle.867 At these gatherings 
orders were issued, maps distributed, discussions held, and other pre-attack plans decided 
upon. Adequate preparations could pay dividends in the attack itself, though sufficient 
time was often in short supply by the final months of the war.  
 Perhaps the most important aspect of preparations prior to, and during, the 
operations of the Hundred Days was that there simply was not enough time for all of it. 
The complexity of the operations and the sheer number of troops and variables involved 
warranted more time for preparation. Yet because of Foch’s strategy of applying constant 
pressure all across the Western Front, there was insufficient time for full preparations for 
operations of this magnitude. The desire of the Entente leadership to defeat the Germans 
before the onset of winter, or before the latter could regroup and recover, pushed the 
participating soldiers to the very limits of their endurance.868 These rushed, incomplete, or 
insufficient preparations caused myriad problems in this period. An officer with the 1st 
Canadian Divisional Artillery (CDA), for example, noted in his diary that barrage maps 
were sometimes late in arriving. These were crucial for the artillery to properly prepare its 
barrages and lifts, but the pace of operations and the fluid nature of the situation 
“necessitates very hasty work by the 1st CDA staff,” especially when orders and maps 
                                                             
 
866 LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4206, Folder 7, File 8, ‘Operations Canal du Nord (Bourlon Wood), 19-9-18.’  
867 Ibid, Volume 4189, Folder 8, File 1, ‘52nd Battalion, 21-24 October 1918.’ 
868 Humphries, ed., Selected Papers of Sir Arthur Currie, 108. 
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were issued at the last minute.869 For the 2nd Battalion, preparations in this period were 
often made “in haste,”870 causing further problems in the attack itself. This also 
negatively affected the 20th Battalion, where the “lack of time for proper preparation” led 
to delays and confusion.871 These problems could prove fatal to those undertaking 
operations, and could compromise entire attack plans.  
This lack of proper preparation time, especially for “battle wearied troops” was 
problematic, to say the least.872 And because of heavy casualties, the lack of properly-
trained replacements, and the pace of operations, under-strength and exhausted units 
tended to suffer heavier losses in battle, which could compromise the local military 
situation. And as was true with military units, so too was the case for individuals. As 
Currie put it, “to continue to throw tired troops against such opposition, without giving 
them an opportunity to refit and recuperate, was obviously inviting a serious failure,”873 
and thus should be avoided at all costs. That attacks were so successful in this period is 
quite remarkable, and suggests the increasing technological sophistication of the Allies, 
but also the deterioration and especially war weariness plaguing the enemy in the final 
months. And to put the pace of operations into perspective, the Corps staff officers and 
planners had months to prepare for the attack at Vimy, and several weeks to plan for the 
attacks at Hill 70, and Third Ypres in 1917. But for the attack on the DQ Line, on the 
other hand, and “unlike previous battles,” Currie and his staff were given mere days to 
plan for this complex operation.874 As one officer wrote in his diary on 2 September 1918, 
the Vimy operation “took months of preparation,” but “four days ago I knew nothing of 
this affair and the job is at the least of equal magnitude.”875 All the set-piece battles of the 
                                                             
 
869 Bick, Diary of an Artillery Officer, 148. 
870 Murray, History of the 2nd Canadian Battalion, 286. 
871 Corrigall, The History of the Twentieth Canadian Battalion, 223, 227, 257 and 260. Corrigall later wrote that the 
pace of operations caused problems, for instance, when the artillery was unable to keep pace with the infantry advance. 
He admitted that these were indeed complex and “complicated” operations. 
872 LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4666, Chaplain Service, Last 100 Days, ‘The Final Advance (7th October-11th 
November).’ 
873 Archival documents quote Currie as saying “to continue to throw tired troops against fresh troops in superior 
numbers was to court disaster.” See Ibid, and Humphries, ed., Selected Papers of Sir Arthur Currie, 281. 
874 Humphries, ed., Selected Papers of Sir Arthur Currie, 108.  
875 Joseph Pope, ed., Letters from the Front: 1914-1918 by Lieutenant-General Maurice A. Pope, C.B., M.C. (Toronto: 
Pope & Company, 1993), 132. 
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Hundred Days were complex, involving thousands of troops, different arms and services, 
numerous units from multiple divisions and brigades, and for some operations, a careful 
emphasis upon secrecy and deception. At Amiens some participating troops found that 
there was insufficient time for proper preparations because of this need for secrecy.876 
Many troops, including NCOs and some officers, were ignorant as to the location and 
objectives of the upcoming attack, leaving little time for reconnaissance and other 
important tasks. The Corps commander again weighed in on this matter, lamenting that 
they were unable to carry out meticulous and careful preparations as they were 
accustomed to. In a letter to Brigadier-General F.W. Hill on 15 August 1918, Currie 
wrote that:  
What worried me more than the actual operation itself was getting the troops and 
guns into position without arousing any suspicion on the part of the Boche. All 
movement for many miles behind our lines had to be carried out at night…the 
move also was so hurried, and the necessity of secret so urgent, that many things 
which are normally done in preparation for an attack had to be left undone.877 
 
It was hoped that these things ‘left undone’ did not imperil the attack. Hasty preparations 
and the nature of the fighting of the Hundred Days only added to the stresses and strains 
imposed on the soldiers, fighting and dying, on the Western Front. Orders issued from the 
high command asked the troops to push the enemy, and themselves, to the very limits of 
their endurance. And it was this reality, coupled with the refusal of German forces to 
quietly submit to the Entente, that exacerbated the growing war weariness found 
everywhere by 1918.  
 
 
                                                             
 
876 Norm Christie, ed., Silhouettes of the Great War: The Memoir of John Harold Becker 1915-1919 (Ottawa: CEF 
Books, 2001), 195. 
877 Humphries, ed., Selected Papers of Sir Arthur Currie, 105 and 263. Currie also noted that after Amiens the Corps 
had to attack without surprise, and with little time for preparation, making Arras more difficult than Amiens.  
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The Operations of the Hundred Days, Contemporary Views, and 
Firsthand Accounts 
 The operations of the Canadian Corps in August 1918, in conjunction with other 
Allied forces, included the two big set-piece battles at Amiens, and then at Arras.878 The 
Battle of Amiens (beginning 8 August) was the first major action of the Hundred Days 
campaign, and punched a large hole in the German defences on the Western Front. After 
this breakthrough the attacking forces pushed the enemy back over eight miles the first 
day, and then another five miles on 9 August.879 And by 10 August British and French 
forces were completing a pincer movement, closing in on Montdidier and the capture of 
roughly 25,000 POWs.880 The Amiens battle officially ended on 11 August, and was 
trailed closely by follow-up and consolidation actions, designed to exploit the gains, beat 
off counterattacks, and prepare the way for further operations. At the Battle of Arras, 
which included operations at the Scarpe River (26-30 August)881 and the DQ Line (2-3 
September), there were further gains. This area was dominated by German defensive 
systems, not least of which was the Hindenburg (or Siegfried) Line. The Canadians, 
playing an outsized role in these final months, “made the first break” in these positions.882 
They were now tasked with breaking the Hindenburg Line, as well as its “tributaries,” 
including the Fresnes-Rouvroy Line, Vis-en-Artois Line, Buissy Switch, and DQ Line 
                                                             
 
878 These full-scale and more traditional set-piece attacks were also joined by pursuit operations, urban warfare, and 
actions against German defensive positions, designed to isolate Germany, destroy the cohesion and fighting 
effectiveness of the Central Powers, and ultimately win the war by defeating them in the field. All weapons were made 
use of, including the Motor Machine Gun Brigades, under the command of the Canadian Independent Force, or 
‘Brutinel’s Brigade.’ And along with combined arms tactics, Allied forces also made use of bite and hold tactics, fire 
and movement, as well as a focus on the initiative, training, and the firepower of the soldiers themselves. LAC, RG 9 III 
D1, Volume 4687, Folder 38, File 5, ‘1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade,’ August 1918. 
879 Pope, Letters from the Front, 127. This rapid advance also allowed for the field ambulances and medical services to 
move their operations forward, bringing their facilities and activities closer to the front line, and thus reducing the time 
casualties had to wait for treatment, medicine, diagnosis, etc. LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4715, Folder 107, File 20, No. 
10 Field Ambulance, Historical Records, Operations, ‘Synopsis of, from Mount Sorrel, 2nd June 1916 to Mons, 11th 
November 1918.’ 
880 Rolt-Wheeler, History of the Great War, 124. 
881 The PPCLI were at Jigsaw Wood during the Battle of Amiens/Scarpe, and then pushed on toward Tilloy and 
Cambrai. The pace of operations, however, proved problematic, as units were forced to attack without proper rest, faced 
stiff opposition, and were forced to pull back in some areas. Attacks on subsequent days were compromised by the fact 
that the “men were tired” as well as by manpower shortages. PPCLI Archives, WWI Battles, 16 (20) – 1, Tilloy.  
882 Some even deemed these impregnable. Horne, Source Records of the Great War Volume VI, xxxiii and Corrigall, 
History of the Twentieth Canadian Battalion, 235.  
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itself;883 these were all astride the Arras-Cambrai road, and protected Cambrai, 
Valenciennes, and Mons.884 In the words of the PPCLI CO, the Corps was “exhausted” 
after these engagements,885 and it was still only early September. 
 The main engagements in September included those around the Hindenburg Line 
and affiliated defensive positions, and the daring attack across the Canal du Nord, which 
began 27 September.886 In October the Corps completed its attack across and beyond the 
formidable Canal, broke through the Marquion Line,887 and captured Bourlon Wood. In 
conjunction with British forces they then advanced on Cambrai. At Bourlon/Bourlon 
Wood, the attacking forces encountered many difficulties, including traffic congestion on 
roads and bridges, which by delaying the arrival of ammunition and supplies888 
compromised the ability to attain battlefield objectives. And as the advance continued all 
along the line, the enemy was forced to evacuate Lens (3 October), and by 9 October the 
city of Cambrai fell to the 3rd Canadian Division and British forces; meanwhile, the 2nd 
Division crossed the Scheldt Canal.889 Allied momentum continued after the fall of 
Cambrai, as the Germans were being pushed back all across the Western Front. Le Cateau 
                                                             
 
883 The attacks on the DQ Line, Buissy Switch, and these other positions began 2 September. These (British) forces 
attacked with tanks, but repeated assaults taxed the strength of the Entente forces. Other sources indicate that in the 
Canadian attacks on 2 September the tanks were late in arriving, forcing the infantry to deal with wire and other 
defensive features on their own. Moreover, clearing pockets of heavy German resistance cost the 85th Battalion (Nova 
Scotia Highlanders) roughly 50% casualties, a rate clearly unsustainable. It must also be remembered that understrength 
and exhausted units tended to take heavier casualties in subsequent operations. See Horne, Source Records of the Great 
War Volume VI, 294; General Ludendorff, My War Memories 1914-1918 – Volume II (London: Hutchison & Co., 
1919), 696, 699; Chartrand, The Canadian Corps in World War I, and LAC, RH 9 III D1, Volume 4680, Folder 18, File 
18, 4th Division, September 1918, ‘Operations DQ Line, Report On.’ 
884 Wheeler, The 50th Battalion in No Man’s Land, 247. 
885 Christie, Letters of Agar Adamson, 342. 
886 On 18 September British troops breached the Hindenburg Line north from Marcoing to Lens, and captured the 
village of Épehy, and thousands of prisoners in the process. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 556; Rolt-
Wheeler, History of the Great War, 125; Wheeler, The 50th Battalion in No Man’s Land, 261 and LAC, RG 9 III C3, 
Volume 4231, Folder 23, File 1, Operations, Canal du Nord and Bourlon Wood, 20-8-18 to 28-9-18, ‘12th Brigade.’ 
887 Wheeler, The 50th Battalion in No Man’s Land, 263. 
888 LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3913, Folder 43, File 3, ‘Notes and Comments on Bourlon Wood Operation.’ French 
cities, towns, and villages were swollen with refugees, which further compounded the supply problem. And as the 
Germans retreated they shelled roads, destroyed water supplies, and mined paths, which also contributed to the 
logistical difficulties. Renison, “A Canadian Epic of One Hundred Days,” in Canada at War, 363, 388. 
889 For the evacuation of Lens, see Rolt-Wheeler, History of the Great War, 127. For information on the Cambrai 
attacks, see Pope, Letters from the Front, 135. 
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and Iwuy were captured on 11 October, Lille and Douai taken on 17 October, and the 
liberation of Denain was completed by the 4th Canadian Division on 19 October.890 
 As the campaign continued into November, the Corps continued its advance 
through France and Belgium, driving the enemy back towards the German frontier. This 
was done in coordination with British units, as well as the French, American, and Belgian 
armies. The main Canadian operations between 1 and 11 November were at 
Valenciennes/Mont Houy, and Mons. But as winter was fast approaching, the Entente 
leadership was dedicated to ending the war as quickly as possible. Allowing the enemy to 
withdraw in good order and establish further defensive positions would ensure at least 
another campaign in 1919. This would destroy the Entente’s momentum and initiative, 
increase the reliance on inexperienced troops, and give the Germans time to regroup. The 
high command sought to avoid this fate at all costs, even to the point of driving their own 
soldiers to the breaking point. Cases of war weariness and shell shock continued right up 
to the signing of the Armistice on 11 November.  
 At Valenciennes and the Mont Houy operations there were still difficulties to 
overcome, even as the German Army – and nation – crumbled in these final weeks of the 
war. Hindsight allows us to appreciate this, but for the regular soldier at the front, there 
was no end in sight.891 The attacking infantry were supported by the artillery and other 
services, but the former were expected to conduct mopping up operations as soon as 
possible,892 which could put undue stress on these individuals. Moreover, conducting 
operations before consolidating gains and moving artillery and supplies forward could 
end in disaster. Fortunately, the Canadians involved were able to overcome resistance in 
the area, even as the 12th Brigade faced “considerable opposition…and the troops were 
unable to progress beyond” a certain point.893 Valenciennes was eventually captured by 
                                                             
 
890 Pope, Letters from the Front, 135; Rolt-Wheeler, History of the Great War, 127 and LAC, RG III D1, Volume 4677, 
Folder 9, File 6, October 1918, ‘Address from L’Abbe Podvin, of Denain, Regarding ‘The Deliverance of Denain, by 
the Canadian Corps, 27 October 1918.’ 
891 The German city of Aachen, for example, was still over 100 miles from Valenciennes. For all the troops knew, they 
still had to cross the German frontier and march on Berlin. See the map in Michael S. Neiberg, The Military Atlas of 
World War I (London: Amber Books, 2014), 95. 
892 LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3914, Folder 46, File 9, ‘Orders and Instructions by the 4th Canadian Division,’ 28-10-18 
to 5-11-18. 
893 Ibid, ‘Report on Mont Houy Operations.’  
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troops of the 11th and 12th Brigades, but not before suffering casualties so near the end of 
the war. According to operational reports, casualties were “comparatively light,” 
amounting to 500 all ranks from the 47th Battalion, of the roughly 1,200 involved (around 
42%).894 Casualties might have been ‘light’ in comparison to the bloody, drawn-out 
attritional struggles of the past, but was little comfort for the grieving families back home 
and their unit comrades. These gains were important, of course, but in the words of one 
contemporary, “never did men more sorely miss their fellows than the Canadians [and] 
their comrades who were sacrificed when the victory was in sight.”895 
 The Canadians captured hundreds of POWs, and contributed to the destruction of 
the Germans’ “resistance and morale” at this late phase of the war. And yet, Valenciennes 
was still a hard-fought battle, in the face of “severest opposition,”896 in which soldiers had 
to deal with obstacles that placed enormous strain on them and their units. To give an 
indication of the devastation, Valenciennes only fell after every bridge was destroyed, and 
every road mined and set with explosives.897 In preparation for the attack, the enemy cut 
retaining walls and constructed dams to raise the water levels of the Canal de L’Escaut 
over six feet. These proved an obstacle at the best of times, but the enemy had also blown 
bridges, wired the approaches to the canal, and destroyed culverts, roads, railway 
crossings, and buildings.898 In the end, Canadian and British units in the vicinity captured 
the city and forced the withdrawal of the remaining Germans back toward the Belgian 
city of Mons. Progress was finally being made, which could cheer the men, but the cost 
was still heavy, which assaulted morale. The advance continued, and by the evening of 10 
November, Canadian units had entered Mons; by the next morning, some had pushed 
                                                             
 
894 LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4214, Folder 2, File 3, Operations Valenciennes, November 1918, 47th Battalion, 
including ‘Narrative of Operations’ and a report of 13-11-18 by J.M. Ross, CO 10th CIB. 
895 Renison, “A Canadian Epic of One Hundred Days,” in Canada at War, 411. 
896 LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4214, Folder 2, File 3, Operations Valenciennes, November 1918, 47th Battalion, 
including ‘Narrative of Operations’ and a report of 13-11-18 by J.M. Ross, CO 10th CIB. 
897 Renison, “A Canadian Epic of One Hundred Days,” in Canada at War, 411. 
898 LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4163, Folder 12, File 4, ‘Operations Mons, October – November 1918.’ 
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beyond the city itself.899 In these operations, there were casualties900 right up until the 
signing of the Armistice. Indeed, Private George Price of the 28th Battalion was perhaps 
the last Canadian to be killed in action on the Western Front, just minutes before 11:00am 
and the suspension of hostilities.901 He was supposedly killed by a sniper, but those still 
fighting had other problems to deal with as well. The PPCLI, for instance, had been 
“desperately crippled” by previous actions around Cambrai, and thus spent “the next 
month…devoted to training and bringing it back to something near the strength of a 
fighting battalion” that could undertake operations. And yet, these units were still 
expected to undertake operations, to maintain pressure on the enemy, to defeat German 
rearguards, and to clear villages. As the PPCLI advanced and overcame enemy resistance, 
the 4th Company even helped seize Mons.902 It is thus no surprise there were indicators of 
war weariness, even on the precipice of victory.  
Though the Hundred Days had been a bloody and protracted affair, the Canadians 
and their allies accomplished what they set out to do. Ultimately, the Central Powers were 
defeated on the field of battle, and were forced to sue for peace in the face of these 
coordinated and unrelenting attacks. The fighting in the final months had cost the Corps 
thousands of casualties, and also contributed in large measure to the development of war 
weariness in this period. And the war weariness would have been even worse if the Corps 
had not been so successful on the battlefield. Nevertheless, the accomplishments all along 
the Western Front cannot be denied or denigrated. By the end of September the 
Canadians had a very strenuous, but also very successful two months of combat. In this 
short period there were four major operations in a span of seven weeks, in which each 
                                                             
 
899 Canadian officer Maurice Pope noted that by the time the Armistice was signed some units were already 
approximately five miles northeast of Mons. See Pope, Letters from the Front, 135 and PPCLI Archives, First World 
War, Regimental History and Summary, Part IV, File No. 16 (1.6) – 1.  
900 Canada’s Official Historian stated that the 3rd Canadian Division “gave its total losses for both 10 and 11 November 
as 9 officers and 107 ORs killed, wounded and missing,” whereas the 2nd Division reported 22 officer and 343 OR 
casualties between 7 and 11 November. Official post-war calculations, however, indicated 18 officers and 262 OR 
casualties (including killed, wounded, MIA, and gassed) on 10 and 11 November. Research done at the behest of Currie 
showed that on the final day of the war there were 16 casualties, one fatal and 15 non-fatal. Nicholson, Canadian 
Expeditionary Force, 482. 
901 CWM, Canada and the First World War, Battles and Fighting – Land Battles, Mons, 
http://www.warmuseum.ca/firstworldwar/history/battles-and-fighting/land-battles/mons/.  
902 PPCLI Archives, World War I Battles, File No. 16 (20) – 1, Mons (The Final Advance). 
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Division took part in three, including at the Canal du Nord. Simply surviving these 
intense and bloody battles, despite the lack of proper rest and respite for the troops 
involved, was impressive enough. The captures in this period were also impressive. By 
the end of September the Corps had captured 27,000 POWs, 170 miles (along the front) 
had been recaptured, 69 villages liberated, 500 guns captured, and had supposedly 
encountered 49 German divisions in the field.903 Currie calculated that between 8 August 
and 11 November, the Corps were responsible for the capture of 31,537 POWs,904 623 
heavy and field guns, 2,842 MGs, 335 heavy and light TMs, and over 500 square miles of 
territory. 228 cities, towns, and villages had also been liberated, including Cambrai, 
Denain, Valenciennes, and Mons.905 Currie was proud of these accomplishments, and the 
Corps’ tenacity during this period, especially at Amiens, Arras, and Cambrai. He wrote 
that just because the newspapers were not discussing the exploits after the capture of 
Cambrai, “you must not assume that we have been out of the line and resting,” as they 
still had to ‘roll up’ the flanks and march on Valenciennes, and beyond.906 Between 
August and November, this was “three months of the hardest fighting experienced by the 
Canadian Corps,” where they suffered heavy casualties in a “period of relentless 
fighting.”907 Official reports were also supplemented by later historical writing and 
analysis that reinforced the view of the presence of war weariness by 1918.908 
                                                             
 
903 Pope, Letters from the Front, 133-134. And though some of these numbers have been called into question in the 
years since the end of the war, including the composition and strength of those German divisions, the totals are 
remarkable nonetheless. 
904 There is some confusion regarding the number of POWs captured in the Hundred Days, largely stemming from the 
fact that my personal copy of The Selected Papers of Sir Arthur Currie: Diaries, Letters, and Report to the Ministry has 
the total captures at 1,537 prisoners. This is clearly a typo, especially as other sources have the total captures as tens of 
thousands (31,537, in fact), and Nicholson stated that the Canadian Corps “was credited with capturing 5033 prisoners” 
during the first day of the Amiens offensive alone. See Humphries, ed., The Selected Papers of Sir Arthur Currie, 303; 
Shane B. Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire: The Canadian Corps in the Last 100 Days of the Great War 
(Westport: CT, 1997), 132, and Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 407. 
905 Humphries, ed., The Selected Papers of Sir Arthur Currie, 303 and Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire, 
132. During the period the Corps broke through at Amiens, Arras, and the Hindenburg Line, and captured Cambrai, 
Denain, Valenciennes, and Mons. Macphail, Medical Services, 381. 
906 Grecoe, The Book of War Letters, 196. 
907 LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3946, Folder 64, File 2, ‘Report of 1918.’ 
908 Granatstein wrote that German morale was “shaken as weariness took hold.” Granatstein, Canada’s Army. A pair of 
Canadian historians titled their chapter on 1918 ‘The Weariest Year.’ Moreover, by late 1917 and without conscription 
(yet), Canadian soldiers adopted fatalism as a coping mechanism, but “even if they were wounded, they would still be 
sent back to the front again and again until army doctors agreed that they were too badly mutilated to be cannon fodder 
any longer.” In 1918 “Borden and his key ministers were as wear-weary as any Canadians.” And Canada went to war 
against Bolshevism even though it was “a country weary enough with fighting Germans.” They also referred to 
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Unit accounts including regimental histories and war diaries (WDs), are a valuable 
tool for understanding how the participants experienced the fighting in the final months, 
as well as the problems encountered. Colonel W.W. Murray, for instance, referred to 
congested roads and the need to advance without the expected tank support at Amiens, 
lamented the brevity of rest periods, German rearguard actions and defensive measures. 
Despite these issues, the 2nd Battalion was successful due to preparation and the 
integration of reinforcements, training, and the use of tactics such as leap-frogging and 
advancing in ‘diamond’ formation.909 Ultimately, the 2nd at Amiens captured seven 
officers and 428 ORs, four guns, 20 MGs, and stores of engineering material, though of 
course suffered casualties as well.910 Moreover, of the factors undermining chances of 
success, perhaps the most important were the “fairly heavy casualties” suffered. Speed 
and especially surprise, however, allowed the attacking forces to overcome enemy 
resistance, artificial smoke and fog, and tanks, helped in this regard as well.911 These 
‘heavy casualties’ only increased in importance over time, particularly as units found 
themselves engaged in action day after day. Neither individual soldiers nor units could 
maintain this pace and casualty rate for long. E.L.M. Burns noted that the 3rd Division 
was “fighting continuously for twelve days from the crossing of the Canal du Nord on 
September 27, until it entered Cambrai on the 9th of October.”912 The nature of these 
operations was hard on both men and machines, and war weariness and breakdown were 
the inevitable result after a certain amount of time.  
 The fighting, exhaustion, and lack of respite in the final months served to 
compromise the endurance and fighting effectiveness of both the individual and unit, and 
began to negatively affect operations. One medical WD referred to “ten days and nights 
                                                             
 
spreading militancy on the home front and how 1918 saw “more strikes in Canada than in the rest of the war years 
combined,” based in part on inflation and stagnant wages. And finally, “war-weariness was relative:” it was worse in 
Europe “where death and hunger had gone on too long,” than in Canada. And all major armies, save the Germans, had 
“cracked” by 1918. First the Habsburgs, then the Russians, French, Italian, and “even British in 1917.” Desmond 
Morton and J.L. Granatstein, Marching to Armageddon: Canadians and the Great War 1914-1919 (Toronto: Lester & 
Orpen Dennys Limited, 1989), Chapter 8, and pages 152, 194, 205, 206, 207. 
909 Murray, History of the 2nd Canadian Battalion, 258, 263, 290, 319, 253, 270, 287,  
910 Ibid, 266, 273. Two days cost the 2nd Battalion 170 total casualties, with 84 on 8 August and 86 on 9 August.  
911 Urquhart also noted German treachery at Amiens, whereby some prisoners of war sought to escape their escorts and 
dashed for weapons to turn on their captors. Urquhart, History of the 16th Battalion, 269, 274, 278-279.  
912 Burns, General Mud, 76. 
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without a rest, [and] rarely getting sleep” either. This was problematic, and troops got fed 
up with such a life. One wrote that “you got awfully tired of 18 days under shell fire and 
mud and machine gun fire and no hot meals…we lived on bully beef and hard 
biscuits…[and] there was no glamour in it at all.”913 Exhaustion had a direct and negative 
impact on soldierly abilities at this phase of the war. As October turned to November, the 
pace of operations and difficulty in maintaining momentum were compounded by poor 
weather. For the 2nd CMRs, “rain and cold wet nights” had the effect of “greatly impeding 
the movements of our troops,” and contributed to trench foot cases.914 And for units of the 
9th Brigade, attacks at Amiens were pushed forward “until an impasse was reached owing 
to the nature of the ground” and the defenders.915 The terrain and weather acted as 
obstacles to the advance, just as the enemy did. 
 Unit histories and WDs provide a relatively narrow outlook, but other accounts 
took a broader view of the situation and contextual reality. From a larger perspective, it 
was clear that the Corps and its constituent units were engaged nearly the entire period of 
the Hundred Days. Lt.-Col. W.T. Workman, writing on behalf of the Catholic Chaplains 
overseas, referred to the “violent nature of fighting in 1918, the rapid movement from 
place to place, and the fact that the troops were almost continually in action,”916 which 
acted as a contributing factor to the onset of war weariness and health problems. And 
though the units of the Corps were advancing and capturing vast quantities of equipment, 
weapons, and POWs, they were suffering heavy casualties with every attack.917 During 
                                                             
 
913 Another soldier of the 43rd Battalion wrote that because of heavy casualties his unit required more men immediately, 
but orders to attack brought consternation. He wrote that “if such a disorganized mob is sent ‘over’ now I shall call it a 
crime.” LAC, RG 41B III 1, Volume 9, Interview with Lt.-Col. T.S. Morrissey of the 13th Battalion, Interview 1 of 2, 
page 17, and LAC, MG 30 E 32, ‘Diary of Corporal Albert West,’ entry for 9 October 1918, page 46. 
914 LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4163, Folder 12, File 9, Operational Summaries, 2nd CMRs, 26-10-18 to 13-11-18, 
‘Summary of Operations,’ 26 October – 13 November. See also Gunner Bertram Howard Cox, Letter of 3 October 
1918, found at http://www.shiawasseehistory.com/coxoctober31918.html.  
915 LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4189, Folder 6, File 5, Operations, Amiens, August 1918, 9th Brigade, ‘Operational 
Orders’ and ‘Amiens Report,’ OC 52nd Battalion. The 43rd Battalion at Arras, moreover, found that they attained their 
objectives “though suffering heavily” in terms of casualties. The 116th Battalion encountered poor weather and thus 
roads in poor condition. Ibid, Folder 7, File 1, Operations Arras, August 1918, 9th Brigade, ‘43rd Battalion Narrative of 
Operations’ and Ibid, Folder 8, File 1, Operations Valenciennes, ‘116th Battalion.’ 
916 LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4674, Lt.-Col. W.T. Workman, including ‘Report: The Canadian Catholic Chaplains 
Overseas.’ 
917 It was difficult to calculate the number of POWs captured, as many were used as stretcher bearers. The 9th Brigade at 
the Canal du Nord and Bourlon Wood, however, estimated that there were approximately 200 captured on 28 
September, 300 on 29 September, and 450 on 1 October (for a total of roughly 950). The casualties for the four 
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the Valenciennes operations, other problems included the substantial number of civilians 
and refugees in the area. Being greeted as liberators boosted spirits, but also meant limits 
placed on military operational flexibility and freedom, as well as the sharing of rations 
and water. Moreover, the Germans continued to practice scorched-earth tactics; under 
such circumstances it was difficult to advance, and especially to maintain contact with 
other units in these conditions.918 Accounts of those in staff positions, part of the High 
Command, or at HQ,919 including Currie, also provide insight into the difficulties 
encountered by attacking troops, and some of the various factors that helped overcome 
these difficulties, and ultimately contributed to victory. Currie wrote that after the loss of 
surprise the fighting on 9 August, the second day of the Amiens operation, “fresh 
[German] troops” offered stiff resistance to the attackers. This highlighted the importance 
of having rested soldiers for each phase of the attack, and the maintenance of surprise. 
Despite the difficulties encountered, however, the German Army was “impressed” with 
Allied superiority and the “great determination of our troops.”920 This was an impressive 
victory indeed, as evidenced by the congratulatory messages and visits921 after the 
conclusion of the battle. 
 Agar Adamson of the PPCLI lamented the heavy casualties inflicted on his troops 
and fellow officers. In many cases these were not only colleagues, they were friends and 
companions too. He referred to the fighting as “most intense” in a letter to his wife, in 
part because of Foch’s plan to maintain pressure on the faltering Germans all along the 
front. Adamson also referred to breaking down (or “cracking”) after long service at the 
                                                             
 
battalions engaged (43rd, 52nd, 58th, and 116th), however, were also substantial. Between 27 September and 2 October 
there were 221 killed, 905 wounded, 397 MIA, a total of 1,523 casualties. LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4189, Folder 7, 
File 3, Canal du Nord (Bourlon Wood), 13-9-18 to 9-10-18, ‘9th Brigade.’  
918 Ibid, Folder 8, File 1, Operations, Valenciennes, 21-10-18 to 9-11-18, October 1918, 9th Brigade, ‘Field Messages,’ 
and ‘Narrative of Operations,’ 43rd Battalion, 21-24 October.  
919 Though the tone and motivation of these accounts might be affected by their biases and propagandistic nature and 
value, they are still a good source for understanding events during this period. 
920 LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3946, Folder 66, File 2, ‘Interim Report Covering the Operations of the Canadian Corps 
during the Year 1918 (By Lieutenant-General Sir A.W. Currie.)’  
921 After the Allied victory at Amiens, and in recognition of Canada’s role in the battle, the King made a personal visit, 
as did Georges Clemenceau, and members from the Belgian and Italian mission at GHQ. There were also telegrams 
from the Duke of Connaught, PM Borden, Sir Edward Kemp, Major-General Mewburn, General Plumer, General 
Horne, and letters of congratulations from Commander-in-Chief Haig, and Generals Byng, Rawlinson, and others. 
LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4677, Folder 9, File 5, August 1918, ‘Unit Narratives.’  
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front as all but inevitable.922 These combat veterans were aware of the reality at the front, 
and acknowledged that all soldiers had their breaking point. The intensity of fighting was 
also noted by the commander of the British First Army, Henry Horne. In a report of 4 
October, he praised the “determined fighting of the Canadian Corps during the last five 
days,” which saw them cross the Canal du Nord and capture Bourlon Wood. The Corps 
also had to destroy numerous determined counterattacks, with troops from 12 German 
divisions engaged.923  
 One artilleryman who participated in the Battle for Mont Houy and the capture of 
Valenciennes was Andrew McNaughton, Canada’s Counter-Battery Staff Officer. Of the 
problems encountered in the final months, he referenced the German propensity to 
counterattack any Allied gains as soon as possible. This was part of their defensive 
doctrine, and gave no respite to attacking troops. This also suggested the importance of 
having ‘fresh’ reserves close at hand for consolidation and follow-up operations. He 
noted, moreover, that proper planning and preparations were still required, as suddenly 
improvised attacks were liable to failure, especially important given the pace of 
operations during the period.924 McNaughton also expressed concern for the presence of 
civilians, how it was important to be careful in the deployment of gas and artillery.925  
McNaughton also provided an indication as to the importance of the successful 
attack at Valenciennes. This was the Corps’ final set-piece assault, its last “major pre-
arranged attack” of the war. Valenciennes can therefore be seen as incorporating many of 
the lessons learned over the previously bloody years of combat on the Western Front. The 
Corps managed to break the German lines, a “key position stoutly and desperately 
defended,” suggesting the improvement of the Canadians, but also the decline of the 
                                                             
 
922 Christie, Letters of Agar Adamson, 341. 
923 LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4547, Folder 1, File 4, ‘Canadian Corps Routine Orders, 3rd Canadian Field 
Ambulance,’ 23-7-18 to 21-1-19.  
924 McNaughton noted that careful and thorough preparations were one of the keys to victory. Prior to any major attack 
it was imperative to locate strong points and enemy defences, use aeroplane photos and intelligence reports to make 
maps, to coordinate with different units, and to study previous operations, especially regarding enemy positions and 
probable counterattack plans. It was crucial not to overlook any dangerous possibility, and prepare for any contingency. 
Major-General A.G.L. McNaughton, “The Capture of Valenciennes: ‘A Study in Co-ordination,’” Canadian Defence 
Quarterly 10, 3 (April 1933): 279-294. See pages 281, 283, and 289. 
925 Ibid, 284 and 290.   
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Germans.926 Canadian casualties were deemed ‘light’ compared with those of the enemy 
and considering the important gains made, totalling 60 killed and 300 wounded. And 
finally, this was an important battle because of the enormous amount of artillery pieces 
and weight of shells involved. At Mont Houy 88,090 artillery rounds were fired, 
amounting to 2,149 tons. In contrast, at the Battle of Waterloo (1815) there were roughly 
9,000 rounds fired, of 37 tons; during the entire Second Boer War, 279,000 rounds of 
2,800 tons were fired, and the German fleet at Jutland (1916) fired a total of 1,942 tons. 
This firepower was impressive, constituting “the most intense barrage in history 
[supporting] a single infantry brigade.”927 It is thus not surprising there were so many 
demoralized prisoners in the wake of such fire. This reliance on artillery and technology 
might also have helped mitigate the worst effects of war weariness amongst the troops in 
this operation, as Canadian soldiers spent less time in combat. But the thunderous artillery 
shook the ground and rattled the nerves of even the most experienced veterans. 
Another feature of the period was the enormous distances covered, and the sheer 
pace of operations. One veteran referred to it as “the almost continuous offensive 
operations which took the Canadian Corps from in front of Amiens on August 8 to Mons 
on the 11th of November”928 and the end of the war. Currie wrote that after Amiens and 
Arras, “something had to break,” but was thankful that it was not the Canadians as a 
whole (though there were certainly individuals who broke down). In this final campaign, 
the Corps was advancing and pushing hard, suffering casualties but also pushing the 
Germans inexorably back. In a letter of mid-October, Currie wrote that “we are still in the 
line, three [divisions] in and one out, so you see there is no rest for the wicked.”929 James 
Adams of the 26th Battalion wrote that though he was new to the front, “many of the lads 
here through the Amiens business have had about enough and are under a great deal of 
strain.” Yet despite these problems “we continue to win battle after battle but are given no 
                                                             
 
926 According to McNaughton, German dead littered the battlefield – there were corpses in rifle and MG pits, in 
trenches and sunken roads, out in the open, and in demolished houses. Over 800 enemy dead were collected, and over 
1,000 unwounded POWs captured. 
927 Ibid, 279, 292-293. 
928 Burns, General Mud, 70. 
929 LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4648, England 1915-1919, ‘Currie Letter,’ dated 16 October 1918. 
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rest,” and are “victims of our own success I guess.”930 The reality of this open and more 
mobile warfare proved a challenge for all involved. Aside from the “demands of the 
varying conditions” and types of terrain, the heavy casualties, the difficulties in bringing 
up adequate supplies, the lack of opportunity for rest, respite, relief, and recuperation 
undermined the health and morale of the soldiers involved.931 These military successes 
were thus bought at a rather heavy cost.  
Members of the medical services and Chaplain Service provide unique insight into 
the health, morale, and overall well-being of the troops at this time. One British MO 
wrote that when the Germans were undertaking defensive destruction and scorched-earth 
tactics, they often made shelters unusable in less than sanitary ways.932 And for the 
members of the No. 10 Canadian Field Ambulance, the preparations, operations, and 
follow-up aspects of Amiens between 2 and 20 August were characterised by congestion 
and crowded roads, where progress was “slow and wearisome;” rapid advances served to 
complicate medical arrangements933 and delay the arrival of equipment and supplies. And 
after the loss of surprise, enemy resistance increased over time and “held to his strong 
points with stubborn determination.” And yet, despite this “more difficult phase of the 
fighting,” the men went forward with the “same spirit and eagerness that characterized the 
first day of action” at Amiens.934 The Entente forces were able to overcome these 
difficulties, but this last point on their ‘spirit and eagerness’ speaks to a larger problem in 
the realm of military history, namely, the difficulty in analysing these intangible 
descriptors, such ‘dash,’ ‘bravery,’ and ‘devotion.’935 What exactly do these terms mean? 
Did this suggest they had good morale, effective discipline, the use of rum and other 
fortifying forces? Does it mean they triumphed in combat despite difficulties? There are 
                                                             
 
930 Caughill, ed., Letters to Janet, 114. 
931 LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4666, Amiens, ‘Report’ by the A.D.C.S., dated 20 September 1918. 
932 The retreating Germans did their best “to make all shelter unusable,” by fouling floors, defecating in basins and on 
cooking tools, etcetera. Davidson, A Doctor in the Great War, 108. 
933 LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4715, Folder 107, File 20, No. 10 Field Ambulance, Historical Records, ‘Operations, 
Synopsis of, from Mount Sorrel, 2nd June 1916 to Mons, 11th November 1918.’ 
934 Ibid. 
935 See, for instance, the ‘Special Orders’ of the day for the Canal du Nord, which referred to the “dash and magnificent 
bravery of our incomparable infantry,” the “skill” of the machine gunners, and the “initiative and resourcefulness” of 
the engineers. LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4747, Folder 178, File 2, ‘Special Orders’ of the Day, ‘Canal du Nord.’ 
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difficulties in quantifying and understanding behaviour and motivations in the chaos of 
combat and the ‘fog of uncertainty,’ in the words of Clausewitz. But this problem is also 
based on the penchant to attribute success and victory on the battlefield to the ‘character’ 
of the individuals involved. This only seems to complicate the task of the historian and 
muddle the waters of analysis.  
Many stresses confronted the attacking soldiers in this period. As part of their 
scorched-earth tactics, for example, the Germans purposely flooded large sectors of 
ground prior to retiring.936 The advancing troops also had to deal with large numbers of 
civilians and refugees, many of whom were in an “emaciated condition” after years of 
hardship. The liberation of formerly-occupied areas “was recompensed by the suffering 
and misery of the days spent in the trenches,” where death, disease, and disfigurement 
lurked around every corner. The fighting in the Hundred Days was difficult and 
undermined health and morale, but chaplains and the YMCA played a key role in 
providing the men with coffee, cigarettes, biscuits, and other material comforts. The 
Chaplain Service and those attached to infantry and other units played an important role 
in the health, morale, physical, emotional, and spiritual well-being of the soldiers at the 
front and on the lines of communication. One chaplain wrote on 8 August that he visited 
medical facilities and wounded troops to offer coffee and smokes, and organised a coffee 
stall at the ADS.937 The importance and benefits of these actions cannot be measured or 
quantified, but they were invaluable. In letters from the front, Coningsby Dawson made 
reference to booby traps, often attached to explosives and mines, and the scorched earth 
tactics of the Germans. This included the destruction of buildings and property, the 
levelling of cities, and even “civilian populations…being carried away captive”938 by the 
enemy. F.A. McKenzie, who fought at Amiens, Arras, and the D-Q Line, made reference 
to encountering booby traps, obstacles and tank traps. He noted, moreover, that despite 
declining German morale, enemy machine gunners put up stout resistance, battalion 
losses were “cruelly heavy,” and the defenders were at times able to withdraw in good 
                                                             
 
936 LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4715, Folder 107, File 20, No. 10 Field Ambulance, ‘1 September – 31 October.’ 
937 LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4651, Diaries 1, ‘Entry for 8 and 9 August.’ 
938 Dawson, Living Bayonets, 206, 213.  
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order.939 Nevertheless, at Amiens alone the Entente forces penetrated to a depth of 12 
miles on the first day, and within a fortnight 30 villages had been liberated, over 10,000 
German POWs captured, along with hundreds of guns.940 
 Yet despite these gains and successes on the battlefield, they came at a rather 
heavy cost. There were casualties suffered by attacking troops and support personnel – as 
well as to the defenders – but also unprecedented demands were placed on the surviving 
soldiers. It was up to these long-serving veterans, in addition to recently-arrived 
conscripted troops, to ensure attacks continued and that the enemy was given no respite to 
regroup. Will Bird of the 42nd Battalion wrote at Amiens “I felt I would collapse if I did 
not get anything to eat,” which suggested how busy the soldiers were and the supply 
problems inherent in this warfare. Bird admitted he was simply exhausted from lack of 
sleep and physical exertion, and that he was extremely thirsty during this period as 
well.941 These problems, combined with the pace of the fighting, ensured that the health 
and morale942 of soldiers could become compromised, and these factors all contributed to 
the growing war weariness amongst both individuals and units. These problems wore 
down even the strongest and most dedicated troops, and one wrote in a letter about the 
continuous fighting and moving, and the extended periods without proper rest and 
recuperation. His unit went ‘over the top’ three times in one week, and then again three 
times in eight days.943 This pace could certainly not be maintained for long, and 
contributed to war weariness and psychiatric casualties. Victor Wheeler of the 50th 
Battalion also wrote about the pace and intensity of operations, and the negative effects 
this had on himself and comrades. Long marches and combat led to “great physical and 
mental strain” in this period. And before the Battle of Amiens, his unit arrived in 
jumping-off positions “already exhausted, [and] we lay down on our haunches like weary 
                                                             
 
939 Horne, Source Records of the Great War Volume VI, 292, 295, 293. 
940 Ibid, 287. 
941 Bird, Ghosts Have Warm Hands, 99-102, 108 and Caughill, ed., Letters to Janet, 118. 
942 These problems could compromise the health and morale of the soldiers, but morale could also be bolstered by 
battlefield success and victories. Black wrote that after the breakthrough at Amiens he and his men had high morale, 
explaining that “we had done very well and were aware of it.” It is important to note, however, that they were 
artillerymen, so were not exposed to as much death and trauma, in an immediate sense, as their infantry counterparts. 
Black, I Want One Volunteer, 53. 
943 Grescoe, eds., The Book of War Letters, 186. 
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oxen on the soaking-wet ground to get a few hours rest before zero hour” the next 
morning.944 Wheeler also acknowledged heavy casualties, especially to officers; that his 
battalion faced “long, hard” days at Amiens, where units advanced for three straight days; 
and that his unit, “worn down by the heat and the lack of drinking water…lost a lot of 
men.”945 This lack of water could have serious detrimental effects on both individuals, 
units, and their ability to seize battlefield objectives. At times, desperation for water led 
troops to drink from contaminated (with poison gas) water sources.946 Desperation 
contributed to health problems, and discontent on the part of participating soldiers.  
One contemporary noted that the Battle of Cambrai, after the hard-fought victories 
at Amiens, Arras, and the Canal du Nord, was the “most intense and fierce battle” of 
1918, in part because the enemy was “desperate,” and fought in a “severe and stubborn” 
way. They relied heavily on rearguard units, MGs, and gas as manpower problems rose 
dramatically. The Germans also continued to launch counterattacks in an attempt to 
dislodge the Allied forces. The Canadian and British troops finally captured Cambrai on 9 
October, and observers noted that “even victorious war is an awful thing.”947 The Army 
high command, the press and politicians, the propaganda and public could all discuss 
glory, personal heroism, sacrifice, and defence of the Empire, but for the soldiers actually 
taking part in these operations, it was likely a different sort of feeling after these bloody 
battles. This rhetoric, moreover, was largely unwelcome amongst the troops, and made 
certain commanders appear callous or out-of-touch with reality.948 
 
 
                                                             
 
944 Wheeler, The 50th Battalion in No Man’s Land, 230-231. 
945 Ibid, 239, 236-237, 239, 244. Wheeler stated that at the Amiens battle alone, the 50th Battalion lost 14 officers, and 
231 ORs killed, wounded, MIA, or gassed.  
946 It was very difficult to maintain communications owing to the speed of the advance. Ibid, 233 and 245.  
947 Renison, “A Canadian Epic of One Hundred Days,” in Canada at War, 394-396. 
948 Currie, for instance, “had an unfortunate gift for the ill-chosen phrase.” He apparently spoke to a group of exhausted 
survivors of a unit, saying ‘that’s the way I like to see you, all mud and blood.’ Morton and Granatstein, Marching to 
Armageddon, 197.  
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Casualties, Medical Aspects, and Medical Arrangements for July-
November 1918 
The medical arrangements illustrate the developments made in military medicine 
during the war, but also the perennial problems affecting soldiers and those responsible 
for their care. The thousands of wounded, gassed, and ill admitted to medical facilities949 
demonstrate that despite the decline of German fighting power, heavy casualties were still 
inflicted on the attacking forces, including 1,000s of killed or MIA. These casualties also 
reflect that in many ways the power of the defensive950 still had the advantage over 
offensive forces, even during this period of open and more mobile warfare; every time 
there were engagements beyond normal trench warfare, there was also a corresponding 
increase in casualties.951 This is perhaps counterintuitive given the general perception of 
terrible trench conditions and artillery bombardments. But the reality was that trenches 
provided a modicum of protection, and trench warfare had a twisted logic and 
predictability about it. Tunnels and communication trenches provided some measure of 
protection for those bringing supplies up the line, and removing casualties. Open warfare, 
on the other hand, exposed troops to danger from above, below, and all sides.   
 The medical classification system ensured that manpower requirements were 
addressed above all else. By the final months of the war, the emphasis on preserving and 
maximising manpower for the coming campaign, and to compensate for heavy casualties, 
took on a new level of importance and urgency. On 12 August 1918 the classification of 
soldiers in CASC units was updated,952 presumably to ensure that any troops fit for 
frontline service were transferred to infantry units. The idea was that these individuals 
were of more use in combat units, and their experience and expertise along the lines of 
communication could be more easily replaced. This attempt to free up all able-bodied 
troops for combat duties also occurred right after the closing of the Amiens battle, where 
heavy casualties were suffered. Infantry units needed to be brought up to strength, and the 
                                                             
 
949 See, for example, LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4677, Folder 9, File 4, August 1918, ‘Operation Orders.’ 
950 One historian argued that even by the final months of the war the Allies never achieved “the technical means to 
completely break through an opposing defensive system.” Beckett, The Making of the First World War, 234. 
951 LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4564, Folder 2, File 1, ‘Casualties: Monthly Returns, Sick and Wounded, 1-1-17 to 1-
2-19.’ 
952 LAC, RG 150, Volume 246, 9th Depot Unit of Supply, File ‘12-8-18.’ 
271 
 
 
 
combing out of rear echelons for any remaining “A” men could help supplement those 
arriving from reserve units, hospitals, and the newly-arrived MSA troops.953 But even 
when infantry and other combat units were up to strength, they still suffered heavy 
casualties. Due to the nature of operations thousands of casualties were regularly admitted 
to medical facilities from the front and lines of communication. Front-line evacuations 
constituted a higher percentage of these casualties,954 and numbers spiked during periods 
of combat; even successful operations were costly, and wore down the strength of both 
individuals and units. At the Arras operations, medical personnel and the combat services 
encountered many difficulties. During inclement weather, for example, roads could 
become nearly impossible to traverse with the rain and mud, it was difficult to avoid 
congestion, and the reliance on evacuation by hand slowed and complicated matters. Yet 
despite these obstacles, “these [medical] men did exceptionally good work today under 
very heavy shell fire”955 and exposure to other mortal danger. This evacuation system 
generally worked quite well,956 especially given the enormous challenges facing medical 
personnel and the number of casualties suffered. The system did well under the 
circumstances, but not all troops were treated equally and on the whole the needs of the 
collective, especially manpower and morale, trumped those of the individual. This was 
the case when soldiers were sent back to the front prematurely, or before their treatment 
had been completed.957 With war-weary and psychiatric cases, this increased the chances 
                                                             
 
953 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3597, 24-1-4C, Returns, ‘Strengths and Casualties’ and Volume 3686, 30-0-0 (Volume 
4), June 1918 – December 1918, General Correspondence, 21 August 1918, ‘Instructions for Medical Officers.’ See 
also Brown, British Logistics on the Western Front, 165. 
954 LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4564, Folder 2, File 2, Weekly Statistical Reports, ‘Concise Report for Week Ending 
Midnight, Saturday August 17th, 1918.’ 
955 LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4546, Folder 6, File 3, Appendix “B” to Diary for August, ‘Report of Fighting East of 
Arras, 26-28 August 1918.’  
956 To provide one example, Coningsby Dawson was wounded by shell fire near the DQ Line, and was sent to an 
advanced aid post, likely a RAP or advanced dressing station. From there, he was sent to Arras and a CCS. After this he 
proceeded by train to the British Army bases on the coast, to No. 20 General Hospital, before taking a train to the port 
and then a hospital vessel across the Channel to England. Dawson, Living Bayonets, 201-202. 
957 See Cate, ed., A Soldier’s Memoir of World War I, 73 and Rogers, ed., The Diary of Gunner Frank Byron Ferguson, 
149-149. Ferguson wrote on 11 January 1918 that he was “discharged as cured today…notwithstanding the fact that I 
was in a very weakened position.” This seemed to be especially the case with VD patients, and those suffering from 
non-combat wounds and illnesses. Some soldiers were sent back to their units at the front before they had fully 
completed their treatment regimen. One report of August 1918 stated that “the retention of syphilis cases in hospital 
until open lesions are healed, is really quite unnecessary,” as their treatment could continue at the front, just as long as it 
was done “in such a manner that it will not interfere in the least with the man doing full duty even in a fighting unit.” 
Another report from a combat unit, however, noted that soldiers “are continually being returned to this battalion before 
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of relapse and permanent breakdown/debilitation. Medical personnel did what they could 
under difficult conditions, attempting to balance conflicting motives and priorities.  
During the final months of the war medical personnel suffered from the same 
problems afflicting combat soldiers, but also had other burdens unique to their duties. For 
the 1st Canadian CCS, congestion complicated medical arrangements at Arras, and the 
pace of operations and heavy casualties taxed the MOs and their staffs to the very limit.958 
Moreover, soldiers were given precious little time out of the line for rest. The lack of 
respite from service and sources of stress put enormous strain on those participating, and 
wore down soldiers both mentally and physically. The open warfare of the period, and the 
sheer pace of operations, also put more responsibility on medical personnel regarding 
their sanitary duties; daily advances complicated matters, and meant new obstacles to 
overcome, new sources of water to test, new dangers to confront.959  
 The experiences of medical personnel allow for a look at the inner workings of the 
military medical system, and the problems and casualties suffered. At Amiens and related 
operations, for instance, the 31st Battalion MO noted the heavy casualties suffered. He 
acknowledged that “we had been in the line exactly a month and were all unspeakably 
dirty and lousy,” a problem that for some amounted to “not only an annoyance and 
discomfort but a positive torture.”960 Another CAMC member argued that the secrecy and 
the “swiftness of the attack” at Amiens, as well as the “depth of penetration,” taxed the 
medical services and personnel. There were also enormous casualties suffered in the few 
days of battle there, including 7,643 wounded on 8 August alone, in addition to 5,076 and 
4,783 wounded on 9 and 10 August respectively.961 During Arras and the fighting around 
                                                             
 
properly cured and have to be returned to hospital.” The author lamented that troops were being sent back to the front 
“in an unfit condition for duty.” This clearly did little to help with the morale and manpower problems in the forces. 
LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3618, 25-11-3, Files ‘Syphilis,’ ‘Delay in Treatment,’ 16 October 1917, report on treatment 
dated 10 May 1918, and report dated 5 August 1918. 
958 DUASC, Clearing: The Tale of the First Canadian Casualty Clearing Station, BEF, 1914-1919, by Thomas Brenton 
Smith, MS-2-432 – SF 44-1, page 175-176, 181. 
959 MOs were to advise on and oversee work pertaining to the health of the soldiers, and were to work in conjunction 
with the unit CO. ‘Instructions’ issued to them in September 1918 stated that “the efficiency of the unit depends largely 
upon your constant care in the performance of all sanitary duties by yourself and those under you.” LAC, RG 9 III B2, 
Volume 3686, 30-0-0 (Volume 4), June 1918 – December 1918, ‘Instructions to Medical Officers,’ 1 September 1918 
and LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4575, Folder 1, File 2, 4th Canadian Sanitary Section, ‘Miscellaneous Subjects.’ 
960 Norris, The World War I Memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, 325. 
961 Macphail, Medical Services, 385-386.  
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the Hindenburg Line, the Corps suffered substantial casualties as well, totalling 664 
officer and 13,686 ORs wounded alone between 26 August and 7 September.962  
 The pace of fighting caused considerable casualties to the attackers during this 
period, but casualties were also incurred from regular duty and simply living at the front. 
By the Hundred Days, troops were still being removed from the line for VD,963 despite 
the best efforts at prevention, education, and discipline. The lack of clean water and fresh 
produce964 also caused health problems, and German scorched-earth tactics and 
destruction of water sources combined with supply difficulties only exacerbated this 
issue. Soldiers were still incapacitated and thus removed from the line for ailments like 
trench foot, trench fever, accidental and SIWs and illness.965 Perhaps most importantly, 
by the summer of 1918 the global pandemic known as Spanish Influenza was wreaking 
havoc amongst the troops.966 And as was the case during trench warfare, casualties were 
sustained by infantry (and other) units at the front, even in supposedly ‘quiet’ sectors, and 
during ‘quiet’ periods between operations – daily wastage. 967 Service and support troops 
on the lines of communication also suffered casualties, from stray shells and explosives, 
gas, snipers, and other distance weapons. There were also accidents, such as lorry 
collisions or falling off horses or wagons. This wastage was a daily and interminable 
                                                             
 
962 Ibid, 394. 
963 VD continued to be a problem to the end of the war and into the post-Armistice period. A report of 25 October 1918 
mentioned the presence of VD in villages and communities recently-captured by the Allies. Another report even stated 
that as Germany evacuated Belgium and withdrew towards their own frontier, they (apparently) “liberated a large 
number of diseased prostitutes,” perhaps as a form of biological warfare. LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4575, Folder 1, 
File 7, report of 25 October regarding Venereal Disease, and File 8, ‘Sanitation.’ 
964 As one artillery officer noted, the lack of fresh vegetables had negative health effects over time. By the final months 
of the war, there was “an epidemic of boils among the old-timers.” Between August and November, this soldier had 41 
boils. Black, I Want One Volunteer, 99. 
965 One soldier longed for a ‘Blighty’ wound so he could see his wife, but suffered from trench fever instead, and was 
not sent across the Channel to Britain. And in terms of accidental and self-inflicted injuries, these were still occurring 
by October of 1918. The ‘Report on Accidental or Self-Inflicted Injures’ seemed to be Army Form W. 3428. Dawson, 
Living Bayonets, 195 and LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4557, Folder 5, “D” 1501-2000, ‘12-10-18 to 13-1-19 (2).’  
966 On Spanish Influenza, see LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4575, Folder 1, File 7, ‘Report on Influenza;’ LAC, RG 9 III 
C15, Volume 4653, Historical 2, ‘October 1918’ and LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4715, Folder 107, File 20, No. 10 
Canadian Field Ambulance, Historical Records, Synopsis of Operations, Mt. Sorrell to Mons, ‘Passchendaele to Gouy-
en-Artois.’ For Influenza on the Canadian home front, see Mark Osborne Humphries, The Last Plague: Spanish 
Influenza and the Politics of Public Health in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013).  
967 For example the 43rd Battalion suffered casualties in operations of 15/16 August. The 43rd suffered 9 officer 
casualties, as well as 14 ORs killed, 109 wounded, 5 missing and wounded, and 31 MIA. Macphail, Medical Services, 
382 and LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4189, Folder 5, File 6, Operations, Amiens, August 1918, 9th Brigade, including 
‘Operation Orders’ and ‘Amiens Report,’ written by OC 52nd Battalion. 
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drain on the forces, constantly undermining strength and removing soldiers from duty, at 
least temporarily. They also had the potential to negatively affect morale, reinforcing the 
reality that death and danger surrounded these troops, even when they were not going 
‘over the top.’ Eventually, many soldiers adopted a fatalistic attitude, indicative of war 
weariness, in response to the reality that death or wounding was all but inevitable.  
During this period every infantry unit engaged in operations suffered casualties, 
whether it was battle wounds from enemy fire, or due to illness/disease. Casualties were 
especially troublesome as the pace of operations afforded each unit little time to make 
good their losses; the integration and training of replacements took time, and the lack of 
respite following operations increased the burden on those who were not rotated out of 
the line or sent to medical facilities as a casualty. Deward Barnes of the 19th (Central 
Ontario) Battalion noted that they suffered 158 casualties, including eleven officers, on 8 
August alone.968 Heavy losses, especially to officers, had the potential to adversely affect 
the military effectiveness of the battalion going forward. There was promotion within the 
ranks, especially of NCOs, but there was no replacing the steady hand of trusted and 
experienced officers. The nominal strength of an infantry battalion was around 1,000 all 
ranks, so casualties of 158 constituted a good proportion of total strength. Some suffered 
even heavier losses than the 19th Battalion, at times approaching or surpassing 50% of 
forces employed. And the 19th still had to continue fighting after these losses at Amiens, 
they were not exempt from further combat.969 The 20th Battalion also suffered heavily on 
the first day at Amiens, including thirty-two killed and seventy-seven wounded.970 On the 
first day at Amiens the Corps largely achieved surprise, but on the following days the 
enemy was able to bring up substantial reinforcements and launch counterattacks, slowing 
the attack considerably. The German defenders were able to regain balance and put up 
much stouter resistance starting on 9 August. The 50th Battalion at Amiens alone suffered 
fourteen officers killed or wounded, as well as 231 ORs killed, wounded, gassed, or MIA; 
                                                             
 
968 Cane, ed., The Haunting Journal of Deward Barnes, 233 and Chartrand, The Canadian Corps in World War I, 15. 
969 Aside from combat at Amiens beginning on 8 August, the 19th Battalion also fought at the Arras trench systems, at 
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The 2nd CMRs lost four officers killed and five wounded, and seventy-eight ORs killed 
and 135 wounded between 8-10 August.971 Between 8 and 20 August, at Amiens and 
subsequent consolidation operations, the Corps suffered 11,822 casualties, part of the 
reason why August 1918 was the single bloodiest month of the war for the Canadians.972 
The casualties continued throughout the Hundred Days, ensuring that the pressure 
and strain was maintained on those who did survive these engagements. During the next 
major operation at Arras, the DQ Line and Hindenburg Line, casualties continued to 
accrue. The 19th Battalion suffered heavy losses on 17 August, especially to officers, with 
a nearly 50% casualty rate. For the unit as a whole this was obviously unsustainable, 
especially as the campaign stretched out beyond weeks and into months. At the end of the 
day, “only three officers came out who were not wounded,” compromising the ability to 
seize battlefield objectives on subsequent days.973 In attacks on the DQ Line in early 
September, the 50th Battalion suffered nearly 300 casualties before 8:30 am, undermining 
the next phase of operations throughout the day.974 In other cases, casualties were 
suffered even before the attack itself was launched, as artillery barrages and gas attacks 
caught soldiers in assembly areas and collecting points preparing to go ‘over the top.’975 
At the fighting around the Scarpe and the Fresnes-Rouvroy Line (Battle of Arras), the 19th 
                                                             
 
971 Wheeler, The 50th Battalion in No Man’s Land, 244 and LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4163, Folder 11, File 4, 
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972 For casualties at Amiens, see Humphries, ed., The Selected Papers of Sir Arthur Currie, 102. For Canadian 
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the MG Corps suffered 180 Officer and 3,200 OR casualties in this period. LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3946, Folder 64, 
File 2, ‘Report of 1918.’ Other sources indicate that there were 455 officers and 9,102 ORs wounded processed in 
August, which also excluded wounded from the 51st British Division (which fought with the Corps at Amiens), as well 
as other formations outside the four Canadian Divisions, as well as POWs, killed, and missing. LAC, RG 9 III D1, 
Volume 4677, Folder 9, File 4, August 1918, ‘Operation Orders.’ 
973 The 19th was forced to go into battle again on 28 August, though heavy casualties prevented some units from taking 
their objectives. Cane, Journal of Deward Barnes, 244-245 and Chartrand, The Canadian Corps in World War I, 15. 
974 Wheeler, The 50th Battalion in No Man’s Land, 248-250. 
975 At the Canal du Nord and Bourlon Wood operations the 1st CMRs suffered roughly 90 casualties from high 
explosive and Blue Cross gas shells just moving up the line. And the 4th CMRs suffered over 10 casualties on roads and 
assembly areas, including three killed. Casualties were also sustained during moves and reliefs. LAC, RG 9 III C3, 
Volume 4163, Folder 12, File 3, ‘Operations Canal du Nord (Bourlon Wood)’ and ‘Narrative of Events.’ 
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Battalion lost 295 soldiers, and the 20th Battalion 437 in just three days.976 Of course 
territorial gains were being made, but the cost was great.  
The next major battles at the Canal du Nord, Bourlon Wood, and Cambrai again 
saw substantial casualties in driving the Germans back. In these operations, the defenders 
seemed to become more desperate over time, realising that every attack brought the 
enemy one step inexorably closer to German territory. At the Canal du Nord, Victor 
Wheeler of the 50th Battalion saw every single officer of “D” Company become a 
casualty, and it was tough to bear the loss of “gallant, irreplaceable men.”977 And near 
Cambrai, the 2nd CMRs also suffered heavy losses, which compromised their ability to 
seize objectives in subsequent operations. The unit suffered some forty casualties prior to 
even reaching assembly positions, meaning fewer soldiers for the attack itself. Heavy 
uncut wire caused further problems, and “owing to heavy casualties, [the troops] were 
unable to advance” to their objectives. Battalion strength at the outset of operations 
amounted to 29 officers and 575 ORs, and they suffered fifteen officer and 266 OR 
casualties.978 This meant that 52% of all officers became casualties, and roughly 46% of 
ORs, totalling 47% of the entire unit. The 20th Battalion suffered eleven officer and 319 
OR casualties at Cambrai on 10 and 11 October alone.979 Heavy casualties were inflicted 
on the attackers because as the Germans continued to deteriorate and the supply situation 
proved critical, the enemy relied heavily upon rearguard actions, MGs, and the copious 
use of gas980 to slow the Allied attackers.  
                                                             
 
976 Cane, ed., Journal of Deward Barnes, 249. 
977 Wheeler also wrote that companies were down to around 65% strength in this period, and that by the Canal du Nord 
all company COs who were at Amiens were gone, with two officers killed and nine wounded. Wheeler, The 50th 
Battalion in No Man’s Land, 262-264. 
978 LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4163, Folder 12, File 2, Operations Cambrai 3-10-18 to 7-10-18, ‘2nd Canadian Mounted 
Rifles Battalion, Report on Operations Before Cambrai, 29th September – 3rd October, 1918.’ 
979 Corrigall, History of the Twentieth Canadian Battalion, 265. 
980 Poison gas was a difficult weapon to counteract because it was indiscriminate, potentially long-lasting, and could be 
terrifying. In many ways, gas was a psychological weapon, inducing fear and demanding numerous precautions; no 
soldier, except perhaps those at the base, could ever truly be safe from its reach. And because there were different types 
of gas, including poison and lachrymatory gas, some soldiers took the latter gas lightly, thinking it was relatively 
benign. One report stated that troops were taking German Yellow Cross gas lightly, but “the current impression that this 
gas only produces slight casualties…is erroneous and should be checked.” Furthermore, it was difficult to prevent gas 
casualties as “the gas was scarcely perceptible to the sense, and, in many cases, the effect seemed to take some hours to 
develop,” providing a false sense of security. Moreover, the Germans were able to launch and release enormous 
quantities of gas prior to withdrawal, ensuring that the battlefield was ‘drenched’ with gas. Between 27 October and 2 
November, the 50th Battalion suffered five ORs killed, three officers and 34 ORs wounded, eight officers and 76 ORs 
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Even after the final set-piece attack at Valenciennes, casualties continued right up 
until the Armistice came into effect at 11:00am on 11 November.981 By this phase of the 
war, casualties had taken their toll on participating units. The PPCLI on 10 November, for 
example, could muster “only 450 strong including both bands and transport,”982 
illustrating the costly and desperate nature of the fighting. This was a particularly bitter 
pill to swallow, especially as the war appeared to be won, but not yet over. Indeed, 
Currie’s order to take Mons on 10 November caused resentment at the time, and 
considerable controversy in the years following.983 Casualties continued until the final 
hour, but orders were orders, and Currie had received instructions to advance on Mons 
from the highest levels. Advance the Canadians did, and by 11 November units of the 
Corps had captured Mons, and pushed beyond the city itself. By the time the Armistice 
came into effect, the Corps had already suffered 437 killed and 1,275 wounded in the less 
than two weeks’ fighting of November.984 And since the beginning of August, the Corps 
lost 11,259 killed and 36,906 wounded, which amounted to more than 25% of all 
Canadian battle casualties in the entire war.985 This illustrates just how intense and costly 
                                                             
 
wounded (gas), and one OR missing, for a total of 11 Officer and 116 OR casualties in this short time period. LAC, RG 
9 III C3, Volume 4214, Folder 2, File 3, ‘50th Battalion, 27 October – 2 November;’ LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3897, 
Folder 7, ‘Canadian Corps G.256/23-11’ and Ibid, ‘Canadian Corps G. 429/25-5.’ For more on gas and the Canadian 
experience, see Tim Cook, No Place to Run: The Canadian Corps and Gas Warfare in the First World War 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 1999) and CWM, Battles and Fighting – Weapons on Land, “Poison Gas.” Government of 
Canada, Accessed 28 February 2018, http://www.warmuseum.ca/firstworldwar/history/battles-and-fighting/weapons-
on-land/poison-gas/.  
981 On 1 November the 46th Battalion suffered one officer and 33 ORs killed, three officers and 87 ORs wounded, and 
two ORs MIA (total of 126 casualties). And in November the 47th Battalion suffered five officer and 130 OR casualties. 
One veteran remembered that six Canadians were killed by MG fire in Mons. LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4214, Folder 
2, File 3, ‘46th Battalion, Report on Operations,’ November 1st and ‘47th Battalion Report on Operations;’ Wheeler, The 
50th Battalion in No Man’s Land, 284 and Reid, Personal Memoirs of the First World War, 225. 
982 Christie, Letters of Agar Adamson, 347. 
983 Much of this controversy can be explained by the re-interpretation of the meaning and cost of the war; and in part on 
the views and writings of unrepresentative war poets, broken promises to veterans following the war, and by Sam 
Hughes’ personal vendetta against the Corps Commander. On the famous Currie libel trial, as well as the contested 
nature of historical memory, see Cook, Shock Troops, 631-633; Tim Cook, Clio’s Warriors: Canadian Historians and 
the Writing of the World Wars (Vancouver and Toronto: UBC Press, 2006), 56-61; Daniel D. Dancocks, Spearhead to 
Victory: Canada and the Great War (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1987), Appendix One, 241-245; Humphries, ed., 
Selected Papers of Sir Arthur Currie, 365-366; Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 482, and Jonathan F. Vance, 
Death So Noble: Memory, Meaning, and the First World War (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997), 180-188, 197, 212. On 
the matter of being called a bloodthirsty butcher, or murderer of his own men, Currie wrote “to have gone through what 
anyone who has been here for three years has had to go through, and to have given the very best that is in one to the 
service of your country, would almost justify one in hoping that your own countrymen would not refer to you as a 
murderer.” John Robert Colombo, ed., Colombo’s Canadian Quotations (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, n.d.), 135. 
984 Humphries, ed., Selected Papers of Sir Arthur Currie, 139. 
985 Ibid. 
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these final operations were, even if it is difficult for the modern reader to comprehend the 
scale of the bloodshed.986  
These casualties were problematic for at least three reasons. First of all, the fact 
that the Corps continued to suffer heavy casualties at this phase of the war, even when the 
enemy was disintegrating and the German nation was on the verge of revolution, was 
perhaps disheartening for those undertaking these operations. And though there was relief 
that the tide of war had finally swung decisively against the enemy, even successful and 
victorious combat was costly. The German Army was able to inflict casualties on the 
Canadian forces despite the Allied preponderance in military forces, technology such as 
tanks and aircraft, and industrial and economic strength. Secondly, casualties undermined 
the health and strength of individual soldiers, but also eroded the fighting effectiveness of 
their units. Missing important leaders and key personnel was difficult to deal with during 
the best of circumstances, including in combat operations and afterwards. Additionally, 
understrength units tended to take heavier casualties in attacks, forming a cyclical pattern 
that could only be broken with a large influx of new troops, or with the halting of 
operations, rest and recuperation. The MSA ultimately put less than 25,000 new troops 
into the field (with units in France and Belgium), ensuring that combat units relied 
increasingly upon veteran soldiers, those previously in support roles, and those returning 
from hospitals and convalescent centres. And because of the nature of fighting, and 
especially the plans of the Allied high command to keep up pressure on the faltering 
Germans all across the line, there would be no substantial break in operations. And 
finally, casualties and the daily draining of military strength reinforced the notion that 
death and disfigurement were inevitable, they were only a matter of time for every single 
soldier at the front. This state of affairs placed an enormous burden on the individual, 
regardless of their experience or level of commitment. These coping mechanisms were 
also no panacea to the problem. War weariness, and shell shock were the inevitable result 
                                                             
 
986 158 members of the Canadian Armed Forces lost their lives related to operations in Afghanistan. 
http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/history/canadian-armed-forces/afghanistan-remembered/fallen.  
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of all this. The loss of comrades and close friends only exacerbated this reality, especially 
so near the end of the war.  
Though it was difficult to determine which casualties were ‘genuine’ cases of 
shell shock (a term the authorities used) and those related to exhaustion and gradual 
erosion of fighting strength, including war weariness, there is no doubt these cases 
continued right up until the cessation of hostilities. Indeed, the mere acknowledgment on 
the part of army authorities that the stresses of war and the violence of combat could 
create psychiatric casualties was progress of sorts. PPCLI daily orders for 27 September – 
the opening day of the Canal du Nord – for example, referred to soldiers invalided out of 
the line as “mental” cases, and were not listed as sick or wounded.987 This appeared to be 
a frank recognition of a different type of casualty in modern, industrial war, that made 
soldiers militarily ineffective but without a visible wound. Confusion over what 
constituted shell shock, its manifestations and diagnoses, however, continued into 1918 
and beyond. CAMC Captain F. Dillon wrote in September 1918 that there was still a 
“diversity of opinion” regarding shell shock, but that it was a “class of cases amongst the 
most difficult within the scope of medicine” to diagnose and treat. Some MOs, however, 
refused to accept that the reality of war could produce such casualties in otherwise 
healthy and committed soldiers; there was reluctance based on both “egoistic and 
patriotic” motives to accept that psychiatric casualties were a normal part of modern 
warfare. Dillon lamented that  
no attempt seems to have been made to form any conception of a constantly 
recurring clinical condition which might be said to represent the disorder resulting 
from the stresses and strains of warfare.988 
 
For more punitive or traditionally-minded doctors, their emphasis was elsewhere, 
predisposition of soldiers to ‘mental’ problems. Many MOs and army doctors continued 
to interpret shell shock in a narrowly physical sense, as the result of shell explosions or 
                                                             
 
987 PPCLI Archives, 34 (3) – 6, Battalion Orders, Daily Orders Part II, 1 January – 31 December 1918, ‘Daily Orders,’ 
27-9-18.  
988 LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4575, Folder 1, File 5, ‘Bulletin of the CAMC,’ Vol. I, No. 6 (September 1918), by 
Captain F. Dillon, ‘On the Nature of Shell Shock.’ 
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brain concussion that disrupted the nervous system, rather than as a natural result of long-
term and/or acute exposure to the trauma and terror associated with combat and frontline 
service. This had a tangible impact on the soldiers, ranging from accusations of cowardice 
to the rejection of post-war pensions for disability.  
 Though the sources of trauma and the contributors toward war weariness and 
psychiatric casualties could not be removed entirely,989 there were things that the 
authorities could do to minimise suffering, and reduce chances of debilitation. Relief from 
duty was essential, as was emotional and mental respite. Fatigue and exhaustion not only 
contributed to casualties, but also undermined combat effectiveness and the ability to 
carry on with duty.990 Commanding, medical officers, and the support services also 
played an important role in identifying those driven to the breaking point, providing an 
opportunity for intervention on their behalf. Chaplains could help ease the suffering of the 
dying and wounded, and provide “cheering words to men on the edge of nervous 
collaps[e],”991 comforting and reassuring those suffering from the results of the war. And 
indeed, many did suffer during the war, whether at the front, on the lines of 
communication, or on the home front. Anything the army could do to extend the ‘shelf 
life’ of the troops was welcomed.  
 Most soldiers suffered during the war, though this suffering and the inevitable 
casualties that accompanied combat were understood by authorities as a means to an end. 
The troops endured hardships and trauma, the loss of friends and relatives, disease and 
disfigurement, but it was all in the name of attaining victory.992 In order to ensure 
                                                             
 
989 Long marches and combat itself led to “great physical and emotional strain” on the troops. And because of the pace 
and intensity of fighting, these pressures were all but interminable. One soldier noted that when they were pinned down 
or under an artillery bombardment, their “nerves [were] stretched taut.” It was only a matter of time before these nerves 
‘broke’ entirely. Wheeler, The 50th Battalion in No Man’s Land, 230 and 256. 
990 By August 1918 previous actions and lack of proper sleep and rest could compromise future operations, especially 
during the combined arms attacks of the Hundred Days. Moreover, “the exhaustion of the crews of the tanks is very 
great after a heavy day’s fighting and if they are called upon again the next day, disappointment to infantry may result,” 
which could imperil the entire assault. Another document referred to “the desirability of getting troops to the 
concentration area with as little fatigue as possible,” so they would not expend precious energy prior to the attack itself. 
LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4163, Folder 11, File 4, ‘Operations Amiens, 5-8-18 to 16-8-18’ and Volume 4189, Folder 
6, File 5, ‘Lessons Learnt from Recent Operations, 42nd Battalion, R.H.C.,’ 25-30 September 1918. 
991 LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4653, Precis, ‘September 1918.’ 
992 Indeed, the historical record suggests that in many cases soldiers were sent back to the front despite their chances of 
relapse, or before they were fully recovered, all in the name of military duty and the need to beat the enemy. In this 
sense the soldiers really were a means to an end, and the collective needs of the army and nation trumped the needs of 
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compliance and to impose the best terms possible on the defeated enemy, the Allies 
needed to illustrate their offensive prowess and military superiority, and push as far into 
German-occupied territory as possible. Hence the orders issued to take Mons, so near the 
end of the war. And in the end, Currie was unable, or perhaps unwilling, to disobey orders 
even with the cessation of hostilities on the near horizon.993 Currie sought to balance the 
needs of his superiors, with those of his subordinates, thus his established emphasis on 
shells over human lives. There was a widespread belief, however, especially in the post-
war period that these casualties were unnecessary, and that those troops fell in vain.  
 The loss of trusted and experienced leaders hit the troops hard, as was the case 
with the 20th Battalion in the tough and bloody fighting at this phase of the war. At Arras, 
the unit was pinned down on the far side of the Sensée River, and “nearly all the officers 
and section commanders were killed or wounded,”994 leaving the survivors largely 
leaderless. And at the Canal du Nord, Currie wrote the enemy have fought us “very, very 
hard,” and that “these [German] counter-attacks were the most violent in character, 
heavily driven home and made in large numbers.” Heavy casualties were suffered by the 
attacking forces, especially officers, and “some of our battalions have none.”995 
Promotion through the ranks often took place in response to officer casualties, but it 
would take time for newly-promoted troops to grasp the intricacies of unit command and 
new responsibilities. The 52nd Battalion at Amiens also experienced a similar problem. 
The (surviving) unit CO wrote of heavy losses, and that “my battalion was left with very 
                                                             
 
the individual soldier/patient, even in terms of health and recovery. LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3618, 25-13-6, Gas 
Poisoning, December 1915 – May 28 1918, File ‘The Use of Oxygen in Gassed Cases.’ 
993 The 2nd Canadian Division reported that between 7 and 11 November it suffered 365 casualties, and the 3rd Division 
suffered 116 casualties on 10-11 November. Another source indicated there were eight Canadians killed in the capture 
of Mons, whereas a report on casualties for 11-12 November indicated there were no reported casualties for the 1st 
Division, two wounded in the 2nd Division, 66 casualties in the 3rd Division, and eight for the 4th Division. According to 
Nicholson, “considering the resistance put up by the German machine-gunners, the capture of the city had been 
achieved with very few casualties,” but this unlikely acted as much of a palliative to the friends, comrades, and family 
of the fallen in the final days of the war. See Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 482; Renison, “A Canadian 
Epic of One Hundred Days,” in Canada at War, 423, and LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3874, Folder 122, File 1, ‘Reports 
and Returns, Daily Casualty Summary from Canadian Corps,’ 31-8-18 to 31-1-19. Moreover, “official post-war 
calculation of Canadians killed, wounded and missing, including from gas, show a total of 18 officers and 262 ORs for 
the final two days of operations.” And, “careful research made at General Currie’s request revealed that on 11 
November itself there were one fatal and 15 non-fatal casualties.”  
994 Corrigall, The History of the Twentieth Canadian Battalion, 219 and 241. 
995 Humphries, ed., The Selected Papers of Sir Arthur Currie, 121. 
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few officers of experience, having had 16 officer casualties during the past few days as 
well as 20 sergeants.”996 They suffered officer casualties but also lost important NCOs 
like sergeants, who were vital links between officers and enlisted men. The CO of the 
52nd Battalion also lamented the loss of ‘experienced’ officers; their knowledge and 
steadying hand could not simply be replaced by bringing in another from the base depot. 
Losses to runners and other communications personnel and equipment could likewise 
handicap a unit in operations. The fighting in the Hundred Days, however, required even 
more reliance on runners than during static trench warfare. But it was exceedingly 
difficult to maintain proper communications and links between the front and HQ when 
roughly 90% of runners became casualties.997 
 Substantial problems arising from the pace of operations directly impacted the 
medical care and evacuation of the period. Traffic jams, congestion, and the lack of 
serviceable roads contributed to these problems.998 Delays in the treatment and clearing of 
wounded meant the chances of saving these troops was “undoubtedly diminished” during 
and after operations. Moreover, it was important that COs gave their subordinates fair 
warning regarding the goals and duration of advances, “in order that the men may take the 
necessary steps to conserve sufficient energy, physical and mental, to cope with the 
situation” at the front.999 After all, exhausted units and individuals tended to perform less 
well in their duties than their well-rested and ‘fresh’ counterparts. In this period, though, 
‘fresh’ units and individuals were in rather short supply.  
 Despite the best efforts of the CAMC, casualties continued to accrue during the 
heavy fighting of the final months of the war. Even during successful offensive 
                                                             
 
996 LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4189, Folder 6, File 5, Operations, Amiens, August 1918, 9th Brigade, including 
‘Operational Orders’ and ‘Amiens Report,’ OC 52nd Battalion.  
997 Corrigall, The History of the Twentieth Canadian Battalion, 242. 
998 The 6th Canadian Field Ambulance also made reference to these difficulties, stating that slow evacuation and the 
unfamiliarity of ambulance drivers with the roads compounded problems. Moreover, because of rapid advances the 
CCSs were often too far away; congestion at the main dressing station slowed matters; insufficient troops to load and 
unload casualties delayed things; congestion on the roads, and questionable traffic control (“no assistance to the passage 
of ambulance cars and lorries”) all exacerbated the already difficult job of the medical services. LAC, RG 9 III C10, 
Volume 4551, Folder 1, File 13, 6th Canadian Field Ambulance, ‘Medical Arrangements during 2nd Battle of Amiens.’ 
999 LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3859, Folder 85, File 7, ‘1st Canadian Division, 6 November 1918.’ 
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operations, the number of dead, wounded, sick, and gassed increased over time.1000 
Casualties were inevitable, but became even more problematic if they constituted a large 
percentage of the attacking force or unit as a whole. To provide but one example, the 2nd 
CMRs in October and November had a battalion strength of 22 officers, and 561 ORs 
(583 all ranks). Their casualties in this period of just over two weeks amounted to five 
officers, and 82 ORs, including 29 killed.1001 This meant roughly 23% of all officers and 
15% of ORs became casualties during this short period.1002 And though during normal 
trench warfare these losses would not have been insurmountable, because of the pace of 
operations in the Hundred Days these units would be expected to launch multiple large 
set-piece attacks in a relatively short time frame. And because of those killed in 
operations, there was no chance of getting these veteran soldiers back in the unit after 
hospitalization and convalescence – they would have to be replaced with troops less 
experienced, and perhaps unfamiliar with the traditions and history of the unit. This no 
doubt had an impact on the morale and cohesion of the unit itself. It was not uncommon, 
furthermore, for attacking units to lose over 50% of their strength in a single operation. 
The 43rd Battalion at Arras suffered this fate. The objectives for the unit were eventually 
taken, “but the losses had been over 50%” and each company only had one officer 
remaining. These casualties took their toll, and “A” and “C” Companies only mustered 38 
ORs between them, whereas “D” Company only had 13 ORs, and 1 Lewis Gunner 
surviving.1003 These losses were unsustainable over time, even with the rump of the unit 
left behind in the LOB group to reconstitute the unit.  
 The heavy fighting also negatively affected the health and well-being of the 
participating individuals. In the 2nd Battalion, exhausted soldiers drank water from shell 
                                                             
 
1000 See, for example, LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4564, Folder 2, File 1, ‘Casualties: Monthly Returns, Sick and 
Wounded, 1-1-17 to 1-2-19.’ 
1001 When these casualties were suffered the unit also captured nine officers and 172 ORs as POWs. LAC, RG 9 III C3, 
Volume 4163, Folder 12, File 9, ‘Operational Summaries, 2nd CMRs, 26-10-18 to 13-11-18, Summary of Operations 26 
October – 13 November.’ 
1002 It should also be kept in mind that of the battalion’s total strength, a certain percentage would be kept out of combat 
as part of the LOB group. This makes the casualties of troops engaged that much higher. 
1003 LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4189, Folder 7, File 1, ‘Operations Arras, August 1918, 9th Brigade, 43rd Battalion 
Narrative of Operations.’ 
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holes at Amiens, and got violently ill as a result.1004 It seems these troops grew so 
desperate that they sated their thirst with polluted water, despite warnings and their best 
judgment to the contrary. Exhaustion thus drove soldiers to take risks that ended up 
harming their health. It was also acknowledged by the medical services that exhaustion 
could compromise the health, ability, and endurance of those affected. One MO, for 
example, after a passage on H.M.T. Victoria “arrived thoroughly broken down” due to 
mental strain, lack of sleep, and the fact that he had “worked incessantly” throughout the 
voyage.1005 And of course there were different aspects to exhaustion and war weariness, 
namely, both physical and psychological exhaustion. Shell shocked soldiers could be fine 
physically, but psychologically unable to carry on with duty. Conversely, one soldier 
argued there was a disconnect between the mind and body, as “the body is a traitor to the 
spirit – it can become very tired.”1006 Thus even if one had the desire or will to carry on in 
combat or duty, they might be physically unable or incapable to do so. This speaks to a 
larger point about the distinctions between war weariness and shell shock debilitation, 
that the former largely represented an unwillingness and reluctance to carry on in combat, 
whereas the latter suggested an inability to continue at the front or with normal duty. The 
“stomach-sinking tension of nerves,”1007 as described by Will Bird, might not prevent a 
soldier from doing his duty in battle, but without proper rest, outlets or ‘safety valves,’ 
and mitigating factors, this unwillingness could transform into inability.   
These attacks pushed the troops to the very limits of their endurance, which had 
detrimental consequences in the coming campaign.1008 On 31 August Currie wrote that 
the 4th British Division was unable to gain its objectives, or even carry out its ordered 
attack, “owing to the physical condition of the men and to their lack of numbers.”1009 
Heavy casualties, exhaustion, and the health problems of the soldiers thus had real 
                                                             
 
1004 Murray, History of the 2nd Canadian Battalion, 258. 
1005 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3752, Folder 3-1-1-5, ‘Influenza Epidemic: H.M.T. Victoria,’ Abstract of a Report by 
Lt.-Col. Bell, October 19th, 1918.  
1006 Dawson, Living Bayonets, 194. 
1007 Every soldier needed (physical) health, or the ability to do their duty despite the stresses and strains of war, as well 
as the will or willingness to continue on despite the trauma and terror. Bird, Ghosts Have Warm Hands, 114. 
1008 See, for example, LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4666, Last 100 Days, ‘The Final Advance (7th October – 11th 
November), Chaplain Services,’ and Humphries, ed.,The Selected Papers of Sir Arthur Currie, 108. 
1009 Ibid, 113.  
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military implications. One MO went “ten days and nights without a rest, rarely getting 
sleep.” And in one particular attack, a captain of the Fort Garry Horse admitted that 
“there might have been more prisoners [captured] but we were too tired to run after 
them,”1010 thus allowing their escape to fight another day. Ultimately, however, the 
soldiers were able to overcome these difficulties and triumph in the war, despite their 
exhaustion, war weariness, casualties, and health problems during the final months. The 
survivors of the fighting in October 1918 were also praised by authorities and officials for 
their “bravery and endurance,” their confidence and “powers of resistance,”1011 though 
this poses a problem for modern researchers attempting to understand these intangibles. 
 
 
Results, Lessons Learned, Conclusions, and Interpretations 
For the size and strength of the Canadian Corps, the captures and results attained 
in the final months of the war were impressive indeed. These captures acted as a tangible 
reminder that the Entente were successful in this period, and illustrated German decline; 
this acted as a powerful antidote to the war weariness present in all armies at the time. 
The Canadians, along with their Dominion allies and alongside the British, French, and to 
a lesser extent Belgian and American armies, made a direct and material contribution to 
the destruction of German fighting capacity, will to continue, and therefore the cessation 
of hostilities with the Armistice. Regarding results attained, the Corps captured thousands 
of POWs, copious amounts of military equipment1012 and weapons, and liberated 
numerous cities, towns, villages, occupied territory and countryside. On 8 August alone, 
the Corps pushed the German defenders back anywhere from eight to ten miles,1013 and 
there were similar advances on the Australian front to the north. Though the gains on the 
                                                             
 
1010 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3601, 24-3-0 (Volume 4), ‘Medical War Diary, July 1917 to August 1918.’ See also 
Gunner Bertram Howard Cox, Letter of 29 August 1918, found at 
http://www.shiawasseehistory.com/coxaugust291918.html.  
1011 See, for example, LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4677, Folder 9, File 6, ‘October 1918.’  
1012 In late September 1918 the 42nd Battalion alone captured two large German supply dumps, containing engineering 
supplies, TMs, bombs, signalling lights, MGs, and other equipment. LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4189, Folder 7, File 2, 
‘Lessons Learnt from Recent Operations,’ 42nd Battalion, R.H.C. 25-30 September 1918. 
1013 Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 407 and LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4651, Diaries 1, ‘Entry for 8 and 
9 August 1918.’ The Canadians were “credited with capturing 5033 prisoners and 161 guns” on this first day alone.  
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9 August were more modest, Canadians “made advances of up to four miles,” despite the 
fact that “resistance had been stronger than expected, and was becoming still stronger” 
over time.1014 The Canadians were also responsible for the destruction and capture of 
hundreds of German MGs, artillery pieces, TMs, and other equipment during the attack. 
To provide but one example the 2nd CMRs, in just two days, captured 342 POWs, fifteen 
MGs, one TM, and one anti-tank (AT) rifle; the prisoners captured also exceeded the 
unit’s own casualties, which was not always the case.1015  
 After the consolidation operations following Amiens, the Corps launched attacks 
near Arras. These were quite successful, though did come at a heavy cost. The capture of 
POWs, however, had a direct effect on the ability of the enemy to withstand further 
Entente attacks, as prisoners were removed from combat and thus unable to return to the 
fight. In late August the Corps was credited with capturing nearly 2,000 enemy soldiers, 
and the decision of the German high command to counterattack resulted in the capture of 
a further “approximately 6000 unwounded prisoners between 1 and 4 September” 
alone.1016 The Canal du Nord, Bourlon Wood, and Cambrai operations further contributed 
to the destruction of German fighting strength, and netted several thousand more POWs. 
The 4th CMRs at the Canal du Nord, for instance, liberated civilians in the area, seized 
four guns, a TM and AT rifle, twelve MGs and sixty-one POWs. And the 9th Brigade 
captured nearly 1,000 POWs, though it was difficult to determine exactly as most were 
used as stretcher-bearers and did not always remain in any given unit’s area of 
operations.1017 And according to the CO of the British First Army, the actions of the 
Corps were crucial, as they crossed the Canal, captured Bourlon Wood, and engaged 12 
                                                             
 
1014 Ibid, 414. 
1015 The casualties for the 2nd CMRs at Amiens amounted to 82 killed and 140 wounded. LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 
4163, Folder 11, File 4, ‘Operations Amiens,’ 5-8-18 to 16-8-18, including ‘Notes and some Lessons Learned from the 
Experience Gained during the Operations August 8th to 12th, on the Somme.’ 
1016 See Horne, Source Records of the Great War Vol. VI, 293 and Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 440. 
Another document indicated that in the attacks on the DQ Line the Corps captured 4,250 all ranks, at a cost of 166 
officer and 3,425 OR casualties. LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4680, Folder 18, File 18, 4th Division, September 1918, 
‘Operations DQ Line, Report On.’ For more on POWs during the war see Ferguson, The Pity of War, 369-370. 
1017 LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4163, Folder 12, File 3, ‘Narrative of Events,’ and Volume 4189, Folder 7, File 3, 
‘Operations Canal du Nord (Bourlon Wood),’ 13-9-18 to 9-10-18, 9th Brigade. 
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German divisions,1018 providing opportunity for forces elsewhere to advance against a 
depleted and distracted enemy. The captures in the final set-piece attack of the war, at 
Mont Houy and Valenciennes and on through to the capture of Mons, were equally 
impressive.1019 The Canadians and their allies had refined their attack doctrine and 
improved substantially in offensive operations, but these captures also reflected German 
decline over time.1020  
Though the Hundred Days campaign resulted in the cessation of hostilities and the 
destruction of the German Army and its willingness to continue the war, there were still 
lessons to be learnt for other armies and forces. Lessons were not always taken to heart, 
and sometimes the wrong lessons were learned. Following the conclusion of the war the 
Canadian forces quickly demobilized and returned to their pre-war state as a small, under-
equipped, and relatively unprepared fighting force in the interwar period; many of the 
lessons regarding fire and movement, secrecy and surprise, and all-arms tactics were also 
forgotten. But while the war was still being fought, lessons could be applied to 
subsequent operations. The medical services at Arras incorporated lessons from the 
previous operation at Amiens, to help with the treatment and evacuation of soldiers. The 
CAMC prepared for heavy casualties, understanding that momentum slowed after the first 
day of attack, as congestion, the need to bring up artillery, and increasing enemy 
resistance over time all factored in.1021  
                                                             
 
1018 LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4547, Folder 1, File 4 (3rd), ‘Canadian Corps Routine Orders’ 3rd Canadian Field 
Ambulance, 23-7-18 to 21-1-19. 
1019 The 47th Battalion at Valenciennes and Mont Houy captured between 800 and approximately 1,500 German POWs, 
of different units, and roughly 800 Germans were killed in the attack as well. They also captured “several” field guns, 
MGs, and TMs. The 44th Battalion in four days’ fighting captured three field guns, 20 medium and heavy minenwerfers, 
83 MGs, and over 600 POWs. And on a single day of fighting the 46th Battalion captured seven field guns, six TMs, 45 
MGs, four AT guns, a large quantity of rifles, ammunition, and equipment, as well as 800 POWs. LAC, RG 9 III C3, 
Volume 4214, Folder 2, File 3, ‘Operations Valenciennes,’ November 1918, 47th Battalion, including ‘Narrative of 
Operations,’ and report of 13-11-18 by J.M. Ross, CO 10th CIB; Ibid, 44th Battalion, ‘Report on Operations,’ 29 
October – 1 November, and Ibid, 46th Battalion, ‘Report on Operations,’ November 1st. 
1020 At this phase of the war the capture of enemy prisoners, especially unwounded ones, was likely indicative of 
German war weariness, the fall of morale, loss of faith in ultimate victory, and acknowledgment of the hopelessness of 
the situation. Some Germans refused to surrender and fought to the bitter end, to be sure, but the enormous number of 
POWs falling into Allied hands suggested a widespread recognition of defeat and disintegration. In all, the Canadians 
seized in excess of 30,000 POWs, over 600 guns, nearly 3,000 MGs, and over 300 mortars, in addition to capturing 
over 500 square miles of territory, including the liberation of 228 cities, towns, and villages. 
1021 DUASC, MS – 2 – 432, SF 44-1, Clearing: The Tale of The First Canadian Casualty Clearing Station, British 
Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919, by Thomas Brenton Smith, page 173-177. 
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This time period also made it evident that exhaustion could be detrimental, even 
fatal, to any attack. Thus rest, rotation, and respite were crucial for both soldiers and their 
units. Without proper rest and time away from the stresses and strains of war, war 
weariness, shell shock, and other psychiatric casualties were all too likely. Units could 
achieve their battlefield objectives without sufficient rest beforehand,1022 but this was 
likely rare and the pace of operations in the Hundred Days made this unwise. The Allied 
high command and unit COs needed to take the reality of exhaustion and the erosion of 
endurance seriously, as war weariness and shell shock could harm the individual soldier, 
his unit,1023 and, ultimately, the wider military situation itself. These types of problems 
could induce recklessness, undue caution, apathy, terror, and any number of emotions and 
issues related to the impact of combat on the individual and collective. 
And indeed, the intensity of fighting took its toll on those involved. Bloody and 
protracted engagements occurred earlier in the war, such as at the Somme and Third 
Ypres, but never before had these operations taken place in such a short time period. 
Successive attacks in the same area or employing the same units was a feature of the final 
months, and simply put, there was a price to pay for this fighting. Not only in the 
casualties inflicted, but also in the disciplinary problems it engendered and the moral 
issues it created. The final Canadian to be officially executed for wartime crimes, Private 
Norman Ling of Toronto, suffered this fate early in the campaign; he faced the firing 
squad on 12 August, 1918.1024 The military authorities were keen on ensuring that the 
proper ‘message’ was sent to those still in the line, and there was a clear deterrent aspect. 
There were fears that disciplinary problems would overwhelm the situation, and thus a 
                                                             
 
1022 After the Battle of Amiens, and between 12 and 15 August, “during the four days there was little or no opportunity 
for rest or sleep” but apparently the troops involved still displayed “magnificent fighting abilities” and “high spirit.” 
Would this remain the case if this exhausted unit was asked to attack again in short order? PPCLI Archives, WWI 
Battles, File 16 (20) – 1, Parvillers.  
1023 At Amiens, “having suffered rather severely in the shelling, a platoon occupying our position about that point 
followed their officer who had apparently been shell shocked and was unaccountable for his action, ran towards 
Damery.”  My italics. LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4189, Folder 6, File 5, Operations, Amiens, August 1918, 9th 
Brigade, including ‘Operation Orders’ and ‘Amiens Report,’ OC 52nd Battalion.  
1024 LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4561, Folder 7, 1, ‘Orders Part I and II,’ 31-7-18 to 15-3-19, 2nd Canadian Stationary 
Hospital. For more on Private Ling and other executed Canadians, see Godefroy, For Freedom and Honour and Chris 
Madsen, Another Kind of Justice: Canadian Military Law from Confederation to Somalia (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
1999). For the role of chaplains in defending accused soldiers at courts martial trials, and also helping them prior to 
their execution, see LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 4664, ‘Report for 15 June to 14 July 1918’ inclusive. 
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firm hand was required – desertion or cowardice would not be tolerated, despite the 
particulars of any given case. Soldiers were punished for failing to do their duty, often in 
disregard to the reasons for this failure.  
This period was also problematic for authorities because the fighting brought the 
troops within hand-to-hand combat range of the enemy. In many cases, this was the first 
time they had been within such close contact with the enemy, save for trench raids and 
patrols. And with this close contact, there were abundant opportunities for bloodlust, 
revenge, and rage killings, especially as some enemy units, such as machine gunners, 
refused to give in and fought to the bitter end. There is both anecdotal and official 
evidence of the killing of German POWs and those attempting to surrender in the heat of 
battle. At times, this killing was presented matter-of-factly in letters and memoirs, such as 
those of Agar Adamson.1025 Other soldiers, however, felt guilty about contravening 
international laws, agreements, and the norms of war. Some justified it by arguing that it 
was of military necessity, part of orders received from superiors, or was done for the 
safety of them and comrades.1026 This abrogation of the moral high ground was the result 
of intense combat, but also reflected that at times no amount of discipline, training, 
orders, expectations, or regimental culture could prevent human emotions from 
overwhelming the individual. This was just one reason why connections to home and 
family life, partly in the form of letters,1027 were so important for the soldiers at the front. 
Constant reinforcements of their humanity perhaps helped prevent further 
dehumanization of the enemy across No Man’s Land. 
                                                             
 
1025 At Vimy Adamson wrote that “A German Major refused to be sent with prisoners to the rear, except in charge of a 
Major. He will trouble us no more,” suggesting that his captors shot this uncooperative German prisoner as a matter of 
course. Christie, ed., Letters of Agar Adamson, 274. 
1026 Wheeler recounted at Amiens that the 54th Battalion had received orders to take no prisoners, and to “show no 
mercy” to the enemy. In another section, he wrote that beyond Denain German MG crews were “given no quarter,” and 
that those who refused to surrender were “despatched without mercy.” In a telling statement, he wrote that “it was 
impossible to avoid taking so many alive,” suggesting that they did not want to take many alive. Wheeler, The 50th 
Battalion in No Man’s Land, 244 and 279. Barnes noted in his journal that he witnessed and even participated in the 
shooting of prisoners. He wrote, for example, that when they reached the German lines not all were captured, as “we 
shot them down like dogs.” In another case, POWs were killed on their way to prisoner cages in the rear. And in a final 
example, Barnes wrote that his comrade “Bell wanted to say for sure that he killed a German and so he shot a prisoner 
point-blank.” Cane, ed., Journal of Deward Barnes, 226-231. 
1027 Postal arrangements were thus crucial to the soldiers. During the open warfare of the period it was important that 
letters and packages from home be delivered to the soldiers, even being brought up with military supplies if need be. 
LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4575, Folder 1, File 8, ‘Postal Arrangements during Operations,’ 2 September 1918. 
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For the historian, there were also lessons to be gleaned from this time period. The 
Canadian forces during the war were composed mostly of volunteer citizen-soldiers, 
rather than professionals. And though months and years at the front tended to create 
hardened veterans familiar with the strains of warfare, these were still humans with 
natural (biological) reactions to trauma and terror. It is thus not surprising that despite 
comradeship and pride in unit, discipline and effective leadership, and both ‘carrots and 
sticks’ to keep soldiers at duty, some were unable to stand the strain and sought an escape 
from the horror of combat, death, and dying. Many soldiers over time became war weary 
and cautious, or fatalistic and apathetic, reducing their participation in combat to a bare 
minimum; others suffered shell shock debilitation or panic, and did all they could to avoid 
the sources of their fear and uncertainty. This is just one reason why instances of AWL 
and desertion continued throughout the Hundred Days,1028 despite the tangible signs of 
military success and corresponding indications of German disintegration. And desperate 
soldiers would do nearly anything to escape their plight at the front, or evade duty, 
including surrendering, adopting reckless behaviour that invited death or wounding, and 
the administering of a SIW or illness. For these soldiers, almost any fate was preferable to 
the inevitable result of the trenches and combat. Ultimately, just like human society and 
life in general, combat and warfare more generally were (and remain) complex and 
confusing, and resist clean, easy analysis.  
Other unpredictable elements such as inclement weather or enemy responses1029 
could make things difficult, or even compromise attacks altogether. Heavy rain turned the 
battlefield into a bloody morass, and a well-timed and executed counterattack could 
dislodge troops from recently-captured positions. Problems with the “inevitable confusion 
and obscurity of close fighting” were also common in this period.1030 This emphasised the 
need for substantial reserves close at hand, contingency plans and flexibility, as well as 
robust communications. Perhaps most importantly, however, was the need to ensure that 
soldiers were kept well-rested, and physically and mentally prepared for any 
                                                             
 
1028 LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3597, 24-1-4C, ‘Returns, Strengths, Casualties.’  
1029 Corrigall, The History of the Twentieth Canadian Battalion, 245. 
1030 LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3913, Folder 43, File 3, ‘Notes and Comments on Bourlon Wood Operation.’  
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contingencies. Disorganisation was inevitable in combat, but it was important to minimise 
the chances for confusion and exhaustion, lest they undermine efforts to seize objectives 
and the ability to do one’s duty.1031 And yet despite all these difficulties, the Corps and its 
allies were able to triumph and eventually bring about the cessation of hostilities.  
The Canadian experience in Hundred Days was presented by veterans and unit 
historians in a largely positive light. Regimental histories acknowledged the costly nature 
of the fighting, especially with their honour rolls and lists of the fallen, but also 
interpreted the Canadian role as effective, making a direct contribution to victory. 
Moreover, many histories have a decidedly nationalist tone, emphasising Canada’s 
contributions, sometimes at the expense of other formations and the very real and 
important role played by other forces. It would be anti-historical and misguided, for 
instance, to acknowledge the role played by the Corps while at the same time failing to 
stress the role of Canadians within the wider British Army. The Corps was part of the 
British Army, and the British Army was but one of the major armies on the Western Front 
in 1918, fighting alongside its French, Belgian, and American allies. Nevertheless, these 
histories and numerous secondary accounts emphasised that the war, especially Vimy 
Ridge, Third Ypres, and the Hundred Days were an important event for Canada. A history 
of the 1st Canadian CCS highlighted that Canadians “took a prominent part” in the attacks 
on Amiens, Arras, the DQ Switch, Canal du Nord, Cambrai, and other battles.1032 A 
biographer of Currie also made reference to the “outstanding” achievements of the Corps 
in the Hundred Days, noting good fighting qualities and efficient military 
organisation.1033 And even into the 21st Century, laudatory accounts stressing Canada’s 
important contributions continue to emerge. In a history of the 1st Division, for example, 
the Hundred Days was presented as a “rapid succession of set-piece attacks” and “a 
                                                             
 
1031 Ordering follow-up operations shortly after the conclusion of other engagements was inviting disaster and failure. 
For example, one report stated that “the battalions, which have captured Rocourt and Magnicourt, are too exhausted and 
disorganised to undertake any further advance.” LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3915, Folder 51, File 9, ‘Special Idea: 
Enemy Force.’  
1032 DUASC, MS – 2 – 432, SF 44-1, Clearing: The Tale of The First Canadian Casualty Clearing Station, British 
Expeditionary Force, 1914-1919, by Thomas Brenton Smith, page 266-269. 
1033 Hyatt, General Sir Arthur Currie: A Military Biography, 118-119. 
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continuous coordinated advance.”1034 This was a view echoed by other historians, one of 
whom wrote that this was “the most sustained series of offensives in the entire war,” and 
that the Canadians were “practically never out of the line,”1035 yet never wavered. 
Though this might be a reductive reading of the historical record there is truth to 
this, and cotemporary army reports and official documents also conform to this view, 
while recognising the problems and the casualties incurred. One report for November 
1918 referred to the “heavy and continuous fighting for three months.” This report also 
pointed to the numerous cities and towns captured by the Canadians, and the liberated 
civilians freed from German bondage. In this way, the Canadians were depicted as 
conquering heroes, despite the fact that there continued to be charges of looting, theft, and 
other untoward behaviour in the formerly occupied areas. Ultimately, the actions of the 
Canadian forces during the war were interpreted by many back home as earning a place 
for Canada at the negotiating table. It would be simplistic and anachronistic to say that 
Canadian independence and sovereignty were born on the slopes of Vimy Ridge or in the 
battles of the Hundred Days, especially as the repatriation of the constitution did not 
occur until 1982, and the Statute of Westminster was years away (1931). It was popularly 
understood that Canada’s role in the war justified its presence at the Versailles Peace 
Conference as a junior, but independent, ally of Great Britain.  
Luckily for the soldiers of the Corps, the Allies were able to force the surrender of 
the enemy before 1919. There were many factors that help explain why the war turned out 
the way it did, and why it happened when it did, but suffice it to say here that the 
Canadians played an important role in the fight to victory. The Hundred Days campaign 
was, in fact, the culmination of a steep learning curve, where lessons from previous 
operations were incorporated into attack plans, and where an all-arms doctrine emerged to 
overcome the enemy defences. It first took a rather heavy toll in both blood and treasure 
to determine that careful planning, and limited set-piece attacks increased the chances of 
battlefield success. Effective attacks also served to reinforce the reputation of the Corps 
                                                             
 
1034 Kenneth Radley, We Lead, Others Follow: First Canadian Division 1914-1918 (St. Catharines: Vanwell Publishing 
Limited, 2006), 354. 
1035 Hyatt, General Sir Arthur Currie, 118-119. 
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as elite, marching shoulder to shoulder with its allies.1036 And by 1918 the Entente 
boasted overwhelming technological advantages over the Central Powers; their economic, 
industrial, and financial strength also gave them enormous powers that their enemies 
simply could not match. It cannot be denied, however, that Germany and its allies had 
agency, and also played a role in their own defeat. The German offensives of March to 
June 1918, for instance, served to inflict heavy casualties on the attackers, exhausted first-
rate stormtroop units, put heavy strain on existing resources, expanded supply lines, and 
of course hurt morale after promises of victory.  
The final months of the war can also be understood in terms of morale, discipline, 
combat motivation, and endurance. War weariness, related to these concepts and yet 
separate from them, is also an effective way of understanding the experience of the 
soldiers in the Hundred Days, and to a lesser extent the rest of the war too. It is my 
contention that Canadian soldiers triumphed in this period despite the presence and 
impact of war weariness on both an individual and collective level. The historical record, 
firsthand accounts, and other evidence emphasises that other armies experienced even 
more serious and deep-rooted war weariness compared with the Canadians.1037 Strong 
morale was one way to stave off and minimise war weariness and mitigate against its 
worst aspects. When Foch became Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in the 
spring of 1918, there was hope that a combined strategy would be able to finally and 
effectively drive the enemy back. There was a sense that despite the heavy casualties and 
resistance, progress was being made, and hope was evident. As one contemporary put it 
“these are anxious days for Germany and encouraging ones for us…Foch is hurling his 
opponent against the ropes…[and] the knock-out blow will follow later.”1038 After the 
successful attack at Amiens, some even began to think that the war might come to an end 
in the next few months. One British soldier stated “by Jove, the war’s coming to an 
                                                             
 
1036 Some historians would also argue that this period reinforced the sense of Canadian superiority or exceptionalism in 
the war, which some continue to assert even today.  
1037 One historian argued that “the reality was that all armies were on their last legs come 1918, with the exception of 
the slowly growing and green American army and the small Belgian army.” Philpott, War of Attrition, 311. 
1038 The Military Museums, W.A. Howard Library and Arthur J.E. Child Archives, TMM F0038, Gordon Gilmour 
Fonds, Canada’s Triumph: Amiens, Arras, Cambrai by Fred James, Official Correspondent to the Ministry, OMFC. 
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end,”1039 which served to uplift them. Many were also heartened to leave the old Somme 
battlefields behind and enter open country again, with one remembering that leaving the 
old war-scarred land “was marvellous.”1040 D.J. Corrigall of the 20th Battalion noted that a 
“spirit of optimism was in the air” after the success at Amiens.1041 As the Hundred Days 
continued, tangible signs of success continued to emerge. Morale was also bolstered after 
the men learned that Turkey, one of Germany’s allies, had sued for peace.1042  
Morale was also be strengthened and preserved by both physical and non-physical 
aspects. Of the former, hearty and timely food, clean water, alcohol, cigarettes, letters and 
parcels from home, good clothing and equipment, physical comforts provided by 
chaplains,1043 the YMCA, and other support services all contributed to the health, well-
being, and ability of soldiers to withstand the strains of war. After months and then years 
of war, it was often the little material comforts that mattered, and helped sustain the 
troops just a bit longer. Of the non-physical factors that helped bolster morale, luck, 
chance, superstition, religious belief, and fatalism all played a role. Some troops held firm 
to their religious beliefs despite the horrors of war, which helped them endure the trauma 
and terror of the front. Others used superstition, talismans or lucky charms in an attempt 
to ward off danger – at times, it seemed that one survived based on mere chance.1044 
These things made no real difference in reality, but were important if soldiers believed 
they helped, and thus took psychological and emotional comfort in them. Importantly, 
however, soldiers putting too much stock into the idea of chance could become 
disheartened too. Losing a friend to a stray shell far behind the lines after surviving a tour 
                                                             
 
1039 Arthur, ed., Forgotten Voices of the Great War, 294. 
1040 Ibid, 203.  
1041 Corrigall, The History of the Twentieth Canadian Battalion, 234. 
1042 Ibid, 273 and  LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4574, Folder 2, File 6, ‘Orders, December 1917 to February 1919.’ 
Orders of 9 November contained a ‘Text of Conditions of Armistice with Turkey.’ See also Gunner Bertram Howard 
Cox, Letter of 5 October 1918, found at http://www.shiawasseehistory.com/coxoctober51918.html.  
1043 Coffee stalls, canteens, and sometimes soup kitchens run by the Chaplain Services provided the soldiers with a 
quiet and warm place to rest, free coffee, writing material, and other material comforts. Chaplains also often worked in 
conjunction with the Red Cross Society to provide comfort and entertainment to the troops LAC, RG 9 III C15, Volume 
4653, Historical 1, ‘Precis, September 1918,’ and ‘August 1918’ and Volume 4664, Red Cross Society, ’15 April – 19 
May,’ and ‘Summary of Work on the Lines of Communication During the Month of November 1917.’ 
1044 One soldier of the 43rd Battalion stated that the “lucky arrival” of the CO helped stave off disaster for the unit. LAC, 
RG 9 III C3, Volume 4189, Folder 7, File 1, Operations Arras, August 1918, ‘9th Brigade, 43rd Battalion Narrative of 
Operations.’ For more on the role of religion and superstition, see Chapter 14 of Cook, Shock Troops, entitled 
‘Supernatural Battlefields: The Dead and Undead on the Western Front.’ 
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of duty in the trenches, for instance, might be very difficult to accept. The apparent 
randomness could unnerve even the strongest and most dedicated. And the idea that you 
could be killed despite all your experiences and best efforts to stay safe could certainly be 
demoralising. Success and commitment on the battlefield could also be explained, in part, 
through other non-physical aspects such as “fighting spirt,” faith in leadership, the plans 
of attack, abilities and equipment, confidence, “determination…dash and gallantry,” the 
“high spirits” of the troops, “enthusiasm” and any number of other intangibles that are 
difficult to explain, let alone quantify.1045 
Just as there were myriad factors and forces that could bolster morale and 
positively shape the soldier’s mind toward duty and belief in ultimate victory, there were 
even more that undermined and eroded morale. As historians it is important to assess both 
sides, and decide whether strengthening or weakening aspects were in the ascendency. A 
single incident could assault morale, or it could be eroded over time though poor 
leadership, bad equipment or clothing,1046 inadequate food, and lack of rest and respite. 
As Currie wrote regarding the Canal du Nord, the “tremendous exertions and 
considerable casualties consequent upon the four days of almost continuous fighting had 
made heavy inroads on the freshness and efficiency of all arms” involved, and it was 
doubtful whether further success could be attained as a result.1047 And a poem entitled 
                                                             
 
1045 A report of late 1917 stated that “the greatest factor of success…was the fighting spirit of the men, tempered by 
discipline, developed by training and enhanced by the confidence in themselves and their officers created by a year of 
unbroken success.” Raids and training also helped build morale. LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3859, Folder 85, File 8, 
‘Reasons for Success in Recent Operations by Canadians on Second Army Front,’ and Ibid, HQ General Staff, 
‘Preliminary Notes on Recent Operations on the Front of the Second Army;’ LAC RG 9 III C15, Volume 4664, Report, 
‘23 June – 17 February’ and ‘Chaplains with Canadian Corps during September 1918;’ LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 
4163, Folder 11, File 4, Operations Amiens, 5-8-18 to 16-8-18, document of 16 August 1918 and Ibid, Folder 8, File 1, 
Operations Valenciennes, 21-10-18 to 9-11-18, October 1918, ‘9th Brigade, 116th Battalion;’ and Volume 4214, Folder 
2, File 3, Operations Valenciennes, November 1918, 47th Battalion, including ‘Narrative of Operations,’ and report of 
13-11-18 by J.M. Ross, CO 10th CIB.  
1046 The lack of proper clothing, especially during the cold winter months, could attack the morale of the troops. In 1918 
the lack of great coats and cardigans created “a serious problem,” and this lack of warm clothing “entails great 
discomforture” [sic] amongst the men. Moreover, General Routine Order No. 33 of August 1918 stated that men should 
try to maintain their clothing and equipment themselves, and that “clothing should be continued in wear until actually 
worn out” before requesting replacements. They were also instructed to allow regimental or divisional tailors attempt to 
repair them before requesting new clothing or equipment. See LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4564, Folder 2, File 11, 
‘Clothing Correspondence, Generally’ and Ibid, ‘General Routine Order No. 33,’ 16 August 1918.  
1047 Humphries, ed., The Selected Papers of Sir Arthur Currie, 280. 
296 
 
 
 
Armistice Day by T. McKenzie of Saskatchewan, contained the following lines, expressed 
relief that the war had finally ended, but that it had been a hard road: 
If you ever recall the sights we have seen 
You’ll always remember in hell we have been. 
For in Flanders fields at break of day 
The dead and dying around did lay…1048 
 
The death of comrades and effective leaders certainly had the ability to hurt the morale 
and emotional well-being of those in the unit, but casualties also had the added effect of 
putting an extra burden on the survivors. There was ‘survivor’s guilt,’ but there were 
other burdens to shoulder as well. Exhaustion was a reality for all soldiers, regardless of 
their branch of service. And during the Hundred Days there was even less time and 
opportunity for rest than during trench warfare. The military authorities came to 
acknowledge the detrimental effects of exhaustion on the abilities of the soldiers,1049 and 
that soldiers needed to go into battle ‘fresh’ and well-rested. Exhaustion also contained 
both physical and non-physical aspects, and thus rest from combat and respite from the 
sources of stress were both essential.  
 Perhaps the largest assault on morale was that for much of the war, despite what 
the propagandists and politicians said, there was no end in sight – except perhaps death. 
One soldier wrote that by 1918 he and his mates were “almost reconciled to the belief that 
the war would go on forever.” James Adams of the 26th Battalion wrote after the Arras 
battles that any “exhilaration” he once felt gave way to “the awful realisation that this is 
not a one time test and will go on and on with no definite end.”1050 In addition to this, for 
many soldiers there was not much to look forward to. Leave was welcome by all, but 
happened all too rarely, especially for the rank and file. Time out of the line and rotation 
into reserve areas was also welcomed, yet time behind the front lines often did not mean 
                                                             
 
1048 The Military Museums, W.A. Howard Library and Arthur J.E. Child Archives, TMM F0038, Gordon Gilmour 
Fonds, Ephemera, ‘France – Afterwards.’ 
1049 LAC, RG 9 III C3, Volume 4189, Folder 7, File 1, Operations Arras, August 1918, ‘9th Brigade, 43rd Battalion 
Narrative of Operations.’  
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actual rest and the ability to properly and fully recover. Infantry units out of the line were 
still expected to undertake training and contribute to work parties. One soldier wrote in 
mid-August that not knowing when the war would end, or how far they still had to go was 
rather tough on the troops;1051 this sense of uncertainty preyed on the men, and eroded 
their staying power over time. And as the final campaign continued and it became clearer 
that the war might be ended in the next weeks, no one wanted to be killed so near the end. 
As one artillery officer noted, every soldier still exposed to enemy fire “must have 
wondered whether he was going to survive, or whether some shell ‘with his name on it’ 
would wipe him off the rolls in the last hours of the long war.”1052 This served to 
undermine the enthusiasm and confidence of those still in the line, and for some troops, 
induced a sense of caution that ran counter to Allied strategy at this phase of the war. 
 One way in which the authorities sought to keep the troops in the line was the use 
of army discipline. Military discipline had three general characteristics: punishment, the 
threat of punishment (deterrence), and as a system of personnel management. Upon 
enlistment in the forces soldiers were aware of the numerous rules, regulations, and army 
laws they were subject to. These were often published in daily and routine orders, to 
remind the soldiers and to draw their attention to specific issues. In October of 1918, for 
example, orders were issued to units in the forward areas about looting and removing 
furniture to furnish dugouts, huts, and other billets. The high command instructed COs 
that “formations and units will adopt strict measures to prevent such occurrences, which 
not only constitute a grave disobedience of orders, but also tend to bring into disrepute the 
fair name of the British Army.”1053 An increase in incidents, or the high command’s 
awareness of such incidents, likely prompted these orders to be issued with such urgency.  
 Part of discipline was to instil unquestioning obedience. The idea was that if 
soldiers naturally obeyed orders while out of the line, they were more likely to 
automatically do so while at the front and under dangerous conditions in the line. The 
                                                             
 
1051 Dawson, Living Bayonets, 186. 
1052 Burns, General Mud, 80. See also LAC, RG 41 III B1, Volume 12, Interview with R. Ferrie of the 31st Battalion, 
Interview 2 of 2, page 14 for caution bordering on insubordination in the hope of preventing casualties near the end.  
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entire functioning of the armed forces depended on this obedience to legal and legitimate 
orders. This was one reason why the army seemed to care so much about appearance and 
behaviour, even far from the front. One report of October 1918, for instance, lamented the 
“slackness in saluting” shown by troops, their posture, and body language.1054 These 
behaviours apparently suggested a lack of respect for officers, the uniform, and the army, 
and might undermine the very hierarchy that was so crucial for executing tasks, carrying 
out orders, and maintaining continuity of leadership. This also explain the emphasis upon 
cleanliness, discipline, and ‘smartness’ in appearance. One soldier in August of 1918 was 
punished for having a “dirty rifle on parade.”1055 It was difficult for combat soldiers to 
keep their weapons and equipment clean, but even for those on the lines of 
communication it could seem frivolous to expect such cleanliness during active service 
conditions, especially considering the pace of the Hundred Days. It seems, moreover, that 
for the authorities any breach of discipline or disobedience, whether big or small, at the 
front or behind the lines, could be interpreted as contrary discipline and perhaps the first 
step toward the breakdown of the army hierarchy, order, and control. It was even more 
difficult to get the soldiers to obey orders in the heat of battle, so it was important to 
inculcate automatic and unquestioning obedience out of the line. In order to uphold 
discipline and punish offending soldiers, military police (MPs) and provost agents were 
used. By late August 1918, the Corps had 216 MPs in France alone.1056 
 Yet despite all the rules and regulations, and the personnel to enforce them, there 
were still breaches of discipline and crimes committed in the Hundred Days. This is 
important, if only because some historians have asserted that breaches of discipline 
spiked during periods of inactivity, or when things looked rather bleak. The final months 
of the war were anything but a period of inactivity, and though no one knew when (or 
even if) the war would end, there was some cautious hope based on military successes in 
                                                             
 
1054 This report noted that “men [were] slouching around with their hands in their pockets.” Moreover, it was not just 
ORs that failed to uphold proper discipline, as even some officers were depicted as being slack in returning salutes. 
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this period. Desertion and AWL, voluntary surrenders, SIWs, and acts of collective 
indiscipline (‘strikes’ or mutinies) were examples of soldier discontent and attempts to 
escape the front. There were, moreover, attempts to minimise individual participation or 
evade further duty rather than escape the situation entirely. Hard fighting and heavy 
casualties were a reality during the Hundred Days, but an extended period of inactivity it 
certainly was not. This suggests that breaches of discipline were just part of the soldier 
life, and that these crimes/acts of indiscipline were a way for soldiers to augment their 
meagre rations (in the form of theft and looting), for example, or a way to let off some 
steam, acting as an important safety valve. Grumbling, grousing, and complaining were a 
natural part of being a soldier; verbal complaints did not necessarily lead to illegal actions 
or military crimes, and there were different types of dissent and discontent.  
 If the final months of the war put more pressure on the soldiers taking part in these 
operations, it also provided them with increased opportunities for indiscipline, especially 
to loot, thieve, and acquire ‘souvenirs.’ Charles Harrison wrote that as the troops arrived 
in Arras, “discipline has disappeared,” and looting for food commenced. Challenges to 
military authority were evident, especially as there were fights between soldiers and MP 
in the city.1057 One soldier candidly admitted that he and his pals “blew the padlock off” a 
brewery in Arras, and before they knew it the “fellows were bathing in white wine.”1058 
But then some MPs showed up, and “of course there was a fracas” between the two 
groups. Looting was also frowned upon as the victims were often civilians, rather than 
enemy soldiers; Allied forces were there to end the occupation, not aggravate its effects. 
Captain G.A. Ramsay of the CAMC also noted the effects of looting, which had a 
“baleful” effect on discipline in the area.1059 From the army point of view, the toleration 
of discipline in one area might very well have encouraged it elsewhere. Others made 
reference to corpses being looted, though it is rarer to see personal admissions of 
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participating in this. 1060 Many other troops, however, readily admitted to ‘relieving’ 
German POWs of watches, badges, and other highly-coveted souvenir items.1061 
 Indiscipline in this period also included insubordination and the refusal of orders. 
Will Bird (42nd Battalion) wrote of disobeying direct orders, standing up to a new officer, 
and even threatening him with bodily harm if an unpopular order was not rescinded.1062 
Under the Army Act alone, Bird and his comrades could have been charged with several 
crimes or breaches of discipline. Section 8 (1), for example, covered ‘offering violence to 
his superior officer,’ or ‘striking his superior officer,’ whereas 8 (2b) was ‘using 
insubordinate or threatening language to his superior officer.’ Section 9 pertained to 
‘disobedience of an order or lawful command,’ and section 11 was ‘refusing to obey a 
general order.’ Disobedience and refusing orders are found in other firsthand accounts as 
well. Sometimes this took the form of halting an attack and going to ground rather than 
continuing, or even withdrawing without orders to do so. At times, this behaviour was 
based more on biological determinants and self-preservation, rather than on wilful 
disobedience or cowardice. Army discipline was designed to overcome these instincts and 
natural responses, though. John Becker of the 75th Battalion wrote of going to ground 
during an artillery barrage and attack. He admitted that “I was genuinely ashamed of 
myself for flattening…as I was familiar enough with shelling to know by the sound if 
[sic] would not be close.” He further wrote that “I realized then that my nerves were 
going and that I wouldn’t be much good in action if I kept at it many weeks longer,”1063 
                                                             
 
1060 Reid, Personal Memoirs of the First World War, 226. One artillery officer wrote that upon coming across a pile of 
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illustrating the wear and tear on even committed volunteer veterans. Many soldiers 
wanted to stick it out at duty, but were becoming increasingly unable to do so.  
There were also some troops who candidly admitted they would welcome a 
Blighty wound that would allow them to leave the trenches honourably, legally and 
legitimately, but without having to do something drastic. In numerous memoirs, letters, 
journals, and other accounts, many expressed the hope for a Blighty without having to 
resort to more extreme measures like desertion or SIWs,1064 which were dangerous and 
could bring disrepute on the individual and unit. When soldiers did finally get their 
Blighty and were removed from combat, a sense of relief, and envy from their comrades, 
was palpable.1065 One officer noted that “we often killed time by debating the question of 
how badly we would be willing to be hit to get a Blighty,” and thus removed from 
combat, at least temporarily.1066  This talk did not necessarily suggest demoralisation or 
defeatism, but a decrease in commitment to the war effort could spread amongst young, 
inexperienced, or impressionable troops. Perhaps more importantly, however, for some 
desperate soldiers, this talk could turn to action after months and years of trauma and 
tension. Some might have decided that they would throw caution to the wind and act in an 
overly aggressive manner, reclaiming their agency and asserting their independence.  
Reckless behaviour could bring further danger to the unit, and also ran counter to 
military control and discipline. In the words of one veteran, from that point forward it was 
either the ‘Victoria Cross or a wooden cross,’ suggesting an award for bravery, or death. 
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Other troops, however, might have decided that instead of waiting to get a Blighty in 
combat naturally, they would help the process along and put themselves in harm’s 
way.1067 Others took the next step, administering a SIW or illness to ensure they no longer 
remained effective as a soldier, whereas some went AWL or sought to escape duty 
permanently through desertion or surrender.1068 And finally, the killing of prisoners also 
represented a breakdown of army authority and discipline, could be counterproductive, 
and put comrades in harm’s way in the form of retaliation for such behaviour.1069 And 
yet, despite orders to the contrary and the negative aspects related to this illegal conduct, 
killing prisoners continued throughout the war. As one infantry subaltern wrote, the 
“circumstances of infantry fighting in the war were not such as to engender a chivalrous 
attitude towards the enemy.” And furthermore, in this war there was “violence done by 
angry men, whose experience had filled their hearts with cold fury and disgust,”1070 
clearly not conducive to sympathy and mercy when emotions ran high and the cold steel 
of the bayonet found vulnerable targets. 
Disciplinary issues were evident on both sides of the line1071 in the final months of 
the war. Discipline was an important way to understand soldier behaviour and the attitude 
of authorities because it was often used as a proxy to measure the morale and military 
effectiveness of a given unit. A battalion with high desertion and trench foot rates, for 
                                                             
 
1067 One soldier who sought a ‘cushy’ put his hand above the parapet to attract German fire. Another soldier, “fed up 
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example, was often understood as lacking in morale and the appropriate application of 
top-down and self-discipline. Stronger leadership and a better appreciation of duty could 
bring these rates down, so the argument went. Moreover, discipline was also seen as a 
prerequisite for effective action in combat. At the Canal du Nord Currie explained that 
success was based to a large measure on “iron discipline” and tactical expertise.1072 But 
what, exactly, did this mean? Did it suggest the unquestioning obedience to orders, 
regardless of consequences, even if it resulted in heavy casualties? Or did it suggest 
strength in the face of opposition, and self-mastery over one’s panic and self-preservation 
instinct? These disciplinary problems also had a direct effect on the fighting itself. When 
authority broke down, and indiscipline rose, it could result in killing prisoners. At 
Valenciennes, rumours and stories of brutal German occupation overwhelmed some 
soldier’s sense of morality and discipline. One officer admitted that the German 
occupation of Denain (and other cities) “so stimulated their desire to revenge the wrongs 
done [to] these wretched people, that the miserable enemy could expect and certainly 
received no quarter” in combat.1073 The capture of enemy forces was preferable, in many 
ways, to the continued fighting between the two sides that served to elevate casualty rates.  
Combat motivation is often understood as being composed of ‘carrots and sticks,’ 
or positive ways to encourage certain behaviour, through promises and rewards, and 
threats of punishments or punishment itself should the soldier not fulfill his duty. This is a 
useful analogy which helps explain soldier behaviour. There were both positive and 
negative motivators, with the former encouraging good outcomes through duty and 
combat, and the latter examining the fear of specific outcomes (for oneself, their unit, or 
others entirely) should certain behaviour not be adhered to, and negative aspects that 
shaped behaviour as well. In terms of positive inducements to behaviour, the apparent 
righteousness and justice of the cause was motivation enough for some. After the signing 
of the Armistice, Currie’s ‘Special Order of the Day’ thanked the troops for their 
dedication and service. He referred to the soldiers, “conscious of the righteousness of 
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your cause,” who “have fought many battles and endured cruel hardships” throughout.1074 
According to Currie, in the end their suffering had been worth it. There were also 
religious and moral overtones to inducements to fighting, stressing the need to rid the 
world of its current danger, including militarism and the belief in ‘might over right.’ In 
this regard, chaplains at the front and pastors in Canada had an important role to play in 
motivating the soldiers to fight, and if need be, die for the cause. Some troops were 
motivated by these high ideals and sense of holy obligation, as evident in the Latin 
phrase: Melius est mori quant vivendi perdere causas.1075 One French Army chaplain also 
told his troops that “friends, you are fighting for God’s cause…He has a splendid reward 
for those who might fall.” Others stressed the great moral issues at stake, the war aims, 
the “righteousness and justice of our cause,” and the opportunities for “the recognition 
and renewal of our personal and national obligations to Almighty God in whose cause the 
Allied sword has been unsheathed.”1076 Yet other chaplains appealed to the manhood or 
masculinity of their flock, for example in stating that “there will be no feeble effort” or 
weaklings among members of the Bible Society,1077 and that these soldiers should have 
courage and follow in the example of Christ. Some chaplains made a direct comparison 
between the suffering of Christ and that of the soldiers during the war.1078 
In addition to the Allies’ war aims and the cause for which they were fighting, 
during the final months the Canadians encountered numerous examples and reminders as 
to why they were fighting. The liberation of cities, towns, and villages, along with 
thousands of inhabitants, were tangible reminders that this war was about the lives of 
human beings,1079 who by all accounts had suffered during occupation; there were many 
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civilians and refugees in these areas. Liberation acted as a morale boost for troops, and 
Victor Wheeler of the 50th Battalion wrote that “we felt a deep gratification in our mission 
to liberate a conquered people and free enslaved spirits.”1080 The liberation of Denain, for 
example, brought the reality of the suffering in occupied areas home to the soldiers. In an 
address on the city’s liberation, its abbot spoke of German actions and “the odious crime 
of a colossal empire.” He explained that the citizens were “weary of suffering,” of the 
pillaging, having their rights trampled, their dignity outraged, the theft and looting, 
families broken apart, and all the other injustices.1081 Letters of thanks from civilians, 
being feted as liberators, visits from dignitaries, and messages of congratulations from 
Currie, PM Borden, the Prince of Wales and others might very well have sustained the 
soldiers at this late phase of the war.1082 These messages and visits were also an official 
recognition of the part played by the soldiers in this final campaign. 
Evidence of success on the battlefield and of impending victory in the wider war 
also helped sustain some of the troops who had been worn down over months and years 
of war. This also played an important role in keeping war weariness at a simmer. Currie 
himself wrote that prior to the opening of the Battle of Arras in late August, the troops 
were already “flushed with the great victory they had just won” at Amiens.1083 Success on 
the battlefield beget confidence and a growing belief that the war might be victoriously 
concluded before every last soldier currently in the ranks was killed or maimed. And 
though Germany was certainly the senior and most important member of the Central 
Powers, the fall of Turkey and then Austria-Hungary,1084 and the prospect of ultimate 
victory, provided added motivation. And aside from wanting to complete the task at hand 
and see the war through to its (successful) conclusion, many soldiers were also motivated 
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by the desire to ensure the sacrifices of their comrades, who had fallen on the field of 
battle in the thousands, had not been in vain. To guarantee this, however, the Allies would 
have to emerge victorious over their foe. This, of course, meant pressing on despite the 
growing war weariness in all quarters. On the eve of Amiens, Currie instructed his troops 
to “remember with solemn pride our gallant dead,” and to live up to their heroic example. 
He reminded his subordinates to remember the Corps’ past achievements, and with an 
“unmistakable belief in the justice of our cause” and a faith in God, to “fight for freedom, 
for righteousness, for humanity.” And as a final word of encouragement, Currie 
admonished his troops that with “high purpose and enduring determination let us ‘carry 
on’ until the last fight is over and the final victory won” in this war.1085 During the 
Hundred Days itself Currie reminded his officers to continue with training and discipline, 
“united in a burning desire for victory of right over might”1086 which justified their 
involvement in this bloody war. 
Sometimes this ‘burning desire’ boiled over into acts of indiscipline as moral 
outrage, a sense of wrath or revenge, or other less-than-honourable motivators animated 
the soldiers in the final months. Some troops were motivated, frankly put, less by high 
ideals of duty, hearth and home, service, and Christian sacrifice than by more mundane 
things like souvenir acquisition and opportunities for plunder. For others, souvenirs were 
merely a bonus, just rewards in a bloody affair that caused untold suffering. The historian 
of the 2nd Battalion noted the propensity of troops to take souvenirs from the enemy, and 
getting drunk on captured booze.1087 In other cases, food and drink were looted from 
overrun stores and civilian establishments to augment monotonous, and at times 
insufficient, army rations. For some, with looting and the collecting of souvenirs there 
was an element of superstition to it.1088 Soldiers used superstitions, talismans, and other 
‘lucky charms’ as a psychological defence mechanism to the horrors of war, and so 
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anything that allowed the men to carry on at the front, without bringing undue dishonour 
to the army, was generally accepted.  
The moral outrage experienced by many Allied troops in the final months of the 
war also acted as a powerful motivator. During trench warfare, the ability to appreciate 
the destructiveness of the war and the deliberate destructive behaviour of the enemy was 
rather limited. During the open warfare of the Hundred Days, however, the atrocities 
committed and the destruction wrought were evident for all to see, at least in any given 
area. The liberation of inhabited regions and the meeting of refugees and civilians in 
countless number brought the Canadians face-to-face with the victims of German 
aggression. These experiences were also exacerbated by years of rumours and stories as 
to the frightful behaviour of ‘the Hun.’ Some of these atrocity stories were apocryphal, 
highly exaggerated, or simply fabrications conjured up by propagandists and politicians. 
And yet, many atrocity stories were based in reality, as documented by John Horne and 
Alan Kramer in German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial. Canadian soldiers in the 
final months did encounter much evidence of suffering, violence, and destruction caused 
directly or indirectly by the German invasion, occupation, and defensive measures. One 
soldier, for example, made reference to houses looted and interiors smashed during 
advances.1089 Currie wrote on 9 October that as the troops of the 3rd Division entered 
Cambrai they encountered surviving enemy troops, “many of whom I believe were left 
behind by the Germans to start fires,” explaining that “new fires have been breaking out 
in different parts of the city all day.” The Canadians also had to send out groups to “look 
for booby traps,” left behind to kill or maim curious advancing soldiers.1090 Other troops 
noted the fires of Cambrai, apparently set in the “spirit of wanton destructiveness.”1091 
This must have invoked the ire of the advancing troops, already frustrated and worn down 
by the pace of the Hundred Days.  
                                                             
 
1089 Bird, Ghosts Have Warm Hands, 127,  
1090 Humphries, ed., The Selected Papers of Sir Arthur Currie, 122. 
1091 Black, I Want One Volunteer, 23 and Corrigall, The History of the Twentieth Canadian Battalion, 256. When the 
troops reached Valenciennes there were also “signs that it had been ransacked.” Hesler, ed., Interlude: 1916-1919, 69. 
See also Gunner Bertram Howard Cox, Letter of 24 October, found at 
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German occupation and behaviour in the war, the treatment of French and Belgian 
civilians, as well as captured Allied POWs, further convinced many attacking troops not 
only of the justice of their cause, but also engendered feelings of wrath, revenge, hatred, 
and even bloodlust. It became apparent to some that not only should these areas be 
liberated of the enemy menace, any captured Germans or those met on the field of battle 
should be punished for their wrongdoings. This punishment sometimes took the shape of 
war crimes and behaviour that ran counter to military discipline and international norms 
of warfare. And yet, as these powerful emotions were stirred up in the liberators, officers 
and COs found themselves unable, and at times unwilling, to rein in their troops. 
Accounts of wartime service referred to hatred of the Germans, and the ongoing process 
of de-humanisation throughout the war. Others made reference to the sinking of the 
H.M.H.S. Llandovery Castle,1092 and how this tragedy was invoked just prior to the 
opening of the Battle of Amiens to ‘get the blood up.’1093 Historian Tim Cook explained 
the connection between the Battle of Amiens and Llandovery Castle thusly: 
For the Canadians, the operations [at Amiens] was informally known as 
Llandovery Castle, in homage to the hospital ship of that name that was sunk at 
the end of June by a German U-boat. Eighty-eight of the ninety-four Canadians on 
board died, including fourteen nurses. Even worse, the U-boat had machine-
gunned and rammed a number of lifeboats. This was viewed as the height of 
barbarity, and as Canadians moved into the line on the night of August 7, many 
felt that revenge was in in order. Brigadier George Tuxford…gave orders that the 
‘battle cry on the 8th of August should be Llandovery Castle, and that cry should 
be the last to ring in the ears of the Hun as the bayonet was driven home.’1094 
 
                                                             
 
1092 The HMHS Llandovery Castle, originally the RMS Llandovery Castle, was a 500 foot ocean liner launched in 1914. 
It was commissioned as a hospital ship in 1916, and it held 622 beds and 102 medical staff. By 1918 it was run almost 
exclusively by Canadian authorities, and operated by Canadian staff by early 1918. On 27 June 1918, she was sunk by 
U-86. LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4717, Folder 110, File 28, ‘H.M.H.S. Llandovery Castle, Historical Record,’ 
including newspaper clippings and photos, as well as ‘Part II Daily Orders.’ 
1093 Harrison, Generals Die in Bed, 142 and 245. 
1094 Cook, Shock Troops, 417, citing McWilliams and Steel, Amiens, 31. Moreover, in the orders issued to Canadian 
units prior to the Amiens attack, operational instructions were entitled “L.C.,” for Llandovery Castle. LAC, RG 9 III 
C1, Volume 3855, Folder 74, File 11, ‘Complete Copy of “L.C.” Instructions Issued by Canadian Corps.’ 
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The calls for revenge and the reference to ‘the Hun’ further encouraged the de-
humanisation of the enemy, making it easier to forego taking prisoners and acting in a 
benevolent way upon contact with the enemy.  
The news and literature reaching the soldiers at the front, including information 
from home (despite censorship and a muzzled and mostly-loyal press), reinforced this 
sense of German sinister behaviour. It is thus no surprise that soldiers on the eve of battle 
were motivated by a sense of revenge or hatred. Officers often exploited these feelings to 
encourage commitment and aggression on the battlefield. This sense of moral outrage was 
the result of the sinking of Llandovery Castle, but also other actions like the bombing of 
military hospitals behind the lines. One soldier at a reinforcement camp wrote that the 
sinking “makes me all the more busting to get there [to the front]” because the Germans 
do not “deserve to walk this good earth.”1095 Army publications and newspapers back in 
Canada, indeed throughout the Empire, were whipping up martial and anti-German 
sentiment, just as war weariness was becoming a serious problem on both the military and 
(civilian) home fronts. To provide but one example, on 4 July 1918 The Canadian Daily 
Record, printed for the troops in Europe, published an article entitled ‘The Dominion 
Aroused: Feeling Intense over Sinking of Canadian Hospital Ship – Outrage Steels the 
Nation’s Will.’ In this article references were made to “intense feelings of sorrow and 
horror,” based on the “latest Hun sea outrage,” which was “deliberate in its cruelty,” but 
just “the most recent exhibition of German infamy.”1096 And in order to capitalise on this 
tragedy, the article suggested that “the consensus of opinion…is that by the outrage 
Canada’s will to defeat the unspeakable Hun will be further steeled and the national effort 
                                                             
 
1095 Caughill, ed., Letters to Janet, 102 and LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4575, Folder 1, File 5, ‘Bulletin of the 
CAMC,’ Vol. 1, No. 5 (August 1918), including articles on air raids and the sinking of the Llandovery Castle. On the 
bombings of Canadian hospitals, see LAC, RG 9 III D1, Folder 108, File 20, ‘Outside the Pale: Yet Another Canadian 
Military Hospital Bombed.’ The author wrote that “there is no possible excuse for such foul and ghoulish action.” He 
even compared the Germans unfavourably to the Turks, who apparently had at least gave warning before their actions 
against the Armenians; but “the Huns are beyond this: they are outside the pale of civilization.” See also Various 
Authors, Canada in the Great War, 112-114. 
1096 LAC, RG 9 III C10, Volume 4575, Folder 1, File 5, ‘Bulletin of the CAMC,’ Vol. 1, No. 5 (August 1918), 
including articles on air raids and the sinking of the Llandovery Castle and LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3751, Folder 2-
8-3, File ‘Hospital Ships.’ 
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increased.”1097 In other words, this was no time to give into war weariness, despair, or 
defeatism; this event could act as a powerful motivator.  
In addition to the newspaper articles and stories from home, Canadians also 
personally encountered the victims of German aggression. This acted as a powerful 
motivator for many at this phase of the war. One soldier wrote that his anger rose to the 
fore after his unit encountered some recently-liberated British prisoners. These former-
POWs were “walking skeletons…[with] rags tied around their feet in lieu of boots, their 
clothing crawling with vermin.”1098 And after coming across a POW camp and talking 
with some of the troops there, it was determined the inmates had been treated poorly; 
there was not enough food, and no heat.1099 Upon attestation, soldiers were aware that it 
was possible to fall into enemy hands; this was a fate they accepted, even if it was not one 
they hoped to have to endure. And as German resources became stretched to the breaking 
point, it is not surprising that food and fuel for enemy prisoners suffered as a result.  
The poor treatment of civilians and refugees encountered during the advance also 
acted as a motivating force, and stimulated certain emotions in the troops. In a letter from 
the front published in The Cobourg World in late November 1918, an officer wrote of his 
experience in liberating a French village. The stories he heard chilled his blood, and he 
hoped that “Heine’s men” would have to atone for their transgressions, “fourfold.” The 
German occupiers had routinely stolen food from the villagers, had destroyed a lady’s 
glassware, wrecked furniture “intentionally,” and drove away cattle.1100 Encountering 
tired and hungry refugees driven from their homes angered the soldiers,1101 and reinforced 
the view that Germans probably did not deserve mercy. Other contemporaries wrote of 
enemy atrocities including the shelling of inhabited areas, the rape of women, and the 
                                                             
 
1097 Ibid. 
1098 Bird, Ghosts Have Warm Hands, 138. 
1099 Ibid, 144 and Renison, “A Canadian Epic of One Hundred Days,” in Canada at War, 399. British POWs 
encountered in May of 1918 also exhibited signs of mistreatment. They had escaped from German lines, after being 
captured at the Scarpe on 28 March. They were “in a very weakened state as a result of the treatment they had 
received,” and at least one had to be hospitalised. LAC, RG 9 III D1, Volume 4677, Folder 9, File 3, ‘May 1918.’  
1100 Climo, Lively Letters from World War One, 289. The soldiers also encountered destitute civilians and the 
destruction of cities, towns, and villages, with many areas “greatly damaged and uninhabitable.” LAC, RG 9 III B2, 
Volume 3751, Folder 2-4-1, ‘Relations with M.H.C.’ 
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kidnapping of civilians for forced labour.1102 All of this came to be known by the soldiers 
through indirect channels, and through direct experience in liberating formerly-occupied 
areas. Agar Adamson also reflected this view of hatred and anger at the Germans. In a 
letter to his wife Mabel he mentioned “the devastated parts of Belgium and France,” 
where the people had suffered greatly.1103 He wrote that “I have not the slightest spark of 
feeling, but that of hate for any German,”1104 a rather candid admission. And even Currie 
admitted in a 1 November letter to Sir Edward Kemp, the Minister of the OMFC, that  
We have taken quite a number of prisoners…and furthermore, since our men have 
released the French civilians in the areas they have traversed, and have talked with 
these civilians concerning their treatment by the Germans, their feelings towards 
the enemy have become much more bitter so that this morning I can well imagine 
there were not quite as many prisoners taken as usual.1105 
 
A soldier of the 50th Battalion also expressed hatred and even bloodthirstiness as a result 
of the ill-treatment of locals. After arriving in a French village, he learned that local 
women were forced into prostitution, and other villagers were tired, hungry, and in 
rags.1106 It is often difficult to separate the exaggerated and apocryphal from the genuine 
stories of the locals, but for many troops, these stories had a direct emotional impact on 
them. And after the capture of Cambrai, this same soldier wrote of the “vicious enmity we 
felt for the Hun,” but feelings of pity were also developing. He wrote of the devastation 
they encountered, that “destruction and misery were everywhere,” and his unit spent an 
evening in a “typically ravished village.” And finally, he admitted that “our thirst for 
blood of les Allemands was being assuaged with every passing day” in this period.1107 A 
report on the Valenciennes operations indicated similar behaviour, as the desire for 
revenge led to questionable actions and atrocities. J.M. Ross of the 10th CIB wrote that 
                                                             
 
1102 Renison, “A Canadian Epic of One Hundred Days,” in Canada at War, 399. Another contemporary made reference 
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the capture of Valenciennes was completed on 2 November, “to the great rejoicing of the 
wretched inhabitants who had been in practical slavery for four years.” His troops had 
learned from the locals of the brutal occupation, such as at Denain, Valenciennes, and 
other cities, which “stimulated their desire to revenge the wrongs done [to] these 
wretched people,” and thus the Germans were given no quarter.1108  
 The desire for revenge and to free occupied France and Belgium from the German 
yoke inspired and motivated the soldiers in this period, but also helped sustain them and 
allowed them to endure the stresses and strains of war. This was especially important 
after long months and years of war, and combat, which served to erode the morale, health, 
and commitment of even the most dedicated volunteer soldiers – they were war weary. 
Moreover, this period saw increasing war weariness on both an individual and collective 
level, and on the home front. The endurance of the troops in the final months of the war 
can be explained in part by both physical and non-physical factors that helped prevent the 
worst effects of war weariness and shell shock debilitation. War weariness and shell 
shock did, of course, incapacitate and undermine the performance of many, but it would 
have been even worse had it not been for these sustaining influences. Medical care, 
treatment, and the reassurances that this brought were an important element in the 
endurance of the soldiers near the end of the war. The medical services did not always 
function properly or were able to effect prompt evacuation, but the chances for survival 
after being wounded were greater than in previous conflicts. And despite the difficulties 
inherent in open and more mobile warfare, the medical services had grown and learned 
much from the previous years of combat. The CAMC and its British counterpart (the 
RAMC) had expanded substantially in terms of size, resources, personnel, treatment 
capabilities, administrative reach, and transport capacity. For the wounded and ill, 
medical services sustained the soldiers, worn down and suffering ill-health from repeated 
stressors. The CAMC, in addition to the YMCA and Chaplain Service all played an 
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important role in the health, morale, well-being, and material comfort of the troops.1109 
Chaplains were placed at HQ, at bases, with combat units, along the lines of 
communication, with railway and labour units, and their duties included “ministering to 
the spiritual, moral and social welfare of the troops.”1110 Chaplains in conjunction with 
the YMCA and other charities also oversaw the entertainment of troops, such as cinemas 
and concerts, as well as provided stationary, hot beverages, food, parcels from Canada, 
and other material comforts that helped them endure the often brutal nature of the war. 
The availability, cleanliness, quantity, and quality of water was also an important factor in 
the health and endurance of the soldiers, especially while on the move and encountering 
new sources of water, which may or may not have been contaminated.1111 
 Proper care for the soldiers, and their equipment and animals, went a long way in 
sustaining the troops in the final months. This care gave the troops the best chance at the 
front, and also illustrated the paternalism and care of the officers for their subordinates. 
The supplies and equipment required at the front depended upon the transport services of 
the CASC, as well as on the Veterinary Corps. Horses and mules needed proper care, 
forage, and water, in addition to sufficient riders and caregivers (like groomers); 
veterinarians helped keep these animals healthy and ready for duty. It is not too much to 
argue that the entire war machine depended on these animals and their services. And 
especially during the Hundred Days when the soldiers were nearly always on the move, 
and “from the point of view of maintaining the mobility of the Corps as a fighting 
formation, it is most undesirable to reduce the veterinary establishment except under the 
most urgent necessity.”1112 When manpower shortages and infantry casualties forced the 
                                                             
 
1109 The Military Museums, W.A. Howard Library and Arthur J.E. Child Archives, TMM F0038, Gordon Gilmour 
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authorities to comb out rear echelon and support units, the case was made that these 
veterinary services should be exempt.  
 In terms of non-material aspects of endurance, many benefitted from the religious 
and spiritual support of chaplains. Aside from holding religious services and providing 
religious rituals, such as the sacraments, chaplains played an important role in steadying 
the soldiers prior to attack. Pep talks, informal chats, and prayers before combat helped 
calm the soldiers, some of whom would meet their maker in the next 24 hours. Moreover, 
issuing the Last Rites, and promises of a proper Christian burial served to reassure and 
comfort believers who were mortally wounded. Chaplains oversaw burial services, gave 
talks to men, in private or in small groups, and even wrote to next of kin when soldiers 
were KIA. Not all soldiers were Christian, or even religious, of course, but for those who 
were the chaplains had an important role to play in ensuring the soldiers were aware of 
their duties, and were to be supported in all matters spiritual. In addition, soldiers also 
benefitted from rest, relief, respite from trauma, rotation out of the line, and relaxation. 
During the Hundred Days one soldier wrote that “after the strain of the preceding days, 
the sunshine and relaxation were a welcome and pleasant relief,”1113 and rejuvenated the 
troops. Time out of the line allowed them to reacquaint themselves with their humanity, 
as well as relaxed their mental, psychological, and biological stress responses to mortal 
danger, terror, and trauma. The authorities were responsible for the “comfort and 
convenience of the men” while out of the line,1114 even if it was not always possible to 
provide them with all they needed to remain healthy and committed. The reference to 
‘sunshine,’ however, raises an important point on how circumstances beyond anyone’s 
control could both contribute to, and undermine, a soldier’s perception and morale.  
 Morale, discipline, combat motivation, and endurance are all concepts linked to 
the phenomenon of war weariness. The nature, pace, and intensity of the fighting in the 
Hundred Days made this the most fertile period of the entire war for the onset, 
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development, and detrimental impact of war weariness for both individuals, and the 
collective (the military unit). Heavy casualties and the continuing use of long-serving 
veterans only exacerbated this problem. Moreover, the sense of uncertainty, belief in the 
inevitability of death or disfigurement, and a sense of helplessness or hopeless also 
compounded the issue. References to the phenomenon of war weariness, and the use of 
the term itself, can be found in both contemporary sources and firsthand accounts, and in 
secondary sources1115 written by historians and researchers after the war. War weariness 
also affected both soldiers (combatant and support personnel), as well as civilians on the 
home fronts. War weariness has also been used to understand the post-war world, and 
conflicts today.1116 
 For the soldiers at the front and fighting the war in Europe, war weariness often 
took the form of a longing for home, an end to the suffering, and expressions of how ‘fed 
up’ they were becoming with all the discomfort and danger. At other times, troops 
expressed discontent with how the war was being prosecuted, and desired an end to the 
war itself, or at least their own personal participation in it. And others took this a step 
further, seeking ways to escape the front or evade duty, if only for a short respite lest they 
would ‘crack’ or breakdown shortly. Some accounts, such as letters, are also difficult 
sources to assess, in part because of the censors, self-censorship (soldiers often did not 
want to worry those at home), and cultural attitudes regarding masculinity and having a 
‘stiff upper lip’ in the face of adversity. A few examples should help illustrate how war 
weariness began to take its toll on the troops near the end of the war. Corporal Frank 
Davidson wrote to his sister from France on 14 July 1918, even before the heavy, nearly-
continuous fighting that began at Amiens. After thanking her for recent correspondence, 
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he reassured her that he was “feeling fine,” and that the weather had been good of late. 
Later in the letter, however, he wrote that he  
sure would like to make a trip home this year, as it is nearly three years since I left 
and I have been over two years in France, and while there never out of hearing of 
the guns, so you cannot wonder at our getting tired of the awful game…I am 
living in hopes that we finish this job this year and then home again.1117 
 
This letter was written before the start of the campaign, and the hard fighting and war 
weariness of the next few months was somewhat offset or tempered by the successful 
battles and prospect of victory.1118 Other soldiers, moreover, found the inner strength, 
outlets, and other sustaining forces to carry on despite their war weariness. One soldier, 
W.P. Lajoie, wrote on the opening day of Amiens that “it is a regular hell over here and 
every man is fighting for all that is in him and facing death with a smile.” It is important 
to note, however, that Lajoie was not combat infantry, where the heaviest casualties were 
suffered and we see the largest percentage of war weary soldiers. Would many frontline 
infantry have described their plight as ‘facing death with a smile?’ But his later remarks 
expressed more war weariness, especially when he wrote that “everybody over here 
thinks the fun will be over this fall…[and] I hope it is right for I have had pretty nearly 
enough of fighting…[but] still, the war is not over yet, and we are too game to keep quiet, 
as fight is our middle name.”1119 He admitted that he had had enough of the fighting, but 
also that his pride and commitment ensured he continued, regardless of the consequences.  
 Other soldiers admitted that their thoughts often focussed on home and loved 
ones,1120 and their hope to return shortly. This is not surprising given many soldiers’ 
youth, lack of international travel, and the regular hardships of combat. The reality of the 
war, however, was a sobering prospect that dashed hopes for a quick and easy victory, 
even at the end of the war. Sergeant T.P. Lapp wrote in August 1918 that “while we hope 
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for an early finish we are not building any hopes on leaving the shores of France before 
the close of 1919,” and that “the main point is – we must win, and win we will, regardless 
of the time and price.” Not all were so sanguine about ultimate victory, however, and the 
uncertainty over when the war would end, or even if it would end in victory, contributed 
to the development of war weariness at this phase of the war. Others, moreover, were not 
so sure that the ends justified the means, or that victory was worth the cost. Lapp admitted 
that “I am writing this from a forward line where daily the price of blood is paid.”1121 
How much more blood would have to be paid before final victory was achieved? Were 
the soldiers merely sacrificial lambs led to the slaughter, mere blood offerings placed at 
the altar to appease Ares or Mars? Some soldiers, certainly, were unwilling or unable to 
endure long enough to find out. Others expressed discontent at their day to day lives, with 
one writing that “we get very tired of the soldier life and I hope to be home this year,” 
whereas others felt they had nothing to look forward to, such as rest or leave.1122 The 
horizon only showed the enemy, further death, and suffering.  
 Deward Barnes of the 19th Battalion also made reference to the phenomenon of 
war weariness, without actually using that term. He wrote on 2 October that he was “fed 
up with war and have [therefore] neglected my diary.” Another soldier wrote in June 
1918 that “I hope this year sees the finish of the war, but I think that the enemy is more 
fed up than what we are,”1123 suggesting both the Entente and enemy troops were war-
weary. My research has suggested that being ‘fed up,’ and admitting as much, was in 
many cases tantamount to an acknowledgment of war weariness.1124 Captain Harold 
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McGill (31st Battalion) made reference to the “dreary monotony” of the war as very trying 
on the troops. There were, of course, periods of intense activity and excitement which 
punctuated these long stretches of monotony, but duty, day after day, with the attendant 
“dirt, discomfort, noise and sights of blood and death gradually brought about that 
condition in a man so graphically described as being ‘fed up.’”1125 Other soldiers were 
also ‘fed up’ with the war, with their participation in it, as well as the implications of this 
reality. A soldier of the 42nd Battalion admitted that he and his troops were ‘fed up’ by 
delayed transports and having missed their breakfast. And though this was a seemingly 
mundane issue, matters of food, water, leave, mail and parcels from home,1126 equipment 
and supplies made an enormous difference to the health, morale, and well-being of the 
troops. This soldier wrote later that they were “damp and depressed,” and “wet and bone-
weary,” from having to wait for transport – ultimately, this left them “fed up to the back 
teeth.”1127 And John Becker of the 75th Battalion wrote that because he was so “fed up,” 
orders were disobeyed and he was decidedly apathetic.1128 The editor of Deward Barnes’ 
journal, moreover, explained his ‘fed up’ attitude as based on the fact that Barnes returned 
to the line (“misery”), coupled with “mild depression” and a “return to a hellish and 
uncertain existence at the front.”1129 This sense of uncertainty, and the stresses and strains 
characteristic of frontline combat, were contributing factors toward war weariness. It 
must be noted here, however, that war weariness affected frontline troops, and those on 
the lines of communication – none were immune to its effects. The Corps Commander 
also made reference to the fact that the soldiers were worn out, and only wanted to be 
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167; Dawson, Living Bayonets, 65, letter from London, 10 December 1917 and DUASC, Duncan Chisholm MacDonald 
Fonds, Collection No. MS – 2 – 520, Volume 1, Folder 1-3, Letter 8 September 1917. 
1125 Norris, The World War I Memoir of Captain Harold W. McGill, 139. 
1126 One soldier wrote that these letters did “a world of good,” news from home “is the best medicine,” and mail 
reminded the troops of home and helped them forget “all the terrible things I have seen.” Caughill, ed., Letters to Janet, 
103, 134, 125. See also Steward, An Infantryman on the Western Front, 125. 
1127 Bird, Ghosts Have Warm Hands, 116 and 131, 135. 
1128 Christie, The Memoir of John Harold Becker, 196-197. Other soldiers, and not just “shirkers,” even previously 
“good soldiers” began having problems with morale and commitment. See LAC, MG 30 E 113, ‘Back to Blighty,’ 
George V. Bell Diary, page 113. 
1129 Cane, ed., Journal of Deward Barnes, 256-257. 
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done with soldiering. In an address delivered before the Canadian Club in Toronto on 29 
August 1919, Currie argued that 
You cannot understand how sick we all were of the war, nor our anxiety of 
finishing it as soon as possible, if there was any chance of success. Your sons and 
brothers wanted to see it out. They wanted to be done with the cursed thing. They 
never want to see any more war.1130 
 
It is not clear how representative this view was – that the soldiers wanted to see the war 
through, come what may – but certainly some soldiers were increasingly unable to carry 
on, even if they had wanted to and been previously committed and dedicated.  
 Uses of the term war weariness itself are more infrequent, but can still be found in 
the historical record among contemporary source material, official, and firsthand 
accounts.1131 Captain Ralph Bell, for example, wrote that the matron who ran the local 
estaminet never mentioned the war while the men were there, describing this as a “real 
kindness to us war-weary people.”1132 This same soldier wrote that “war weariness” could 
negatively affect a soldier’s judgment,1133 which could obviously be fatal or endanger the 
entire unit in certain circumstances. References to war weariness at this phase of the war 
can also be found in other firsthand accounts, both Allied and enemy.1134 War weariness 
negatively affected the Canadian forces by the final months, and it is therefore a worthy 
concept for understanding soldier experiences and the impact of war and combat on 
individuals and military units.  
                                                             
 
1130 Colombo, Colombo’s Canadian Quotations, 135. 
1131 Chaplains had a role to play in comforting a “war-weary soul.” Various Authors, Canada in the Great World War, 
130. 
1132 Captain Ralph W. Bell, Canada in War- Paint (London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1917), 50. 
1133 Ibid, 81. 
1134 Dawson wrote in October 1918 that pacifists and “war-weary mothers and wives” might call for an end to the war 
prematurely, but the Allies looked to the US to remain firm “for the reason that she is not war-weary.” The implication 
of this, of course, was that the Entente forces were, indeed, war weary by this point in the war. And even General 
Ludendorff admitted that war weariness began to negatively affect his troops in the final months of the war. The 
maintenance of morale was crucial for the continued functioning of the army, but the reality of life at the front and 
developments in the wider military situation served to undermine this crucial aspect. He wrote that the soldiers were 
lacking in strength and determination, as “the armistice offer had had an unfavourable effect on the men’s spirits, and 
war weariness had increased” substantially.  Even if Ludendorff was only trying to save his reputation and explain the 
poor performance of his forces, he still blamed war weariness for their inability to stem the Allied advance and avoid 
defeat. See Dawson, Living Bayonets, 215-216 and Ludendorff, My War Memories – Volume II, 745. 
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It is also important to note that despite the problems facing the Canadians by the 
summer and autumn of 1918, as a whole the Corps itself did not break. This is especially 
important as other formations and national armies on the Western Front experienced 
serious problems after a similar period of combat and length of time in the field – most 
armies experiences significant issues by mid to late-1917, including the French, Italian, 
and British armies. These problems included disciplinary issues, a decline in 
commitment, morale, and endurance, a reduction in military effectiveness, and 
increasingly conditional service on the part of soldiers. The Canadians, on the other hand, 
might be said to have bent, but did not break in 1918. There are a few explanations as to 
why the Canadians were able to continue fighting despite their wear and tear. First of all, 
the Corps leadership made a concerted effort to stave off the most pernicious effects of 
war weariness, especially with their policies that encouraged a homogenous structure, and 
with the adoption of tactical and technological improvements to assist the soldiers on the 
battlefield. Secondly, in many ways the Corps was better than comparable units in the 
French and British forces; their divisions were larger, had more firepower, increased 
engineering and communications abilities, and a more stable leadership and 
organisational structure. When the Corps faced serious difficulties in the final months of 
the war, and when this wearing process was at its most pronounced, there were positive 
aspects to help offset the stresses and strains that served, over time, to break other armies. 
And this is also related to a third point, about how during the Hundred Days the results of 
combat provided a welcome antidote to the worst aspects of war weariness. The act of 
liberating civilians and settlements, the tangible successes as evidenced by the enormous 
capture of enemy POWs, and the simple act of movement and advancing were welcome 
by weary warriors. Fourthly, and in contradistinction to set-piece battles earlier in the 
war, the operations of the Hundred Days proved surprisingly successful militarily. 
Previously in the war, such as in 1916 or 1917, battles of similar magnitude would have 
been catastrophic in terms of casualties and engendered a sense of futility and 
hopelessness because of little gain. During the final months of the war, on the other hand, 
these operations were remarkably successful – they were a pleasant surprise to these worn 
veterans who had suffered for so long. Even with all the casualties and problems facing 
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the troops between July and November 1918, they were successful, providing a powerful 
antidote to disillusionment and war weariness verging on collapse. And finally, the Corps 
was able to avoid complete breakdown and collapse because of the timing of the ceasefire 
in November. Further action of this nature would have worn the soldiers and units of the 
Corps perhaps beyond the point of no return. Instead, the Armistice provided relief, even 
if the troops were unsure if fighting would eventually resume.  
Ultimately, the Canadians and other Entente soldiers were victorious on the 
Western Front, despite the collective and growing war weariness in the ranks. This can be 
explained by the external realities and mitigating factors that acted as powerful antidotes 
to the worst effects of war weariness. These included the prospect of ultimate victory; 
tangible successes on the battlefield, including the enormous captures in POWs, weapons 
and equipment; the liberation of civilians, towns, villages, and cities, as well as vast 
swaths of countryside;1135 a continuing belief in the justice of the cause; the influx of 
‘fresh’ and conscripted MSA men into the worn units of the Corps; the increasing reliance 
on technology and more successful and refined tactics; the desire for souvenirs and 
revenge; and the sense of uniqueness or superiority1136 on the part of Canadian troops, 
and the acknowledgement that they were taking part in an historic moment.1137 And 
finally, the decline of the German army and nation coupled with the conclusion of 
hostilities that came with the signing of the Armistice happened at a fortuitous time, 
ensuring that these worn units and war-weary soldiers would not have to continue 
fighting throughout the winter of 1918 and into 1919. It is not certain they would have 
been able to withstand such subsequent fighting. 
 
                                                             
 
1135 The successes of the period gave some “new life,” and there was excitement after the “previous dull warfare.” 
Moreover, they began reaching areas not yet completely ravaged by war, and were greeted as liberators. An 
“enthusiastic welcome” seemed to help the troops, as did “living in houses once more.” Hesler, ed., Interlude: 1916-
1919, 59, 66; Teed, ed., Uncle Cy’s War, 255-257, and Walsh, The First World War Diary of Private Bert Cooke, 160. 
1136 See, for example, Gunner Bertram Howard Cox, Letter 3 October 1918, found at 
http://www.shiawasseehistory.com/coxoctober31918.html. 
1137 Though referring to the Vimy Battle, one soldier wrote that despite the “Hell” of battle, he was “glad to say that I 
was through it, as it will be one of the biggest things in Canadian history.” McClare, ed., The Letters of a Young 
Canadian Soldier during World War I, 107. Another soldier wrote in October 1918 that his spirits were up because they 
were taking part in a “glorious period of history.” Gunner Bertram Howard Cox, Letter of 15 October 1918, found at 
http://www.shiawasseehistory.com/coxoctober151918.html.  
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Conclusion 
 The experiences of Canadian soldiers in the First World War allows the historian 
to discern some salient points. This project examined the contributing factors toward war 
weariness, as well as its development, manifestations, impact, and potential responses. 
This study also explored how morale, discipline, combat motivation, combat 
effectiveness, and endurance affected war weariness and our understanding of the impact 
of combat on both the individual and the collective. War weariness is closely related to 
shell shock, war neuroses, and other psychiatric casualties of war, but there were 
important distinctions. Shell shock debilitation reflected the inability of individuals to 
continue with duty,1138 whereas war weariness was characterised by the unwillingness or 
reluctance to carry on indefinitely. War weariness often developed over time in a 
cumulative process, as veteran soldiers became worn down by over-use and the lack of 
proper respite, relief, rotation, and genuine rest. Heavy casualties and the intensity of 
fighting during the war, especially in the final months, ensured that these same troops 
were used again and again in combat. Experienced soldiers were crucial to the overall 
success of Entente arms, but the continued use of these same troops led to health and 
morale problems, as well as war weariness and discontent. Outlets, material comforts, 
support services, and ‘safety valves’ helped the soldiers endure, as did the tangible 
evidence of success/military gain (such as effective combat operations and the seizing of 
substantial enemy POWs). It is also fortuitous that the German Army – and nation – 
collapsed when it did, as it is questionable if Allied soldiers could withstand more of this 
intense combat for much longer.1139 War weariness and shell shock also existed on the 
same spectrum, whereby the former was often an important marker on the road to shell 
shock debilitation and breakdown. 
                                                             
 
1138 And though there were myriad causes of shell shock and PTSD, and every individual reacted somewhat differently 
to mortal threat and trauma, generally speaking PTSD in the First World War was caused by acute exposure to intense 
trauma; long-term, continual, or cumulative exposure to trauma, death, and combat; the lack of rest (physical and 
psychological), relief, respite, rotation, and leave; and exposure to combat and the strains of war itself.  
1139 It is also possible that the Allied administrative system could not support another major offensive for months. See 
Brown, British Logistics on the Western Front, 237. 
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 This project attempted to illustrate that war weariness could be minimised, 
addressed, and partially neutralised with effective intervention strategies on the part of 
military and medical authorities, and proper care of the troops. There were both physical 
(material) and non-physical aspects of this care. Of the former, this included the 
provisioning of sufficient water and edible food, as well as ensuring that equipment, 
weapons, and supplies were plentiful and in good working order. Of non-material aspects 
of endurance and care, it was important that the troops were psychologically committed to 
the war effort and had coping strategies for dealing with the trauma and terror, stresses 
and strains of war and especially combat. In many ways, the human element in combat 
was crucial to success, and to our current understanding of often complex and confusing 
events and historical processes. 
 This project sought to address some important questions as to the nature of 
combat in the First World War, and how this impacted both individuals, at and behind the 
front lines, and the larger unit of which they were a part. For example, did the army 
husband its resources properly and address the issues that emerged in an effective way? 
And were army policies conducive to the health and long-term stability of the troops 
under its care? Chapter 1 on the legal and disciplinary system was designed to illustrate 
that these structures were unable to properly deal with those soldiers who were 
approaching the breaking point. The use of courts martial and military law could be a 
rather blunt object; and as the purpose of the military authorities was to field the 
maximum number of men as possible, maintain morale, provide a disincentive and 
deterrent to soldiers, and punish troops guilty of dereliction of duty, individuals who had 
broken down in combat or became war-weary were treated in a similar manner than to 
those who willingly and consciously turned their back on duty. Many volunteers who 
eventually succumbed to the enormous and cumulative pressures, stresses, and strains of 
frontline service, who otherwise were honourable and committed, were caught up in this 
system. The expectations of the army, high command, and leadership, moreover, did not 
always match the reality on the ground. This was a unique and unprecedented war, in 
many ways, and the troops were worn down over time and also responded in 
unpredictable ways.  
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 Chapter 2 on the medical system facing the Canadians, was similar to the first in 
outlining the structures in place to control and shape behaviour. I argued that with the 
army medical system, the paramount desire to ensure manpower requirements were met 
and that morale was prioritised above all else could actually backfire and exacerbate the 
pre-existing problems facing the troops. Soldiers, including many war-weary ones, fell 
through the cracks in the system and were not adequately cared for, thus ensuring that 
they became a liability and an even larger problem further down the road. One of the 
main dangers of war weariness during the war was its potential to transmute into more 
serious shell shock debilitation. Furthermore, more localised and individual war 
weariness could also become more widespread and collective, creating even more 
problems for the medical and military authorities. In many ways, the leadership’s 
response to war weariness was understandable, however. It was a concept not fully 
understood at the time, akin to shell shock, and the army only had so many resources and 
time to devote to certain problems. As a cost-benefit analysis, for authorities it seemed 
that soldiers who were fed up or not faring well in combat, or those who were wearing 
down but not yet unable to continue with duty (but only reluctant or unwilling), it was 
simply not worth the resources to address their problems until it became more serious and 
actually prevented them from carrying on.  
 Chapters 3 and 4 examined the aforementioned legal/disciplinary and medical 
structures as they actually played out on the battlefield. To this end, two distinct time 
periods were examined, April-August 1917 and July-November 1918. In the former 
period, Chapter 3 looked at the Battle of Vimy Ridge and affiliated operations, to 
understand how troops reacted to combat and how army authorities and structures dealt 
with emerging problems. In the Vimy period, the (Canadian) systems in place were 
mostly able to deal with issues as they developed. Substantial evidence on widespread 
war weariness were lacking for this time period, which is perhaps counterintuitive 
considering it was at this point in the war – the spring of 1917 – that other armies were 
beginning to ‘crack’ and break down from the cumulative problems and thousands, if not 
millions of casualties already suffered. For the Canadian forces, however, war weariness 
did not yet appear to be a big problem, and thus the authorities were able to deal with 
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problems as they developed. This also meant, unfortunately, that the military and medical 
authorities were less prepared to deal with problems related to war weariness, shell shock, 
and other war neuroses when they did finally emerge in the final year of the war. During 
the Vimy period the Corps leadership was largely able to accommodate medical and 
morale problems and the beginnings of the wearing process. Fortunately, moreover, the 
Vimy Battle and other operations in this period were relatively short and successful. And 
this, combined with substantial preparations prior and extensive rest and respite periods 
after Vimy, allowed for war weariness to remain at a simmer instead of boiling over into 
more serious and long-term problems in this period. 
 The final months of the war, in the Hundred Days Campaign, was a different story 
entirely. This was explored in Chapter 4, and it was during this period that the cumulative 
stresses and strains imposed on the individual soldiers and their military units began to 
take their toll. Though there were efforts on the part of the military and medical 
authorities to deal with rising war weariness and other issues, they were unable to fully 
and properly deal with them at this time. Authorities began to recognise emerging 
problems, but the pace of operations and the urgency of the final campaign militated 
against more substantive efforts. During this period war weariness became a problem for 
the Canadian forces, but external factors and mitigation efforts prevented it from 
seriously undermining the overall combat effectiveness of the Corps. In some cases 
individuals and military units were worn down, destroyed, and unable to properly attain 
objectives, but the influx of MSA soldiers and the increasing reliance on technology and 
more effective tactics helped offset these disadvantages. Moreover, German decline also 
served to mask the very real decline of the Canadian forces in this period. The tangible 
successes of the final months of the war, including the seizure of thousands of prisoners, 
guns, and other war material, in addition to capturing towns and liberating grateful French 
and Belgian civilians acted as powerful antidotes to the very worst effects of war 
weariness. And finally, it was fortuitous that the war ended when it did, as it was unlikely 
that the Entente forces could withstand much more intense combat operations at this time.  
 War weariness and the negative impact of the war effort affected all combatant 
armies and nations after a certain period of time. Even successful and ultimately victories 
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armies experienced war weariness, as evidenced by the problems facing the French, 
British, Italian, and Canadian forces by 1918 (by 1918 the Russians had already gone 
beyond the point of no return). This speaks to an important point discerned from my years 
of research, reflection, and writing on the subject, namely, that individual soldiers could 
carry on with duty and endure the stresses and strains of war despite the onset and 
development of war weariness. War weariness could shape behaviour and attitude in 
subtle, yet important ways. It did not preclude soldiers from pressing on in battle, though 
once individual and localised war weariness transmuted into collective or more general 
war weariness, problems began to multiply. It was at this junction that military, medical, 
and other authorities needed to intervene1140 to prevent deepening war weariness from 
moving beyond the point of no return, and to prevent worn soldiers from becoming 
debilitated by shell shock. It was thus crucial for the authorities to provide the troops with 
mitigating factors and forces, and to allow them to develop coping mechanisms to help 
them endure over time.1141 Both individuals and military units could become war weary, 
and it was important to prevent defeatism, dissent, discontent, and demoralisation from 
spreading. Of the troops in uniform, both combat soldiers at the front as well as support 
personnel on the lines of communication experienced the negative impact of war and 
combat over time. For those at the front such as infantry, however, the contributing 
factors toward and manifestations of war weariness were more numerous and significant.   
 Mitigation efforts were important to implement on the battle fronts, partly to 
ensure that protests surrounding local conditions and complaints about how the war was 
prosecuted did not transform into protests about why the war was being prosecuted, or 
                                                             
 
1140 On the home fronts, interventionist and remedial policies could be either positive or negative. Regarding the latter, 
this could take the form of silencing anti-war or anti-government dissent or the co-optation of certain segments of the 
population. In terms of positive steps, addressing grievances and implementing reforms could help stave off widespread 
discontent and prevent war weariness from boiling over into more dangerous expressions of discontent. On the battle 
fronts, the government could provide the soldiers with ‘safety valves,’ outlets, distractions, and entertainment, as well 
as use both ‘carrots and sticks’ to shape behaviour and thinking.  
1141 The soldiers that managed to stay in the line and avoid permanent breakdown or shell shock debilitation did so for a 
few reasons, including respite and relief, sleep, rest, leave, and rotation policies; mental and psychological coping 
strategies (fatalism, apathy/indifference, forgetting, attitude, superstition/faith/religion); songs, music, humour, jokes, 
parody, satire; unit cohesion, friendship, and camaraderie; connections with home, such as parcels, letters, leave, and 
(photos of) loved ones; recognition, praise, awards; the use of ‘carrots and sticks;’ adrenaline and other chemical props 
(alcohol, caffeine, nicotine); good tactics, leadership, communication, and teamwork; material comforts (like hot tea 
and warm clothes); female companionship and sex; estaminets and entertainment. This list is of course not exhaustive.  
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against the war in general. Some soldiers were able to endure the war and military service 
without long-term medical and psychological problems, and some even came to enjoy 
combat and killing.1142 Many soldiers on the Western Front, however, became ‘fed up’ 
with the way things were going and with the apparent ineffectiveness of attacks in 1915-
1917, and thus it was important to provide them with reasons for continuing, despite all 
the horror and bloodshed. Connections with home were important, whether that entailed 
leave, newspapers from home, or the regular delivery of mail and parcels, this could not 
be overlooked. Moreover, technological, doctrinal, and tactical developments needed to 
be implemented, and if they had a tangible impact on the battlefield there might be hope 
of a breakthrough. The veteran troops on the Western Front were not naïve, however, and 
thus both political and military authorities needed to make it clear that all was being done 
to defeat the enemy and win the war. This was just one reason why calls for the British 
and other Entente governments to articulate war aims became so urgent by 1917; the 
troops needed to know that the reasons for fighting, suffering, and dying were still valid 
and actually worth laying down one’s life for. Exhortations to do one’s duty and protect 
the Empire rang hollow after just a few short months of war.  
 Throughout the dissertation several different ideas, concepts, and themes were 
explored. This included the types of casualties inflicted during the war, such as seemingly 
‘legitimate’ battle wounds, versus that of suspicious psychiatric casualties or illnesses. 
This provided the medical officers with a dilemma and some tension in their duties. It 
could be quite difficult, for example, to determine which soldiers were genuinely unable 
to withstand further service, those that were unwilling to further endure duty, and those 
that were merely malingering or shirking duty. Moreover, some soldiers were certainly in 
need of a break or rest behind the lines, as recognised by their own MOs, but were unable 
                                                             
 
1142 There was the concept of the ideal soldier or happy warrior during the war. One historian defined the happy warrior 
as “marching the roads of France and Flanders with a jolly whistle and a bright smile that would not desert him, even in 
death.” Were these soldiers merely new, ignorant of the reality of war, or naïve? Or were they perhaps mentally 
unstable? Another historian argued that some soldiers and military institutions glorified and enjoyed killing, and sought 
to brag and boast about their prowess in combat. Others have noted that only about 2% of soldiers exposed to battle will 
not break down under stress eventually, perhaps because they are already psychopaths or mentally ill. And one veteran 
also wrote that only 2% of soldiers can withstand combat indefinitely, but these are those predisposed to “aggressive 
psychopathic personalities.” See Vance, Death So Noble, 257; Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing, especially 
Chapter 2 ‘The Warrior Myth,’ pages 32-56; Gabriel, No More Heroes, 79, and Grossman, On Killing, 44. 
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to be sent down the line due to restrictions on what constituted a genuine battle wound 
and justifications for evacuation from the front. MO and CAMC tension also reflected the 
difficulty in reconciling the needs of the collective – the army and the nation more 
broadly – with that of the individual. The historical record suggests that in most cases the 
needs of the army trumped that of the individual, and questions of morale and manpower 
at the front took precedence over those of patient choice, genuine recovery, and effective 
long-term treatment. In many ways, the individual soldier was merely a means to an end, 
and more traditionally-minded authorities were comfortable with this state of affairs. It 
was problematic, however, when these authorities refused to acknowledge the reality of 
modern, industrial, attritional, total war and the inevitability of breakdown over time. 
Simply banning the use of the term ‘shell shock,’ as the British high command sought to 
do, was no solution to the problem. In many way, it actually exacerbated the problem. 
Related to this concept was the idea of emotional versus physical breakdown. Troops 
could suffer a breakdown in combat and be unable to continue based on the loss of will 
and demoralisation, or because one’s body refused to cooperate and ‘betrayed the spirit.’ 
Another important aspect of the project was an exploration of preventative measures and 
mitigating factors that allowed soldiers to endure the stresses and strains of war, if only 
for a short while longer. These included chaplain, medical, or CO intervention at a timely 
manner to address problems and prevent more permanent breakdown amongst soldiers at 
the front. Other preventative measures included strong connections with home, and 
alcohol, sufficient food and water, proper equipment, leadership, and support.  
 This dissertation also explored the distinction between the unwillingness to carry 
on with combat and duty (war weariness) with that of the increasing inability to endure at 
the front and on the lines of communication. Just where this transition occurred was 
difficult to determine and was contextually based, but for soldiers who acknowledged that 
they were not ‘wearing well’ and might soon breakdown or become permanently 
debilitated, certain actions and attitudes were adopted to reduce or even evade 
participation in duty. Soldiers might become overly cautious, for example, or attempt to 
develop excuses to avoid further service in a hostile environment. Others feigned 
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illness1143 or tried to get removed from duty for other reasons. For soldiers increasingly 
desperate to escape the trenches or service altogether, however, even more drastic 
measures were taken. Some soldiers administered a self-inflicted wound or illness in 
order to be medically excused from duty, whereas others sought a Blighty wound that 
could remove them from the line whilst still keeping (some semblance of) their honour. 
Other desperate troops actually deserted the battlefield or went AWL to avoid further 
service. The most desperate soldiers of all committed suicide, or acted in such a reckless 
way that was tantamount to suicide; for these troops, death was preferable to the 
uncertainty, suffering, and trauma that was service on the Western Front.  
 The era of the First World War was in many ways a watershed moment. The death 
of millions of soldiers and civilians around the globe may have killed the Victorian and 
Edwardian eras for good, and perhaps ushered in the modern world. And though it is 
somewhat reductive to claim that an entire generation was lost due to the war, the 
cultural, social, and political scars outlived the generation that fought and suffered during 
the war years. For some nations like Britain and France, the nation and society could 
never truly escape the clutches of the war and its profound impact on all matter of life in 
these countries. For countries like Germany, Italy, and Russia, only subsequent and 
traumatic events like Fascism and the Holocaust, Mussolini and occupation, the 
Bolshevik Revolution and the ‘Great Patriotic War,’ respectively, could overshadow the 
trauma that was the First World War. And it is also not too far of a stretch to argue that 
the rise of Hitler and Mussolini, the Second World War, the Russian Revolution and the 
Stalin years were the direct offspring of the First World War.  
 The aftermath of the war also helps us understand the post-war disillusionment so 
prevalent in the English-speaking world after 1919. In Canada and much of the combatant 
nations, the public was never fully exposed to the reality of the war. This was in large 
                                                             
 
1143 The historical record suggests that some soldiers used illness or health problems, both real and perceived, as a tool 
or weapon to fight back against army discipline and the strictures imposed by military service. Because of this, we as 
modern historians cannot always give these soldiers the benefit of the doubt. There were, for example, some 
troublemakers and ‘bad apples’ in the ranks, but there were also troops who were driven to extreme measures like 
administering a self-inflicted wound to escape the trenches and avoid further service for the foreseeable future. This all 
serves to complicate the story.  
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measure due to propaganda, censorship, and the silencing of anti-war dissent on a 
systematic scale. When the soldiers did return to Canada after demobilisation, as opposed 
to the trickle of returning soldiers during the war itself, the enormity of the conflict and 
the enormous impact it had on thousands became evident. The war and its results would 
have a profound impact on society, and pensions and other payments would shackle the 
Dominion government for decades to come. This post-war disillusionment was also based 
primarily on the period following the war, rather than during the war. Broken government 
promises,1144 the lack of employment and sufficient housing, alienation from wider 
society, the questioning of veterans’ masculinity in this environment, combined with 
inflation, an economic downturn, rise of Fascism, and eventually the onset of the 
Depression all served to engender this disillusionment. The post-war bitterness, cynicism, 
and writings of the (usually) elite war poets was powerful, articulate, and haunting, 
though largely unrepresentative of the wider veteran pool. Most soldiers during the war 
did not believe the war was in vain, or that it was merely ‘mud, blood, folly, and futility.’ 
It was the post-war world and the problems of the period that led to a re-examination of 
the purposes and results of the war. Of course, there was no single veteran experience, 
and the importance of veterans’ organisations like the Legion and Great War Veterans 
Association may have been overstated; less than half of all former soldiers joined these 
veterans’ organisations. It is also important to remember that the governments of both 
Canada and the UK were overwhelmed by a lack of money, resources, and bureaucracy to 
deal with the enormous number of war veterans, casualties, and dependents. And the 
onset of the Depression, the insularity of American thinking in this period, the reality of 
post-war debt, and the desire of Ottawa to avoid charity long before the onset of the 
welfare state helps explain this inability to cope with all the veterans and their needs.  
 The years following the First World War were crucial for how the veteran soldiers 
approached their lives, as well as for how society more generally viewed the war. The 
                                                             
 
1144 Much of the disillusionment on the part of veterans was based on these broken promises. Various promises 
emanating from London and Ottawa encouraged an increase in expectations. Some of these problems emanated from 
the failure to attain fulfilling employment and dignity, national unity, international peace, imperial harmony, the 
continued support for the League of Nations, as well as other unfulfilled promises.  
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1922 British War Office Committee of Enquiry into ‘Shell Shock,’ debates over future 
foreign policy and interventions abroad, and the problems surrounding the awarding of 
pensions all illustrate that the history of the war was contested from the very beginning. 
Debates over the Treaty of Versailles, the (impotence of) the League of Nations, the onset 
of the Depression, emerging Pacifism, anti-war attitudes, and disillusionment all shaped 
how historians after 1919, and wider society itself, understood and depicted the war. This, 
in part, helps explain the inability or unwillingness of the victorious Entente powers to 
prevent the rise of Fascism, and Italian and German aggression beginning in the 1930s. 
The history and consequences of the war remained contested, and certain political leaders 
were willing to re-shape the post-war order in violent ways. 
 The Second World War provided historians another opportunity to assess the 
applicability and validity of conclusions made during and immediately following the First 
World War. The lessons of the Great War were not always learned, or remembered, but 
there were developments in enlistment, leave, and medical policy during 1939-1945 that 
can be directly attributed to the experiences of 1914-1919. Studies related to war 
weariness, in the guise of battle exhaustion and combat fatigue, in addition to continuing 
research on shell shock and (what came to be known as) PTSD, continued the trend of 
examining the impact of combat on the individual and the interplay between the 
individual and the group. The Second World War provided much fodder for these studies, 
and new research techniques, the use of questionnaires, an increased role for medical 
specialists including psychiatrists, all assisted in this process. And after the Second World 
War, studies on breakdown and the medical and psychological impact of combat 
continued in the context of the Korean War, Vietnam War, and conflicts in the Balkans, 
amongst other war zones and conflicts. And of course trauma and stress are an integral 
part of the modern world. Everyone, in all walks of life, around the globe, experiences 
trauma and stress at various points in their lives. Sometimes this is based on war and 
conflict, at other times it emerges from poverty and oppression; at other points this stress 
and trauma is caused by natural disaster, crime, religious fundamentalism, rape, or 
violence. There are, moreover, professions that tend to have higher rates of stress and 
exposure to trauma than other vocations. Of the former, air traffic controllers and 
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surgeons might very well experience significant and dangerous levels of stress on the job, 
on a regular basis. Medical problems, addiction, and all manner of social issues can be the 
result. In terms of exposure to trauma, soldiers, first-responders, councillors/therapists, 9-
1-1 dispatch operators, and others often suffer from PTSD and other reactions to high 
levels of trauma, and these can be either direct or indirect. And even for regular civilians 
in relatively ‘normal’ and stable professions, there are various sources of stress and strain 
in the modern world. Some suffer from a lack of purpose, whereas others lament the 
decline of organised religion and civic engagement; unemployment and insufficient 
housing continue to plague the developed world, as do problems with education, rising 
inequality, and health care. Isolation, loneliness, grief, and mental health problems can 
also contribute to medical problems and other social, economic, and political issues.  
 And though the human element in combat and warfare will be relevant for 
decades to come, how will trauma studies and those on the impact of combat on the 
individual and military unit change with the emergence of modern technology? It is 
difficult to predict how far and fast the technological revolution in military affairs will go, 
but there are rapid changes that military historians and researchers need to be aware of. In 
advanced economies, the shape of war (and military service) has changed dramatically 
since the mid-20th Century. Reserve forces play an increasingly important role, and 
though professional, volunteer, and career soldiers remain in Canada’s armed forces, the 
international environment has changed in important ways. Civil wars, rudimentary 
technology and tactics, and drawn-out conflicts will remain for the foreseeable future, but 
in the developed world technology plays an increasingly prevalent role on the battlefield. 
The use of autonomous weapons and vehicles, such as aerial and underwater drones, 
coupled with other types of warfare (electronic, cultural, economic) indicate these 
changes. Russian ‘hybrid’ warfare as displayed in eastern Ukraine and the seizure of the 
Crimea, and the various loyalties and alliances as evident in Syria and Yemen, also 
suggest this complexity. And yet even with the use of technology, drones, and 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, there will always be room for the human element in 
warfare. This also means that there will continue to be psychological problems for 
combatants and veterans, and one need not look too far, even in Canada, for evidence of 
333 
 
 
 
these problems. Suicide, homelessness, alcoholism, depression, dependency and other 
issues continue to disturb former soldiers, a situation we Canadians should not tolerate. 
As long as there is trauma and stress in the world, there will be a need to attempt to 
understand the impact of these on the human body and mind. We ignore these serious 
issues at our own peril.  
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Appendix I – Charts and Graphs 
 
Officers in the CEF, July – November 1918 
 
 
Figure 1 - Chart of Officers in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, July-November 1918 – Illustrates the Steady Decline of 
Leaders in the CEF for the Final Months of the War – Statistics Taken from Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, 
Appendix "C," Table 2: Strength at the End of Each Month from 30 September 1914 to November 1919, 547 
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Other Ranks in the CEF, July – November 1918 
 
Figure 2 - Chart of ORs in the CEF, July - November 1918 - Illustrates the Heavy Casualties of the Canadian Forces in the 
Final Months of the War – Statistics Taken from Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, Appendix "C," Table 2: Strength 
at the End of Each Month from 30 September 1914 to November 1919, 547 
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All Ranks in the CEF, July – November 1918 
 
 
Figure 3 - Chart of All Ranks in the CEF, July - November 1918 - Illustrates the Overall Decline in Numbers of the Canadian 
Forces in the Final Months of the War – Statistics Taken from Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, Appendix "C," 
Table 2: Strength at the End of Each Month from 30 September 1914 to November 1919, 547 
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Canadian Casualties by Month 
 
Figure 4 - Chart of Canadian Casualties by Month - Highlights the Enormous Casualties Suffered by the Canadian Corps in 
the Final Months of the War – Statistics Taken From Bird, The Communication Trench, 141-142 
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British Casualties on the Western Front by Month 
 
Figure 5 - Chart of British Casualties on the Western Front by Month - Illustrates the Deadly Nature, Pace, and Intensity of 
the Fighting in the Final Months of the War – Statistics Taken from Churchill, The World Crisis, 845, Citing British War 
Office, Statistics of the Military Effort, 253 
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Casualties and Losses to the British Army on the Western Front, 
July – November 1918 
 
Figure 6 - Chart of British Army Casualties on the Western Front - Highlights the Enormous Casualties Suffered in the Final 
Months of the War – Statistics Taken from Churchill, The World Crisis, 845, Citing British War Office, Statistics of the 
Military Effort, 253 
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Number of German Prisoners of War Captured by the British 
Armies in France 
 
Figure 7 - Chart of German POWs Captured by the British Armies in France - Indicates the Substantial Number of German 
Prisoners Captured and Surrendered in the Final Months of the War - Information Taken from British War Office, Statistics 
of the Military Effort, 632 
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Prisoners of War Captured by Entente and Associate Power 
Armies, Between 18 July and 11 November 1918 
 
Figure 8 - Chart of POWs Captured in the Final Months of the War - The Enormous Number of Enemy Prisoners Captured in 
the Final Months of the War Indicated the Steady Decline of German Fighting Power and the Hard Fighting of the Period - 
Information Taken from Bird, The Communication Trench, 131 
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Enemy Guns Captured Between 18 July and 11 November 1918 
 
Figure 9 - Chart of Enemy Guns Captured in the Final Months of the War - The Large Number of Guns Seized Reflected the 
Loss of Will and Ability of the Enemy Forces – Information Taken from Bird, The Communication Trench, 131 
 
 
 
Total Captures by the Canadian Corps, 8 August – 11 November 
1918 
Prisoners of War 31,537 
Heavy and Field Guns 623 
Machine Guns 2,842 
Heavy and Light Trench Mortars 336 
Square Miles of Territory 500 + 
Towns, Cities, Villages Liberated 228 
Figure 10 - Chart of Captures by the Canadian Corps in the Hundred Days Campaign – The Enormous Number of Enemy 
Prisoners, Guns, Military Equipment, and Territory Seized Reflected the Hard Fighting of the Final Months of the War – 
Information Taken from Currie, Corps Operations 1918, 84-85, Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Empire, 132, and 
Humphries, ed., The Selected Papers of Sir Arthur Currie, 303 
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Appendix II – Maps 
The Military Hospital Commission in Canada 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11 - Map of the Location of Facilities Pertaining to the Military Hospital Commission in Canada - Includes Location of 
Hospital Accommodations, Convalescent Hospitals, and Tuberculosis Sanatoria, Soldiers Suffering from Shell Shock and other 
Psychiatric Casualties were often sent back to Canada for potential Recovery - LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3751 
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Canadian Hospitals in the United Kingdom 
 
Figure 12 - Map of Canadian Hospitals in the UK - LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3686 
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Consolidation Scheme for the Arleux-Acheville Operations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13 - Map of the 
Consolidation Scheme 
for the Arleux-
Acheville Operations - 
The Map Indicates the 
Position of Lewis and 
Machine Guns 
Following the Battle of 
Vimy Ridge - LAC, RG 
9 III C1, Volume 3847, 
Folder 54, File 1 
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Communications Network at the Battle of Third Ypres 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14 - Map Inidcating the Extent and Complexity of the Network of Air and Buried Cables at the Third Battle of Ypres - 
LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3853 
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The Battle of Amiens  
  
Figure 15 - Map of the Battle of Amiens, 8-12 August 1918 - Map Indicates the Advances of the Canadian Units in the Battle - 
Originally Reproduced by the Army Survey Establishment for Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, between pages 412-
396 
 
 
 
413, also found on the Veterans Affairs Canada Website, http://veterans.gc.ca/eng/rememberance/history/first-world-war/last-
hundred-days?filter=range&start=1 
The Battle of Arras 
  
Figure 16 - Map of the Battle of Arras - Map Indicates the Canadian Area of Operations, Objectives, and Units Involved - 
Found in Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force, between 442 and 443, and Veterans Affairs Canada Website, 
http://www.veterans.gc.ca/images/feature/hundreddays/maps/map-03_e.png 
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The Advance to the Hindenburg Line and Canal du Nord 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17 - Map of the Canadian Advance to Hindenburg Line and the Canal du Nord - Found in Nicholson, Canadian 
Expeditionary Force, 439, and Veterans Affairs Canada Website, 
http://www.veterans.gc.ca/images/feature/hundreddays/maps/map-02_e.png 
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The Final Advance  
 
Figure 18 - The Final Advances Beyond Cambrai and to Mons, October to 11 November 1918 - Found in Nicholson, Canadian 
Expeditionary Force, between pages 472 and 473, and Veterans Affairs Canada Website, 
http://www.veterans.gc.ca/images/feature/hundreddays/maps/map-06_e.png 
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Appendix III – Photos and Images 
Ambulance Lorry 
. 
Figure 19 - Contemporary Photograph Showing the Interior of an Ambulance Lorry - Illustrates how Stretchers were 
Transported Behind the Lines for Evacuation and between Medical Facilities, and used in Conjunction with Mechanical 
Transport, Light Railways, River Barges, and Draught Animals – LAC, RG 9 III B2 
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Ambulance Lorry 2  
 
Figure 20 - Royal Army Medical Corps and Canadian Army Medical Corps Ambulance Lorry - LAC, RG 9 III B2, 3686 
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Political Cartoon 
 
 
 
Figure 21 - Political Cartoon poking 
fun at the Hardships of Frontline 
Service - Soldiers were often happy to 
get a lift from lorries and motorcars, 
despite the poor condition of many 
roads in the War Zone. Published 
October 1917 - Taken from the Ley 
and Lois Smith Military History 
Collection, Department of History, 
University of Western Ontario, the 
Records of Reverend Lt. Alexander 
M. Gordon 
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Invalided Soldiers 
 
Figure 22 - Photo of Invalided Soldiers at Work in a Carpenter's Shop - After Being Evacuated from Europe, these Soldiers 
attempt to stay busy and learn a new trade. The original caption reads "Here convalescent soldiers, strong enough to move 
around, are taught carpentry or some other useful occupation whereby they may earn their livelihood and not become a 
burden to Canada” -  LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3751, Folder 2-4-1, ‘Salvaging War’s Waste,’ by Adam Black.  
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The Wastage of War 
 
Figure 23 - Photo of Soldiers Working on Basket-Making - Photo Taken at a Sanatorium in Canada. These activities were good 
for Soldier Morale, reminding them that though they were unable to continue soldiering, they could maintain their dignity and 
contribute positively to society. These activities also often had a therapeutic aspect to them. Some companies also gave 
preferential treatment to veterans in the hiring process – LAC, RG 9 III B2, Volume 3751, Folder 2-4-1, ‘Salvaging War’s 
Waste,’ by Adam Black 
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Helping with the Healing 
Figure 24 - Photo of the Band of 
the Granville Canadian Hospital - 
These groups played an important 
role in keeping the spirits of the 
patients up - Dalhousie University 
Archives and Special Collections, 
Records of the No. 7 Overseas 
Stationary Hospital, Folder 9.  
 
The Healers 
 
 
Figure 25 - Photo of the Nursing Sisters of the No. 7 Canadian Stationary Hospital, in thier gowns - Dalhousie University 
Archives and Special Collections, Records of the No. 7 Overseas Stationary Hospital, Folder 9.77, 'MS-2-128, Laura May 
Hubley.' 
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The Spiritual Well-Being of the Soldiers 
Figure 26 - Photo of 
Catholic Padre 
Canon Frederic Scott, 
flanked by Majors 
Alexander Gordon 
(left) and E.E. 
Graham - Medical 
Personnel and the 
Canadian Chaplain 
Service helped with 
the health and well-
being of the soldiers 
at the front, behind 
the lines, and back in 
the UK – Taken from 
the Ley and Lois 
Smith Military 
History Collection, 
Department of 
History, University of 
Western Ontario, 
Records of Reverend 
Alexander M. Gordon 
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Padres and Chaplains  
Figure 27 - Photo 
of a Catholic 
Sunday Service, 
Seaford England, 
June 1918 - 
Chaplains played 
a crucial role in 
the maintenance 
of soldier morale 
- The Archives of 
the Catholic 
Diocese of 
London, 
Ontario, Bishop 
M.F. Fallon, 
'World War I 
Photos - 1918' 
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Humour Amongst the Suffering 
Figure 28 - Photo of the Maple Leaves, a Canadian Concert Party - These concert parties were important for morale amongst 
the soldiers, forced to endure the stresses and strains of war. Satire, humour, and other forms of entertainment also acted as 
important 'safety valves,’ releasing pent-up emotion and allowing for the ridicule of the army system and superiors without 
deteriorating into insubordination or indiscipline – Taken from the Ley and Lois Smith Military History Collection, 
Department of History, University of Western Ontario, Records of Reverend Alexander M. Gordon 
 
Connections with Home 
Figure 29 - Photo of a Christmas Postcard - 
Letters, Parcels, and Postcards played an 
important role in the maintenance of Morale at the 
front. It was crucial for the soldiers to know that 
they were not forgotten by loved ones, and wider 
society, at home - Taken from the Ley and Lois 
Smith Military History Collection, Department of 
History, University of Western Ontario, Records 
of Reverend Alexander M. Gordon 
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Intelligence Photos 
 
Figure 30 - 3rd Canadian Division Intelligence Photos for Operations at Third Ypres -  LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3853, 
Folder 68, File 7, ‘Passchendaele, Bellevue Spur, Operations 26/30-10-17’ 
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Passchendaele  
 
Figure 31 - Intelligence Photograph - LAC, RG 9 III C1, Volume 3853, Folder 68, File 7, ‘Passchendaele, Bellevue Spur, 
Operations 26/30-10-17’ 
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The Battle of Amiens 
 
Figure 32 - Photo of Armoured Car going into Action at the Battle of Amiens - Library and Archives Canada/PA-003015, 
taken from: http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/history/first-world-war 
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The Spoils of War 
 
Figure 33 - Photo of Captured German Guns and Machine Guns in the Hundred Days- Captured in the fighting near Arras, 
summer 1918. The Military Museums, W.A. Howard Library and Arthur J.E. Child Archives, TMM FOO 38, Gordon 
Gilmour Fonds, Box 1 of 1, 3 
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The Hard Fighting of the Hundred Days 
 
Figure 34 - Photo of 
German Barbed Wire at 
the Hindenburg Line – 
This was one of the most 
heavily-fortified 
positions on the Western 
Front – The Military 
Museums, W.A. Howard 
Library and Arthur J.E. 
Child Archives, TMM 
FOO 38, Gordon 
Gilmour Fonds, Box 1 of 
1, Folder 6, ‘Series: 
Photographs’  
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Engineering Work in the Hundred Days 
 
Figure 35 – Canadian Engineers Constructing a Bridge across Canal du Nord, during the Advance east of Arras, September, 
1918 -  LAC/PA-003456, taken from: http://www.veterans .gc.ca/eng/remembrance/history/first-world-war/last-hundred-
days?filter=range&start=41 
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The Canal du Nord 
 
Figure 36 - Photo of the Canadian Engineers at the Canal du Nord - Contemporary view of a section of the Canal du Nord, 
which the Canadians stormed on 27 September 1918 -  The Military Museums, W.A. Howard Library and Arthur J.E. Child 
Archives, TMM FOO 38, Gordon 
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Cambrai, France 
 
Figure 37 - Photo of the Hotel de 
Ville, Cambrai -  The Military 
Museums, W.A. Howard Library 
and Arthur J.E. Child Archives, 
TMM FOO 38, Gordon Gilmour 
Fonds, Box 1 of 1, 3-1-4, ‘Canada’s 
Triumph: Amiens, Arras, 
Cambrai.’ 
 
 
German Scorched Earth Policies and Defensive Destruction 
 
Figure 38 - An explosion in 
Cambrai - After the Germans 
had departed, fires and 
explosions continued. Firsthand 
and official army accounts 
indicate that the Germans 
practised scorched earth tactics 
during the final months of the 
war, including the use of fires 
and booby-traps to slow down 
the attacking troops – The 
Military Museums, W.A. 
Howard Library and Arthur J.E. 
Child Archives, TMM FOO 38, 
Gordon Gilmour Fonds, Box 1 of 
1, 3-1-4, ‘Canada’s Triumph: 
Amiens, Arras, Cambrai. 
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Death and Destruction  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 39 - Cambrai, October 1918 - The Military Museums, W.A. Howard Library and Arthur J.E. Child Archives, TMM 
FOO 38, Gordon Gilmour Fonds, Box 1 of 1, 3-1-4, ‘Canada’s Triumph: Amiens, Arras, Cambrai  
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The Final Battles 
 
Figure 40 - Photo of Canadian Soldiers entering Valenciennes from the west - LAC/PA-003377, taken from 
http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/history/first-world-war/last-hundred-days?filter=range&start=81  
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The End of the Road 
 
 
Figure 41 - Photo of Canadians marching through the streets of Mons on the morning of 11 November 1918 -  LAC/PA-003547, 
taken from: http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/history/first-world-war/last-hundred-days?filter=range&start=81 
The War Comes Full Circle – Mons, Belgium 
 
Figure 42 - Photo of Mons, Belgium - Taken from 
the Ley and Lois Smith Military History 
Collection, Department of History, University of 
Western Ontario, Records of Reverend Lt. 
Alexander M. Gordon 
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Studies Conference, University of Calgary, 20-23 June, 2012. 
 
 
Academic Work: 
 
Teaching Assistant and Tutorial Leader for History 1401E – Modern Europe, 1715 to the 
Present: Conflict and Transformation, September 2016 – April 2017. Responsibilities 
included: attending lectures, holding office hours, grading exams, assignments and 
papers, hosting exam review sessions, working with OWL online teaching tools, inputting 
grades using online software and overseeing two tutorial groups. 
 
Teaching Assistant and Tutorial Leader for History 1401E – Modern Europe, 1715 to the 
Present: Conflict and Transformation, September 2015 – April 2016. Responsibilities 
included: attending lectures, holding office hours, grading exams, assignments and 
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papers, hosting exam review sessions, inputting grades using online software and 
overseeing two tutorial groups. 
 
Teaching Assistant and Tutorial Leader for History 1401E – Modern Europe, 1715 to the 
Present: Conflict and Transformation, September 2014 – April 2015. Responsibilities 
included: attending lectures, holding office hours, grading exams, assignments and 
papers, hosting exam review sessions, inputting grades using online software and 
overseeing two tutorial groups.  
 
Teaching Assistant and Tutorial Leader for History 1401E – Modern Europe: 1715 to the 
Present: Conflict and Transformation, September 2013 – April 2014. Responsibilities 
included: attending lectures, holding office hours, grading exams and papers, inputting 
grades using online software and holding weekly tutorials.  
 
Teaching Assistant for History 209 – The History of China, January – April 2013, the 
University of Calgary. Responsibilities included: attending lectures, holding office hours, 
interacting with students, grading exams and term papers, delivering lectures and review 
sessions. 
 
Member of the Organising Committee for the Directions West History Conference, hosted 
by the University of Calgary, May - June 2012. 
 
Teaching Assistant for History 307 – The Contemporary World, September - December 
2011, the University of Calgary. Responsibilities included: attending lectures, holding 
office hours, interacting with students, grading exams and term papers, delivering 
lectures. 
 
Member of Editorial Staff for Dalhousie University Undergraduate History Journal, 
Pangaea. Dalhousie University, 2011.  
 
 
Non-Academic Work: 
 
Historical Consultant for play Dancing in Poppies by Gail Bowen and Ron Marken, 
Playwrights Guild of Canada, in association with the London Theatre Company, October-
November 2017.  
 
 
Awards and Scholarships: 
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Awarded the Kenneth Hilborn Doctoral Completion Award, January 2018. 
 
Nominated for Society of Graduate Studies (SOGS) Graduate Student Teaching Award, 
May 2017. 
 
Awarded the Western Graduate Research Scholarship (WGRS) for the 2016-2017 
academic year. 
 
Nominated for Society of Graduate Studies (SOGS) Graduate Student Teaching Award, 
May 2016. 
 
Awarded the Ley and Lois Smiths Military History Fund, April 2016. 
 
Awarded the Western Graduate Research Scholarship (WGRS) for the 2015-2016 
academic year. 
 
Awarded the Ivie Cornish Memorial Fellowship in History, March 2015. 
 
Awarded the Ley and Lois Smith Military History Fund, March 2015. 
 
Awarded the Western Graduate Research Scholarship (WGRS) for the 2014-2015 
academic year. 
 
Awarded the Western Graduate Research Scholarship (WGRS) for the 2013-2014 
academic year. 
 
Awarded the Alberta Heritage Scholarship Fund for 2013.  
 
Awarded the Queen Elizabeth II Graduate Scholarship for 2012-2013 academic year. 
 
Awarded the University of Calgary’s Faculty of Graduate Studies Scholarship for the 
2011-2012 academic year. 
 
Awarded Queen Elizabeth II Graduate Scholarship for the 2011-2012 academic year. 
 
Awarded the Dalhousie University Undergraduate Scholarship for 2010-2011 academic 
year. 
 
Awarded the Dalhousie University Entrance Scholarship for the 2006-2007 academic 
year.  
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Professional Affiliations: 
 
Email Reading List for Journal of Canadian Military History (CMH), the journal of the 
LCMSDS. 
 
Subscription to the journal of the Canadian Historical Review (CHR). 
 
Member of the Canadian Historical Society (CHS).  
 
  
 
Languages:  
 
Ability to read, write, speak and aurally comprehend English. 
 
Ability to read, comprehend, and translate French and also completed the required 
second-language exam at the University of Calgary, summer 2013. 
 
Currently seeking to improve my reading abilities in German. 
 
 
 
 
